AI Trajectory


Trajectory: (Expand/Collapse All)
Seq Timestamp Type Name Duration
0/0 2026/07/22 12:05 flow patch-triage
0m Args:
null

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "KVM",
    "KVM_INTEL"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "vmx_vcpu_run",
    "vmx_handle_exit",
    "__vmx_handle_exit",
    "handle_ept_violation",
    "handle_exception_nmi"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch adds a \"memory\" clobber to inline assembly for VMCS reads and writes in KVM VMX. This is a functional change that prevents compiler reordering and caching of memory values around VMCS operations, which can lead to subtle bugs in KVM execution flow.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

1/1 2026/07/22 12:05 action read-patch-diff
0m Args:
null

Results:
{
  "PatchDiff": "commit 565f82c4716fa2f35ded4c9e3819815a3fb716eb\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate:   Wed Jul 22 12:05:04 2026 +0000\n\n    syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h\nindex 81784befaaf498..9ffe03a0c223c4 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h\n@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)\n \n \t\t\t  : [output] \"=r\" (value)\n \t\t\t  : [field] \"r\" (field)\n-\t\t\t  : \"cc\"\n+\t\t\t  : \"cc\", \"memory\"\n \t\t\t  : do_fail, do_exception);\n \n \treturn value;\n@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)\n \n \t\t     : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, [output] \"=\u0026r\" (value)\n \t\t     : [field] \"r\" (field)\n-\t\t     : \"cc\");\n+\t\t     : \"cc\", \"memory\");\n \treturn value;\n \n #endif /* CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT */\n@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ do {\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n \tasm goto(\"1: \" __stringify(insn) \" %0\\n\\t\"\t\t\t\\\n \t\t\t  \"jna %l[error]\\n\\t\"\t\t\t\t\\\n \t\t\t  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])\t\t\t\\\n-\t\t\t  : : op1 : \"cc\" : error, fault);\t\t\\\n+\t\t\t  : : op1 : \"cc\", \"memory\" : error, fault);\t\\\n \treturn;\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n error:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n \tinstrumentation_begin();\t\t\t\t\t\\\n@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ do {\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n \tasm goto(\"1: \"  __stringify(insn) \" %1, %0\\n\\t\"\t\t\t\\\n \t\t\t  \"jna %l[error]\\n\\t\"\t\t\t\t\\\n \t\t\t  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])\t\t\t\\\n-\t\t\t  : : op1, op2 : \"cc\" : error, fault);\t\t\\\n+\t\t\t  : : op1, op2 : \"cc\", \"memory\" : error, fault);\\\n \treturn;\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n error:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\n \tinstrumentation_begin();\t\t\t\t\t\\\n"
}

2/1 2026/07/22 12:05 agent patch-evaluator
0m Model:
best-expensive

Args:
null

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "KVM",
    "KVM_INTEL"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "vmx_vcpu_run",
    "vmx_handle_exit",
    "__vmx_handle_exit",
    "handle_ept_violation",
    "handle_exception_nmi"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch adds a \"memory\" clobber to inline assembly for VMCS reads and writes in KVM VMX. This is a functional change that prevents compiler reordering and caching of memory values around VMCS operations, which can lead to subtle bugs in KVM execution flow.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

Instruction:
You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and determine
if it makes functional changes to the kernel that should be fuzzed.

IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively
use your code access tools to examine the actual source code and confirm any assumptions.

Return WorthFuzzing=false if the patch only contains:
- Modifications to Documentation/, Kconfig files, or code comments.
- Purely decorative changes, such as logging (e.g., pr_err, printk) or tracepoints.
- Changes to numeric constants or macros that do not functionally alter execution flow.
- Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU,
even when utilizing software-emulated hardware (e.g., usb gadget, mac80211_hwsim).

If it modifies reachable core kernel logic, drivers, or architectures, use your code search
tools to verify the code can be executed, then return WorthFuzzing=true.

When returning WorthFuzzing=true, you MUST ALSO:
1. Extract any specific kernel functions that should be heavily fuzzed into FocusSymbols.
   Avoid listing generic hot-path functions to prevent skewed test distributions.
2. Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly test this new/modified feature.
   Go and look into the Kconfig files and check for ifdefs around the code, do not make assumptions.
   Do not list too generic configs (we already have them enabled). Only list those that
   specifically cover the modified code. List them in the EnableConfigs output array,
   and DO NOT add a 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

Prompt:
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit 565f82c4716fa2f35ded4c9e3819815a3fb716eb
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 22 12:05:04 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
index 81784befaaf498..9ffe03a0c223c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
 
 			  : [output] "=r" (value)
 			  : [field] "r" (field)
-			  : "cc"
+			  : "cc", "memory"
 			  : do_fail, do_exception);
 
 	return value;
@@ -145,7 +145,7 @@ static __always_inline unsigned long __vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)
 
 		     : ASM_CALL_CONSTRAINT, [output] "=&r" (value)
 		     : [field] "r" (field)
-		     : "cc");
+		     : "cc", "memory");
 	return value;
 
