AI Trajectory


Trajectory: (Expand/Collapse All)
Seq Timestamp Type Name Duration
0/0 2026/10/02 17:53 flow patch-triage
2m Args:
null

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "TLS",
    "INET"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "tls_sw_recvmsg",
    "tls_sw_splice_read",
    "tls_sw_read_sock"
  ],
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch addresses the handling of zero-length (empty) TLS records across net/tls (tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, and tls_sw_read_sock). Specifically, it prevents stalls/unbounded loops on consecutive empty records, avoids premature EOF reports on splice reads, ensures signals are checked, prevents queuing empty records on rx_list, and disables async decryption for empty records so the skb is not freed while an async operation is underway.\n\nAll new local variables (nodata, nonblock, released) are primitive scalar types explicitly initialized at declaration. No uninitialized memory is read or used in branching. Furthermore, empty records have their skbs freed via consume_skb() without copying data to user space or pipes; existing copy paths remain guarded by positive length checks (chunk \u003e 0, rxm-\u003efull_len \u003e 0), so no uninitialized buffers are exposed or leaked.\n\nThe potential failure modes introduced by this patch involve skb lifecycle management (risk of use-after-free or double-free), socket locking semantics (release state in tls_rx_rec_wait), and control flow/hangs. These risks are covered by KASAN, LOCKDEP, and standard kernel debugging facilities, not KMSAN. Therefore, a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not warranted.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false,
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies kernel TLS (kTLS) receive handling for empty/zero-length records across tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, and tls_sw_read_sock in net/tls/tls_sw.c. It changes skb lifetime/consumption, async crypto evaluation, non-blocking flag interpretation, retry loops, and socket lock handling. This code is reachable from userspace via TCP sockets with the TLS ULP enabled, making it a critical target for fuzzing.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

1/1 2026/10/02 17:53 action read-patch-diff
0m Args:
null

Results:
{
  "PatchDiff": "commit 2b2b72470d78ca950945c06549f50b4699f1d6f6\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate:   Fri Oct 2 17:53:52 2026 +0000\n\n    syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c\nindex d1ad31986cf2c..4fecac8a0b0da 100644\n--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c\n+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c\n@@ -1824,6 +1824,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,\n \tbool is_peek = flags \u0026 MSG_PEEK;\n \tbool rx_more = false;\n \tbool released = true;\n+\tbool nodata = false;\n \tbool zc_capable;\n \n \tif (unlikely(flags \u0026 MSG_ERRQUEUE))\n@@ -1858,6 +1859,16 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,\n \t\tstruct tls_decrypt_arg darg;\n \t\tint to_decrypt, chunk;\n \n+\t\t/* A run of empty records advances neither loop bound, and\n+\t\t * tls_rx_rec_wait() tests for a signal only after it sleeps.\n+\t\t */\n+\t\tif (nodata \u0026\u0026 signal_pending(current)) {\n+\t\t\tlong timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags \u0026 MSG_DONTWAIT);\n+\n+\t\t\terr = sock_intr_errno(timeo);\n+\t\t\tgoto recv_end;\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags \u0026 MSG_DONTWAIT,\n \t\t\t\t      released, !!(decrypted + copied));\n \t\tif (err \u003c= 0)\n@@ -1874,9 +1885,12 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,\n \t\t    tlm-\u003econtrol == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)\n \t\t\tdarg.zc = true;\n \n-\t\t/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */\n+\t\t/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data, or if it\n+\t\t * is empty: the receive loop frees an empty record's skb,\n+\t\t * so its decryption must have completed.\n+\t\t */\n \t\tif (tlm-\u003econtrol == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)\n-\t\t\tdarg.async = ctx-\u003easync_capable;\n+\t\t\tdarg.async = ctx-\u003easync_capable \u0026\u0026 to_decrypt;\n \t\telse\n \t\t\tdarg.async = false;\n \n@@ -1910,8 +1924,22 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,\n \t\t/* TLS 1.3 may have updated the length by more than overhead */\n \t\trxm = strp_msg(darg.skb);\n \t\tchunk = rxm-\u003efull_len;\n+\t\tnodata = !chunk;\n \t\ttls_rx_rec_done(ctx);\n \n+\t\t/* Keep an empty record off rx_list. On the zero-copy path\n+\t\t * the strparser owns darg.skb, and tls_rx_rec_done() has\n+\t\t * released it.\n+\t\t */\n+\t\tif (!chunk \u0026\u0026 control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {\n+\t\t\tif (!darg.zc)\n+\t\t\t\tconsume_skb(darg.skb);\n+\n+\t\t\t/* An empty record still marks a boundary. */\n+\t\t\tmsg-\u003emsg_flags |= MSG_EOR;\n+\t\t\tcontinue;\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\tif (!darg.zc) {\n \t\t\tbool partially_consumed = chunk \u003e len;\n \t\t\tstruct sk_buff *skb = darg.skb;\n@@ -2006,11 +2034,16 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,\n \tstruct sock *sk = sock-\u003esk;\n \tstruct tls_msg *tlm;\n \tstruct sk_buff *skb;\n+\tbool released = true;\n \tssize_t copied = 0;\n+\tbool nonblock;\n \tint chunk;\n \tint err;\n \n-\terr = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags \u0026 SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);\n+\tnonblock = (flags \u0026 SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK) ||\n+\t\t   (sock-\u003efile-\u003ef_flags \u0026 O_NONBLOCK);\n+\n+\terr = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, nonblock);\n \tif (err \u003c 0)\n \t\treturn err;\n \n@@ -2019,13 +2052,13 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,\n \tif (err)\n \t\tgoto splice_read_end;\n \n+retry:\n \tif (!skb_queue_empty(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list)) {\n \t\tskb = __skb_dequeue(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list);\n \t} else {\n \t\tstruct tls_decrypt_arg darg;\n \n-\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags \u0026 SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,\n-\t\t\t\t      true, false);\n+\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, released, false);\n \t\tif (err \u003c= 0)\n \t\t\tgoto splice_read_end;\n \n@@ -2037,6 +2070,9 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,\n \n \t\ttls_rx_rec_done(ctx);\n \t\tskb = darg.skb;\n+\n+\t\t/* The retry's wait runs with the socket lock still held. */\n+\t\treleased = false;\n \t}\n \n \trxm = strp_msg(skb);\n@@ -2048,6 +2084,16 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,\n \t\tgoto splice_requeue;\n \t}\n \n+\t/* Splicing zero bytes reads as EOF to the caller. */\n+\tif (rxm-\u003efull_len == 0) {\n+\t\tconsume_skb(skb);\n+\t\tif (signal_pending(current)) {\n+\t\t\terr = sock_intr_errno(sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock));\n+\t\t\tgoto splice_read_end;\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tgoto retry;\n+\t}\n+\n \tchunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm-\u003efull_len, len);\n \tcopied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm-\u003eoffset, pipe, chunk, flags);\n \tif (copied \u003c 0)\n@@ -2070,6 +2116,8 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,\n \tgoto splice_read_end;\n }\n \n+#define TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT\t16\n+\n int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\n \t\t     sk_read_actor_t read_actor)\n {\n@@ -2078,6 +2126,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\n \tstruct tls_prot_info *prot = \u0026tls_ctx-\u003eprot_info;\n \tstruct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;\n \tstruct sk_buff *skb = NULL;\n+\tunsigned int nodata = 0;\n \tstruct sk_psock *psock;\n \tsize_t flushed_at = 0;\n \tbool released = true;\n@@ -2136,14 +2185,22 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\n \t\t\tgoto read_sock_requeue;\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\t/* An empty data record (legal in TLS 1.3) gives a zero\n-\t\t * read_actor return, indistinguishable from the consumer\n-\t\t * stalling; the used \u003c= 0 path would requeue it at the\n-\t\t * head of rx_list and block all later records. Consume it\n-\t\t * here instead.\n+\t\t/* An empty data record gives a zero read_actor return,\n+\t\t * indistinguishable from the consumer stalling; the\n+\t\t * used \u003c= 0 path would requeue it at the head of rx_list\n+\t\t * and block all later records. Consume it here instead.\n \t\t */\n \t\tif (rxm-\u003efull_len == 0) {\n+\t\t\terr = 0;\n \t\t\tconsume_skb(skb);\n+\t\t\tif (++nodata \u003e= TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT) {\n+\t\t\t\t/* tls_rx_reader_release() calls\n+\t\t\t\t * saved_data_ready(), not the callback a\n+\t\t\t\t * consumer installs after the handshake.\n+\t\t\t\t */\n+\t\t\t\tsk-\u003esk_data_ready(sk);\n+\t\t\t\tbreak;\n+\t\t\t}\n \t\t\tcontinue;\n \t\t}\n \n@@ -2154,6 +2211,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\n \t\t\tgoto read_sock_requeue;\n \t\t}\n \t\tcopied += used;\n+\t\tnodata = 0;\n \t\tif (used \u003c rxm-\u003efull_len) {\n \t\t\trxm-\u003eoffset += used;\n \t\t\trxm-\u003efull_len -= used;\ndiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c\nindex 9d3cd4fff062b..6207a90c5f077 100644\n--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c\n+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c\n@@ -2549,6 +2549,42 @@ static const struct raw_rec id2_data_l0 = {\n \t},\n };\n \n+static void zero_len_sock_pair(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,\n+\t\t\t       int *fd, int *cfd, bool *notls)\n+{\n+\tstruct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;\n+\tint ret;\n+\n+\ttls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128,\n+\t\t\t     \u0026tls12, 0);\n+\n+\tulp_sock_pair(_metadata, fd, cfd, notls);\n+\tif (*notls)\n+\t\treturn;\n+\n+\t/* fd stays keyless; these fixtures send raw records over it */\n+\tret = setsockopt(*cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, \u0026tls12, tls12.len);\n+\tASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);\n+}\n+\n+/* Send a variant's records; return the last one carrying payload */\n+static const struct raw_rec *\n+zero_len_send_recs(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd,\n+\t\t   const struct raw_rec *const *recs)\n+{\n+\tconst struct raw_rec *payload = NULL;\n+\tint i;\n+\n+\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c 4 \u0026\u0026 recs[i]; i++) {\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(send(fd, recs[i]-\u003ecipher_data, recs[i]-\u003ecipher_len, 0),\n+\t\t\t  recs[i]-\u003ecipher_len);\n+\t\tif (recs[i]-\u003eplain_len)\n+\t\t\tpayload = recs[i];\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn payload;\n+}\n+\n FIXTURE(zero_len)\n {\n \tint fd, cfd;\n@@ -2611,19 +2647,7 @@ FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len, data_0data_0data)\n \n FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len)\n {\n-\tstruct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;\n-\tint ret;\n-\n-\ttls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128,\n-\t\t\t     \u0026tls12, 0);\n-\n-\tulp_sock_pair(_metadata, \u0026self-\u003efd, \u0026self-\u003ecfd, \u0026self-\u003enotls);\n-\tif (self-\u003enotls)\n-\t\treturn;\n-\n-\t/* Don't install keys on fd, we'll send raw records */\n-\tret = setsockopt(self-\u003ecfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, \u0026tls12, tls12.len);\n-\tASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);\n+\tzero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, \u0026self-\u003efd, \u0026self-\u003ecfd, \u0026self-\u003enotls);\n }\n \n FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len)\n@@ -2639,10 +2663,10 @@ TEST_F(zero_len, test)\n \tint rec_off;\n \tint i;\n \n-\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c 4 \u0026\u0026 variant-\u003erecs[i]; i++)\n-\t\tEXPECT_EQ(send(self-\u003efd, variant-\u003erecs[i]-\u003ecipher_data,\n-\t\t\t       variant-\u003erecs[i]-\u003ecipher_len, 0),\n-\t\t\t  variant-\u003erecs[i]-\u003ecipher_len);\n+\tif (self-\u003enotls)\n+\t\tSKIP(return, \"no TLS support\");\n+\n+\tzero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self-\u003efd, variant-\u003erecs);\n \n \trec = \u0026variant-\u003erecs[0];\n \trec_off = 0;\n@@ -2668,6 +2692,203 @@ TEST_F(zero_len, test)\n \t}\n };\n \n+FIXTURE(zero_len_peek)\n+{\n+\tint fd, cfd;\n+\tbool notls;\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_peek)\n+{\n+\tconst struct raw_rec *recs[4];\n+\tssize_t peek_ret;\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_peek, 0data_0data_data)\n+{\n+\t.recs = { \u0026id0_data_l0, \u0026id1_data_l0, \u0026id2_data_l11, },\n+\t.peek_ret = 11,\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_peek, 0data_0data_0data)\n+{\n+\t.recs = { \u0026id0_data_l0, \u0026id1_data_l0, \u0026id2_data_l0, },\n+\t.peek_ret = -EAGAIN,\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len_peek)\n+{\n+\tzero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, \u0026self-\u003efd, \u0026self-\u003ecfd, \u0026self-\u003enotls);\n+}\n+\n+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len_peek)\n+{\n+\tclose(self-\u003efd);\n+\tclose(self-\u003ecfd);\n+}\n+\n+/* Peeking past a run of empty data records must reach the payload\n+ * behind them, and a run with no payload behind it must report EAGAIN\n+ * rather than the zero return that means EOF.\n+ */\n+TEST_F(zero_len_peek, test)\n+{\n+\tconst struct raw_rec *payload;\n+\tunsigned char buf[128];\n+\tssize_t ret;\n+\n+\tif (self-\u003enotls)\n+\t\tSKIP(return, \"no TLS support\");\n+\n+\tpayload = zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self-\u003efd, variant-\u003erecs);\n+\n+\tif (variant-\u003epeek_ret \u003c 0) {\n+\t\tret = recv(self-\u003ecfd, buf, sizeof(buf),\n+\t\t\t   MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK);\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(errno, -variant-\u003epeek_ret);\n+\t\treturn;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tret = recv(self-\u003ecfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK);\n+\tEXPECT_EQ(ret, variant-\u003epeek_ret);\n+\tif (ret == variant-\u003epeek_ret)\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload-\u003eplain_data,\n+\t\t\t\t variant-\u003epeek_ret), 0);\n+\n+\tret = recv(self-\u003ecfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);\n+\tEXPECT_EQ(ret, variant-\u003epeek_ret);\n+\tif (ret == variant-\u003epeek_ret)\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload-\u003eplain_data,\n+\t\t\t\t variant-\u003epeek_ret), 0);\n+\n+\tret = recv(self-\u003ecfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);\n+\tEXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);\n+\tEXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);\n+}\n+\n+FIXTURE(zero_len_splice)\n+{\n+\tint fd, cfd;\n+\tbool notls;\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_splice)\n+{\n+\tconst struct raw_rec *recs[4];\n+\tssize_t splice_ret;\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_data)\n+{\n+\t.recs = { \u0026id0_data_l0, \u0026id1_data_l11, },\n+\t.splice_ret = 11,\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0data_data)\n+{\n+\t.recs = { \u0026id0_data_l0, \u0026id1_data_l0, \u0026id2_data_l11, },\n+\t.splice_ret = 11,\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0data_0data)\n+{\n+\t.recs = { \u0026id0_data_l0, \u0026id1_data_l0, \u0026id2_data_l0, },\n+\t.splice_ret = -EAGAIN,\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0ctrl)\n+{\n+\t.recs = { \u0026id0_data_l0, \u0026id1_ctrl_l0, },\n+\t.splice_ret = -EINVAL,\n+};\n+\n+FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len_splice)\n+{\n+\tzero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, \u0026self-\u003efd, \u0026self-\u003ecfd, \u0026self-\u003enotls);\n+}\n+\n+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len_splice)\n+{\n+\tclose(self-\u003efd);\n+\tclose(self-\u003ecfd);\n+}\n+\n+/* An empty data record splices zero bytes, which a splice caller reads\n+ * as EOF. Splicing must skip past such a record to the payload behind\n+ * it, and report EAGAIN when a run of them has no payload behind it.\n+ * A control record behind the run reports EINVAL, the error splice\n+ * already reports for a control record it meets first.\n+ */\n+static void\n+zero_len_do_splice(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,\n+\t\t   FIXTURE_DATA(zero_len_splice) *self,\n+\t\t   const FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_splice) *variant,\n+\t\t   unsigned int splice_flags)\n+{\n+\tconst struct raw_rec *payload;\n+\tunsigned char buf[128];\n+\tssize_t ret;\n+\tint p[2];\n+\n+\tASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0);\n+\n+\tpayload = zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self-\u003efd, variant-\u003erecs);\n+\n+\tif (variant-\u003esplice_ret \u003c 0) {\n+\t\tret = splice(self-\u003ecfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf),\n+\t\t\t     splice_flags);\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(errno, -variant-\u003esplice_ret);\n+\t} else {\n+\t\t/* ASSERT so a zero return stops the test here; the read\n+\t\t * below would block until the harness timeout.\n+\t\t */\n+\t\tASSERT_EQ(splice(self-\u003ecfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf),\n+\t\t\t\t splice_flags), variant-\u003esplice_ret);\n+\t\tret = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf));\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(ret, variant-\u003esplice_ret);\n+\t\tif (ret == variant-\u003esplice_ret)\n+\t\t\tEXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload-\u003eplain_data,\n+\t\t\t\t\t variant-\u003esplice_ret), 0);\n+\n+\t\t/* The empty records were consumed, not left queued */\n+\t\tret = recv(self-\u003ecfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);\n+\t\tEXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);\n+\t}\n+\n+\tclose(p[0]);\n+\tclose(p[1]);\n+}\n+\n+TEST_F(zero_len_splice, test)\n+{\n+\tif (self-\u003enotls)\n+\t\tSKIP(return, \"no TLS support\");\n+\n+\tzero_len_do_splice(_metadata, self, variant, SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);\n+}\n+\n+/* The socket's O_NONBLOCK governs the record wait, as on a plain TCP\n+ * socket, so a splice without SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK behaves like one that\n+ * sets it. Deriving the wait from SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK alone sleeps here\n+ * until the harness timeout.\n+ */\n+TEST_F(zero_len_splice, nonblock_socket)\n+{\n+\tint sflags;\n+\n+\tif (self-\u003enotls)\n+\t\tSKIP(return, \"no TLS support\");\n+\n+\tsflags = fcntl(self-\u003ecfd, F_GETFL, 0);\n+\tASSERT_GE(sflags, 0);\n+\tASSERT_EQ(fcntl(self-\u003ecfd, F_SETFL, sflags | O_NONBLOCK), 0);\n+\n+\tzero_len_do_splice(_metadata, self, variant, 0);\n+}\n+\n FIXTURE(tls_err)\n {\n \tint fd, cfd;\n"
}

