AI Trajectory

null

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PKEY_UV",
    "S390_UV_UAPI",
    "PKEY"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "uv_find_secret"
  ],
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch fixes two bugs in the Ultravisor secret listing logic:\n1. It changes the loop bound in `find_secret_in_page` from `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` (total secrets in the guest) to `list-\u003enum_secr_stored` (secrets stored in the current page). This prevents reading past the valid entries in the `list-\u003esecrets` array, which could have resulted in out-of-bounds reads (caught by KASAN) or reading uninitialized memory.\n2. It fixes the loop condition in `uv_find_secret` to correctly iterate over multiple pages of secrets by updating `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop rather than the end.\n\nThese changes are purely bug fixes for iteration logic and bounds checking. They do not introduce any new allocations, structures, or data paths to user space that could expose uninitialized memory. Therefore, a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not necessary.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false,
  "Reasoning": "The patch fixes a bug in the `uv_find_secret` function where the loop to iterate through pages of secrets would terminate prematurely after the first iteration because `start_idx` was updated to `list-\u003enext_secret_idx` before the loop condition check. It also fixes an out-of-bounds read by using `list-\u003enum_secr_stored` instead of `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` when iterating over secrets in a single page. These are functional changes to the s390x Ultravisor secret retrieval logic, which is reachable from userspace via the `/dev/pkey` ioctl interface when the `PKEY_UV` module is loaded. Fuzzing this is valuable to ensure the secret retrieval logic handles multi-page responses correctly.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

null

{
  "PatchDiff": "commit 6510d9d492167ac0e264929e3d0110a1414c8a02\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate:   Tue Aug 11 16:42:30 2026 +0000\n\n    syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\nindex a284f98d97168..e70acad09cd5f 100644\n--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\n+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\n@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n {\n \tu16 i;\n \n-\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c list-\u003etotal_num_secrets; i++) {\n+\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c list-\u003enum_secr_stored; i++) {\n \t\tif (memcmp(secret_id, list-\u003esecrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {\n \t\t\t*secret = list-\u003esecrets[i].hdr;\n \t\t\treturn 0;\n@@ -781,11 +781,14 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n \t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n \t\t   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n {\n-\tu16 start_idx = 0;\n+\tu16 start_idx;\n \tu16 list_rc;\n \tint ret;\n \n+\tlist-\u003enext_secret_idx = 0;\n+\n \tdo {\n+\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\n \t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\n \t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n \t\t\tif (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)\n@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n \t\tret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);\n \t\tif (ret == 0)\n \t\t\treturn ret;\n-\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\n \t} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA \u0026\u0026 start_idx \u003c list-\u003enext_secret_idx);\n \n \treturn -ENOENT;\n"
}

best-expensive

null

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PKEY_UV",
    "S390_UV_UAPI",
    "PKEY"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "uv_find_secret"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch fixes a bug in the `uv_find_secret` function where the loop to iterate through pages of secrets would terminate prematurely after the first iteration because `start_idx` was updated to `list-\u003enext_secret_idx` before the loop condition check. It also fixes an out-of-bounds read by using `list-\u003enum_secr_stored` instead of `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` when iterating over secrets in a single page. These are functional changes to the s390x Ultravisor secret retrieval logic, which is reachable from userspace via the `/dev/pkey` ioctl interface when the `PKEY_UV` module is loaded. Fuzzing this is valuable to ensure the secret retrieval logic handles multi-page responses correctly.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and determine
if it makes functional changes to the kernel that should be fuzzed.

IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively
use your code access tools to examine the actual source code and confirm any assumptions.

Return WorthFuzzing=false if the patch only contains:
- Modifications to Documentation/, Kconfig files, or code comments.
- Purely decorative changes, such as logging (e.g., pr_err, printk) or tracepoints.
- Changes to numeric constants or macros that do not functionally alter execution flow.
- Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU,
  even when utilizing software-emulated hardware (e.g., usb gadget, mac80211_hwsim).
- Code in vendor-specific PCIe switch, SmartNIC, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed,
  ionic, amdgpu) that require physical PCIe hardware cards not emulated in standard QEMU.
- Driver .remove, .shutdown, or pci_unregister_driver teardown callbacks (e.g., igb_remove)
  that are executed only during PCI hot-unplug or sysfs driver unbind operations.

If it modifies reachable core kernel logic, drivers, or architectures, use your code search
tools to verify the code can be executed, then return WorthFuzzing=true.

When returning WorthFuzzing=true, you MUST ALSO:
1. Extract any specific kernel functions that should be heavily fuzzed into FocusSymbols.
   Avoid listing generic hot-path functions to prevent skewed test distributions.
   Prefer non-static, non-inlined API entrypoint functions over internal static helper functions
   (which are inlined by the compiler and do not have distinct symbol addresses).
2. Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly test this new/modified feature.
   Go and look into the Kconfig files and check for ifdefs around the code, do not make assumptions.
   Also check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs
   needed for Kbuild to compile the code statically into vmlinux. List them in the EnableConfigs
   output array, and DO NOT add a 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit 6510d9d492167ac0e264929e3d0110a1414c8a02
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Tue Aug 11 16:42:30 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index a284f98d97168..e70acad09cd5f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 {
 	u16 i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < list->total_num_secrets; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_secr_stored; i++) {
 		if (memcmp(secret_id, list->secrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {
 			*secret = list->secrets[i].hdr;
 			return 0;
@@ -781,11 +781,14 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		   struct uv_secret_list *list,
 		   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)
 {
-	u16 start_idx = 0;
+	u16 start_idx;
 	u16 list_rc;
 	int ret;
 
+	list->next_secret_idx = 0;
+
 	do {
+		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 		uv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, &list_rc, NULL);
 		if (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED && list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {
 			if (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)
@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		ret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);
 		if (ret == 0)
 			return ret;
-		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 	} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA && start_idx < list->next_secret_idx);
 
 	return -ENOENT;

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 2381
							output: 19
							thoughts: 279
						

**Analyzing a Patch to s390x UV Code**

Okay, so I've got this patch that touches `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`. I need to understand the implications, specifically because the changes are in the `find_secret_in_page` and `uv_find_secret` functions. In `find_secret_in_page`, it looks like they've renamed `list->total_num_secrets` to `list->num_secr_stored`. A simple name change; nothing too exciting there. However, the changes to `uv_find_secret` are a bit more interesting. We have an initialization of `list->next_secret_idx = 0;` and, crucially, `start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;` moved to the *beginning* of the loop, and the removal of the same line from the end. This clearly modifies the secret searching behavior. I need to figure out the exact implications of this.

The question then becomes, is this code even *reachable* in a typical setup? This `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c` file is clearly related to Ultravisor, or UV, on s390x. My immediate thought is, can this be fuzzed? Well, syzkaller does support s390x, so that’s a good starting point. Can I test this specific code change? QEMU is perfectly capable of emulating s390x. However, the catch is UV support in QEMU. Luckily, QEMU *does* have some s390x protected virtualization (PV) support, and PV uses UV. So, it's very likely that I can get a reproducible test case.

My next step is to quickly track down where `uv_find_secret` is called. That should give me a better understanding of the code's context and the impact of these changes.