 #endif /* CONFIG_CC_HAS_ASM_GOTO_OUTPUT */
@@ -192,7 +192,7 @@ do {									\
 	asm goto("1: " __stringify(insn) " %0\n\t"			\
 			  "jna %l[error]\n\t"				\
 			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])			\
-			  : : op1 : "cc" : error, fault);		\
+			  : : op1 : "cc", "memory" : error, fault);	\
 	return;								\
 error:									\
 	instrumentation_begin();					\
@@ -208,7 +208,7 @@ do {									\
 	asm goto("1: "  __stringify(insn) " %1, %0\n\t"			\
 			  "jna %l[error]\n\t"				\
 			  _ASM_EXTABLE(1b, %l[fault])			\
-			  : : op1, op2 : "cc" : error, fault);		\
+			  : : op1, op2 : "cc", "memory" : error, fault);\
 	return;								\
 error:									\
 	instrumentation_begin();					\

3/2 2026/07/22 12:05 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 2320
							output: 44
							thoughts: 132
						

Thoughts:
**Analyzing the KVM/VMX Patch**

Okay, so I'm looking at this patch that touches `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h`. My immediate thought is, "Ah, VMX operations." That file is central to how the KVM hypervisor interacts with the hardware virtualization extensions. Specifically, it seems like they've added `"memory"` to the clobber list within the inline assembly for `__vmcs_readl` and those VMX instruction macros, like `vmcs_writel` and their ilk, which use the `insn %0` or `insn %1, %0` constructs.

My expertise tells me this is almost certainly aimed at ensuring proper memory ordering. With these VMCS reads/writes, you're dealing with very sensitive hardware state. Compilers can be clever, potentially reordering instructions or caching values in ways that break the critical synchronization needed for virtualization to function correctly. By including `"memory"` in the clobber list, the patch is essentially telling the compiler, "Hey, don't assume anything about the contents of memory surrounding these instructions. They *might* be changed by the VMX instruction, and you need to treat them as volatile." This makes sense to me. The patch is probably fixing potential compiler-related bugs related to reordering of instructions that would normally be perfectly valid in non-virtualized code.

Now, I'll dive into `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h` itself to confirm my understanding and see the specifics of the change. This addition is likely the necessary "fence" to make sure that these VMX instructions work properly.



4/2 2026/07/22 12:05 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "__vmcs_readl",
  "PathPrefix": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h=79=static __always_inline void vmcs_checkl(unsigned long field)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-90-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:91:static __always_inline unsigned long __vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-92-{\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h=154=static __always_inline u16 vmcs_read16(unsigned long field)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-158-\t\treturn evmcs_read16(field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:159:\treturn __vmcs_readl(field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-160-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h=162=static __always_inline u32 vmcs_read32(unsigned long field)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-166-\t\treturn evmcs_read32(field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:167:\treturn __vmcs_readl(field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-168-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h=170=static __always_inline u64 vmcs_read64(unsigned long field)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-175-#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:176:\treturn __vmcs_readl(field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-177-#else\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:178:\treturn __vmcs_readl(field) | ((u64)__vmcs_readl(field+1) \u003c\u003c 32);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-179-#endif\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h=182=static __always_inline unsigned long vmcs_readl(unsigned long field)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-186-\t\treturn evmcs_read64(field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:187:\treturn __vmcs_readl(field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-188-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h=266=static __always_inline void vmcs_clear_bits(unsigned long field, u32 mask)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-272-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:273:\t__vmcs_writel(field, __vmcs_readl(field) \u0026 ~mask);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-274-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h=276=static __always_inline void vmcs_set_bits(unsigned long field, u32 mask)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-282-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h:283:\t__vmcs_writel(field, __vmcs_readl(field) | mask);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h-284-}\n"
}

5/2 2026/07/22 12:05 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 3928
							output: 40
							thoughts: 248
						

Thoughts:
**Analyzing the Impact of the Memory Clobber in KVM VMX Inline Assembly**

Okay, so this patch introduces a `"memory"` clobber into the inline assembly within `__vmcs_readl` and the `vmx_asm1`/`vmx_asm2` macros. My initial thought is that this is a functional change, a necessary one. It stops the compiler from being overly aggressive in caching memory values across VMCS reads and writes. That's crucial for correctness in this context. But wait… does this actually *change* the execution flow? Technically, it's a compiler behavior change, but that subtly affects how the code executes, especially with memory barriers. This warrants a deeper look.

The next question is fuzzing. Would this be a good target? It won't specifically target the clobber itself, but it’s a core change within KVM VMX. While fuzzing might not hit the precise race condition or compiler reordering we're now trying to prevent, it *is* a functional change in a critical area, so it's probably worth it.

Alright, let's try to extract some relevant symbols to focus on. Thinking about the functions involved: `vmcs_readl`, `vmcs_writel`, and the like - they're all inline. I can see they are used pretty widely throughout `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/`. I'll focus on `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c` to see if I can understand how these new clobbers are being used in more concrete examples.