2/1 2026/10/02 17:53 agent patch-evaluator
1m Model:
core

Args:
null

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "TLS",
    "INET"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "tls_sw_recvmsg",
    "tls_sw_splice_read",
    "tls_sw_read_sock"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies kernel TLS (kTLS) receive handling for empty/zero-length records across tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, and tls_sw_read_sock in net/tls/tls_sw.c. It changes skb lifetime/consumption, async crypto evaluation, non-blocking flag interpretation, retry loops, and socket lock handling. This code is reachable from userspace via TCP sockets with the TLS ULP enabled, making it a critical target for fuzzing.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

Instruction:
You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and evaluate whether it warrants fuzzing with syzkaller.

IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on internal assumptions. You must actively use your code access
tools to inspect the actual source code, callers, and surrounding context.

================================================================================
1. CORE TRIAGE PHILOSOPHY
================================================================================
The goal of patch fuzzing is to discover crashes, regressions, exposed latent bugs,
and newly triggered assertions introduced by the patch series.

- REACHABILITY IS THE PRIMARY GATE:
  Fuzzing can only discover bugs in code that can actually execute in standard virtualized
  environments (GCE or QEMU, utilizing software-emulated devices like USB gadgets, netdev, tun/tap).
  If the modified code is structurally unreachable (see Section 2), it MUST NOT be fuzzed,
  regardless of whether it adds assertions or complex logic.

- DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST "NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGE" (NFCI) OR "REFACTORING" CLAIMS:
  Patch authors routinely label changes as "cleanups", "refactorings", or state
  "No functional change intended". Do NOT take these claims at face value.
  Code refactorings that rearrange logic, introduce helper functions, or alter state management
  in core subsystems frequently introduce subtle semantic shifts or uncover latent kernel bugs.
  If reachable executable code is modified or refactored, it MUST be fuzzed.

- NEW OR MODIFIED ASSERTIONS IN REACHABLE CODE MUST BE FUZZED:
  When a patch introduces or modifies runtime checks or assertions (e.g., WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*,
  BUG_ON*, lockdep_assert*) in reachable code paths, it enforces new or stricter invariants.
  Even if the author believes the invariant always holds, fuzzing is essential to verify whether
  an unusual sequence of operations can violate it.

================================================================================
2. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=false (NEGATIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=false ONLY IF all modified code falls strictly into one or more of these categories:

- Non-kernel and non-executable changes:
  * Modifications to Documentation/, comments, or spelling fixes.
  * User-space directories, self-tests, samples, or scripts (e.g., tools/, samples/, scripts/, usr/)
    that do not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.
  * Purely decorative logging (e.g., message strings in pr_err, printk, dev_info) or tracepoints
    that do not alter control flow or data structures.
  * Build system or Kconfig changes that do not alter compiled C logic.
- Structurally unreachable hardware:
  * Vendor-specific PCIe switches, SmartNICs, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed,
    ionic, amdgpu) requiring physical ASIC/PCIe cards not emulated in standard QEMU.
- Unreachable execution paths:
  * Driver teardown callbacks (.remove, .shutdown, pci_unregister_driver) executed only during
    physical PCI hot-unplug or manual sysfs driver unbinding.
  * Code paths exclusive to architectures other than the target architecture.

================================================================================
3. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=true (POSITIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=true whenever the patch touches reachable executable code, including:
- Core Subsystems:
  * Any logic modifications in memory management (mm/), synchronization/locking (kernel/locking/),
    BPF, scheduler, core networking, VFS, or syscall handling.
- Refactorings and Code Cleanups:
  * Any restructuring of reachable data structures, helper abstractions, or algorithm flows.
- Runtime Assertions and Defensive Checks:
  * Any introduction or alteration of assertions (WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*, BUG_ON*, etc.) in reachable paths.
- Reachable Drivers and Protocols:
  * Drivers accessible via virtual buses (virtio, USB gadget, loopback, netlink, binder, sockets, etc.).

================================================================================
4. EXTRACTING FocusSymbols (PREVENTING DILUTION)
================================================================================
When WorthFuzzing=true, you must extract specific kernel functions into FocusSymbols to guide the fuzzer:

- AVOID UBIQUITOUS LIFECYCLE HOT-PATHS:
  Do NOT list generic, ubiquitous functions called by almost every program in the corpus
  (including, but not limited to: general memory allocators and deallocators, page fault
  and trap handlers, or core synchronization primitives; this is not an exhaustive list).
  Listing ubiquitous functions causes the fuzzer to classify thousands of unrelated tests as "focused",
  which severely dilutes fuzzing effort away from the actual changes.

- TARGET SPECIFIC FEATURE LOGIC AND ENTRYPOINTS:
  List functions that specifically implement the logic being added or altered, or direct API entrypoints
  for the subsystem feature under review.

- HANDLING STATIC INLINE FUNCTIONS IN HEADERS (.h):
  Compiler-inlined static functions (such as static inlines in mm/*.h or include/linux/*.h) lack
  distinct symbol addresses in vmlinux and cannot be targeted directly by symbol coverage filters.
  If the changes are primarily in static inline helpers, identify non-static, feature-specific caller
  functions in .c files that exercise them (avoiding ubiquitous lifecycle wrappers).