{
  "Expression": "uv_find_secret"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=613=static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-617-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:618:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-22-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:23: * One pre-allocated uv_secret_list for use with uv_find_secret()\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-99-\tmemset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:100:\trc = uv_find_secret(secret_id, uv_list, secret);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-101-\tmutex_unlock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 3788
							output: 19
							thoughts: 55
						

Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this process:

**Diving into the `uv_find_secret` Call**

Okay, so `uv_find_secret` is being called within the `get_secret_metadata` function, and the call originates from `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`. That's a good starting point. My initial thought is to dive right into that file. Knowing the context of `get_secret_metadata` narrows down the potential areas within `pkey_uv.c` I need to focus on. Let's see what secrets are being fetched by checking `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`. I have a feeling this will be straightforward.

{
  "Expression": "get_secret_metadata"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c=806=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-812- * @buf_size: Size of the buffer. The correct buffer size is reported as part of\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:813: * the result from `uv_get_secret_metadata`.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-814- *\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=83=static bool is_uv_keytype(enum pkey_key_type keytype)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-92-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:93:static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-94-\t\t\t       struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=106=static int retrieve_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-111-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:112:\trc = get_secret_metadata(secret_id, \u0026secret_meta_data);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-113-\tif (rc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=233=static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-247-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:248:\trc = get_secret_metadata(t-\u003esecret_id, \u0026secret_meta_data);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-249-\tif (rc)\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 4555
							output: 17
							thoughts: 43
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, assuming I'm already quite familiar with the codebase:

**Tracing Data Flow: Uncovering Dependencies**

Right, so `get_secret_metadata` is the key function here. It's obviously pulling some critical information, likely about secrets, and I need to understand its impact. It's called from both `retrieve_secret` and `uv_verifykey`. My next logical step is to quickly determine the call sites of *those* two functions. Knowing where `retrieve_secret` and `uv_verifykey` are invoked will give me a clear picture of how this `get_secret_metadata` function fits into the larger system. I need to understand the data flow and identify any potential bottlenecks or security implications. Understanding the calling contexts of `retrieve_secret` and `uv_verifykey` is crucial for understanding `get_secret_metadata`.

{
  "Expression": "retrieve_secret"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=618=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-620-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:621:int uv_retrieve_secret(u16 secret_idx, u8 *buf, size_t buf_size);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-622-\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=806=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-808-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:809: * uv_retrieve_secret() - get the secret value for the secret index.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-810- * @secret_idx: Secret index for which the secret should be retrieved.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-825- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:826:int uv_retrieve_secret(u16 secret_idx, u8 *buf, size_t buf_size)\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-827-{\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-852-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:853:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_retrieve_secret);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-105-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:106:static int retrieve_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-107-\t\t\t   u16 *secret_type, u8 *buf, u32 *buflen)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-118-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:119:\trc = uv_retrieve_secret(secret_meta_data.index,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-120-\t\t\t\tbuf, secret_meta_data.length);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=190=static int uv_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *_apqns __always_unused,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-211-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:212:\trc = retrieve_secret(t-\u003esecret_id, \u0026secret_type, protkey, protkeylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-213-\tif (rc) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:214:\t\tPKEY_DBF_ERR(\"%s retrieve_secret() failed with %d\\n\",\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-215-\t\t\t     __func__, rc);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 5668
							output: 20
							thoughts: 40
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, from an expert's perspective:

**Investigating the `retrieve_secret` Call Chain**

Right, `retrieve_secret` is being called from within `uv_key2protkey`. That's the starting point. My immediate thought is, let's trace this back and understand the broader context. I need to see *where* `uv_key2protkey` and `uv_verifykey` are *themselves* being invoked. Understanding those calling contexts will illuminate what `retrieve_secret` is ultimately being used for and shed light on its criticality. Knowing the call graph will help identify possible vulnerabilities. A quick search for those functions and their usages should give me a better handle on the potential implications of this `retrieve_secret` call.

{
  "Expression": "uv_key2protkey"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=130=static int uv_get_size_and_type(u16 secret_type, u32 *pkeysize, u32 *pkeytype)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-189-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:190:static int uv_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *_apqns __always_unused,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-191-\t\t\t  size_t _nr_apqns __always_unused,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=272=static struct pkey_handler uv_handler = {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-276-\t.is_supported_keytype\t = is_uv_keytype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:277:\t.key_to_protkey\t\t = uv_key2protkey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-278-\t.verify_key\t\t = uv_verifykey,\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 6208
							output: 17
							thoughts: 88
						

Okay, here's my breakdown of this.

**Tracing the Path to the User Interface of the s390 PKey API**

Right, so I'm digging into how the s390's PKey functionality interacts with userspace. I see these components: we have `uv_handler`, which is part of a `pkey_handler`. The `pkey_handler` is being used within the `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c` file. The immediate question in my mind is, "Can userspace even reach this `pkey_api`?" And, thankfully, the answer is yes, because there's an ioctl interface exposed through `/dev/pkey`. So, I'll need to dive into that specific file, `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c`, to understand how this ioctl works and how it translates to the underlying key management functions. Time to dig in and see what's going on.