6/2 2026/07/22 12:05 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "vmcs_read",
  "PathPrefix": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "\nFull output is too long, showing 500 out of 510 lines.\nUse more precise expression if possible.\n\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=562=noinline void vmwrite_error(unsigned long field, unsigned long value)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-564-\tvmx_insn_failed(\"vmwrite failed: field=%lx val=%lx err=%u\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:565:\t\t\tfield, value, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-566-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=568=noinline void vmclear_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-570-\tvmx_insn_failed(\"vmclear failed: %p/%llx err=%u\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:571:\t\t\tvmcs, phys_addr, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-572-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=574=noinline void vmptrld_error(struct vmcs *vmcs, u64 phys_addr)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-576-\tvmx_insn_failed(\"vmptrld failed: %p/%llx err=%u\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:577:\t\t\tvmcs, phys_addr, vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-578-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=863=static u16 vmx_read_guest_seg_selector(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-867-\tif (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_SEL))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:868:\t\t*p = vmcs_read16(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].selector);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-869-\treturn *p;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=872=static ulong vmx_read_guest_seg_base(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-876-\tif (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_BASE))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:877:\t\t*p = vmcs_readl(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].base);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-878-\treturn *p;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=881=static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_limit(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-885-\tif (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_LIMIT))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:886:\t\t*p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].limit);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-887-\treturn *p;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=890=static u32 vmx_read_guest_seg_ar(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx, unsigned seg)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-894-\tif (!vmx_segment_cache_test_set(vmx, seg, SEG_FIELD_AR))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:895:\t\t*p = vmcs_read32(kvm_vmx_segment_fields[seg].ar_bytes);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-896-\treturn *p;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=1627=unsigned long vmx_get_rflags(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1633-\t\tkvm_register_mark_available(vcpu, VCPU_REG_RFLAGS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:1634:\t\trflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1635-\t\tif (vmx-\u003ermode.vm86_active) {\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=1679=u32 vmx_get_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1680-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:1681:\tu32 interruptibility = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1682-\tint ret = 0;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=1692=void vmx_set_interrupt_shadow(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int mask)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1693-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:1694:\tu32 interruptibility_old = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1695-\tu32 interruptibility = interruptibility_old;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=1804=static int skip_emulated_instruction(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1819-\t    exit_reason.basic != EXIT_REASON_EPT_MISCONFIG) {\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:1820:\t\tinstr_len = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1821-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=1909=static void vmx_clear_hlt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1917-\tif (kvm_hlt_in_guest(vcpu-\u003ekvm) \u0026\u0026\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:1918:\t\t\tvmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE) == GUEST_ACTIVITY_HLT)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1919-\t\tvmcs_write32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE, GUEST_ACTIVITY_ACTIVE);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=1922=void vmx_inject_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1943-\t\tvmcs_writel(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS,\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:1944:\t\t\t    vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS) | DR6_BS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-1945-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=2126=int vmx_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2134-\tcase MSR_FS_BASE:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2135:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_readl(GUEST_FS_BASE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2136-\t\tbreak;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2137-\tcase MSR_GS_BASE:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2138:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GS_BASE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2139-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2164-\tcase MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_CS:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2165:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2166-\t\tbreak;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2167-\tcase MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2168:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2169-\t\tbreak;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2170-\tcase MSR_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2171:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2172-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2177-\t\t\treturn 1;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2178:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2179-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2261-\tcase MSR_IA32_S_CET:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2262:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2263-\t\tbreak;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2264-\tcase MSR_KVM_INTERNAL_GUEST_SSP:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2265:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2266-\t\tbreak;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2267-\tcase MSR_IA32_INT_SSP_TAB:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2268:\t\tmsr_info-\u003edata = vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2269-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=2635=void vmx_cache_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, enum kvm_reg reg)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2642-\tcase VCPU_REGS_RSP:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2643:\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.regs[VCPU_REGS_RSP] = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2644-\t\tbreak;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2645-\tcase VCPU_REG_RIP:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2646:\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.rip = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2647-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2655-\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.cr0 \u0026= ~guest_owned_bits;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2656:\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.cr0 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0) \u0026 guest_owned_bits;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2657-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2663-\t\tif (!