================================================================================
5. IDENTIFYING EnableConfigs
================================================================================
Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly compile and reach the modified code:
- Inspect Kconfig files and #ifdef guards; do not make assumptions.
- Check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs needed.
- Strip any 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

Prompt:
Target architecture: amd64

For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit 2b2b72470d78ca950945c06549f50b4699f1d6f6
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Fri Oct 2 17:53:52 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index d1ad31986cf2c..4fecac8a0b0da 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1824,6 +1824,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 	bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
 	bool rx_more = false;
 	bool released = true;
+	bool nodata = false;
 	bool zc_capable;
 
 	if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
@@ -1858,6 +1859,16 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 		int to_decrypt, chunk;
 
+		/* A run of empty records advances neither loop bound, and
+		 * tls_rx_rec_wait() tests for a signal only after it sleeps.
+		 */
+		if (nodata && signal_pending(current)) {
+			long timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+
+			err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+			goto recv_end;
+		}
+
 		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
 				      released, !!(decrypted + copied));
 		if (err <= 0)
@@ -1874,9 +1885,12 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		    tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
 			darg.zc = true;
 
-		/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
+		/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data, or if it
+		 * is empty: the receive loop frees an empty record's skb,
+		 * so its decryption must have completed.
+		 */
 		if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
-			darg.async = ctx->async_capable;
+			darg.async = ctx->async_capable && to_decrypt;
 		else
 			darg.async = false;
 
@@ -1910,8 +1924,22 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		/* TLS 1.3 may have updated the length by more than overhead */
 		rxm = strp_msg(darg.skb);
 		chunk = rxm->full_len;
+		nodata = !chunk;
 		tls_rx_rec_done(ctx);
 
+		/* Keep an empty record off rx_list. On the zero-copy path
+		 * the strparser owns darg.skb, and tls_rx_rec_done() has
+		 * released it.
+		 */
+		if (!chunk && control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
+			if (!darg.zc)
+				consume_skb(darg.skb);
+
+			/* An empty record still marks a boundary. */
+			msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		if (!darg.zc) {
 			bool partially_consumed = chunk > len;
 			struct sk_buff *skb = darg.skb;
@@ -2006,11 +2034,16 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct tls_msg *tlm;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	bool released = true;
 	ssize_t copied = 0;
+	bool nonblock;
 	int chunk;
 	int err;
 
-	err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
+	nonblock = (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK) ||
+		   (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+
+	err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, nonblock);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
@@ -2019,13 +2052,13 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	if (err)
 		goto splice_read_end;
 
+retry:
 	if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) {
 		skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list);
 	} else {
 		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 
-		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
-				      true, false);
+		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, released, false);
 		if (err <= 0)
 			goto splice_read_end;
 
@@ -2037,6 +2070,9 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 
 		tls_rx_rec_done(ctx);
 		skb = darg.skb;
+
+		/* The retry's wait runs with the socket lock still held. */
+		released = false;
 	}
 
 	rxm = strp_msg(skb);
@@ -2048,6 +2084,16 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 		goto splice_requeue;
 	}
 
+	/* Splicing zero bytes reads as EOF to the caller. */
+	if (rxm->full_len == 0) {
+		consume_skb(skb);
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			err = sock_intr_errno(sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock));
+			goto splice_read_end;
+		}
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
 	chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
 	copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
 	if (copied < 0)
@@ -2070,6 +2116,8 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	goto splice_read_end;
 }
 
+#define TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT	16
+
 int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 		     sk_read_actor_t read_actor)
 {
@@ -2078,6 +2126,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 	struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
 	struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
+	unsigned int nodata = 0;
 	struct sk_psock *psock;
 	size_t flushed_at = 0;
 	bool released = true;
@@ -2136,14 +2185,22 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 			goto read_sock_requeue;
 		}
 
-		/* An empty data record (legal in TLS 1.3) gives a zero
-		 * read_actor return, indistinguishable from the consumer
-		 * stalling; the used <= 0 path would requeue it at the
-		 * head of rx_list and block all later records. Consume it
-		 * here instead.
+		/* An empty data record gives a zero read_actor return,
+		 * indistinguishable from the consumer stalling; the
+		 * used <= 0 path would requeue it at the head of rx_list
+		 * and block all later records. Consume it here instead.
 		 */
 		if (rxm->full_len == 0) {
+			err = 0;
 			consume_skb(skb);
+			if (++nodata >= TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT) {
+				/* tls_rx_reader_release() calls
+				 * saved_data_ready(), not the callback a
+				 * consumer installs after the handshake.
+				 */
+				sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
+				break;
+			}
 			continue;
 		}
 
@@ -2154,6 +2211,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 			goto read_sock_requeue;
 		}
 		copied += used;
+		nodata = 0;
 		if (used < rxm->full_len) {
 			rxm->offset += used;
 			rxm->full_len -= used;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
index 9d3cd4fff062b..6207a90c5f077 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
@@ -2549,6 +2549,42 @@ static const struct raw_rec id2_data_l0 = {
 	},
 };
 
+static void zero_len_sock_pair(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+			       int *fd, int *cfd, bool *notls)
+{
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+	int ret;
+
+	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128,
+			     &tls12, 0);
+
+	ulp_sock_pair(_metadata, fd, cfd, notls);
+	if (*notls)
+		return;
+
+	/* fd stays keyless; these fixtures send raw records over it */
+	ret = setsockopt(*cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+}
+
+/* Send a variant's records; return the last one carrying payload */
+static const struct raw_rec *
+zero_len_send_recs(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd,
+		   const struct raw_rec *const *recs)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *payload = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4 && recs[i]; i++) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(send(fd, recs[i]->cipher_data, recs[i]->cipher_len, 0),
+			  recs[i]->cipher_len);
+		if (recs[i]->plain_len)
+			payload = recs[i];
+	}
+
+	return payload;
+}
+
 FIXTURE(zero_len)
 {
 	int fd, cfd;
@@ -2611,19 +2647,7 @@ FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len, data_0data_0data)
 
 FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len)
 {
-	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
-	int ret;
-
-	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128,
-			     &tls12, 0);
-
-	ulp_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls);
-	if (self->notls)
-		return;
-
-	/* Don't install keys on fd, we'll send raw records */
-	ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len);
-	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls);
 }
 
 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len)
@@ -2639,10 +2663,10 @@ TEST_F(zero_len, test)
 	int rec_off;
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < 4 && variant->recs[i]; i++)
-		EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, variant->recs[i]->cipher_data,
-			       variant->recs[i]->cipher_len, 0),
-			  variant->recs[i]->cipher_len);
+	if (self->notls)
+		SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+	zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs);
 
 	rec = &variant->recs[0];
 	rec_off = 0;
@@ -2668,6 +2692,203 @@ TEST_F(zero_len, test)
 	}
 };
 
+FIXTURE(zero_len_peek)
+{
+	int fd, cfd;
+	bool notls;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_peek)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *recs[4];
+	ssize_t peek_ret;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_peek, 0data_0data_data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l11, },
+	.peek_ret = 11,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_peek, 0data_0data_0data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l0, },
+	.peek_ret = -EAGAIN,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len_peek)
+{
+	zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len_peek)
+{
+	close(self->fd);
+	close(self->cfd);
+}
+
+/* Peeking past a run of empty data records must reach the payload
+ * behind them, and a run with no payload behind it must report EAGAIN
+ * rather than the zero return that means EOF.
+ */
+TEST_F(zero_len_peek, test)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *payload;
+	unsigned char buf[128];
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	if (self->notls)
+		SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+	payload = zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs);
+
+	if (variant->peek_ret < 0) {
+		ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf),
+			   MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK);
+		EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+		EXPECT_EQ(errno, -variant->peek_ret);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->peek_ret);
+	if (ret == variant->peek_ret)
+		EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data,
+				 variant->peek_ret), 0);
+
+	ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->peek_ret);
+	if (ret == variant->peek_ret)
+		EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data,
+				 variant->peek_ret), 0);
+
+	ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);
+}
+
+FIXTURE(zero_len_splice)
+{
+	int fd, cfd;
+	bool notls;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_splice)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *recs[4];
+	ssize_t splice_ret;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l11, },
+	.splice_ret = 11,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0data_data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l11, },
+	.splice_ret = 11,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0data_0data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l0, },
+	.splice_ret = -EAGAIN,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0ctrl)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_ctrl_l0, },
+	.splice_ret = -EINVAL,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len_splice)
+{
+	zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len_splice)
+{
+	close(self->fd);
+	close(self->cfd);
+}
+
+/* An empty data record splices zero bytes, which a splice caller reads
+ * as EOF. Splicing must skip past such a record to the payload behind
+ * it, and report EAGAIN when a run of them has no payload behind it.
+ * A control record behind the run reports EINVAL, the error splice
+ * already reports for a control record it meets first.
+ */
+static void
+zero_len_do_splice(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+		   FIXTURE_DATA(zero_len_splice) *self,
+		   const FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_splice) *variant,
+		   unsigned int splice_flags)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *payload;
+	unsigned char buf[128];
+	ssize_t ret;
+	int p[2];
+
+	ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0);
+
+	payload = zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs);
+
+	if (variant->splice_ret < 0) {
+		ret = splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf),
+			     splice_flags);
+		EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+		EXPECT_EQ(errno, -variant->splice_ret);
+	} else {
+		/* ASSERT so a zero return stops the test here; the read
+		 * below would block until the harness timeout.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf),
+				 splice_flags), variant->splice_ret);
+		ret = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+		EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->splice_ret);
+		if (ret == variant->splice_ret)
+			EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data,
+					 variant->splice_ret), 0);
+
+		/* The empty records were consumed, not left queued */
+		ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
+		EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+		EXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);
+	}
+
+	close(p[0]);
+	close(p[1]);
+}
+
+TEST_F(zero_len_splice, test)
+{
+	if (self->notls)
+		SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+	zero_len_do_splice(_metadata, self, variant, SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
+}
+
+/* The socket's O_NONBLOCK governs the record wait, as on a plain TCP
+ * socket, so a splice without SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK behaves like one that
+ * sets it. Deriving the wait from SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK alone sleeps here
+ * until the harness timeout.
+ */
+TEST_F(zero_len_splice, nonblock_socket)
+{
+	int sflags;
+
+	if (self->notls)
+		SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+	sflags = fcntl(self->cfd, F_GETFL, 0);
+	ASSERT_GE(sflags, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(fcntl(self->cfd, F_SETFL, sflags | O_NONBLOCK), 0);
+
+	zero_len_do_splice(_metadata, self, variant, 0);
+}
+
 FIXTURE(tls_err)
 {
 	int fd, cfd;

3/2 2026/10/02 17:53 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 8171
							output: 30
							thoughts: 528
						

Thoughts:
**Analyzing This Patch Series**

Okay, let's dive into this. My initial impression is that this patch series is focused on improvements and potential fixes within the kernel's TLS implementation, specifically the software-based kTLS layer. From the files modified, I see it centers around handling empty TLS records and dealing with potential blocking issues in the `net/tls/tls_sw.c` module.

Specifically, I need to understand the implications of these changes:

*   **`tls_sw_recvmsg`**: It seems we have added checks for `signal_pending(current)` within the `tls_sw_recvmsg` function. I see logic related to handling empty records. I want to check to ensure this change doesn't introduce any regressions.
*   **`tls_sw_splice_read`**: It looks like `tls_sw_splice_read` is getting some adjustments to better manage situations where zero bytes are read during splicing. The comments about treating zero-byte reads as EOF are interesting, and I'll need to scrutinize how this interacts with the `sock_intr_errno` function and non-blocking sockets.
*   **`tls_sw_read_sock`**: I'm observing a nodata count reset with `TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT` (16). This sounds like a mechanism to prevent indefinite blocking when handling empty records during reads. I'll need to assess the limit to ensure it's reasonable.

The inclusion of `tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c` is great. This suggests there's a corresponding user-space test to validate these changes, which is encouraging.

Next, I'll need to confirm that `net/tls/tls_sw.c` is actually a reachable code path. Given that kTLS is part of core networking and accessed via sockets, with `AF_INET`/`AF_INET6`, `IPPROTO_TCP`, and `TCP_ULP` -> `tls`, it should be. The fact that syzkaller specifically fuzzes kTLS via socket operations (setsockopt, splice, send, recv, read, bpf sockmap) confirms its importance and accessibility. I will double-check the Kconfig, of course, to be sure. It's important to know the CONFIG options that make this reachable to better understand the code and how to test it.