{
  "Expression": "pkey_handler"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=25=static int key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-32-\t/* try the direct way */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:33:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(apqns, nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-34-\t\t\t\t\t key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-39-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:40:\t\trc = pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(apqns, nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-41-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=55=int pkey_key2protkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-62-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:63:\t\tpkey_handler_request_modules();\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-64-\t\trc = key2protkey(NULL, 0, key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=92=static int pkey_ioctl_genseck(struct pkey_genseck __user *ugs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-104-\tkeybuflen = sizeof(kgs.seckey.seckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:105:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-106-\t\t\t\t  kgs.keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=116=static int pkey_ioctl_clr2seck(struct pkey_clr2seck __user *ucs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-128-\tkeybuflen = sizeof(kcs.seckey.seckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:129:\trc = pkey_handler_clr_to_key(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-130-\t\t\t\t     kcs.keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=142=static int pkey_ioctl_sec2protk(struct pkey_sec2protk __user *usp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-153-\tksp.protkey.len = sizeof(ksp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:154:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-155-\t\t\t\t\t ksp.seckey.seckey,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=215=static int pkey_ioctl_findcard(struct pkey_findcard __user *ufc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-229-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:230:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kfc.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-231-\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(kfc.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-234-\tif (rc == -ENODEV)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:235:\t\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kfc.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-236-\t\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(kfc.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=253=static int pkey_ioctl_skey2pkey(struct pkey_skey2pkey __user *usp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-261-\tksp.protkey.len = sizeof(ksp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:262:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-263-\t\t\t\t\t ksp.seckey.seckey,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=276=static int pkey_ioctl_verifykey(struct pkey_verifykey __user *uvk)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-286-\tkvk.domain = 0xFFFF;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:287:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(kvk.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-288-\t\t\t\t     sizeof(kvk.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=305=static int pkey_ioctl_genprotk(struct pkey_genprotk __user *ugp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-313-\tkgp.protkey.len = sizeof(kgp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:314:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0, kgp.keytype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-315-\t\t\t\t  PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=326=static int pkey_ioctl_verifyprotk(struct pkey_verifyprotk __user *uvp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-355-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:356:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(tmpbuf, sizeof(*t),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-357-\t\t\t\t     NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=390=static int pkey_ioctl_genseck2(struct pkey_genseck2 __user *ugs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-414-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:415:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(apqns, kgs.apqn_entries,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-416-\t\t\t\t  u, kgs.type, kgs.size, kgs.keygenflags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=442=static int pkey_ioctl_clr2seck2(struct pkey_clr2seck2 __user *ucs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-470-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:471:\trc = pkey_handler_clr_to_key(apqns, kcs.apqn_entries,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-472-\t\t\t\t     u, kcs.type, kcs.size, kcs.keygenflags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=503=static int pkey_ioctl_verifykey2(struct pkey_verifykey2 __user *uvk)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-514-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:515:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(kkey, kvk.keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-516-\t\t\t\t     \u0026kvk.cardnr, \u0026kvk.domain,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=558=static int pkey_ioctl_apqns4k(struct pkey_apqns4key __user *uak)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-578-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:579:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kkey, kak.keylen, kak.flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-580-\t\t\t\t\tapqns, \u0026nr_apqns, 0);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=608=static int pkey_ioctl_apqns4kt(struct pkey_apqns4keytype __user *uat)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-622-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:623:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(kat.type,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-624-\t\t\t\t\t    kat.cur_mkvp, kat.alt_mkvp,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c=34=static LIST_HEAD(handler_list);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-35-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:36:int pkey_handler_register(struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-37-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:38:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-39-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-78-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:79:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_register);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-80-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:81:int pkey_handler_unregister(struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-82-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-93-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:94:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_unregister);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-95-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-99-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:100:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keybased(const u8 *key, u32 keylen)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-101-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:102:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-103-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-117-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:118:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_get_keybased);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-119-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:120:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(enum pkey_key_type kt)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-121-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:122:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-123-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-137-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:138:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_get_keytypebased);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-139-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:140:void pkey_handler_put(const struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-141-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:142:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-143-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-155-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:156:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_put);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-157-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:158:int pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-159-\t\t\t\tconst u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-162-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:163:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-164-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-165-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:166:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-167-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003ekey_to_protkey) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-171-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:172:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-173-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-175-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:176:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_key_to_protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-177-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-183- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:184:int pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-185-\t\t\t\t\t size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-189-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:190:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h, *htmp[10];\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-191-\tint i, n = 0, rc = -ENODEV;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-215-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:216:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-217-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:218:int pkey_handler_gen_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-219-\t\t\t u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-222-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:223:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-224-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-225-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:226:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-227-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003egen_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-231-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:232:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-233-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-235-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:236:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_gen_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-237-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:238:int pkey_handler_clr_to_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-239-\t\t\t    u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-244-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:245:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-246-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-247-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:248:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-249-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eclr_to_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-253-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:254:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-255-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-257-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:258:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_clr_to_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-259-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:260:int pkey_handler_verify_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-261-\t\t\t    u16 *card, u16 *dom,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-264-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:265:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-266-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-267-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:268:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-269-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003everify_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-272-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:273:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-274-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-276-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:277:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_verify_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-278-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:279:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, u32 flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-280-\t\t\t       struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-282-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:283:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-284-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-285-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:286:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-287-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eapqns_for_key)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-289-\t\t\t\t      xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:290:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-291-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-293-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:294:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_apqns_for_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-295-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:296:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(enum pkey_key_type keysubtype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-297-\t\t\t\t   u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-300-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:301:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-302-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-303-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:304:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-305-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eapqns_for_keytype) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-309-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:310:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-311-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-313-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:314:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-315-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:316:void pkey_handler_request_modules(void)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-317-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-318-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:319:\tstatic const char * const pkey_handler_modules[] = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-320-#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_PKEY_CCA)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-334-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:335:\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_handler_modules); i++) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:336:\t\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-337-\t\tbool found = false;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-341-\t\t\tif (h-\u003emodule \u0026\u0026\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:342:\t\t\t    !strcmp(h-\u003emodule-\u003ename, pkey_handler_modules[i])) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-343-\t\t\t\tfound = true;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-348-\t\tif (!found) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:349:\t\t\tpr_debug(\"request_module(%s)\\n\", pkey_handler_modules[i]);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:350:\t\t\trequest_module(pkey_handler_modules[i]);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-351-\t\t}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-354-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:355:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_request_modules);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-356-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h=145=extern const struct attribute_group *pkey_attr_groups[];\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-150-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:151:struct pkey_handler {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-152-\tstruct module *module;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-192-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:193:int pkey_handler_register(struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:194:int pkey_handler_unregister(struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-195-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-199-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:200:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keybased(const u8 *key, u32 keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:201:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(enum pkey_key_type kt);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:202:void pkey_handler_put(const struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-203-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:204:int pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-205-\t\t\t\tconst u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-207-\t\t\t\tu32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:208:int pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-209-\t\t\t\t\t size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-212-\t\t\t\t\t u32 *protkeytype, u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:213:int pkey_handler_gen_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-214-\t\t\t u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-216-\t\t\t u8 *keybuf, u32 *keybuflen, u32 *keyinfo, u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:217:int pkey_handler_clr_to_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-218-\t\t\t    u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-222-\t\t\t    u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:223:int pkey_handler_verify_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-224-\t\t\t    u16 *card, u16 *dom,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-226-\t\t\t    u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:227:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, u32 flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-228-\t\t\t       struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-229-\t\t\t       u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:230:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(enum pkey_key_type ktype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-231-\t\t\t\t   u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-237- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:238:void pkey_handler_request_modules(void);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-239-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=557=static int cca_slowpath_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-595-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:596:static struct pkey_handler cca_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-597-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=613=static int __init pkey_cca_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-615-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the cca stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:616:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026cca_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-617-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=622=static void __exit pkey_cca_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-624-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:625:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026cca_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-626-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=504=static int ep11_slowpath_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-542-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:543:static struct pkey_handler ep11_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-544-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=560=static int __init pkey_ep11_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-562-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the ep11 stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:563:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026ep11_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-564-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=569=static void __exit pkey_ep11_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-571-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:572:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026ep11_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-573-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=435=static int pkey_pckmo_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-442-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:443:static struct pkey_handler pckmo_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-444-\t.module\t\t      = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=456=static int __init pkey_pckmo_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-469-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the pckmo stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:470:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026pckmo_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-471-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=476=static void __exit pkey_pckmo_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-478-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:479:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026pckmo_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-480-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-17-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:18: * Wrapper around pkey_handler_gen_key() which deals with the\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-19- * ENODEV return code and then tries to enforce a pkey handler\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-21- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:22:static int sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-23-\t\t\t\t    u32 keybitsize, u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-27-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:28:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-29-\t\t\t\t  keytype, keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-32-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:33:\t\tpkey_handler_request_modules();\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:34:\t\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-35-\t\t\t\t\t  keytype, keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=49=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-67-\tprotkey.len = sizeof(protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:68:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-69-\t\t\t\t      protkey.protkey, \u0026protkey.len,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-81-\t\tprotkey.len = sizeof(protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:82:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-83-\t\t\t\t\t      protkey.protkey, \u0026protkey.len,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=106=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_xts_attr_read(u32 keytype, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-131-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:132:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-133-\t\t\t\t      t-\u003eprotkey, \u0026protlen, \u0026prottype);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=148=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_hmac_attr_read(u32 keytype, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-173-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:174:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-175-\t\t\t\t      t-\u003eprotkey, \u0026protlen, \u0026prottype);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=308=static ssize_t pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-321-\tbuflen = sizeof(seckey-\u003eseckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:322:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-323-\t\t\t\t      seckey-\u003eseckey, \u0026buflen, NULL);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-329-\t\tbuflen = sizeof(seckey-\u003eseckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:330:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-331-\t\t\t\t\t      seckey-\u003eseckey, \u0026buflen, NULL);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=419=static ssize_t pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-433-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:434:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(pkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-435-\t\t\t\t      PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER, keybits, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-442-\t\tbuf += CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:443:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-444-\t\t\tpkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=534=static ssize_t pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-548-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:549:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(pkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-550-\t\t\t\t      PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES, keybits, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-557-\t\tbuf += MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:558:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-559-\t\t\tpkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=233=static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-271-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:272:static struct pkey_handler uv_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-273-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=284=static int __init pkey_uv_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-297-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:298:\trc = pkey_handler_register(\u0026uv_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-299-\tif (rc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=308=static void __exit pkey_uv_exit(void)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-309-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:310:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026uv_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-311-\tmutex_lock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 18002
							output: 19
							thoughts: 144
						

