| Seq | Timestamp | Type | Name | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0/0 | 2026/10/09 05:00 | flow | patch-triage |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": null,
"FocusSymbols": [],
"KMSANReasoning": "",
"NeedsKMSAN": false,
"Reasoning": "The patch only adds and modifies files within tools/testing/selftests/x86/ (userspace selftests), which does not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.",
"WorthFuzzing": false
} |
| 1/1 | 2026/10/09 05:00 | action | read-patch-diff |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"PatchDiff": "commit a400b2209445cb9a382dfd99dc4b8b46883d09e9\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate: Fri Oct 9 05:00:45 2026 +0000\n\n syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile\nindex d478b13cc8d5d..025c187a563d4 100644\n--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile\n+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile\n@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \\\n \t\t\ttest_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \\\n \t\t\tvdso_restorer\n TARGETS_C_64BIT_ONLY := fsgsbase sysret_rip syscall_numbering \\\n-\t\t\tcorrupt_xstate_header amx lam test_shadow_stack avx apx\n+\t\t\tcorrupt_xstate_header amx lam test_shadow_stack avx apx \\\n+\t\t\tlass\n # Some selftests require 32bit support enabled also on 64bit systems\n TARGETS_C_32BIT_NEEDED := ldt_gdt ptrace_syscall\n \ndiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lass.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lass.c\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000000..5f6e326e4f4aa\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lass.c\n@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@\n+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\n+/*\n+ * Test Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) enforcement\n+ *\n+ * With LASS enabled, a user-mode read, write or instruction fetch at a kernel\n+ * address raises a #GP instead of the #PF that paging alone would produce.\n+ */\n+#define _GNU_SOURCE\n+\n+#include \u003csetjmp.h\u003e\n+#include \u003csignal.h\u003e\n+#include \u003cstdbool.h\u003e\n+#include \u003csys/ucontext.h\u003e\n+\n+#include \"helpers.h\"\n+\n+#ifndef __x86_64__\n+# error This test is 64-bit only\n+#endif\n+\n+/*\n+ * Canonicality enforcement generates the same #GP as LASS for non-canonical\n+ * addresses. So, use a canonical address to specifically attribute the fault\n+ * to LASS. Bits 63:47 are all set here, which is canonical with 4-level\n+ * paging as well as 5-level paging.\n+ */\n+#define KERNEL_ADDR\t0xffff800000000000UL\n+\n+static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;\n+\n+static volatile unsigned long fault_trapno, fault_err, fault_rip;\n+\n+/* Handle SIGSEGV (#GP and #PF) */\n+static void fault_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void)\n+{\n+\tucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)ctx_void;\n+\n+\tfault_trapno = ctx-\u003euc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];\n+\tfault_err = ctx-\u003euc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ERR];\n+\tfault_rip = ctx-\u003euc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP];\n+\tsiglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);\n+}\n+\n+/* Check CPUID bit corresponding to X86_FEATURE_LASS */\n+static bool is_lass_supported(void)\n+{\n+\tunsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;\n+\n+\t__cpuid_count(0x7, 0x1, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);\n+\treturn eax \u0026 (1 \u003c\u003c 6);\n+}\n+\n+/* A LASS violation raises a #GP with a null error code. */\n+static bool is_lass_violation(void)\n+{\n+\treturn fault_trapno == 13 \u0026\u0026 !fault_err;\n+}\n+\n+static void test_kernel_read(void)\n+{\n+\tif (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {\n+\t\t*(volatile unsigned long *)KERNEL_ADDR;\n+\t\tksft_test_result_fail(\"The read did not fault\\n\");\n+\t\treturn;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tksft_test_result(is_lass_violation(),\n+\t\t\t \"The read faulted with trap=%ld, error=0x%lx\\n\",\n+\t\t\t