4/2 2026/10/02 17:54 tool grepper
0m Error:
no matches

Args:
{
  "Expression": "obj-\\$.*tls_sw",
  "PathPrefix": "net/tls"
}

Results:
{
  "error": "no matches"
}

5/2 2026/10/02 17:54 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 9249
							output: 31
							thoughts: 10
						

Thoughts:
Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, and delivered as a first-person summary:

**Digging into the `net/tls` Makefile**

Alright, so the initial thought is to navigate into the `net/tls` directory. The goal, clearly, is to locate and examine the `Makefile` within that specific subdirectory. This strongly suggests a need to understand the build process or perhaps modify some aspects of the build system related to TLS functionality. I'm likely looking for information on dependencies, compilation flags, linking targets, or perhaps even specific build targets relevant to the TLS implementation. I might be planning to contribute some change, diagnose a build issue, or simply understand how the system assembles its TLS components. Going directly to the `Makefile` is the most logical first step when wanting to get under the hood of a build process.



6/2 2026/10/02 17:54 tool read-file
0m Args:
{
  "File": "net/tls/Makefile",
  "FirstLine": 1,
  "LineCount": 20
}

Results:
{
  "Contents": "   1:\t# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n   2:\t#\n   3:\t# Makefile for the TLS subsystem.\n   4:\t#\n   5:\t\n   6:\tCFLAGS_trace.o := -I$(src)\n   7:\t\n   8:\tobj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o\n   9:\t\n  10:\ttls-y := tls_main.o tls_sw.o tls_proc.o trace.o tls_strp.o\n  11:\t\n  12:\ttls-$(CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE) += tls_device.o tls_device_fallback.o\n"
}

7/2 2026/10/02 17:54 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 9642
							output: 32
							thoughts: 44
						

Thoughts:
Okay, here's my interpretation of those build instructions, thinking through them as I would while working on this code:

**Analyzing the TLS Build Configuration**

Right, so I see these two lines: `obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o` and `tls-y := tls_main.o tls_sw.o ...`. The first line tells me that if the `CONFIG_TLS` option is enabled in the kernel configuration, then the object file `tls.o` needs to be included in the build. This likely acts as a top-level module file. It's a conditional include, pretty standard stuff.

The second line, `tls-y := tls_main.o tls_sw.o ...`, is interesting. The `tls-y` variable is being defined here. The use of `-y` typically indicates that these object files will *always* be included in the build of the target. So, `tls_main.o`, `tls_sw.o`, and whatever other object files follow in the ellipses will *always* be linked into the `tls.o` module. This strongly suggests those are the core implementation files of the TLS functionality.

To fully understand this, I need to check the Kconfig file for this section: `net/tls/Kconfig`. This is where the `CONFIG_TLS` option will be defined and its dependencies described. I'll need to know the possible values and default states of the configuration option, any dependencies it might have on other options, and maybe a brief description of what the TLS implementation does. I'm guessing it will be dependent on cryptography or security modules, maybe even the network stack itself. That will clarify under what circumstances the entire TLS implementation is compiled. I'll also be able to check for any commentary about the impact of the different configuration options. So, Kconfig will have the information I need to understand the larger context of this build process.



8/2 2026/10/02 17:54 tool read-file
0m Args:
{
  "File": "net/tls/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 1,
  "LineCount": 40
}

Results:
{
  "Contents": "   1:\t# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n   2:\t#\n   3:\t# TLS configuration\n   4:\t#\n   5:\tconfig TLS\n   6:\t\ttristate \"Transport Layer Security support\"\n   7:\t\tdepends on INET\n   8:\t\tselect CRYPTO\n   9:\t\tselect CRYPTO_AES\n  10:\t\tselect CRYPTO_GCM\n  11:\t\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n  12:\t\tdefault n\n  13:\t\thelp\n  14:\t\tEnable kernel support for TLS protocol. This allows symmetric\n  15:\t\tencryption handling of the TLS protocol to be done in-kernel.\n  16:\t\n  17:\t\tIf unsure, say N.\n  18:\t\n  19:\tconfig TLS_DEVICE\n  20:\t\tbool \"Transport Layer Security HW offload\"\n  21:\t\tdepends on TLS\n  22:\t\tselect SKB_DECRYPTED\n  23:\t\tselect SOCK_VALIDATE_XMIT\n  24:\t\tselect SOCK_RX_QUEUE_MAPPING\n  25:\t\tdefault n\n  26:\t\thelp\n  27:\t\tEnable kernel support for HW offload of the TLS protocol.\n  28:\t\n  29:\t\tIf unsure, say N.\n"
}

9/2 2026/10/02 17:54 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 10449
							output: 47
							thoughts: 327
						

Thoughts:
**My Analysis of the TLS Configuration Dependency**

Okay, so `CONFIG_TLS` clearly hinges on `INET`. That's the baseline. Now, I need to dig deeper. Are there any other configuration dependencies lurking, specifically related to the cryptographic ciphers or other supporting features? I should examine `tls_sw.c` and `tls_main.c` to look for anything that stands out.

Right, let's focus on `tls_sw.c` and how it is activated. I see that kTLS uses `setsockopt` with `TCP_ULP = "tls"`, then more `setsockopt` calls with `SOL_TLS` options `TLS_TX` and `TLS_RX`. These options are configured by `tls_crypto_info`. This is where the specific ciphers come into play, things like `TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_128`, `TLS_CIPHER_AES_GCM_256`, `TLS_CIPHER_CHACHA20_POLY1305`, etc. This is important as I need to understand all the cipher options.

Ah, `CONFIG_TLS` itself selects `CRYPTO`, `CRYPTO_AES`, `CRYPTO_GCM`, and `NET_SOCK_MSG`. That makes sense. These are the core cryptographic building blocks and the network socket message support. And, as expected, `CONFIG_INET` is required, and, of course, TCP relies on `INET`.

Now, looking at the diff, I need to analyze the functions that were touched. I'm focusing on the following:
1. `tls_sw_recvmsg`
2. `tls_sw_splice_read`
3. `tls_sw_read_sock`

Are these functions static or exported? That will have a huge impact on their accessibility within the kernel. I'll need to go back and check their definitions in `net/tls/tls_sw.c` to confirm.



10/2 2026/10/02 17:54 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "(tls_sw_recvmsg|tls_sw_splice_read|tls_sw_read_sock)",
  "PathPrefix": "net/tls"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "net/tls/tls.h=162=void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:163:int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,\nnet/tls/tls.h-164-\t\t   int flags);\nnet/tls/tls.h=165=bool tls_sw_sock_is_readable(struct sock *sk);\nnet/tls/tls.h:166:ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,\nnet/tls/tls.h-167-\t\t\t   struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,\nnet/tls/tls.h-168-\t\t\t   size_t len, unsigned int flags);\nnet/tls/tls.h:169:int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\nnet/tls/tls.h-170-\t\t     sk_read_actor_t read_actor);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=934=static void build_proto_ops(struct proto_ops ops[TLS_NUM_CONFIG][TLS_NUM_CONFIG],\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-942-\tops[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW  ] = ops[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:943:\tops[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW  ].splice_read\t= tls_sw_splice_read;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-944-\tops[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW  ].poll\t\t= tls_sk_poll;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:945:\tops[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW  ].read_sock\t= tls_sw_read_sock;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-946-\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-947-\tops[TLS_SW  ][TLS_SW  ] = ops[TLS_SW  ][TLS_BASE];\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:948:\tops[TLS_SW  ][TLS_SW  ].splice_read\t= tls_sw_splice_read;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-949-\tops[TLS_SW  ][TLS_SW  ].poll\t\t= tls_sk_poll;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:950:\tops[TLS_SW  ][TLS_SW  ].read_sock\t= tls_sw_read_sock;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-951-\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=996=static void build_protos(struct proto prot[TLS_NUM_CONFIG][TLS_NUM_CONFIG],\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1009-\tprot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW] = prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1010:\tprot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW].recvmsg\t\t  = tls_sw_recvmsg;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1011-\tprot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW].sock_is_readable   = tls_sw_sock_is_readable;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1014-\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW] = prot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE];\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1015:\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW].recvmsg\t\t= tls_sw_recvmsg;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1016-\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW].sock_is_readable   = tls_sw_sock_is_readable;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=1800=static void tls_rx_reader_unlock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1805-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1806:int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1807-\t\t   struct msghdr *msg,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2026-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:2027:ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2028-\t\t\t   struct pipe_inode_info *pipe,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2120-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:2121:int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2122-\t\t     sk_read_actor_t read_actor)\n"
}

11/2 2026/10/02 17:54 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 12488
							output: 28
							thoughts: 2857
						

Thoughts:
**kTLS Software RX: Handling of Zero-Length Records**

Okay, here's the breakdown of this patch, as I see it. It's focused on how we handle empty, or zero-length, TLS records within the kTLS software RX path – those crucial functions (`tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_sw_splice_read`, and `tls_sw_read_sock`) that directly process incoming data from syscalls, sockmaps, and BPF. My initial thought is this is a crucial area and potential sources for bugs, and it's great this is being addressed!

Essentially, we've identified that these zero-length records, which are valid in certain TLS versions (particularly TLS 1.3), were causing some gnarly problems. These "empty" records are not carrying any actual application data, but can lead to hangs, infinite loops, memory leaks (via a use-after-free situation), and other erratic behavior when the underlying assumptions about data availability are not met. The implications here are high because these problems affect the standard virtualized environments and a standard configuration. This patch aims to fix the problems.

Looking at the specific changes, it seems we're addressing these issues in several key areas. First, we're carefully managing locking and release states within the `splice` path (checking `released = false` on retry and handling socket locks correctly). Next, the patch ensures that async decryption doesn't get enabled for empty records (e.g. `darg.async = ctx->async_capable && to_decrypt;`), which would be wasted cycles. Most importantly, we're now carefully consuming the `skb` (socket buffer) associated with an empty record (using `consume_skb`) to free up the resources and prevent memory leaks. Also, in the `read_sock` path we've added a counter, `TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT`, to avoid unbounded loops, by ensuring the socket gets data after reading a certain number of empty records. This is critical for preventing starvation of consumers.

The patch seems meticulous, particularly in `tls_sw_splice_read`, where the retry logic and handling of non-blocking I/O is important. The addition of checks for signal pending (`signal_pending(current)`) in the recvmsg and splice paths indicates we're also making sure we don't block indefinitely on an empty record when a signal arrives. These functions are being updated to address the problem of empty records.

The core of the problem stems from the fact that an empty record acts as a boundary marker in the TLS stream, but the receiving side has to be able to handle it correctly. This means preventing the zero-length records from stalling the RX processing, and avoiding use-after-free and unbounded retries, which is addressed here.

It's clear from these changes that the goal is to make kTLS software RX more robust and prevent these specific failure modes related to empty TLS records. I'm glad this is being addressed.



12/2 2026/10/02 17:54 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "#if.*CONFIG_",
  "PathPrefix": "net/tls"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "net/tls/tls.h=225=static inline bool tls_strp_msg_mixed_decrypted(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h-229-\nnet/tls/tls.h:230:#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE\nnet/tls/tls.h-231-int tls_device_init(void);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=290=static void tls_write_space(struct sock *sk)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-302-\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:303:#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-304-\tif (ctx-\u003etx_conf == TLS_HW)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=934=static void build_proto_ops(struct proto_ops ops[TLS_NUM_CONFIG][TLS_NUM_CONFIG],\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-951-\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:952:#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-953-\tops[TLS_HW  ][TLS_BASE] = ops[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=996=static void build_protos(struct proto prot[TLS_NUM_CONFIG][TLS_NUM_CONFIG],\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1018-\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1019:#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1020-\tprot[TLS_HW][TLS_BASE] = prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];\n--\nnet/tls/tls_proc.c-10-\nnet/tls/tls_proc.c:11:#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS\nnet/tls/tls_proc.c-12-static const struct snmp_mib tls_mib_list[] = {\n--\nnet/tls/tls_proc.c=49=int __net_init tls_proc_init(struct net *net)\nnet/tls/tls_proc.c-50-{\nnet/tls/tls_proc.c:51:#ifdef CONFIG_PROC_FS\nnet/tls/tls_proc.c-52-\tif (!proc_create_net_single(\"tls_stat\", 0444, net-\u003eproc_net,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c=85=struct sk_buff *tls_strp_msg_detach(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-88-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:89:#ifdef CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-90-\tDEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!strp-\u003eanchor-\u003edecrypted);\n"
}

13/2 2026/10/02 17:54 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 16730
							output: 33
							thoughts: 93
						

Thoughts:
Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as an expert's internal monologue:

**Investigating TLS Configuration Dependencies**

Alright, so `net/tls/tls_sw.c` doesn't seem to be guarding any of its functionality with internal `#ifdef CONFIG_` directives. That's unusual, but it's built unconditionally *if* `CONFIG_TLS` is enabled. The build system does that by using the object assignment `obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o`. That tells me that this file is *always* built if `CONFIG_TLS` is defined.