Here's my analysis of the code, as I understand it:

**Reaching `uv_find_secret` in QEMU**

Okay, let's break this down. From what I'm seeing, `pkey_uv_init` is the crucial entry point, because it registers `uv_handler`. That `uv_handler` seems to be the central structure, linking the key-to-protocol key conversion and key verification. Now, `key_to_protkey` points to `uv_key2protkey`, and `verify_key` points to `uv_verifykey`. These two functions, `uv_key2protkey` and `uv_verifykey`, are where the magic happens, as they both call `get_secret_metadata`. And that's where things get interesting, because `get_secret_metadata` in turn calls `uv_find_secret`.

Ah, right, that's the function the patch modified. So the question becomes, is `uv_find_secret` actually *reachable* during QEMU's operation? It's all about control flow. Wait a minute... `uv_find_secret` relies on `uv_list_secrets`. That suggests a path to exploration. I need to understand what `uv_list_secrets` does. If I can figure out how `uv_list_secrets` gets called, I'll know if `uv_find_secret` is on a viable execution path, and I'll have a good handle on the vulnerability.

{
  "Expression": "uv_list_secrets"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=473=static inline int uv_cmd_nodata(u64 handle, u16 cmd, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-489-/**\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:490: * uv_list_secrets() - Do a List Secrets UVC.\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-491- *\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-511- */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:512:static inline int uv_list_secrets(struct uv_secret_list *buf, u16 start_idx,\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-513-\t\t\t\t  u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=780=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-791-\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:792:\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-793-\t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=307=static int uvio_get_list(void *zpage, struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-316-\tdo {\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:317:\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, list-\u003enext_secret_idx, \u0026uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rc,\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-318-\t\t\t\t\u0026uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rrc);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 19045
							output: 17
							thoughts: 231
						

**Analyzing Ultravisor Call Execution in QEMU**

Okay, so I'm digging into this `uv_list_secrets` function, which I see executes an Ultravisor Call (UVC). My first thought is: does QEMU even support these things? Luckily, I know QEMU does support s390x Protected Virtualization (PV) through KVM, which is a good start as it means QEMU *can* intercept these UVCs.

But then I had a realization. If this is a guest running under KVM with PV enabled, the Ultravisor functionality is essentially implemented by the IBM firmware, or in a testing scenario, perhaps KVM/QEMU itself.

Now, the crucial question: can this be reached in a standard QEMU environment without any specific hardware dependencies? I think I remember seeing some PV support in QEMU. However, it's usually tied to KVM and requires a host that actually *supports* PV, like IBM Z hardware.

This is where it gets interesting. I know syzkaller runs on GCE, and GCE *doesn't* have s390x hardware, so it uses QEMU TCG for s390x emulation. So the real question is: does QEMU TCG, the *emulation* mode, actually support s390x Ultravisor calls?

Alright, time to get to the bottom of this. Let's see if we can trigger `uv_list_secrets` in a QEMU TCG environment. This will require closer examination. Let's start by checking that `uv_list_secrets` calls `uv_call` which will provide some context.

{
  "Expression": "uv_call"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/boot/uv.c=15=void uv_query_info(void)\n--\narch/s390/boot/uv.c-25-\t/* Ignore that there might be more data we do not process */\narch/s390/boot/uv.c:26:\tif (uv_call(0, (uint64_t)\u0026uvcb) \u0026\u0026 uvcb.header.rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA)\narch/s390/boot/uv.c-27-\t\treturn;\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=432=static_assert(sizeof(struct uv_secret_list) == PAGE_SIZE);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-433-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:434:static inline int __uv_call(unsigned long r1, unsigned long r2)\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-435-{\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-446-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:447:static inline int uv_call(unsigned long r1, unsigned long r2)\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-448-{\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-451-\tdo {\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:452:\t\tcc = __uv_call(r1, r2);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-453-\t} while (cc \u003e 1);\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-456-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:457:/* Low level uv_call that avoids stalls for long running busy conditions  */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:458:static inline int uv_call_sched(unsigned long r1, unsigned long r2)\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-459-{\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-462-\tdo {\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:463:\t\tcc = __uv_call(r1, r2);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-464-\t\tcond_resched();\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-469-/*\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:470: * special variant of uv_call that only transports the cpu or guest\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-471- * handle and the command, like destroy or verify.\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=473=static inline int uv_cmd_nodata(u64 handle, u16 cmd, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-482-\tWARN(!handle, \"No handle provided to Ultravisor call cmd %x\\n\", cmd);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:483:\tcc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-484-\t*rc = uvcb.header.rc;\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=512=static inline int uv_list_secrets(struct uv_secret_list *buf, u16 start_idx,\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-520-\t};\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:521:\tint cc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-522-\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=571=static inline int share(unsigned long addr, u16 cmd)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-588-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:589:\tif (!uv_call(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb))\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-590-\t\treturn 0;\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=41=static int __init uv_init(phys_addr_t stor_base, unsigned long stor_len)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-49-\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:50:\tif (uv_call(0, (uint64_t)\u0026uvcb)) {\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-51-\t\tpr_err(\"Ultravisor init failed with rc: 0x%x rrc: 0%x\\n\",\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=91=int uv_pin_shared(unsigned long paddr)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-98-\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:99:\tif (uv_call(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb))\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-100-\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=112=static int uv_destroy(unsigned long paddr)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-119-\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:120:\tif (uv_call(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb)) {\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-121-\t\t/*\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=168=int uv_convert_from_secure(unsigned long paddr)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-175-\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:176:\tif (uv_call(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb))\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-177-\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=251=int __make_folio_secure(struct folio *folio, struct uv_cb_header *uvcb)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-268-\t */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:269:\tcc = __uv_call(0, (u64)uvcb);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-270-\tfolio_ref_unfreeze(folio, expected);\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=598=static inline struct uv_cb_query_keys uv_query_keys(void)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-604-\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:605:\tuv_call(0, (uint64_t)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-606-\treturn uvcb;\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=826=int uv_retrieve_secret(u16 secret_idx, u8 *buf, size_t buf_size)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-835-\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:836:\tuv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-837-\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c=284=int kvm_s390_pv_create_cpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-315-\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c:316:\tcc = uv_call(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-317-\t*rc = uvcb.header.rc;\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c=424=static int kvm_s390_pv_deinit_vm_fast(struct kvm *kvm, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-432-\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c:433:\tcc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-434-\tif (rc)\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c=709=int kvm_s390_pv_init_vm(struct kvm *kvm, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-749-\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c:750:\tcc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-751-\t*rc = uvcb.header.rc;\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c=772=int kvm_s390_pv_set_sec_parms(struct kvm *kvm, void *hdr, u64 length, u16 *rc,\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-781-\t};\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c:782:\tint cc = uv_call(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-783-\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c=851=int kvm_s390_pv_set_cpu_state(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u8 state)\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-860-\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c:861:\tcc = uv_call(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-862-\tKVM_UV_EVENT(vcpu-\u003ekvm, 3, \"PROTVIRT SET CPU %d STATE %d rc %x rrc %x\",\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c=869=int kvm_s390_pv_dump_cpu(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, void *buff, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-878-\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c:879:\tcc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-880-\t*rc = uvcb.header.rc;\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c=916=int kvm_s390_pv_dump_stor_state(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *buff_user,\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-962-\t\t/* Get 1MB worth of guest storage state data */\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c:963:\t\tcc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-964-\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c=1024=int kvm_s390_pv_dump_complete(struct kvm *kvm, void __user *buff_user,\n--\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-1040-\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c:1041:\tret = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026complete);\narch/s390/kvm/pv.c-1042-\t*rc = complete.header.rc;\n--\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c=878=static inline int uv_nmi_kdb_reason(void)\n--\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c-895- */\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c:896:static void uv_call_kgdb_kdb(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs, int master)\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c-897-{\n--\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c-928-#else /* !CONFIG_KGDB */\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c:929:static inline void uv_call_kgdb_kdb(int cpu, struct pt_regs *regs, int master)\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c-930-{\n--\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c=938=static int uv_handle_nmi(unsigned int reason, struct pt_regs *regs)\n--\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c-978-\tcase nmi_act_kgdb:\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c:979:\t\tuv_call_kgdb_kdb(cpu, regs, master);\narch/x86/platform/uv/uv_nmi.c-980-\t\tbreak;\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=185=static int uvio_attestation(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-226-\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:227:\tuv_call_sched(0, (u64)uvcb_attest);\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-228-\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=269=static int uvio_add_secret(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-293-\tuvcb.addr = (u64)asrcb;\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:294:\tuv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-295-\tuv_ioctl-\u003euv_rc = uvcb.header.rc;\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=404=static int uvio_lock_secrets(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-413-\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:414:\tuv_call(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-415-\tioctl-\u003euv_rc = uvcb.header.rc;\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=436=static int uvio_retr_secret(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-459-\tuvcb.buf_size = buf_len;\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:460:\tuv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-461-\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 23708
							output: 19
							thoughts: 714
						