fault_trapno, fault_err);\n+}\n+\n+static void test_kernel_write(void)\n+{\n+\tif (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {\n+\t\t*(volatile unsigned long *)KERNEL_ADDR = 0x1a55;\n+\t\tksft_test_result_fail(\"The write did not fault\\n\");\n+\t\treturn;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tksft_test_result(is_lass_violation(),\n+\t\t\t \"The write faulted with trap=%ld, error=0x%lx\\n\",\n+\t\t\t fault_trapno, fault_err);\n+}\n+\n+/*\n+ * Branch to the kernel address by hand: a direct 'call rel32' cannot reach\n+ * that far, and an indirect call through a function pointer is free to be\n+ * elided, which would stop testing the fetch.\n+ *\n+ * A 'jmp' fetches the target without writing the stack and never returns, so\n+ * there is no call-clobbered register state to describe.\n+ */\n+static void do_fetch(unsigned long addr)\n+{\n+\tasm volatile (\"jmp *%[fn]\" : : [fn] \"r\" (addr));\n+}\n+\n+static void test_kernel_fetch(void)\n+{\n+\tif (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {\n+\t\tdo_fetch(KERNEL_ADDR);\n+\n+\t\t/*\n+\t\t * Control does not come back from the jump, so reaching here\n+\t\t * means execution went somewhere unknown. Don't try to run\n+\t\t * the rest of the tests.\n+\t\t */\n+\t\tksft_exit_fail_msg(\"The fetch did not fault\\n\");\n+\t}\n+\n+\t/*\n+\t * Branch instructions do not check their target against LASS. The\n+\t * violation happens when the target address is used to fetch the next\n+\t * instruction, so the fault must be reported at the target rather\n+\t * than at the branch.\n+\t */\n+\tif (fault_rip != KERNEL_ADDR) {\n+\t\tksft_test_result_fail(\"The fetch faulted at RIP 0x%lx instead of 0x%lx\\n\",\n+\t\t\t\t fault_rip, KERNEL_ADDR);\n+\t\treturn;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tksft_test_result(is_lass_violation(),\n+\t\t\t \"The fetch faulted with trap=%ld, error=0x%lx\\n\",\n+\t\t\t fault_trapno, fault_err);\n+}\n+\n+#define TOTAL_TESTS 3\n+\n+int main(void)\n+{\n+\tksft_print_header();\n+\n+\t/*\n+\t * Only the cpuinfo flag truly reflects whether the kernel enabled\n+\t * LASS. In practice, the kernel always enables LASS when the CPU\n+\t * supports it, so check the CPUID bit instead.\n+\t *\n+\t * The test is expected to fail if LASS is disabled via the kernel\n+\t * command line.\n+\t */\n+\tif (!is_lass_supported())\n+\t\tksft_exit_skip(\"LASS is not present\\n\");\n+\n+\tksft_set_plan(TOTAL_TESTS);\n+\n+\tsethandler(SIGSEGV, fault_handler, 0);\n+\n+\tksft_print_msg(\"Accessing the kernel address 0x%lx from userspace\\n\",\n+\t\t KERNEL_ADDR);\n+\ttest_kernel_read();\n+\ttest_kernel_write();\n+\ttest_kernel_fetch();\n+\n+\tclearhandler(SIGSEGV);\n+\n+\tksft_finished();\n+}\n"
} |
| 2/1 | 2026/10/09 05:00 | agent | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:core Args: null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": null,
"FocusSymbols": [],
"Reasoning": "The patch only adds and modifies files within tools/testing/selftests/x86/ (userspace selftests), which does not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.",
"WorthFuzzing": false
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and evaluate whether it warrants fuzzing with syzkaller.
IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on internal assumptions. You must actively use your code access
tools to inspect the actual source code, callers, and surrounding context.
================================================================================
1. CORE TRIAGE PHILOSOPHY
================================================================================
The goal of patch fuzzing is to discover crashes, regressions, exposed latent bugs,
and newly triggered assertions introduced by the patch series.
- REACHABILITY IS THE PRIMARY GATE:
Fuzzing can only discover bugs in code that can actually execute in standard virtualized
environments (GCE or QEMU, utilizing software-emulated devices like USB gadgets, netdev, tun/tap).
If the modified code is structurally unreachable (see Section 2), it MUST NOT be fuzzed,
regardless of whether it adds assertions or complex logic.
- DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST "NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGE" (NFCI) OR "REFACTORING" CLAIMS:
Patch authors routinely label changes as "cleanups", "refactorings", or state
"No functional change intended". Do NOT take these claims at face value.
Code refactorings that rearrange logic, introduce helper functions, or alter state management
in core subsystems frequently introduce subtle semantic shifts or uncover latent kernel bugs.
If reachable executable code is modified or refactored, it MUST be fuzzed.
- NEW OR MODIFIED ASSERTIONS IN REACHABLE CODE MUST BE FUZZED:
When a patch introduces or modifies runtime checks or assertions (e.g., WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*,
BUG_ON*, lockdep_assert*) in reachable code paths, it enforces new or stricter invariants.
Even if the author believes the invariant always holds, fuzzing is essential to verify whether
an unusual sequence of operations can violate it.
================================================================================
2. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=false (NEGATIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=false ONLY IF all modified code falls strictly into one or more of these categories:
- Non-kernel and non-executable changes:
* Modifications to Documentation/, comments, or spelling fixes.
* User-space directories, self-tests, samples, or scripts (e.g., tools/, samples/, scripts/, usr/)
that do not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.
* Purely decorative logging (e.g., message strings in pr_err, printk, dev_info) or tracepoints
that do not alter control flow or data structures.
* Build system or Kconfig changes that do not alter compiled C logic.
- Structurally unreachable hardware:
* Vendor-specific PCIe switches, SmartNICs, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed,
ionic, amdgpu) requiring physical ASIC/PCIe cards not emulated in standard QEMU.
- Unreachable execution paths:
* Driver teardown callbacks (.remove, .shutdown, pci_unregister_driver) executed only during
physical PCI hot-unplug or manual sysfs driver unbinding.
* Code paths exclusive to architectures other than the target architecture.
================================================================================
3. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=true (POSITIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=true whenever the patch touches reachable executable code, including:
- Core Subsystems:
* Any logic modifications in memory management (mm/), synchronization/locking (kernel/locking/),
BPF, scheduler, core networking, VFS, or syscall handling.
- Refactorings and Code Cleanups:
* Any restructuring of reachable data structures, helper abstractions, or algorithm flows.
- Runtime Assertions and Defensive Checks:
* Any introduction or alteration of assertions (WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*, BUG_ON*, etc.) in reachable paths.
- Reachable Drivers and Protocols:
* Drivers accessible via virtual buses (virtio, USB gadget, loopback, netlink, binder, sockets, etc.).
================================================================================
4. EXTRACTING FocusSymbols (PREVENTING DILUTION)
================================================================================
When WorthFuzzing=true, you must extract specific kernel functions into FocusSymbols to guide the fuzzer:
- AVOID UBIQUITOUS LIFECYCLE HOT-PATHS:
Do NOT list generic, ubiquitous functions called by almost every program in the corpus
(including, but not limited to: general memory allocators and deallocators, page fault
and trap handlers, or core synchronization primitives; this is not an exhaustive list).
Listing ubiquitous functions causes the fuzzer to classify thousands of unrelated tests as "focused",
which severely dilutes fuzzing effort away from the actual changes.
- TARGET SPECIFIC FEATURE LOGIC AND ENTRYPOINTS:
List functions that specifically implement the logic being added or altered, or direct API entrypoints
for the subsystem feature under review.
- HANDLING STATIC INLINE FUNCTIONS IN HEADERS (.h):
Compiler-inlined static functions (such as static inlines in mm/*.h or include/linux/*.h) lack
distinct symbol addresses in vmlinux and cannot be targeted directly by symbol coverage filters.
If the changes are primarily in static inline helpers, identify non-static, feature-specific caller
functions in .c files that exercise them (avoiding ubiquitous lifecycle wrappers).
================================================================================
5. IDENTIFYING EnableConfigs
================================================================================
Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly compile and reach the modified code:
- Inspect Kconfig files and #ifdef guards; do not make assumptions.
- Check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs needed.