Now, `CONFIG_TLS` itself depends on `CONFIG_INET`. Makes perfect sense; you need a network stack before you can do TLS. Standard stuff, nothing surprising there.

But I need to get the full picture. I wonder if `CONFIG_TLS_TOE` plays a role anywhere? Or any other related configuration options? I should really check `net/tls/Kconfig` in detail to see all the dependencies and any conditional compilation that *might* be going on within that TLS subsystem, as there are many different TLS implementations and related features. Let's dig in and make sure I fully understand the configuration landscape.



14/2 2026/10/02 17:55 tool read-file
0m Args:
{
  "File": "net/tls/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 25,
  "LineCount": 50
}

Results:
{
  "Contents": "  25:\t\tdefault n\n  26:\t\thelp\n  27:\t\tEnable kernel support for HW offload of the TLS protocol.\n  28:\t\n  29:\t\tIf unsure, say N.\n"
}

15/2 2026/10/02 17:55 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 17181
							output: 171
							thoughts: 231
						

Thoughts:
**Triage Complete: Patch Ready for Analysis**

Okay, so I've got the Kconfig file in front of me, all 29 lines of it.  From a quick glance, I'm seeing `CONFIG_TLS` and `CONFIG_INET` are relevant.  Time to run through my mental checklist and make sure this patch warrants a deeper dive.

First, *WorthFuzzing*.  Yep, this checks out. This patch clearly modifies networking code within `net/tls/tls_sw.c`.  I can see the changes affecting the handling of empty or zero-length TLS records, which is always a good target. It's touching `tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_sw_splice_read`, and `tls_sw_read_sock`, so it's a critical area. Specifically, it's impacting socket locking, the selection of async decryption, how buffers are managed (crucial `consume_skb`), non-blocking flags, and the loop logic. Excellent.

Now, on to *FocusSymbols*.  Easy peasy. I have a clear set of functions to zero in on: `tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_sw_splice_read`, and `tls_sw_read_sock`.

Finally, the *EnableConfigs*.  We have `TLS` and `INET`.  Perfect.

Everything seems clean, and our source code analysis validates all findings. No red flags here.  Time to call `set-results`. Let's get this patch analyzed!



16/2 2026/10/02 17:55 tool set-results
0m Args:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "TLS",
    "INET"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "tls_sw_recvmsg",
    "tls_sw_splice_read",
    "tls_sw_read_sock"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies kernel TLS (kTLS) receive handling for empty/zero-length records across tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, and tls_sw_read_sock in net/tls/tls_sw.c. It changes skb lifetime/consumption, async crypto evaluation, non-blocking flag interpretation, retry loops, and socket lock handling. This code is reachable from userspace via TCP sockets with the TLS ULP enabled, making it a critical target for fuzzing.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "TLS",
    "INET"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "tls_sw_recvmsg",
    "tls_sw_splice_read",
    "tls_sw_read_sock"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies kernel TLS (kTLS) receive handling for empty/zero-length records across tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, and tls_sw_read_sock in net/tls/tls_sw.c. It changes skb lifetime/consumption, async crypto evaluation, non-blocking flag interpretation, retry loops, and socket lock handling. This code is reachable from userspace via TCP sockets with the TLS ULP enabled, making it a critical target for fuzzing.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

17/1 2026/10/02 17:55 action If
1m Args:
{
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

Results:
null

18/2 2026/10/02 17:55 agent kmsan-evaluator
1m Model:
core

Args:
null

Results:
{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch addresses the handling of zero-length (empty) TLS records across net/tls (tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, and tls_sw_read_sock). Specifically, it prevents stalls/unbounded loops on consecutive empty records, avoids premature EOF reports on splice reads, ensures signals are checked, prevents queuing empty records on rx_list, and disables async decryption for empty records so the skb is not freed while an async operation is underway.\n\nAll new local variables (nodata, nonblock, released) are primitive scalar types explicitly initialized at declaration. No uninitialized memory is read or used in branching. Furthermore, empty records have their skbs freed via consume_skb() without copying data to user space or pipes; existing copy paths remain guarded by positive length checks (chunk \u003e 0, rxm-\u003efull_len \u003e 0), so no uninitialized buffers are exposed or leaked.\n\nThe potential failure modes introduced by this patch involve skb lifecycle management (risk of use-after-free or double-free), socket locking semantics (release state in tls_rx_rec_wait), and control flow/hangs. These risks are covered by KASAN, LOCKDEP, and standard kernel debugging facilities, not KMSAN. Therefore, a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not warranted.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

Instruction:
You are an expert Linux kernel security engineer specializing in kernel memory
error detectors (KASAN and KMSAN). Your job is to review the provided patch series and
determine if the code changes justify spawning a dedicated KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer)
fuzzing session in addition to standard KASAN fuzzing.

CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KASAN AND KMSAN:
- Standard KASAN kernel builds (upstream-apparmor-kasan.config) already enable
  a comprehensive suite of debugging tools and sanitizers, including KASAN
  (out-of-bounds accesses, use-after-free, double free, invalid free), LOCKDEP
  (locking bugs and deadlocks), UB-sanitizers, and memory corruption checks.
- KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer) detects reads of UNINITIALIZED memory (stack, heap,
  or page allocations) and kernel-to-user memory info-leaks.

Rule: THERE IS NO SENSE IN RUNNING A KMSAN SESSION IF A BUG CAN BE CAUGHT BY KASAN,
LOCKDEP, OR OTHER STANDARD BUG DETECTORS.
A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session incurs significant resource costs. You must ONLY
set NeedsKMSAN=true if the code changes introduce or expose UNINITIALIZED MEMORY risks
that are detected ONLY by KMSAN.

Look holistically at the patch series and surrounding code. Even if no direct
uninitialized field accesses or new buffer allocations are added in the diff itself,
a patch may alter control flow, bounds checking, or data length calculations in ways
that change how the rest of the code operates on existing buffers (e.g. allowing
uninitialized stack/heap memory to be read, copied to user space, or used in control
flow). Do not hesitate to use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code,
called functions, and callers.

Set NeedsKMSAN=true ONLY IF the patch introduces or modifies:
1. Kernel structures sent to user space (via copy_to_user, put_user, netlink skb
   attributes, ioctl output arguments, socket options, or BPF buffers) where fields
   or structure padding might not be fully initialized/zeroed.
2. Conditional logic or branching that depends on potentially uninitialized variables
   or struct fields.
3. Allocation or initialization of complex data structures where uninitialized fields
   could be read later in reachable code paths.
4. Bounds checks, lengths, or logic in a way that allows surrounding code to access
   uninitialized bytes of existing buffers.

Set NeedsKMSAN=false IF:
- The code changes primarily risk out-of-bounds access, array overflows, NULL pointer
  dereferences, locking deadlocks, or use-after-free bugs (these are already caught
  by KASAN, LOCKDEP, or standard bug detectors).
- All stack/heap structures touched or introduced by the patch are fully zeroed
  or initialized (e.g. using = {0}, memset, kzalloc) before being read or copied.
- The patch does not introduce any risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks.

Use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code if necessary, then provide
detailed KMSANReasoning contrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability for this patch.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

Prompt:
Target architecture: amd64

For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit 2b2b72470d78ca950945c06549f50b4699f1d6f6
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Fri Oct 2 17:53:52 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index d1ad31986cf2c..4fecac8a0b0da 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -1824,6 +1824,7 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 	bool is_peek = flags & MSG_PEEK;
 	bool rx_more = false;
 	bool released = true;
+	bool nodata = false;
 	bool zc_capable;
 
 	if (unlikely(flags & MSG_ERRQUEUE))
@@ -1858,6 +1859,16 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 		int to_decrypt, chunk;
 
+		/* A run of empty records advances neither loop bound, and
+		 * tls_rx_rec_wait() tests for a signal only after it sleeps.
+		 */
+		if (nodata && signal_pending(current)) {
+			long timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT);
+
+			err = sock_intr_errno(timeo);
+			goto recv_end;
+		}
+
 		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags & MSG_DONTWAIT,
 				      released, !!(decrypted + copied));
 		if (err <= 0)
@@ -1874,9 +1885,12 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		    tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
 			darg.zc = true;
 
-		/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data */
+		/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data, or if it
+		 * is empty: the receive loop frees an empty record's skb,
+		 * so its decryption must have completed.
+		 */
 		if (tlm->control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)
-			darg.async = ctx->async_capable;
+			darg.async = ctx->async_capable && to_decrypt;
 		else
 			darg.async = false;
 
@@ -1910,8 +1924,22 @@ int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,
 		/* TLS 1.3 may have updated the length by more than overhead */
 		rxm = strp_msg(darg.skb);
 		chunk = rxm->full_len;
+		nodata = !chunk;
 		tls_rx_rec_done(ctx);
 
+		/* Keep an empty record off rx_list. On the zero-copy path
+		 * the strparser owns darg.skb, and tls_rx_rec_done() has
+		 * released it.
+		 */
+		if (!chunk && control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {
+			if (!darg.zc)
+				consume_skb(darg.skb);
+
+			/* An empty record still marks a boundary. */
+			msg->msg_flags |= MSG_EOR;
+			continue;
+		}
+
 		if (!darg.zc) {
 			bool partially_consumed = chunk > len;
 			struct sk_buff *skb = darg.skb;
@@ -2006,11 +2034,16 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
 	struct tls_msg *tlm;
 	struct sk_buff *skb;
+	bool released = true;
 	ssize_t copied = 0;
+	bool nonblock;
 	int chunk;
 	int err;
 
-	err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
+	nonblock = (flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK) ||
+		   (sock->file->f_flags & O_NONBLOCK);
+
+	err = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, nonblock);
 	if (err < 0)
 		return err;
 
@@ -2019,13 +2052,13 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	if (err)
 		goto splice_read_end;
 
+retry:
 	if (!skb_queue_empty(&ctx->rx_list)) {
 		skb = __skb_dequeue(&ctx->rx_list);
 	} else {
 		struct tls_decrypt_arg darg;
 
-		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags & SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,
-				      true, false);
+		err = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, released, false);
 		if (err <= 0)
 			goto splice_read_end;
 
@@ -2037,6 +2070,9 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 
 		tls_rx_rec_done(ctx);
 		skb = darg.skb;
+
+		/* The retry's wait runs with the socket lock still held. */
+		released = false;
 	}
 
 	rxm = strp_msg(skb);
@@ -2048,6 +2084,16 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 		goto splice_requeue;
 	}
 
+	/* Splicing zero bytes reads as EOF to the caller. */
+	if (rxm->full_len == 0) {
+		consume_skb(skb);
+		if (signal_pending(current)) {
+			err = sock_intr_errno(sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock));
+			goto splice_read_end;
+		}
+		goto retry;
+	}
+
 	chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);
 	copied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm->offset, pipe, chunk, flags);
 	if (copied < 0)
@@ -2070,6 +2116,8 @@ ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock,  loff_t *ppos,
 	goto splice_read_end;
 }
 
+#define TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT	16
+
 int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 		     sk_read_actor_t read_actor)
 {
@@ -2078,6 +2126,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 	struct tls_prot_info *prot = &tls_ctx->prot_info;
 	struct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;
 	struct sk_buff *skb = NULL;
+	unsigned int nodata = 0;
 	struct sk_psock *psock;
 	size_t flushed_at = 0;
 	bool released = true;
@@ -2136,14 +2185,22 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 			goto read_sock_requeue;
 		}
 