**Analyzing the UVC Instruction and Its Implications**

Okay, so I'm looking at this `uv_call` function. It's using the `UVC` instruction, which immediately flags a question: does QEMU TCG actually *emulate* that? I know it often doesn't deal with Protected Virtualization (PV) directly. I need to figure out if the Ultravisor facility is even enabled within QEMU TCG.

I see the kernel checks if the facility is available, which suggests it expects it to *potentially* be there. I remember seeing `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c` and realize it's a module. This makes me wonder: can we get to `uv_find_secret` even if `UVC` returns an error? It looks like it *handles* errors coming back from `uv_list_secrets`. Specifically, if `uv_list_secrets` gives `UVC_RC_INV_CMD`, then it translates to `-ENODEV`.

Now, the code has recently been patched. I'm focusing on the change from `list->total_num_secrets` to `list->num_secr_stored` in the loop. Also, the introduction of `start_idx = list->next_secret_idx` in the `do...while` loop and the initial setting of `list->next_secret_idx = 0`. If `uv_list_secrets` doesn't *do* anything (perhaps because the UVC is not supported), then `list->num_secr_stored` would be whatever it was initialized to, which could be zero.

So, if the UVC instruction isn't supported in QEMU, `uv_call` likely just throws a SIGILL or, at best, returns an error code. However, the kernel *shouldn't* even attempt to use it if the facility is not actually there. I should look into the `pkey_uv_init` function to confirm my understanding.

{
  "Expression": "pkey_uv_init"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=272=static struct pkey_handler uv_handler = {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-283- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:284:static int __init pkey_uv_init(void)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-285-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=308=static void __exit pkey_uv_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-315-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:316:module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_UV, pkey_uv_init);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-317-module_exit(pkey_uv_exit);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 25126
							output: 19
							thoughts: 307
						

**Analyzing the Module Load Condition**

Okay, so this `module_cpu_feature_match(S390_CPU_FEATURE_UV, pkey_uv_init)` function call means the module `pkey_uv_init` will *only* load if the `S390_CPU_FEATURE_UV` CPU feature is present. My initial question is whether this feature, specifically facility 158 – the Ultravisor feature – is even available in QEMU TCG. I know that QEMU TCG typically doesn't support that feature; it's generally reserved for KVM mode on a host with an Ultravisor.

But wait, I need to consider Syzkaller. It runs s390x, and I know it supports both TCG and KVM. I need to be sure. If it runs on a real s390x host (like IBM Cloud), it *could* be using KVM, which would make this possible. Right, Syzkaller *does* have s390x KVM instances. So it *is* reachable via KVM.

The fact that Syzkaller found the bug, and the patch was applied by the `syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>` email address, strongly suggests that Syzkaller either triggered the code directly or it was at least validated in their testing.

Now, what about the configuration? I need to check if any specific kernel config options are required for this to work. I think `CONFIG_PKEY_UV` is required, yes.

{
  "Expression": "config PKEY_UV"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig=137=config PKEY_PCKMO\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-157-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:158:config PKEY_UV\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-159-\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 25871
							output: 34
							thoughts: 19
						

Here's a summary of my thought process:

**Diving into the Cryptographic Configuration Landscape**

Okay, so I need to find the configuration options related to `PKEY_UV`. My instinct is to head straight to the cryptographic configuration files, specifically `drivers/crypto/Kconfig`. That's usually where these types of kernel features are defined and where I'd expect to see the associated build-time controls. I want to quickly ascertain its presence, associated dependencies, and potentially related options in that part of the kernel source.

{
  "File": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 155,
  "LineCount": 20
}

{
  "Contents": " 155:\t\t  this option unless you are sure you never need to derive protected\n 156:\t\t  keys from clear key values directly via PCKMO.\n 157:\t\n 158:\tconfig PKEY_UV\n 159:\t\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n 160:\t\tdepends on PKEY\n 161:\t\tdepends on S390_UV_UAPI\n 162:\t\thelp\n 163:\t\t  This is the PKEY Ultravisor support handler for deriving protected\n 164:\t\t  keys from secrets stored within the Ultravisor (UV).\n 165:\t\n 166:\t\t  This module works together with the UV device and supports the\n 167:\t\t  retrieval of protected keys from secrets stored within the\n 168:\t\t  UV firmware layer. This service is only available within\n 169:\t\t  a protected execution guest and thus this module will fail upon\n 170:\t\t  modprobe if no protected execution environment is detected.\n 171:\t\n 172:\t\t  Enable this option if you intend to run this kernel with an KVM\n 173:\t\t  guest with protected execution and you want to use UV retrievable\n 174:\t\t  secrets via PKEY API.\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 26364
							output: 17
							thoughts: 40
						

Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as an expert's internal monologue:

**Investigating Dependencies**

Alright, this situation hinges on two key factors: the `PKEY` and `S390_UV_UAPI` parameters. My immediate next step, and the only logical one, is to systematically examine those variables. I need to understand their states and their interactions with each other. A deeper dive into how they're set and what dependencies they might have on other system components will be critical to resolving the underlying issue. Essentially, `PKEY` and `S390_UV_UAPI` are the keys to unlocking the solution.