(exec_controls_get(to_vmx(vcpu)) \u0026 CPU_BASED_CR3_LOAD_EXITING))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2664:\t\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.cr3 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2665-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2669-\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.cr4 \u0026= ~guest_owned_bits;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:2670:\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.cr4 |= vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) \u0026 guest_owned_bits;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-2671-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=3131=static void enter_pmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3150-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3151:\tflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3152-\tflags \u0026= RMODE_GUEST_OWNED_EFLAGS_BITS;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3155-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3156:\tvmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, (vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) \u0026 ~X86_CR4_VME) |\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3157:\t\t\t(vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW) \u0026 X86_CR4_VME));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3158-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=3201=static void enter_rmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3231-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3232:\tflags = vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3233-\tvmx-\u003ermode.save_rflags = flags;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3237-\tvmcs_writel(GUEST_RFLAGS, flags);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3238:\tvmcs_writel(GUEST_CR4, vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4) | X86_CR4_VME);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3239-\tvmx_update_exception_bitmap(vcpu);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=3274=static void enter_lmode(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3279-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3280:\tguest_tr_ar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_TR_AR_BYTES);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3281-\tif ((guest_tr_ar \u0026 VMX_AR_TYPE_MASK) != VMX_AR_TYPE_BUSY_64_TSS) {\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=3411=void ept_save_pdptrs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3415-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3416:\tvcpu-\u003earch.pdptrs[0] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3417:\tvcpu-\u003earch.pdptrs[1] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3418:\tvcpu-\u003earch.pdptrs[2] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3419:\tvcpu-\u003earch.pdptrs[3] = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3420-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=3690=static int __vmx_get_cpl(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool no_cache)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3698-\tif (no_cache)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3699:\t\tar = vmcs_read32(GUEST_SS_AR_BYTES);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3700-\telse\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=3784=void vmx_get_idt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3785-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3786:\tdt-\u003esize = vmcs_read32(GUEST_IDTR_LIMIT);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3787:\tdt-\u003eaddress = vmcs_readl(GUEST_IDTR_BASE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3788-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=3796=void vmx_get_gdt(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct desc_ptr *dt)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3797-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3798:\tdt-\u003esize = vmcs_read32(GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:3799:\tdt-\u003eaddress = vmcs_readl(GUEST_GDTR_BASE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-3800-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5108=void vmx_enable_nmi_window(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5110-\tif (!enable_vnmi ||\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5111:\t    vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) \u0026 GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI) {\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5112-\t\tvmx_enable_irq_window(vcpu);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5178=bool vmx_get_nmi_mask(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5186-\t\treturn false;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5187:\tmasked = vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) \u0026 GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5188-\tvmx-\u003eloaded_vmcs-\u003enmi_known_unmasked = !masked;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5212=bool vmx_nmi_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5219-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5220:\treturn (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) \u0026\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5221-\t\t(GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS | GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI |\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5237=bool __vmx_interrupt_blocked(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5239-\treturn !(vmx_get_rflags(vcpu) \u0026 X86_EFLAGS_IF) ||\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5240:\t       (vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO) \u0026\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5241-\t\t(GUEST_INTR_STATE_STI | GUEST_INTR_STATE_MOV_SS));\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5296=static bool rmode_exception(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int vec)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5304-\t\tto_vmx(vcpu)-\u003evcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5305:\t\t\tvmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5306-\t\tif (vcpu-\u003eguest_debug \u0026 KVM_GUESTDBG_USE_SW_BP)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5425=static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5470-\tif (intr_info \u0026 INTR_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5471:\t\terror_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5472-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5534-\t\tkvm_run-\u003edebug.arch.dr6 = dr6 | DR6_ACTIVE_LOW;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5535:\t\tkvm_run-\u003edebug.arch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5536-\t\tfallthrough;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5543-\t\tvmx-\u003evcpu.arch.event_exit_inst_len =\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5544:\t\t\tvmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5545-\t\tkvm_run-\u003eexit_reason = KVM_EXIT_DEBUG;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5752=static int handle_dr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5767-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5768:\tdr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5769-\tif (dr7 \u0026 DR7_GD) {\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5812=void vmx_sync_dirty_debug_regs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5818-\tget_debugreg(vcpu-\u003earch.dr6, 6);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5819:\tvcpu-\u003earch.dr7 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5820-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5909=static int handle_task_switch(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5939-\t\t\t\terror_code =\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5940:\t\t\t\t\tvmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5941-\t\t\t}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5966=static int handle_ept_violation(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5981-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5982:\tgpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5983-\ttrace_kvm_page_fault(vcpu, gpa, exit_qualification);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5999=static int handle_ept_misconfig(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6009-\t */\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6010:\tgpa = vmcs_read64(GUEST_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6011-\tif (!is_guest_mode(vcpu) \u0026\u0026\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6146=static int handle_invpcid(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6161-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6162:\tvmx_instruction_info = vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6163-\tgpr_index = vmx_get_instr_info_reg2(vmx_instruction_info);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6311=static int vmx_get_msr_imm_reg(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6312-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6313:\treturn vmx_get_instr_info_reg(vmcs_read32(VMX_INSTRUCTION_INFO));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6314-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6395=void vmx_get_exit_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *reason,\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6405-\t\tif (is_exception_with_error_code(*intr_info))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6406:\t\t\t*error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6407-\t\telse\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6416=void vmx_get_entry_info(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 *intr_info, u32 *error_code)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6417-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6418:\t*intr_info = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6419-\tif (is_exception_with_error_code(*intr_info))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6420:\t\t*error_code = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6421-\telse\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6433=static void vmx_flush_pml_buffer(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6439-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6440:\tpml_idx = vmcs_read16(GUEST_PML_INDEX);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6441-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6481=static void vmx_dump_sel(char *name, uint32_t sel)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6483-\tpr_err(\"%s sel=0x%04x, attr=0x%05x, limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6484:\t       name, vmcs_read16(sel),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6485:\t       vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_AR_BYTES - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6486:\t       vmcs_read32(sel + GUEST_ES_LIMIT - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6487:\t       vmcs_readl(sel + GUEST_ES_BASE - GUEST_ES_SELECTOR));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6488-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6490=static void vmx_dump_dtsel(char *name, uint32_t limit)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6492-\tpr_err(\"%s                           limit=0x%08x, base=0x%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6493:\t       name, vmcs_read32(limit),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6494:\t       vmcs_readl(limit + GUEST_GDTR_BASE - GUEST_GDTR_LIMIT));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6495-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6507=void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6520-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6521:\tvmentry_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_CONTROLS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6522:\tvmexit_ctl = vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_CONTROLS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6523:\tcpu_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(CPU_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6524:\tpin_based_exec_ctrl = vmcs_read32(PIN_BASED_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6525:\tcr4 = vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR4);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6526-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6527-\tif (cpu_has_secondary_exec_ctrls())\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6528:\t\tsecondary_exec_control = vmcs_read32(SECONDARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6529-\telse\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6532-\tif (cpu_has_tertiary_exec_ctrls())\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6533:\t\ttertiary_exec_control = vmcs_read64(TERTIARY_VM_EXEC_CONTROL);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6534-\telse\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6540-\tpr_err(\"CR0: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6541:\t       vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR0), vmcs_readl(CR0_READ_SHADOW),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6542:\t       vmcs_readl(CR0_GUEST_HOST_MASK));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6543-\tpr_err(\"CR4: actual=0x%016lx, shadow=0x%016lx, gh_mask=%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6544:\t       cr4, vmcs_readl(CR4_READ_SHADOW), vmcs_readl(CR4_GUEST_HOST_MASK));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6545:\tpr_err(\"CR3 = 0x%016lx\\n\", vmcs_readl(GUEST_CR3));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6546-\tif (cpu_has_vmx_ept()) {\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6547-\t\tpr_err(\"PDPTR0 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR1 = 0x%016llx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6548:\t\t       vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR0), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR1));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6549-\t\tpr_err(\"PDPTR2 = 0x%016llx  PDPTR3 = 0x%016llx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6550:\t\t       vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR2), vmcs_read64(GUEST_PDPTR3));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6551-\t}\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6552-\tpr_err(\"RSP = 0x%016lx  RIP = 0x%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6553:\t       vmcs_readl(GUEST_RSP), vmcs_readl(GUEST_RIP));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6554-\tpr_err(\"RFLAGS=0x%08lx         DR7 = 0x%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6555:\t       vmcs_readl(GUEST_RFLAGS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_DR7));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6556-\tpr_err(\"Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6557:\t       vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_ESP),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6558:\t       vmcs_read32(GUEST_SYSENTER_CS), vmcs_readl(GUEST_SYSENTER_EIP));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6559-\tvmx_dump_sel(\"CS:  \", GUEST_CS_SELECTOR);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6570-\tif (vmentry_ctl \u0026 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_EFER)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6571:\t\tpr_err(\"EFER= 0x%016llx\\n\", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_EFER));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6572-\telse if (efer_slot \u003e= 0)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6581-\tif (vmentry_ctl \u0026 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_IA32_PAT)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6582:\t\tpr_err(\"PAT = 0x%016llx\\n\", vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PAT));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6583-\tpr_err(\"DebugCtl = 0x%016llx  DebugExceptions = 0x%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6584:\t       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_DEBUGCTL),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6585:\t       vmcs_readl(GUEST_PENDING_DBG_EXCEPTIONS));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6586-\tif (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() \u0026\u0026\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6588-\t\tpr_err(\"PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6589:\t\t       vmcs_read64(GUEST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6590-\tif (vmentry_ctl \u0026 VM_ENTRY_LOAD_BNDCFGS)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6591:\t\tpr_err(\"BndCfgS = 0x%016llx\\n\", vmcs_read64(GUEST_BNDCFGS));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6592-\tpr_err(\"Interruptibility = %08x  ActivityState = %08x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6593:\t       vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6594:\t       vmcs_read32(GUEST_ACTIVITY_STATE));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6595-\tif (secondary_exec_control \u0026 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6596-\t\tpr_err(\"InterruptStatus = %04x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6597:\t\t       vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6598:\tif (vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_MSR_LOAD_COUNT) \u003e 0)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6599-\t\tvmx_dump_msrs(\"guest autoload\", \u0026vmx-\u003emsr_autoload.guest);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6600:\tif (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_STORE_COUNT) \u003e 0)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6601-\t\tvmx_dump_msrs(\"autostore\", \u0026vmx-\u003emsr_autostore);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6604-\t\tpr_err(\"S_CET = 0x%016lx, SSP = 0x%016lx, SSP TABLE = 0x%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6605:\t\t       vmcs_readl(GUEST_S_CET), vmcs_readl(GUEST_SSP),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6606:\t\t       vmcs_readl(GUEST_INTR_SSP_TABLE));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6607-\tpr_err(\"*** Host State ***\\n\");\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6608-\tpr_err(\"RIP = 0x%016lx  RSP = 0x%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6609:\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_RIP), vmcs_readl(HOST_RSP));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6610-\tpr_err(\"CS=%04x SS=%04x DS=%04x ES=%04x FS=%04x GS=%04x TR=%04x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6611:\t       vmcs_read16(HOST_CS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_SS_SELECTOR),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6612:\t       vmcs_read16(HOST_DS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_ES_SELECTOR),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6613:\t       vmcs_read16(HOST_FS_SELECTOR), vmcs_read16(HOST_GS_SELECTOR),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6614:\t       vmcs_read16(HOST_TR_SELECTOR));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6615-\tpr_err(\"FSBase=%016lx GSBase=%016lx TRBase=%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6616:\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_FS_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_GS_BASE),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6617:\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_TR_BASE));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6618-\tpr_err(\"GDTBase=%016lx IDTBase=%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6619:\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_GDTR_BASE), vmcs_readl(HOST_IDTR_BASE));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6620-\tpr_err(\"CR0=%016lx CR3=%016lx CR4=%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6621:\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR0), vmcs_readl(HOST_CR3),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6622:\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_CR4));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6623-\tpr_err(\"Sysenter RSP=%016lx CS:RIP=%04x:%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6624:\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_ESP),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6625:\t       