-		/* An empty data record (legal in TLS 1.3) gives a zero
-		 * read_actor return, indistinguishable from the consumer
-		 * stalling; the used <= 0 path would requeue it at the
-		 * head of rx_list and block all later records. Consume it
-		 * here instead.
+		/* An empty data record gives a zero read_actor return,
+		 * indistinguishable from the consumer stalling; the
+		 * used <= 0 path would requeue it at the head of rx_list
+		 * and block all later records. Consume it here instead.
 		 */
 		if (rxm->full_len == 0) {
+			err = 0;
 			consume_skb(skb);
+			if (++nodata >= TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT) {
+				/* tls_rx_reader_release() calls
+				 * saved_data_ready(), not the callback a
+				 * consumer installs after the handshake.
+				 */
+				sk->sk_data_ready(sk);
+				break;
+			}
 			continue;
 		}
 
@@ -2154,6 +2211,7 @@ int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,
 			goto read_sock_requeue;
 		}
 		copied += used;
+		nodata = 0;
 		if (used < rxm->full_len) {
 			rxm->offset += used;
 			rxm->full_len -= used;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
index 9d3cd4fff062b..6207a90c5f077 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/net/tls.c
@@ -2549,6 +2549,42 @@ static const struct raw_rec id2_data_l0 = {
 	},
 };
 
+static void zero_len_sock_pair(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+			       int *fd, int *cfd, bool *notls)
+{
+	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
+	int ret;
+
+	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128,
+			     &tls12, 0);
+
+	ulp_sock_pair(_metadata, fd, cfd, notls);
+	if (*notls)
+		return;
+
+	/* fd stays keyless; these fixtures send raw records over it */
+	ret = setsockopt(*cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len);
+	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+}
+
+/* Send a variant's records; return the last one carrying payload */
+static const struct raw_rec *
+zero_len_send_recs(struct __test_metadata *_metadata, int fd,
+		   const struct raw_rec *const *recs)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *payload = NULL;
+	int i;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < 4 && recs[i]; i++) {
+		EXPECT_EQ(send(fd, recs[i]->cipher_data, recs[i]->cipher_len, 0),
+			  recs[i]->cipher_len);
+		if (recs[i]->plain_len)
+			payload = recs[i];
+	}
+
+	return payload;
+}
+
 FIXTURE(zero_len)
 {
 	int fd, cfd;
@@ -2611,19 +2647,7 @@ FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len, data_0data_0data)
 
 FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len)
 {
-	struct tls_crypto_info_keys tls12;
-	int ret;
-
-	tls_crypto_info_init(TLS_1_2_VERSION, TLS_CIPHER_AES_CCM_128,
-			     &tls12, 0);
-
-	ulp_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls);
-	if (self->notls)
-		return;
-
-	/* Don't install keys on fd, we'll send raw records */
-	ret = setsockopt(self->cfd, SOL_TLS, TLS_RX, &tls12, tls12.len);
-	ASSERT_EQ(ret, 0);
+	zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls);
 }
 
 FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len)
@@ -2639,10 +2663,10 @@ TEST_F(zero_len, test)
 	int rec_off;
 	int i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < 4 && variant->recs[i]; i++)
-		EXPECT_EQ(send(self->fd, variant->recs[i]->cipher_data,
-			       variant->recs[i]->cipher_len, 0),
-			  variant->recs[i]->cipher_len);
+	if (self->notls)
+		SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+	zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs);
 
 	rec = &variant->recs[0];
 	rec_off = 0;
@@ -2668,6 +2692,203 @@ TEST_F(zero_len, test)
 	}
 };
 
+FIXTURE(zero_len_peek)
+{
+	int fd, cfd;
+	bool notls;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_peek)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *recs[4];
+	ssize_t peek_ret;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_peek, 0data_0data_data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l11, },
+	.peek_ret = 11,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_peek, 0data_0data_0data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l0, },
+	.peek_ret = -EAGAIN,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len_peek)
+{
+	zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len_peek)
+{
+	close(self->fd);
+	close(self->cfd);
+}
+
+/* Peeking past a run of empty data records must reach the payload
+ * behind them, and a run with no payload behind it must report EAGAIN
+ * rather than the zero return that means EOF.
+ */
+TEST_F(zero_len_peek, test)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *payload;
+	unsigned char buf[128];
+	ssize_t ret;
+
+	if (self->notls)
+		SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+	payload = zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs);
+
+	if (variant->peek_ret < 0) {
+		ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf),
+			   MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK);
+		EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+		EXPECT_EQ(errno, -variant->peek_ret);
+		return;
+	}
+
+	ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT | MSG_PEEK);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->peek_ret);
+	if (ret == variant->peek_ret)
+		EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data,
+				 variant->peek_ret), 0);
+
+	ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->peek_ret);
+	if (ret == variant->peek_ret)
+		EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data,
+				 variant->peek_ret), 0);
+
+	ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
+	EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+	EXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);
+}
+
+FIXTURE(zero_len_splice)
+{
+	int fd, cfd;
+	bool notls;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_splice)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *recs[4];
+	ssize_t splice_ret;
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l11, },
+	.splice_ret = 11,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0data_data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l11, },
+	.splice_ret = 11,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0data_0data)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_data_l0, &id2_data_l0, },
+	.splice_ret = -EAGAIN,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_VARIANT_ADD(zero_len_splice, 0data_0ctrl)
+{
+	.recs = { &id0_data_l0, &id1_ctrl_l0, },
+	.splice_ret = -EINVAL,
+};
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(zero_len_splice)
+{
+	zero_len_sock_pair(_metadata, &self->fd, &self->cfd, &self->notls);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(zero_len_splice)
+{
+	close(self->fd);
+	close(self->cfd);
+}
+
+/* An empty data record splices zero bytes, which a splice caller reads
+ * as EOF. Splicing must skip past such a record to the payload behind
+ * it, and report EAGAIN when a run of them has no payload behind it.
+ * A control record behind the run reports EINVAL, the error splice
+ * already reports for a control record it meets first.
+ */
+static void
+zero_len_do_splice(struct __test_metadata *_metadata,
+		   FIXTURE_DATA(zero_len_splice) *self,
+		   const FIXTURE_VARIANT(zero_len_splice) *variant,
+		   unsigned int splice_flags)
+{
+	const struct raw_rec *payload;
+	unsigned char buf[128];
+	ssize_t ret;
+	int p[2];
+
+	ASSERT_GE(pipe(p), 0);
+
+	payload = zero_len_send_recs(_metadata, self->fd, variant->recs);
+
+	if (variant->splice_ret < 0) {
+		ret = splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf),
+			     splice_flags);
+		EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+		EXPECT_EQ(errno, -variant->splice_ret);
+	} else {
+		/* ASSERT so a zero return stops the test here; the read
+		 * below would block until the harness timeout.
+		 */
+		ASSERT_EQ(splice(self->cfd, NULL, p[1], NULL, sizeof(buf),
+				 splice_flags), variant->splice_ret);
+		ret = read(p[0], buf, sizeof(buf));
+		EXPECT_EQ(ret, variant->splice_ret);
+		if (ret == variant->splice_ret)
+			EXPECT_EQ(memcmp(buf, payload->plain_data,
+					 variant->splice_ret), 0);
+
+		/* The empty records were consumed, not left queued */
+		ret = recv(self->cfd, buf, sizeof(buf), MSG_DONTWAIT);
+		EXPECT_EQ(ret, -1);
+		EXPECT_EQ(errno, EAGAIN);
+	}
+
+	close(p[0]);
+	close(p[1]);
+}
+
+TEST_F(zero_len_splice, test)
+{
+	if (self->notls)
+		SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+	zero_len_do_splice(_metadata, self, variant, SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK);
+}
+
+/* The socket's O_NONBLOCK governs the record wait, as on a plain TCP
+ * socket, so a splice without SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK behaves like one that
+ * sets it. Deriving the wait from SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK alone sleeps here
+ * until the harness timeout.
+ */
+TEST_F(zero_len_splice, nonblock_socket)
+{
+	int sflags;
+
+	if (self->notls)
+		SKIP(return, "no TLS support");
+
+	sflags = fcntl(self->cfd, F_GETFL, 0);
+	ASSERT_GE(sflags, 0);
+	ASSERT_EQ(fcntl(self->cfd, F_SETFL, sflags | O_NONBLOCK), 0);
+
+	zero_len_do_splice(_metadata, self, variant, 0);
+}
+
 FIXTURE(tls_err)
 {
 	int fd, cfd;

19/3 2026/10/02 17:55 llm kmsan-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 7383
							output: 38
							thoughts: 1399
						

Thoughts:
**KMSAN Fuzzing Evaluation for TLS Patch Series**

Okay, let's break this down. My primary concern here is determining if this patch series warrants a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session. I need to evaluate if it introduces or modifies code that could expose uninitialized memory risks, specifically the kind KMSAN detects. Remember, standard KASAN covers the usual suspects like OOB, UAF, and double-frees. KMSAN is the key here, it's about uninitialized reads.

Looking at the rules again: KMSAN is relevant *only if* the patch touches kernel structures sent to userspace with potential uninitialized fields, introduces conditional logic based on uninitialized data, deals with allocations where uninitialized fields could be read, or plays with bounds/lengths in a way that risks uninitialized byte exposure. If it *doesn't* do those things, we can skip the KMSAN session.

Now, let's dig into the diffs, focusing on where uninitialized variables could creep in.

In `tls_sw_recvmsg`: I see the addition of a `bool nodata` variable. The comment suggests it deals with empty records. It's used in a branching condition: `if (nodata && signal_pending(current))`. The critical question is: is `nodata` initialized before that check? A quick scan shows it's initialized to `false` which avoids uninitialized reads. I see no immediate KMSAN red flags. The change to `darg.async` looks reasonable as well.

Moving on to `tls_sw_splice_read`: This one's a little more complex. The introduction of `nonblock` and the `retry` label catch my eye. We have `nonblock` initialization and it is being used in multiple conditions, so far it looks like `nonblock` is initialized and safe. The `tls_rx_rec_wait` and the logic around it.  `released` is initialized to `true`. This doesn't look especially risky, but I'll need to go deeper to be sure. The `retry` label after `tls_rx_rec_done` is the potential trouble spot. `darg.skb` is assigned here, the `tls_rx_rec_done` routine frees the skb, which indicates that we shouldn't have uninitialized data here.

Finally, in `tls_sw_read_sock`: The addition of `unsigned int nodata` and the `TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT` constant. The increment, and the `break` condition look interesting. Again, the important bit is, is `nodata` initialized before being incremented? Yes, initialized to `0`. Seems safe.

So, on a preliminary scan, I don't see any obvious KMSAN violations. The added variables appear to be correctly initialized before use. The conditional logic seems to handle the new variables in a reasonable way. The structures involved, as far as I can see, don't seem to be introduced or modified in a way that *directly* risks uninitialized data being sent to userspace. The most challenging aspect here is the multiple paths in `tls_sw_splice_read`, so I need to make sure that there are no uninitialized variables with `darg.skb` in this code path.

Before making a final decision, I should review the context around these changes with more detail. In general, I should read the existing code in this file to verify my findings using existing tools (e.g. `read-file` or `grepper`). Assuming the context checks out, and there are no hidden interactions with structures that *could* lead to uninitialized memory exposure, I'd lean towards setting `NeedsKMSAN=false` for this patch series. However, due to the complexity in `tls_sw_splice_read`, I want to be 100% sure. I want to look more carefully at the `darg` struct and its initialization.