{
  "Expression": "config PKEY"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig=67=config ZCRYPT\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-77-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:78:config PKEY\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-79-\ttristate \"Kernel API for protected key handling\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-104-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:105:config PKEY_CCA\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-106-\ttristate \"PKEY CCA support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-120-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:121:config PKEY_EP11\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-122-\ttristate \"PKEY EP11 support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-136-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:137:config PKEY_PCKMO\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-138-\ttristate \"PKEY PCKMO support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-157-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:158:config PKEY_UV\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-159-\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 26863
							output: 24
							thoughts: 15
						

Okay, let's dive into this. Here's how I'd approach summarizing the prompt, as if it were my thought process:

**Reviewing `S390_UV_UAPI`**

Alright, the instruction is straightforward: focus on that specific thing, `S390_UV_UAPI`. Presumably, this is a particular set of code, documentation, or configuration related to a system or project. Given my expertise, I'm already mentally running through potential contexts: is this a specific user-space API on an s390x architecture, maybe something related to UV (Ultravisor) or some other virtualization layer? It could be a driver, a library, or even a build target.

The instruction is very concise, which suggests the context is already known, or it's a very specific element within a much larger conversation. I should start by mentally connecting this to any recent discussions or current tasks to provide a helpful summary. My first thought is: What's the *purpose* of this review? Am I checking for something specific – a bug, a performance issue, a security vulnerability, compatibility, or documentation accuracy? Is this part of a debugging process, a code review, or documentation update? I need to understand the intent before I start, otherwise, I might waste time going down a rabbit hole. Let's start with a thorough check.

{
  "Expression": "config S390_UV_UAPI"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/char/Kconfig=75=config HMC_DRV\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/Kconfig-87-\ndrivers/s390/char/Kconfig:88:config S390_UV_UAPI\ndrivers/s390/char/Kconfig-89-\tdef_tristate m\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 27292
							output: 38
							thoughts: 29
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, from an expert's perspective:

**Diving into the Kernel Configuration for UV Support**

Right, so we're talking about S390, that's the System z architecture. The focus is likely on Uniprocessor Virtualization (UV) User API support, given the `S390_UV_UAPI` reference. My intuition immediately points me to the kernel configuration file, and specifically to the character device drivers in the S390 architecture. This seems like a reasonable place to start, as UAPI features often involve character device interfaces for interaction between user space and the kernel. Let's start with `drivers/s390/char/Kconfig`. This is where I would expect to find the relevant configuration options that determine whether or not to include the UV UAPI support during the kernel build. I need to understand if the configuration options are present, and if so, what conditions enable the inclusion of the `S390_UV_UAPI` feature. Time to dig in and see what's actually defined there. I'm looking for dependencies, default values, and any helpful comments that shed light on how this feature is intended to be used and configured.

{
  "File": "drivers/s390/char/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 85,
  "LineCount": 15
}

{
  "Contents": "  85:\t\t  transfer cache size from its default value 0.5MB to N bytes. If N\n  86:\t\t  is zero, then no caching is performed.\n  87:\t\n  88:\tconfig S390_UV_UAPI\n  89:\t\tdef_tristate m\n  90:\t\tprompt \"Ultravisor userspace API\"\n  91:\t\tdepends on S390\n  92:\t\thelp\n  93:\t\t  Selecting exposes parts of the UV interface to userspace\n  94:\t\t  by providing a misc character device at /dev/uv.\n  95:\t\t  Using IOCTLs one can interact with the UV.\n  96:\t\t  The device is only available if the Ultravisor\n  97:\t\t  Facility (158) is present.\n  98:\t\n  99:\tconfig S390_TAPE\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 27849
							output: 33
							thoughts: 48
						

**My Initial Thoughts on Key Definitions**

Okay, so I'm looking at this and it's clear we'll need definitions for `PKEY_UV`, `PKEY`, and `S390_UV_UAPI`. Makes sense, these are likely critical for our configuration. Wait a second, wasn't `PKEY` defined somewhere in the crypto drivers? Let me just double check. Ah yes, it's right there in `drivers/crypto/Kconfig`. Right, now, before I go any further, I need to understand its dependencies. What other pieces does `PKEY` rely on, or which of its upstream elements might affect my considerations? Let's check those dependencies and make sure I haven't missed anything.

{
  "File": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 75,
  "LineCount": 20
}

{
  "Contents": "  75:\t\t  to 8 in Coprocessor (CEXxC), EP11 Coprocessor (CEXxP)\n  76:\t\t  or Accelerator (CEXxA) mode.\n  77:\t\n  78:\tconfig PKEY\n  79:\t\ttristate \"Kernel API for protected key handling\"\n  80:\t\tdepends on S390\n  81:\t\thelp\n  82:\t\t  With this option enabled the pkey kernel modules provide an API\n  83:\t\t  for creation and handling of protected keys. Other parts of the\n  84:\t\t  kernel or userspace applications may use these functions.\n  85:\t\n  86:\t\t  The protected key support is distributed into:\n  87:\t\t  - A pkey base and API kernel module (pkey.ko) which offers the\n  88:\t\t    infrastructure for the pkey handler kernel modules, the ioctl\n  89:\t\t    and the sysfs API and the in-kernel API to the crypto cipher\n  90:\t\t    implementations using protected key.\n  91:\t\t  - A pkey pckmo kernel module (pkey-pckmo.ko) which is automatically\n  92:\t\t    loaded when pckmo support (that is generation of protected keys\n  93:\t\t    from clear key values) is available.\n  94:\t\t  - A pkey CCA kernel module (pkey-cca.ko) which is automatically\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 28439
							output: 19
							thoughts: 68
						

**Analyzing the `PKEY` Dependence**

Okay, so I'm looking at this patch and it's pretty clear that the `PKEY` functionality has a dependency on the `S390` architecture, specifically. It's drilling into the `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c` file. Right, I see the modifications are around the `uv_find_secret` function. It seems to be the key component here, and it's being exported. Now, my immediate thought is to check the cross-references; I need to understand the scope of this change. It looks like `pkey_uv.c` is using it, but I need to make sure I'm not missing any other potential users or dependencies that might get impacted. I need to know if this impacts other areas.

{
  "Expression": "uv_find_secret"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=613=static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-617-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:618:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-22-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:23: * One pre-allocated uv_secret_list for use with uv_find_secret()\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-99-\tmemset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:100:\trc = uv_find_secret(secret_id, uv_list, secret);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-101-\tmutex_unlock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 29392
							output: 17
							thoughts: 1921
						

**Analysis of the UV Secret Finding Bug Fix**

Okay, so I'm looking at this patch and trying to figure out the right approach for fuzzing it with Syzkaller. It seems like the core of the change is in `uv.c`, specifically around how secrets are found and listed. The critical code path is in the `uv_find_secret` function, which is the one that was modified.

First, I need to make sure I can reach this code. It seems like this involves enabling the `PKEY_UV` module. Let me verify: `PKEY_UV` and `S390_UV_UAPI` is used here? Yes. I see now that `S390_UV_UAPI` is needed by `PKEY_UV`. And `PKEY` itself. Alright, so I'll need `PKEY_UV`, `S390_UV_UAPI`, and `PKEY` enabled in the config.

Now, let's dive into the code. The patch seems to be addressing a bug in the loop logic within `uv_find_secret`. It looks like `start_idx` was not updated correctly within the loop, leading to the loop potentially terminating after a single iteration even if there were more secrets to be processed. Specifically, the old code's logic of updating `start_idx` at the *end* of the loop, then checking `start_idx < list->next_secret_idx` (where the new `start_idx` is equal to the new `next_secret_idx`), meant the loop wouldn't iterate beyond the first page.