vmcs_read32(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_CS),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6626:\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_IA32_SYSENTER_EIP));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6627-\tif (vmexit_ctl \u0026 VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_EFER)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6628:\t\tpr_err(\"EFER= 0x%016llx\\n\", vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_EFER));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6629-\tif (vmexit_ctl \u0026 VM_EXIT_LOAD_IA32_PAT)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6630:\t\tpr_err(\"PAT = 0x%016llx\\n\", vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PAT));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6631-\tif (cpu_has_load_perf_global_ctrl() \u0026\u0026\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6633-\t\tpr_err(\"PerfGlobCtl = 0x%016llx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6634:\t\t       vmcs_read64(HOST_IA32_PERF_GLOBAL_CTRL));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6635:\tif (vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_MSR_LOAD_COUNT) \u003e 0)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6636-\t\tvmx_dump_msrs(\"host autoload\", \u0026vmx-\u003emsr_autoload.host);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6638-\t\tpr_err(\"S_CET = 0x%016lx, SSP = 0x%016lx, SSP TABLE = 0x%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6639:\t\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_S_CET), vmcs_readl(HOST_SSP),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6640:\t\t       vmcs_readl(HOST_INTR_SSP_TABLE));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6641-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6647-\tpr_err(\"ExceptionBitmap=%08x PFECmask=%08x PFECmatch=%08x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6648:\t       vmcs_read32(EXCEPTION_BITMAP),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6649:\t       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MASK),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6650:\t       vmcs_read32(PAGE_FAULT_ERROR_CODE_MATCH));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6651-\tpr_err(\"VMEntry: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6652:\t       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6653:\t       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_EXCEPTION_ERROR_CODE),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6654:\t       vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6655-\tpr_err(\"VMExit: intr_info=%08x errcode=%08x ilen=%08x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6656:\t       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_INFO),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6657:\t       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INTR_ERROR_CODE),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6658:\t       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_INSTRUCTION_LEN));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6659-\tpr_err(\"        reason=%08x qualification=%016lx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6660:\t       vmcs_read32(VM_EXIT_REASON), vmcs_readl(EXIT_QUALIFICATION));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6661-\tpr_err(\"IDTVectoring: info=%08x errcode=%08x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6662:\t       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_INFO_FIELD),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6663:\t       vmcs_read32(IDT_VECTORING_ERROR_CODE));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6664:\tpr_err(\"TSC Offset = 0x%016llx\\n\", vmcs_read64(TSC_OFFSET));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6665-\tif (secondary_exec_control \u0026 SECONDARY_EXEC_TSC_SCALING)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6666-\t\tpr_err(\"TSC Multiplier = 0x%016llx\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6667:\t\t       vmcs_read64(TSC_MULTIPLIER));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6668-\tif (cpu_based_exec_ctrl \u0026 CPU_BASED_TPR_SHADOW) {\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6669-\t\tif (secondary_exec_control \u0026 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUAL_INTR_DELIVERY) {\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6670:\t\t\tu16 status = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6671-\t\t\tpr_err(\"SVI|RVI = %02x|%02x \", status \u003e\u003e 8, status \u0026 0xff);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6672-\t\t}\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6673:\t\tpr_cont(\"TPR Threshold = 0x%02x\\n\", vmcs_read32(TPR_THRESHOLD));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6674-\t\tif (secondary_exec_control \u0026 SECONDARY_EXEC_VIRTUALIZE_APIC_ACCESSES)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6675:\t\t\tpr_err(\"APIC-access addr = 0x%016llx \", vmcs_read64(APIC_ACCESS_ADDR));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6676:\t\tpr_cont(\"virt-APIC addr = 0x%016llx\\n\", vmcs_read64(VIRTUAL_APIC_PAGE_ADDR));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6677-\t}\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6678-\tif (pin_based_exec_ctrl \u0026 PIN_BASED_POSTED_INTR)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6679:\t\tpr_err(\"PostedIntrVec = 0x%02x\\n\", vmcs_read16(POSTED_INTR_NV));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6680-\tif ((secondary_exec_control \u0026 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_EPT))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6681:\t\tpr_err(\"EPT pointer = 0x%016llx\\n\", vmcs_read64(EPT_POINTER));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6682-\tif (secondary_exec_control \u0026 SECONDARY_EXEC_PAUSE_LOOP_EXITING)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6683-\t\tpr_err(\"PLE Gap=%08x Window=%08x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6684:\t\t       vmcs_read32(PLE_GAP), vmcs_read32(PLE_WINDOW));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6685-\tif (secondary_exec_control \u0026 SECONDARY_EXEC_ENABLE_VPID)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6686-\t\tpr_err(\"Virtual processor ID = 0x%04x\\n\",\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6687:\t\t       vmcs_read16(VIRTUAL_PROCESSOR_ID));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6688-\tif (secondary_exec_control \u0026 SECONDARY_EXEC_EPT_VIOLATION_VE) {\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6689-\t\tstruct vmx_ve_information *ve_info = vmx-\u003eve_info;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6690:\t\tu64 ve_info_pa = vmcs_read64(VE_INFORMATION_ADDRESS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6691-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6712=static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6799-\t\tvcpu-\u003erun-\u003efail_entry.hardware_entry_failure_reason\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6800:\t\t\t= vmcs_read32(VM_INSTRUCTION_ERROR);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6801-\t\tvcpu-\u003erun-\u003efail_entry.cpu = vcpu-\u003earch.last_vmentry_cpu;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=7030=void vmx_hwapic_isr_update(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int max_isr)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7044-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7045:\tstatus = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7046-\told = status \u003e\u003e 8;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=7054=static void vmx_set_rvi(int vector)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7061-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7062:\tstatus = vmcs_read16(GUEST_INTR_STATUS);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7063-\told = (u8)status \u0026 0xff;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=7246=static void vmx_recover_nmi_blocking(struct vcpu_vmx *vmx)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7277-\t\t\tvmx-\u003eloaded_vmcs-\u003enmi_known_unmasked =\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7278:\t\t\t\t!(vmcs_read32(GUEST_INTERRUPTIBILITY_INFO)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7279-\t\t\t\t  \u0026 GUEST_INTR_STATE_NMI);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=7286=static void __vmx_complete_interrupts(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7319-\tcase INTR_TYPE_SOFT_EXCEPTION:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7320:\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7321-\t\tfallthrough;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7325-\t\tif (idt_vectoring_info \u0026 VECTORING_INFO_DELIVER_CODE_MASK)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7326:\t\t\terror_code = vmcs_read32(error_code_field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7327-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7333-\tcase INTR_TYPE_SOFT_INTR:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7334:\t\tvcpu-\u003earch.event_exit_inst_len = vmcs_read32(instr_len_field);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7335-\t\tfallthrough;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=7351=void vmx_cancel_injection(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7353-\t__vmx_complete_interrupts(vcpu,\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7354:\t\t\t\t  vmcs_read32(VM_ENTRY_INTR_INFO_FIELD),\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7355-\t\t\t\t  VM_ENTRY_INSTRUCTION_LEN,\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=7387=static void vmx_refresh_guest_perf_global_control(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7406-\n\n"
}