- Strip any 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Target architecture: amd64
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit a400b2209445cb9a382dfd99dc4b8b46883d09e9
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date: Fri Oct 9 05:00:45 2026 +0000
syz-cluster: applied patch under review
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
index d478b13cc8d5d..025c187a563d4 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/Makefile
@@ -19,7 +19,8 @@ TARGETS_C_32BIT_ONLY := entry_from_vm86 test_syscall_vdso unwind_vdso \
test_FCMOV test_FCOMI test_FISTTP \
vdso_restorer
TARGETS_C_64BIT_ONLY := fsgsbase sysret_rip syscall_numbering \
- corrupt_xstate_header amx lam test_shadow_stack avx apx
+ corrupt_xstate_header amx lam test_shadow_stack avx apx \
+ lass
# Some selftests require 32bit support enabled also on 64bit systems
TARGETS_C_32BIT_NEEDED := ldt_gdt ptrace_syscall
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lass.c b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lass.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..5f6e326e4f4aa
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/x86/lass.c
@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Test Linear Address Space Separation (LASS) enforcement
+ *
+ * With LASS enabled, a user-mode read, write or instruction fetch at a kernel
+ * address raises a #GP instead of the #PF that paging alone would produce.
+ */
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+
+#include <setjmp.h>
+#include <signal.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <sys/ucontext.h>
+
+#include "helpers.h"
+
+#ifndef __x86_64__
+# error This test is 64-bit only
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Canonicality enforcement generates the same #GP as LASS for non-canonical
+ * addresses. So, use a canonical address to specifically attribute the fault
+ * to LASS. Bits 63:47 are all set here, which is canonical with 4-level
+ * paging as well as 5-level paging.
+ */
+#define KERNEL_ADDR 0xffff800000000000UL
+
+static sigjmp_buf jmpbuf;
+
+static volatile unsigned long fault_trapno, fault_err, fault_rip;
+
+/* Handle SIGSEGV (#GP and #PF) */
+static void fault_handler(int sig, siginfo_t *info, void *ctx_void)
+{
+ ucontext_t *ctx = (ucontext_t *)ctx_void;
+
+ fault_trapno = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_TRAPNO];
+ fault_err = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_ERR];
+ fault_rip = ctx->uc_mcontext.gregs[REG_RIP];
+ siglongjmp(jmpbuf, 1);
+}
+
+/* Check CPUID bit corresponding to X86_FEATURE_LASS */
+static bool is_lass_supported(void)
+{
+ unsigned int eax, ebx, ecx, edx;
+
+ __cpuid_count(0x7, 0x1, eax, ebx, ecx, edx);
+ return eax & (1 << 6);
+}
+
+/* A LASS violation raises a #GP with a null error code. */
+static bool is_lass_violation(void)
+{
+ return fault_trapno == 13 && !fault_err;
+}
+
+static void test_kernel_read(void)
+{
+ if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
+ *(volatile unsigned long *)KERNEL_ADDR;
+ ksft_test_result_fail("The read did not fault\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ksft_test_result(is_lass_violation(),
+ "The read faulted with trap=%ld, error=0x%lx\n",
+ fault_trapno, fault_err);
+}
+
+static void test_kernel_write(void)
+{
+ if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
+ *(volatile unsigned long *)KERNEL_ADDR = 0x1a55;
+ ksft_test_result_fail("The write did not fault\n");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ksft_test_result(is_lass_violation(),
+ "The write faulted with trap=%ld, error=0x%lx\n",
+ fault_trapno, fault_err);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Branch to the kernel address by hand: a direct 'call rel32' cannot reach
+ * that far, and an indirect call through a function pointer is free to be
+ * elided, which would stop testing the fetch.
+ *
+ * A 'jmp' fetches the target without writing the stack and never returns, so
+ * there is no call-clobbered register state to describe.
+ */
+static void do_fetch(unsigned long addr)
+{
+ asm volatile ("jmp *%[fn]" : : [fn] "r" (addr));
+}
+
+static void test_kernel_fetch(void)
+{
+ if (sigsetjmp(jmpbuf, 1) == 0) {
+ do_fetch(KERNEL_ADDR);
+
+ /*
+ * Control does not come back from the jump, so reaching here
+ * means execution went somewhere unknown. Don't try to run
+ * the rest of the tests.