The new code, by moving the `start_idx` update *to the beginning* of the loop fixes this. It ensures the check `start_idx < list->next_secret_idx` compares the current value with the new value, allowing the loop to iterate through all secrets.

Also, it looks like there's a potential fix related to using `num_secr_stored` instead of `total_num_secrets` which is good because we don't want to read past a page boundary.

This is a clear, functional bug fix, so definitely worth fuzzing. The function I need to focus on is `uv_find_secret`, because that's the one modified, and it's also exported. No other functions need to be called.

So the relevant configuration options are: `PKEY_UV`, `S390_UV_UAPI`, and `PKEY`. These look like the required ingredients. Now I'm ready to craft some Syzkaller targets!

{
  "Expression": "config PKEY"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig=67=config ZCRYPT\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-77-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:78:config PKEY\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-79-\ttristate \"Kernel API for protected key handling\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-104-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:105:config PKEY_CCA\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-106-\ttristate \"PKEY CCA support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-120-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:121:config PKEY_EP11\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-122-\ttristate \"PKEY EP11 support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-136-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:137:config PKEY_PCKMO\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-138-\ttristate \"PKEY PCKMO support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-157-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:158:config PKEY_UV\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-159-\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 32190
							output: 32
							thoughts: 40
						

Here's my summary, as the thought process of someone familiar with kernel configuration:

**Analyzing Kernel Crypto Configuration**

Okay, so I'm looking at how the kernel's cryptographic features are configured. I see `drivers/crypto/Kconfig` and I immediately understand that it's sourced from either the main `crypto/Kconfig` file or the top-level `drivers/Kconfig`. So, I need to understand how the Kconfig files are structured and which one takes precedence. My next step is to examine the contents of `drivers/crypto/Kconfig` at its top level to determine its role within the broader configuration framework. I will check what options are defined, what other Kconfig files are included, and how the dependencies are structured. This will help me understand how crypto drivers are integrated into the kernel's configuration options.

{
  "File": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 1,
  "LineCount": 20
}

{
  "Contents": "   1:\t# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n   2:\t\n   3:\tmenuconfig CRYPTO_HW\n   4:\t\tbool \"Hardware crypto devices\"\n   5:\t\tdefault y\n   6:\t\thelp\n   7:\t\t  Say Y here to get to see options for hardware crypto devices and\n   8:\t\t  processors. This option alone does not add any kernel code.\n   9:\t\n  10:\t\t  If you say N, all options in this submenu will be skipped and disabled.\n  11:\t\n  12:\tif CRYPTO_HW\n  13:\t\n  14:\tsource \"drivers/crypto/allwinner/Kconfig\"\n  15:\t\n  16:\tconfig CRYPTO_DEV_PADLOCK\n  17:\t\ttristate \"Support for VIA PadLock ACE\"\n  18:\t\tdepends on X86 \u0026\u0026 !UML\n  19:\t\thelp\n  20:\t\t  Some VIA processors come with an integrated crypto engine\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 32691
							output: 222
							thoughts: 271
						

**My Analysis of the Secret Retrieval Bug Fix**

Okay, so the fix requires `CRYPTO_HW`, which makes sense since it defaults to 'y'. I need to confirm if `CRYPTO` is also a dependency, and it seems likely given that `drivers/crypto` is usually within `CRYPTO`. However, `PKEY_UV` is the key component here.

Here's the gist: the patch addresses a bug in `uv_find_secret`. Specifically, the loop logic for iterating through secret pages was flawed, causing it to exit early. This was due to an update to `start_idx` within the loop before the condition check, causing an early termination. There's also an out-of-bounds read vulnerability being addressed by using `list->num_secr_stored` instead of `list->total_num_secrets`, which corrects how secrets are iterated within a single page. These are significant functional changes, pertaining to how the s390x Ultravisor retrieves secrets. This functionality is accessible from userspace via the `/dev/pkey` ioctl interface – assuming the `PKEY_UV` module is loaded. Since userspace can access this through an ioctl, this would be highly valuable to fuzz. It's crucial to verify the secret retrieval logic handles multi-page responses correctly.

To test this, I need to focus my attention on the `uv_find_secret` function.

To enable the correct configuration, I need `PKEY_UV`, `S390_UV_UAPI` and `PKEY`.

Time to call `set-results`.

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PKEY_UV",
    "S390_UV_UAPI",
    "PKEY"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "uv_find_secret"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch fixes a bug in the `uv_find_secret` function where the loop to iterate through pages of secrets would terminate prematurely after the first iteration because `start_idx` was updated to `list-\u003enext_secret_idx` before the loop condition check. It also fixes an out-of-bounds read by using `list-\u003enum_secr_stored` instead of `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` when iterating over secrets in a single page. These are functional changes to the s390x Ultravisor secret retrieval logic, which is reachable from userspace via the `/dev/pkey` ioctl interface when the `PKEY_UV` module is loaded. Fuzzing this is valuable to ensure the secret retrieval logic handles multi-page responses correctly.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PKEY_UV",
    "S390_UV_UAPI",
    "PKEY"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "uv_find_secret"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch fixes a bug in the `uv_find_secret` function where the loop to iterate through pages of secrets would terminate prematurely after the first iteration because `start_idx` was updated to `list-\u003enext_secret_idx` before the loop condition check. It also fixes an out-of-bounds read by using `list-\u003enum_secr_stored` instead of `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` when iterating over secrets in a single page. These are functional changes to the s390x Ultravisor secret retrieval logic, which is reachable from userspace via the `/dev/pkey` ioctl interface when the `PKEY_UV` module is loaded. Fuzzing this is valuable to ensure the secret retrieval logic handles multi-page responses correctly.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

{
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

null

best-expensive

null

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch fixes two bugs in the Ultravisor secret listing logic:\n1. It changes the loop bound in `find_secret_in_page` from `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` (total secrets in the guest) to `list-\u003enum_secr_stored` (secrets stored in the current page). This prevents reading past the valid entries in the `list-\u003esecrets` array, which could have resulted in out-of-bounds reads (caught by KASAN) or reading uninitialized memory.\n2. It fixes the loop condition in `uv_find_secret` to correctly iterate over multiple pages of secrets by updating `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop rather than the end.\n\nThese changes are purely bug fixes for iteration logic and bounds checking. They do not introduce any new allocations, structures, or data paths to user space that could expose uninitialized memory. Therefore, a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not necessary.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

You are an expert Linux kernel security engineer specializing in kernel memory
error detectors (KASAN and KMSAN). Your job is to review the provided patch series and
determine if the code changes justify spawning a dedicated KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer)
fuzzing session in addition to standard KASAN fuzzing.

CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KASAN AND KMSAN:
- Standard KASAN kernel builds (upstream-apparmor-kasan.config) already enable
  a comprehensive suite of debugging tools and sanitizers, including KASAN
  (out-of-bounds accesses, use-after-free, double free, invalid free), LOCKDEP
  (locking bugs and deadlocks), UB-sanitizers, and memory corruption checks.
- KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer) detects reads of UNINITIALIZED memory (stack, heap,
  or page allocations) and kernel-to-user memory info-leaks.

Rule: THERE IS NO SENSE IN RUNNING A KMSAN SESSION IF A BUG CAN BE CAUGHT BY KASAN,
LOCKDEP, OR OTHER STANDARD BUG DETECTORS.
A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session incurs significant resource costs. You must ONLY
set NeedsKMSAN=true if the code changes introduce or expose UNINITIALIZED MEMORY risks
that are detected ONLY by KMSAN.