7/2 2026/07/22 12:05 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 20906
							output: 43
							thoughts: 189
						

Thoughts:
**Analyzing the Compiler Reordering Patch**

Okay, so this patch is targeting a pretty specific issue: compiler reordering around those crucial VMCS read/write operations. That's a classic cause of hard-to-debug bugs, especially in a performance-critical area like virtualization. It looks like the fix involves tweaking `__vmcs_readl` and the `vmx_asm1` / `vmx_asm2` macros within `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx_ops.h`. Functionally, this seems sound. Addressing potential memory access optimization or reordering issues is definitely the right approach here. We need to focus fuzzing efforts on the KVM VMX components to properly validate this fix.

Given that, I should concentrate on the key VMX operations during fuzzing. My immediate thought is to look at functions like `vmx_handle_exit`, `handle_exception_nmi`, and `handle_ept_violation`. Then, let's nail down the main run loop. It's likely `vmx_vcpu_run`, but I should verify that by checking `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c`. That should give us a good starting point for constructing effective fuzz targets.



8/2 2026/07/22 12:05 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "vmx_vcpu_run",
  "PathPrefix": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5352=static int handle_machine_check(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5353-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5354:\t/* handled by vmx_vcpu_run() */\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5355-\treturn 1;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5425=static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5437-\t * Machine checks are handled by handle_exception_irqoff(), or by\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5438:\t * vmx_vcpu_run() if a #MC occurs on VM-Entry.  NMIs are handled by\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5439-\t * vmx_vcpu_enter_exit().\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=7483=static noinstr void vmx_vcpu_enter_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7496-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7497:\tvmx-\u003efail = __vmx_vcpu_run(vmx, flags);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7498-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7520-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7521:fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7522-{\n"
}

9/2 2026/07/22 12:05 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 21959
							output: 42
							thoughts: 31
						

Thoughts:
Here's a summary of my thought process, as requested:

**Diving into the VMX Exit Handler**

Okay, so we're talking about handling VM exits in the VMX context, and that usually means a trip into `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c`. My immediate thought is to zero in on `vmx_handle_exit`. That's where the rubber meets the road, where the kernel jumps to process the reasons for the guest's halt. I need to understand *how* the hardware signaled an exit, *why* it did, and *what* needs to be done on the host to properly emulate and then resume. The `vmx_handle_exit` function is the central piece of that puzzle. It's the dispatcher, the traffic controller for all these various events that can occur in the VMX environment. I'm expecting to find the logic that determines the exit reason (page fault, interrupt window, nested virtualization event, etc.) and then dispatches to the correct handler. I'll be looking for any hints on how the VCPU is saved and restored here too, because the context switch is the main challenge.



10/2 2026/07/22 12:05 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "vmx_handle_exit",
  "PathPrefix": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=5425=static int handle_exception_nmi(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5490-\t * MMIO, it is better to report an internal error.\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:5491:\t * See the comments in vmx_handle_exit.\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-5492-\t */\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6274=static int handle_bus_lock_vmexit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6278-\t * VM-Exits. Unconditionally set the flag here and leave the handling to\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6279:\t * vmx_handle_exit().\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6280-\t */\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=6507=void dump_vmcs(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6711- */\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6712:static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6713-{\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6870-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6871:int vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6872-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:6873:\tint ret = __vmx_handle_exit(vcpu, exit_fastpath);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-6874-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c=7184=static void handle_external_interrupt_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7199-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c:7200:void vmx_handle_exit_irqoff(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c-7201-{\n"
}

11/2 2026/07/22 12:05 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 23030
							output: 34
							thoughts: 88
						

Thoughts:
Okay, let's break this down.

**My Analysis of the KVM/VMX Code Path**

Right, so I'm looking at how this all fits together. `vmx_vcpu_run`, `vmx_handle_exit`, `__vmx_handle_exit`, `handle_ept_violation`, and `handle_exception_nmi` are definitely key entry points or core functions I need to keep in mind. Those symbols are where the rubber meets the road, the critical junctions in the VMX execution flow. I'll need to understand their interactions intimately.

But I can't just dive into the code without context. What about the build configuration? Kconfig is the gatekeeper. I need to make sure KVM and KVM_INTEL are enabled. Let me pull up `arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig` and see what the build settings are and how this is all configured. That should tell me which code paths are even relevant for my analysis. Understanding the build options is crucial to understanding the relevant code.