20/3 2026/10/02 17:55 tool read-file
0m Args:
{
  "File": "net/tls/tls_sw.c",
  "FirstLine": 1820,
  "LineCount": 80
}

Results:
{
  "Contents": "1820:\t\tssize_t peeked = 0;\n1821:\t\tbool async = false;\n1822:\t\tint target, err;\n1823:\t\tbool is_kvec = iov_iter_is_kvec(\u0026msg-\u003emsg_iter);\n1824:\t\tbool is_peek = flags \u0026 MSG_PEEK;\n1825:\t\tbool rx_more = false;\n1826:\t\tbool released = true;\n1827:\t\tbool nodata = false;\n1828:\t\tbool zc_capable;\n1829:\t\n1830:\t\tif (unlikely(flags \u0026 MSG_ERRQUEUE))\n1831:\t\t\treturn sock_recv_errqueue(sk, msg, len, SOL_IP, IP_RECVERR);\n1832:\t\n1833:\t\terr = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, flags \u0026 MSG_DONTWAIT);\n1834:\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n1835:\t\t\treturn err;\n1836:\t\n1837:\t\t/* If crypto failed the connection is broken */\n1838:\t\terr = ctx-\u003easync_wait.err;\n1839:\t\tif (err)\n1840:\t\t\tgoto end;\n1841:\t\n1842:\t\t/* Process pending decrypted records. It must be non-zero-copy */\n1843:\t\terr = process_rx_list(ctx, msg, \u0026control, 0, len, is_peek, \u0026rx_more);\n1844:\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n1845:\t\t\tgoto end;\n1846:\t\n1847:\t\t/* process_rx_list() will set @control if it processed any records */\n1848:\t\tcopied = err;\n1849:\t\tif (len \u003c= copied || rx_more ||\n1850:\t\t    (control \u0026\u0026 control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA))\n1851:\t\t\tgoto end;\n1852:\t\n1853:\t\ttarget = sock_rcvlowat(sk, flags \u0026 MSG_WAITALL, len);\n1854:\t\tlen = len - copied;\n1855:\t\n1856:\t\tzc_capable = !is_kvec \u0026\u0026 !is_peek \u0026\u0026 ctx-\u003ezc_capable;\n1857:\t\tdecrypted = 0;\n1858:\t\twhile (len \u0026\u0026 (decrypted + copied \u003c target || tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx))) {\n1859:\t\t\tstruct tls_decrypt_arg darg;\n1860:\t\t\tint to_decrypt, chunk;\n1861:\t\n1862:\t\t\t/* A run of empty records advances neither loop bound, and\n1863:\t\t\t * tls_rx_rec_wait() tests for a signal only after it sleeps.\n1864:\t\t\t */\n1865:\t\t\tif (nodata \u0026\u0026 signal_pending(current)) {\n1866:\t\t\t\tlong timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, flags \u0026 MSG_DONTWAIT);\n1867:\t\n1868:\t\t\t\terr = sock_intr_errno(timeo);\n1869:\t\t\t\tgoto recv_end;\n1870:\t\t\t}\n1871:\t\n1872:\t\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags \u0026 MSG_DONTWAIT,\n1873:\t\t\t\t\t      released, !!(decrypted + copied));\n1874:\t\t\tif (err \u003c= 0)\n1875:\t\t\t\tgoto recv_end;\n1876:\t\n1877:\t\t\tmemset(\u0026darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs));\n1878:\t\n1879:\t\t\trxm = strp_msg(tls_strp_msg(ctx));\n1880:\t\t\ttlm = tls_msg(tls_strp_msg(ctx));\n1881:\t\n1882:\t\t\tto_decrypt = rxm-\u003efull_len - prot-\u003eoverhead_size;\n1883:\t\n1884:\t\t\tif (zc_capable \u0026\u0026 to_decrypt \u003c= len \u0026\u0026\n1885:\t\t\t    tlm-\u003econtrol == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)\n1886:\t\t\t\tdarg.zc = true;\n1887:\t\n1888:\t\t\t/* Do not use async mode if record is non-data, or if it\n1889:\t\t\t * is empty: the receive loop frees an empty record's skb,\n1890:\t\t\t * so its decryption must have completed.\n1891:\t\t\t */\n1892:\t\t\tif (tlm-\u003econtrol == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA)\n1893:\t\t\t\tdarg.async = ctx-\u003easync_capable \u0026\u0026 to_decrypt;\n1894:\t\t\telse\n1895:\t\t\t\tdarg.async = false;\n1896:\t\n1897:\t\t\terr = tls_rx_one_record(sk, msg, \u0026darg);\n1898:\t\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n1899:\t\t\t\tgoto recv_end;\n"
}

21/3 2026/10/02 17:55 llm kmsan-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 10931
							output: 38
							thoughts: 28
						

Thoughts:
Okay, here's my interpretation of that request, formatted as requested:

**Diving into the `tls_sw_recvmsg` Function**

Alright, let's get down to brass tacks. I need to take a closer look at the `tls_sw_recvmsg` function. Specifically, I'm focusing on lines 1900 through 1970. That's where the rubber meets the road, as they say, for a critical section of the TLS receive process. I'm expecting this segment to be crucial in understanding how data is handled and processed during the decryption and application layer delivery stages. I'll be keeping an eye out for any interesting control flow, data manipulation, or error handling happening in that specific range. It's time to put on my detective hat and see what secrets this section holds.



22/3 2026/10/02 17:55 tool read-file
0m Args:
{
  "File": "net/tls/tls_sw.c",
  "FirstLine": 1900,
  "LineCount": 80
}

Results:
{
  "Contents": "1900:\t\n1901:\t\t\tasync |= darg.async;\n1902:\t\n1903:\t\t\t/* If the type of records being processed is not known yet,\n1904:\t\t\t * set it to record type just dequeued. If it is already known,\n1905:\t\t\t * but does not match the record type just dequeued, go to end.\n1906:\t\t\t * We always get record type here since for tls1.2, record type\n1907:\t\t\t * is known just after record is dequeued from stream parser.\n1908:\t\t\t * For tls1.3, we disable async.\n1909:\t\t\t */\n1910:\t\t\terr = tls_record_content_type(msg, tls_msg(darg.skb), \u0026control);\n1911:\t\t\tif (err \u003c= 0) {\n1912:\t\t\t\tDEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(darg.zc);\n1913:\t\t\t\ttls_rx_rec_done(ctx);\n1914:\tput_on_rx_list_err:\n1915:\t\t\t\t__skb_queue_tail(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list, darg.skb);\n1916:\t\t\t\tgoto recv_end;\n1917:\t\t\t}\n1918:\t\n1919:\t\t\t/* periodically flush backlog, and feed strparser */\n1920:\t\t\treleased = tls_read_flush_backlog(sk, prot, len, to_decrypt,\n1921:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  decrypted + copied,\n1922:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  \u0026flushed_at);\n1923:\t\n1924:\t\t\t/* TLS 1.3 may have updated the length by more than overhead */\n1925:\t\t\trxm = strp_msg(darg.skb);\n1926:\t\t\tchunk = rxm-\u003efull_len;\n1927:\t\t\tnodata = !chunk;\n1928:\t\t\ttls_rx_rec_done(ctx);\n1929:\t\n1930:\t\t\t/* Keep an empty record off rx_list. On the zero-copy path\n1931:\t\t\t * the strparser owns darg.skb, and tls_rx_rec_done() has\n1932:\t\t\t * released it.\n1933:\t\t\t */\n1934:\t\t\tif (!chunk \u0026\u0026 control == TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {\n1935:\t\t\t\tif (!darg.zc)\n1936:\t\t\t\t\tconsume_skb(darg.skb);\n1937:\t\n1938:\t\t\t\t/* An empty record still marks a boundary. */\n1939:\t\t\t\tmsg-\u003emsg_flags |= MSG_EOR;\n1940:\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n1941:\t\t\t}\n1942:\t\n1943:\t\t\tif (!darg.zc) {\n1944:\t\t\t\tbool partially_consumed = chunk \u003e len;\n1945:\t\t\t\tstruct sk_buff *skb = darg.skb;\n1946:\t\n1947:\t\t\t\tDEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(darg.skb == ctx-\u003estrp.anchor);\n1948:\t\n1949:\t\t\t\tif (async) {\n1950:\t\t\t\t\t/* TLS 1.2-only, to_decrypt must be text len */\n1951:\t\t\t\t\tchunk = min_t(int, to_decrypt, len);\n1952:\t\t\t\t\tasync_copy_bytes += chunk;\n1953:\tput_on_rx_list:\n1954:\t\t\t\t\tdecrypted += chunk;\n1955:\t\t\t\t\tlen -= chunk;\n1956:\t\t\t\t\t__skb_queue_tail(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list, skb);\n1957:\t\t\t\t\tif (unlikely(control != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA))\n1958:\t\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n1959:\t\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n1960:\t\t\t\t}\n1961:\t\n1962:\t\t\t\tif (partially_consumed)\n1963:\t\t\t\t\tchunk = len;\n1964:\t\n1965:\t\t\t\terr = skb_copy_datagram_msg(skb, rxm-\u003eoffset,\n1966:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t    msg, chunk);\n1967:\t\t\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n1968:\t\t\t\t\tgoto put_on_rx_list_err;\n1969:\t\n1970:\t\t\t\tif (is_peek) {\n1971:\t\t\t\t\tpeeked += chunk;\n1972:\t\t\t\t\tgoto put_on_rx_list;\n1973:\t\t\t\t}\n1974:\t\n1975:\t\t\t\tif (partially_consumed) {\n1976:\t\t\t\t\trxm-\u003eoffset += chunk;\n1977:\t\t\t\t\trxm-\u003efull_len -= chunk;\n1978:\t\t\t\t\tgoto put_on_rx_list;\n1979:\t\t\t\t}\n"
}

23/3 2026/10/02 17:55 llm kmsan-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 12393
							output: 38
							thoughts: 16
						

Thoughts:
Okay, let's dive into this. I'm taking a look at `tls_sw_splice_read` next. I need to understand its role within the broader TLS implementation. This is crucial for performance optimization and vulnerability analysis, naturally. I want to identify any potential bottlenecks or inefficiencies in the software-based splicing process. I’m thinking about its interaction with the underlying network stack, the cipher implementations, and any buffer management strategies. Any specific error handling or resource allocation it performs will be of particular interest to me. I'll need to assess the function's complexity and how it scales under different TLS session configurations. Ultimately, I'm trying to mentally map its place in the overall flow, with an eye toward areas that might be ripe for improvement or, conversely, areas that are already elegantly handled.



24/3 2026/10/02 17:55 tool read-file
0m Args:
{
  "File": "net/tls/tls_sw.c",
  "FirstLine": 2030,
  "LineCount": 70
}

Results:
{
  "Contents": "2030:\t{\n2031:\t\tstruct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sock-\u003esk);\n2032:\t\tstruct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);\n2033:\t\tstruct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;\n2034:\t\tstruct sock *sk = sock-\u003esk;\n2035:\t\tstruct tls_msg *tlm;\n2036:\t\tstruct sk_buff *skb;\n2037:\t\tbool released = true;\n2038:\t\tssize_t copied = 0;\n2039:\t\tbool nonblock;\n2040:\t\tint chunk;\n2041:\t\tint err;\n2042:\t\n2043:\t\tnonblock = (flags \u0026 SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK) ||\n2044:\t\t\t   (sock-\u003efile-\u003ef_flags \u0026 O_NONBLOCK);\n2045:\t\n2046:\t\terr = tls_rx_reader_lock(sk, ctx, nonblock);\n2047:\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n2048:\t\t\treturn err;\n2049:\t\n2050:\t\t/* If crypto failed the connection is broken */\n2051:\t\terr = ctx-\u003easync_wait.err;\n2052:\t\tif (err)\n2053:\t\t\tgoto splice_read_end;\n2054:\t\n2055:\tretry:\n2056:\t\tif (!skb_queue_empty(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list)) {\n2057:\t\t\tskb = __skb_dequeue(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list);\n2058:\t\t} else {\n2059:\t\t\tstruct tls_decrypt_arg darg;\n2060:\t\n2061:\t\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, released, false);\n2062:\t\t\tif (err \u003c= 0)\n2063:\t\t\t\tgoto splice_read_end;\n2064:\t\n2065:\t\t\tmemset(\u0026darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs));\n2066:\t\n2067:\t\t\terr = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, \u0026darg);\n2068:\t\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n2069:\t\t\t\tgoto splice_read_end;\n2070:\t\n2071:\t\t\ttls_rx_rec_done(ctx);\n2072:\t\t\tskb = darg.skb;\n2073:\t\n2074:\t\t\t/* The retry's wait runs with the socket lock still held. */\n2075:\t\t\treleased = false;\n2076:\t\t}\n2077:\t\n2078:\t\trxm = strp_msg(skb);\n2079:\t\ttlm = tls_msg(skb);\n2080:\t\n2081:\t\t/* splice does not support reading control messages */\n2082:\t\tif (tlm-\u003econtrol != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {\n2083:\t\t\terr = -EINVAL;\n2084:\t\t\tgoto splice_requeue;\n2085:\t\t}\n2086:\t\n2087:\t\t/* Splicing zero bytes reads as EOF to the caller. */\n2088:\t\tif (rxm-\u003efull_len == 0) {\n2089:\t\t\tconsume_skb(skb);\n2090:\t\t\tif (signal_pending(current)) {\n2091:\t\t\t\terr = sock_intr_errno(sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock));\n2092:\t\t\t\tgoto splice_read_end;\n2093:\t\t\t}\n2094:\t\t\tgoto retry;\n2095:\t\t}\n2096:\t\n2097:\t\tchunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm-\u003efull_len, len);\n2098:\t\tcopied = skb_splice_bits(skb, sk, rxm-\u003eoffset, pipe, chunk, flags);\n2099:\t\tif (copied \u003c 0)\n"
}

25/3 2026/10/02 17:55 llm kmsan-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 13659
							output: 38
							thoughts: 27
						

Thoughts:
Okay, here's my interpretation of that request, formatted for a technically proficient user:

**Digging into `tls_sw_read_sock` - Lines 2120-2230**

Alright, I'm thinking we need to circle back and give the `tls_sw_read_sock` function another look. Specifically, I want to drill down into lines 2120 through 2230. That's where I *suspect* we might find some crucial details related to the recent performance anomaly we're seeing. I remember we had some questions about buffering, error handling during socket reads, or possibly even unexpected interactions with the TLS handshake there. Given the context, my intuition is telling me that the issue could lie within that region of code. I'm going to take a closer look at the error codes and any potential race conditions.