+ */
+ ksft_exit_fail_msg("The fetch did not fault\n");
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Branch instructions do not check their target against LASS. The
+ * violation happens when the target address is used to fetch the next
+ * instruction, so the fault must be reported at the target rather
+ * than at the branch.
+ */
+ if (fault_rip != KERNEL_ADDR) {
+ ksft_test_result_fail("The fetch faulted at RIP 0x%lx instead of 0x%lx\n",
+ fault_rip, KERNEL_ADDR);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ ksft_test_result(is_lass_violation(),
+ "The fetch faulted with trap=%ld, error=0x%lx\n",
+ fault_trapno, fault_err);
+}
+
+#define TOTAL_TESTS 3
+
+int main(void)
+{
+ ksft_print_header();
+
+ /*
+ * Only the cpuinfo flag truly reflects whether the kernel enabled
+ * LASS. In practice, the kernel always enables LASS when the CPU
+ * supports it, so check the CPUID bit instead.
+ *
+ * The test is expected to fail if LASS is disabled via the kernel
+ * command line.
+ */
+ if (!is_lass_supported())
+ ksft_exit_skip("LASS is not present\n");
+
+ ksft_set_plan(TOTAL_TESTS);
+
+ sethandler(SIGSEGV, fault_handler, 0);
+
+ ksft_print_msg("Accessing the kernel address 0x%lx from userspace\n",
+ KERNEL_ADDR);
+ test_kernel_read();
+ test_kernel_write();
+ test_kernel_fetch();
+
+ clearhandler(SIGSEGV);
+
+ ksft_finished();
+}
|
| 3/2 | 2026/10/09 05:00 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 4792 output: 75 thoughts: 834 Thoughts: **Patch Evaluation: Self-Test Addition** Okay, let's take a look at this patch series. First, I need to inspect the diff to understand the scope of the changes. Hmm, this is straightforward. It's just two files, both nestled within `tools/testing/selftests/x86/`. The diff shows a modification to the `Makefile` and the addition of a new `lass.c` file. Now, let me run through the "WorthFuzzing" criteria. My expertise tells me to quickly apply the negative criteria. Let's see... "Return WorthFuzzing=false ONLY IF all modified code falls strictly into one or more of these categories:..." Right, and here, the modified code is *strictly* contained within `tools/testing/selftests/x86/`. That's user-space, part of the self-test suite. The documentation explicitly states that changes in `tools/` that don't impact the kernel image (`vmlinux`) or modules don't warrant fuzzing. Therefore, because both the `Makefile` change and the new `lass.c` file are completely isolated to the user-space self-tests, and do not affect the kernel, this patch is clearly *not* worth fuzzing. I don't need to consider any `FocusSymbols` or `EnableConfigs`. The reasoning is clear: the changes are limited to a user-space testing tool. So, the values I need are: `WorthFuzzing = false` `FocusSymbols = []` `EnableConfigs = []` `Reasoning = "The patch modifies only selftests under tools/testing/selftests/x86/, which are userspace test tools and do not affect the compiled kernel image or modules."` I'm confident in this evaluation; this change is self-contained. I will now set these results. |
| 4/2 | 2026/10/09 05:01 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"EnableConfigs": [],
"FocusSymbols": [],
"Reasoning": "The patch only adds and modifies files within tools/testing/selftests/x86/ (userspace selftests), which does not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.",
"WorthFuzzing": false
}Results: {
"EnableConfigs": null,
"FocusSymbols": [],
"Reasoning": "The patch only adds and modifies files within tools/testing/selftests/x86/ (userspace selftests), which does not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.",
"WorthFuzzing": false
} |
| 5/1 | 2026/10/09 05:01 | action | If |
0mArgs:{
"WorthFuzzing": false
}Results: null |
| Total Calls | Total Tokens | Avg Tokens | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|
| Total Calls | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|