12/2 2026/07/22 12:05 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "config KVM",
  "PathPrefix": "arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/Kconfig=18=if VIRTUALIZATION\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-19-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:20:config KVM_X86\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-21-\tdef_tristate KVM if (KVM_INTEL != n || KVM_AMD != n)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-51-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:52:config KVM\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-53-\ttristate \"Kernel-based Virtual Machine (KVM) support\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-68-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:69:config KVM_WERROR\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-70-\tbool \"Compile KVM with -Werror\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-82-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:83:config KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-84-\tbool \"Enable support for KVM software-protected VMs\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-95-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:96:config KVM_INTEL\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-97-\ttristate \"KVM for Intel (and compatible) processors support\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-106-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:107:config KVM_INTEL_PROVE_VE\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-108-        bool \"Check that guests do not receive #VE exceptions\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig=122=config X86_SGX_KVM\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-133-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:134:config KVM_INTEL_TDX\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-135-\tbool \"Intel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) support\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-145-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:146:config KVM_AMD\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-147-\ttristate \"KVM for AMD processors support\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-155-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:156:config KVM_AMD_SEV\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-157-\tbool \"AMD Secure Encrypted Virtualization (SEV) support\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-171-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:172:config KVM_IOAPIC\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-173-\tbool \"I/O APIC, PIC, and PIT emulation\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-181-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:182:config KVM_SMM\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-183-\tbool \"System Management Mode emulation\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-192-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:193:config KVM_HYPERV\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-194-\tbool \"Support for Microsoft Hyper-V emulation\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-206-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:207:config KVM_XEN\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-208-\tbool \"Support for Xen hypercall interface\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-215-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:216:config KVM_PROVE_MMU\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-217-\tbool \"Prove KVM MMU correctness\"\n--\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-228-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:229:config KVM_EXTERNAL_WRITE_TRACKING\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-230-\tbool\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-231-\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig:232:config KVM_MAX_NR_VCPUS\narch/x86/kvm/Kconfig-233-\tint \"Maximum number of vCPUs per KVM guest\"\n"
}

13/2 2026/07/22 12:05 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 24595
							output: 146
							thoughts: 460
						

Thoughts:
**My Fuzzing Strategy for This KVM VMX Patch**

Okay, so I've got this patch that introduces a "memory" clobber in the inline assembly for VMCS reads and writes within KVM VMX. This is interesting because it's a functional change that's *specifically* aimed at preventing compiler optimizations that could cause subtle, hard-to-debug bugs in KVM execution. That screams "fuzzing target" to me.

First, the configs. Looks like we need `KVM` and `KVM_INTEL` enabled. Good. I'm going to just roll with `KVM_INTEL` since it's sufficient.

Now, let's nail down the critical functions. This patch touches VMCS reads and writes, which means I want to focus on the entry points and the handlers that interact with the VMCS directly. Initially, I was thinking `vmx_vcpu_run`, `vmx_handle_exit`, `__vmx_handle_exit`, `handle_ept_violation`, and `handle_exception_nmi` are prime targets.

`vmx_vcpu_run` seems like a solid choice since it's the main function to enter the VMX execution, so I'm going to keep it. Yes, it's `fastpath_t vmx_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 run_flags)`. 

I've also got `vmx_handle_exit`, as it will handle any exits during the execution.

Let me just double-check for any other functions in this space. Ah, there are a few more: `vmx_set_interrupt_shadow`, `vmx_get_rflags`, `vmx_get_interrupt_shadow`, `vmx_inject_exception`. While interesting, `vmx_vcpu_run` and `vmx_handle_exit` are the big ones. They are the core of VMX execution and exit, and thus rely heavily on the VMCS reads and writes.

So, let's refine those `FocusSymbols` again:

*   `vmx_vcpu_run`
*   `vmx_handle_exit`
*   `__vmx_handle_exit`
*   `handle_ept_violation`
*   `handle_exception_nmi`

Yeah, this is looking like a solid set to start with. I'll flag this as "WorthFuzzing: true" because compiler reordering bugs are exactly the type of subtle issues that fuzzing excels at finding. Time to go ahead and `set-results`.



14/2 2026/07/22 12:05 tool set-results
0m Args:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "KVM",
    "KVM_INTEL"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "vmx_vcpu_run",
    "vmx_handle_exit",
    "__vmx_handle_exit",
    "handle_ept_violation",
    "handle_exception_nmi"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch adds a \"memory\" clobber to inline assembly for VMCS reads and writes in KVM VMX. This is a functional change that prevents compiler reordering and caching of memory values around VMCS operations, which can lead to subtle bugs in KVM execution flow.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "KVM",
    "KVM_INTEL"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "vmx_vcpu_run",
    "vmx_handle_exit",
    "__vmx_handle_exit",
    "handle_ept_violation",
    "handle_exception_nmi"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch adds a \"memory\" clobber to inline assembly for VMCS reads and writes in KVM VMX. This is a functional change that prevents compiler reordering and caching of memory values around VMCS operations, which can lead to subtle bugs in KVM execution flow.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

LLM Calls Summary:
Total Calls Total Tokens Avg Tokens Total Duration (Seconds) Avg Duration (Seconds)
Tool Calls Summary:
Total Calls Total Duration (Seconds) Avg Duration (Seconds)