26/3 2026/10/02 17:56 tool read-file
0m Args:
{
  "File": "net/tls/tls_sw.c",
  "FirstLine": 2120,
  "LineCount": 90
}

Results:
{
  "Contents": "2120:\t\n2121:\tint tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\n2122:\t\t\t     sk_read_actor_t read_actor)\n2123:\t{\n2124:\t\tstruct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);\n2125:\t\tstruct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);\n2126:\t\tstruct tls_prot_info *prot = \u0026tls_ctx-\u003eprot_info;\n2127:\t\tstruct strp_msg *rxm = NULL;\n2128:\t\tstruct sk_buff *skb = NULL;\n2129:\t\tunsigned int nodata = 0;\n2130:\t\tstruct sk_psock *psock;\n2131:\t\tsize_t flushed_at = 0;\n2132:\t\tbool released = true;\n2133:\t\tstruct tls_msg *tlm;\n2134:\t\tssize_t copied = 0;\n2135:\t\tssize_t decrypted;\n2136:\t\tint err, used;\n2137:\t\n2138:\t\tpsock = sk_psock_get(sk);\n2139:\t\tif (psock) {\n2140:\t\t\tsk_psock_put(sk, psock);\n2141:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n2142:\t\t}\n2143:\t\terr = tls_rx_reader_acquire(sk, ctx, true);\n2144:\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n2145:\t\t\treturn err;\n2146:\t\n2147:\t\t/* If crypto failed the connection is broken */\n2148:\t\terr = ctx-\u003easync_wait.err;\n2149:\t\tif (err)\n2150:\t\t\tgoto read_sock_end;\n2151:\t\n2152:\t\tdecrypted = 0;\n2153:\t\twhile (desc-\u003ecount) {\n2154:\t\t\tif (!skb_queue_empty(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list)) {\n2155:\t\t\t\tskb = __skb_dequeue(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list);\n2156:\t\t\t\trxm = strp_msg(skb);\n2157:\t\t\t\ttlm = tls_msg(skb);\n2158:\t\t\t} else {\n2159:\t\t\t\tstruct tls_decrypt_arg darg;\n2160:\t\n2161:\t\t\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, true, released, !!copied);\n2162:\t\t\t\tif (err \u003c= 0)\n2163:\t\t\t\t\tgoto read_sock_end;\n2164:\t\n2165:\t\t\t\tmemset(\u0026darg.inargs, 0, sizeof(darg.inargs));\n2166:\t\n2167:\t\t\t\terr = tls_rx_one_record(sk, NULL, \u0026darg);\n2168:\t\t\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n2169:\t\t\t\t\tgoto read_sock_end;\n2170:\t\n2171:\t\t\t\treleased = tls_read_flush_backlog(sk, prot, INT_MAX,\n2172:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  0, decrypted,\n2173:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  \u0026flushed_at);\n2174:\t\t\t\tskb = darg.skb;\n2175:\t\t\t\trxm = strp_msg(skb);\n2176:\t\t\t\ttlm = tls_msg(skb);\n2177:\t\t\t\tdecrypted += rxm-\u003efull_len;\n2178:\t\n2179:\t\t\t\ttls_rx_rec_done(ctx);\n2180:\t\t\t}\n2181:\t\n2182:\t\t\t/* read_sock does not support reading control messages */\n2183:\t\t\tif (tlm-\u003econtrol != TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA) {\n2184:\t\t\t\terr = -EINVAL;\n2185:\t\t\t\tgoto read_sock_requeue;\n2186:\t\t\t}\n2187:\t\n2188:\t\t\t/* An empty data record gives a zero read_actor return,\n2189:\t\t\t * indistinguishable from the consumer stalling; the\n2190:\t\t\t * used \u003c= 0 path would requeue it at the head of rx_list\n2191:\t\t\t * and block all later records. Consume it here instead.\n2192:\t\t\t */\n2193:\t\t\tif (rxm-\u003efull_len == 0) {\n2194:\t\t\t\terr = 0;\n2195:\t\t\t\tconsume_skb(skb);\n2196:\t\t\t\tif (++nodata \u003e= TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT) {\n2197:\t\t\t\t\t/* tls_rx_reader_release() calls\n2198:\t\t\t\t\t * saved_data_ready(), not the callback a\n2199:\t\t\t\t\t * consumer installs after the handshake.\n2200:\t\t\t\t\t */\n2201:\t\t\t\t\tsk-\u003esk_data_ready(sk);\n2202:\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n2203:\t\t\t\t}\n2204:\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n2205:\t\t\t}\n2206:\t\n2207:\t\t\tused = read_actor(desc, skb, rxm-\u003eoffset, rxm-\u003efull_len);\n2208:\t\t\tif (used \u003c= 0) {\n2209:\t\t\t\tif (!copied)\n"
}

27/3 2026/10/02 17:56 llm kmsan-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.8-flash

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 15276
							output: 303
							thoughts: 1565
						

Thoughts:
**Analysis of TLS Empty Record Handling Patch**

Okay, let's break this down. My focus here is to understand the impact of this patch that deals with zero-length TLS records across several functions: `tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_sw_splice_read`, and `tls_sw_read_sock`. The core problem seems to be that empty records, which are valid in the TLS protocol, were causing issues such as stalling, potential infinite loops, and even a race condition leading to a use-after-free situation with `skb`s.

First, looking at `tls_sw_recvmsg`, I see the main concerns are looping issues and signal handling. The original code could spin in a loop if it encountered a series of empty records because `tls_strp_msg_ready` or the `len` check wouldn't be advanced. The patch addresses this, by introducing signal checks to prevent indefinite waits and by fixing an issue where async mode was incorrectly being used with empty records (where the skb is freed synchronously), which has the potential for a UAF. Essentially, the patch ensures that if `to_decrypt` is zero, we disable async mode. This makes sense; if there's no data to decrypt, we don't need the asynchronous decryption thread. The empty record handling is improved by consuming the skb using `consume_skb` and continuing. These empty records are also excluded from the `rx_list`.

Next, in `tls_sw_splice_read`, the main concern is preventing premature EOF when encountering empty records. It seems that splicing zero bytes was being treated as EOF, which is clearly wrong.  The patch addresses this with an early check, consuming the skb if `rxm->full_len == 0` and retrying. The `released` flag in `tls_rx_rec_wait` is tracked to ensure the socket lock is held when retrying and to avoid any locking problems.

Finally, `tls_sw_read_sock` tackles the problem of consecutive empty records potentially starving the socket. The patch limits the number of consecutive empty records to `TLS_RX_NODATA_LIMIT` (16) and calls `sk->sk_data_ready(sk)` to prevent starvation or an infinite loop.

Now, the important part: memory safety. I need to determine if this patch requires KMSAN (Kernel Memory Sanitizer) and not just KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer). My analysis focuses on checking if uninitialized memory could be read, or if uninitialized kernel data could be leaked to userspace.

I'm looking at four critical criteria for KMSAN applicability:

1.  **Kernel data sent to userspace:**  I don't see any uninitialized kernel structures or potentially uninitialized fields being passed to userspace via `copy_to_user`, `put_user`, netlink, ioctls, socket options, or BPF. The patch explicitly prevents the copy of the empty records. The checks for `chunk == 0` and the positive length checks `rxm->full_len > 0` are crucial here, meaning no data is being sent if `chunk` or `full_len` is zero.
2.  **Conditional logic on uninitialized variables:** I meticulously check all the new variables introduced (`nodata`, `nonblock`, and `released`). They are all local scalar variables, and they are explicitly initialized upon declaration. No problems here.
3.  **New data structures with uninitialized fields:** There are no new data structures introduced that could potentially have uninitialized fields read later on.
4.  **Bounds checks exposing uninitialized data:** The patch actually *prevents* accessing uninitialized bytes because empty records are handled separately and are consumed. Crucially, the code now checks for `chunk > 0` before the data copy occurs. Also, when reading data, `chunk = min_t(unsigned int, rxm->full_len, len);` only runs if `rxm->full_len > 0`. This is good. The async decryption fix (disabling async mode when `to_decrypt == 0`) also fixes a UAF, which falls under KASAN, not KMSAN.

Based on this, my conclusion is that KMSAN is *not* required. The patch doesn't introduce any new risks related to uninitialized memory reads or leaks. The main risks are potential UAF (which KASAN handles) or locking/control-flow bugs (LOCKDEP and general kernel behavior). KASAN is fully sufficient to catch the introduced risks with skb lifetime management. The patch improves security by handling empty records which could lead to race conditions, and prevents a potential UAF/double-free.



28/3 2026/10/02 17:56 tool set-results
0m Args:
{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch addresses the handling of zero-length (empty) TLS records across net/tls (tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, and tls_sw_read_sock). Specifically, it prevents stalls/unbounded loops on consecutive empty records, avoids premature EOF reports on splice reads, ensures signals are checked, prevents queuing empty records on rx_list, and disables async decryption for empty records so the skb is not freed while an async operation is underway.\n\nAll new local variables (nodata, nonblock, released) are primitive scalar types explicitly initialized at declaration. No uninitialized memory is read or used in branching. Furthermore, empty records have their skbs freed via consume_skb() without copying data to user space or pipes; existing copy paths remain guarded by positive length checks (chunk \u003e 0, rxm-\u003efull_len \u003e 0), so no uninitialized buffers are exposed or leaked.\n\nThe potential failure modes introduced by this patch involve skb lifecycle management (risk of use-after-free or double-free), socket locking semantics (release state in tls_rx_rec_wait), and control flow/hangs. These risks are covered by KASAN, LOCKDEP, and standard kernel debugging facilities, not KMSAN. Therefore, a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not warranted.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

Results:
{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch addresses the handling of zero-length (empty) TLS records across net/tls (tls_sw_recvmsg, tls_sw_splice_read, and tls_sw_read_sock). Specifically, it prevents stalls/unbounded loops on consecutive empty records, avoids premature EOF reports on splice reads, ensures signals are checked, prevents queuing empty records on rx_list, and disables async decryption for empty records so the skb is not freed while an async operation is underway.\n\nAll new local variables (nodata, nonblock, released) are primitive scalar types explicitly initialized at declaration. No uninitialized memory is read or used in branching. Furthermore, empty records have their skbs freed via consume_skb() without copying data to user space or pipes; existing copy paths remain guarded by positive length checks (chunk \u003e 0, rxm-\u003efull_len \u003e 0), so no uninitialized buffers are exposed or leaked.\n\nThe potential failure modes introduced by this patch involve skb lifecycle management (risk of use-after-free or double-free), socket locking semantics (release state in tls_rx_rec_wait), and control flow/hangs. These risks are covered by KASAN, LOCKDEP, and standard kernel debugging facilities, not KMSAN. Therefore, a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not warranted.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

LLM Calls Summary:
Total Calls Total Tokens Avg Tokens Total Duration (Seconds) Avg Duration (Seconds)
Tool Calls Summary:
Total Calls Total Duration (Seconds) Avg Duration (Seconds)