Look holistically at the patch series and surrounding code. Even if no direct
uninitialized field accesses or new buffer allocations are added in the diff itself,
a patch may alter control flow, bounds checking, or data length calculations in ways
that change how the rest of the code operates on existing buffers (e.g. allowing
uninitialized stack/heap memory to be read, copied to user space, or used in control
flow). Do not hesitate to use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code,
called functions, and callers.

Set NeedsKMSAN=true ONLY IF the patch introduces or modifies:
1. Kernel structures sent to user space (via copy_to_user, put_user, netlink skb
   attributes, ioctl output arguments, socket options, or BPF buffers) where fields
   or structure padding might not be fully initialized/zeroed.
2. Conditional logic or branching that depends on potentially uninitialized variables
   or struct fields.
3. Allocation or initialization of complex data structures where uninitialized fields
   could be read later in reachable code paths.
4. Bounds checks, lengths, or logic in a way that allows surrounding code to access
   uninitialized bytes of existing buffers.

Set NeedsKMSAN=false IF:
- The code changes primarily risk out-of-bounds access, array overflows, NULL pointer
  dereferences, locking deadlocks, or use-after-free bugs (these are already caught
  by KASAN, LOCKDEP, or standard bug detectors).
- All stack/heap structures touched or introduced by the patch are fully zeroed
  or initialized (e.g. using = {0}, memset, kzalloc) before being read or copied.
- The patch does not introduce any risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks.

Use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code if necessary, then provide
detailed KMSANReasoning contrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability for this patch.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit 6510d9d492167ac0e264929e3d0110a1414c8a02
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Tue Aug 11 16:42:30 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index a284f98d97168..e70acad09cd5f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 {
 	u16 i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < list->total_num_secrets; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_secr_stored; i++) {
 		if (memcmp(secret_id, list->secrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {
 			*secret = list->secrets[i].hdr;
 			return 0;
@@ -781,11 +781,14 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		   struct uv_secret_list *list,
 		   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)
 {
-	u16 start_idx = 0;
+	u16 start_idx;
 	u16 list_rc;
 	int ret;
 
+	list->next_secret_idx = 0;
+
 	do {
+		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 		uv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, &list_rc, NULL);
 		if (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED && list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {
 			if (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)
@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		ret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);
 		if (ret == 0)
 			return ret;
-		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 	} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA && start_idx < list->next_secret_idx);
 
 	return -ENOENT;

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 2378
							output: 21
							thoughts: 1531
						

**Analysis of the s390 Secret Handling Patch**

Okay, let's break this down. The patch focuses on `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`, specifically related to secret management within the UV system. My initial thought is that this is likely a bug fix, and I need to determine if it introduces any *new* risks, especially uninitialized memory issues.

First, the `find_secret_in_page` function is modified. The original code used `list->total_num_secrets` in the loop condition, but now uses `list->num_secr_stored`. My immediate assumption is that `total_num_secrets` probably represents the *total* number of secrets available across potentially multiple pages/lists, whereas `num_secr_stored` specifically indicates the number of secrets currently *stored* in the relevant page/list. If the code used `total_num_secrets` before, it was likely iterating past the initialized data within the current page, which could lead to an out-of-bounds read or, at best, a read of uninitialized memory within the `list->secrets` array. This change is a clear fix for this.

The more intricate part is the changes to `uv_find_secret`.  The loop structure appears to be responsible for iterating through the secrets, potentially across multiple pages.  Initially, the patch introduces `list->next_secret_idx = 0;` to initialize the index. Then, the important part: the `start_idx` is assigned *inside* the loop.  Before the patch, `start_idx` was assigned at the *end* of the loop, which means the condition `start_idx < list->next_secret_idx` would *always* be false. Why? Because the `start_idx` would be the same as `list->next_secret_idx`, rendering the loop ineffective when `list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA`. This is a bug fix, as it prevented iterating through multiple pages and secrets.

Now, with the patch, the logic is as follows: `start_idx` captures the index *before* the call to `uv_list_secrets`. `uv_list_secrets` then updates the internal list and `list->next_secret_idx`.  The `while` condition then correctly compares the *old* index to the *new* index.

My thinking: The `uv_list_secrets` function populates the `list` with secrets. If its return code is `UVC_RC_MORE_DATA`, then `list->next_secret_idx` is likely updated to point to the next secret index to be read.

Regarding the risk of the patch introducing uninitialized memory usage, I'm confident it doesn't.  The modifications are purely logical corrections to the iteration and loop conditions. The intent is to prevent reading beyond the bounds of the valid data.

The important point is that this patch fixes a bug, preventing potential out-of-bounds or uninitialized memory reads. I don't see any code introduced here that *creates* a risk that KMSAN would catch. The patch cleans up the logic. It does not allocate new structures, add fields, or introduce user-space copies. So, `NeedsKMSAN = false`. I still want to double check the structure definitions and double check my thought process, just to confirm my thinking using something like a grepper or similar tool.

{
  "Expression": "struct uv_secret_list \\{"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=411=struct uv_secret_list_item {\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-423- */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:424:struct uv_secret_list {\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-425-\tu16 num_secr_stored;\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 4785
							output: 41
							thoughts: 13
						

Here's my take on the thought process:

**Diving into `uv_secret_list`**

Okay, so I'm looking at something that involves `uv_secret_list`. Right off the bat, I know I need to understand exactly what that refers to. So, the first logical step is to check the definition of `uv_secret_list`. No point in jumping to conclusions or making assumptions – I want to establish a solid foundation of understanding before I dig deeper. Let's see what that definition reveals...

{
  "Expression": "struct uv_secret_list \\{",
  "PathPrefix": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=411=struct uv_secret_list_item {\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-423- */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:424:struct uv_secret_list {\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-425-\tu16 num_secr_stored;\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 5073
							output: 42
							thoughts: 27
						

Here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience:

**Diving into s390 UV Handling**

Alright, let's pull up `arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h`. Specifically, I want to zero in around line 424. My intuition tells me that's a likely spot for some core UV (Universal Virtualization) definitions or perhaps some critical data structures related to the s390 architecture's UV implementation. I'm guessing it'll be something low-level - memory layout, register assignments, or interrupt handling – stuff directly influencing how the hypervisor interacts with the hardware. I'm expecting to see macro definitions, enums, or structure declarations that shed light on how UV capabilities are exposed and utilized within the kernel's context. I'm keen to understand how this code handles the nuances of the UV environment on s390, given its specialized nature. Let's see what gems are hidden there.

{
  "File": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h",
  "FirstLine": 410,
  "LineCount": 30
}

{
  "Contents": " 410:\t */\n 411:\tstruct uv_secret_list_item {\n 412:\t\tstruct uv_secret_list_item_hdr hdr;\n 413:\t\tu64 reserverd08;\n 414:\t\tu8 id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN];\n 415:\t} __packed __aligned(8);\n 416:\t\n 417:\t/**\n 418:\t * uv_secret_list - UV secret-metadata list.\n 419:\t * @num_secr_stored: Number of secrets stored in this list.\n 420:\t * @total_num_secrets: Number of secrets stored in the UV for this guest.\n 421:\t * @next_secret_idx: positive number if there are more secrets available or zero.\n 422:\t * @secrets: Up to 85 UV-secret metadata entries.\n 423:\t */\n 424:\tstruct uv_secret_list {\n 425:\t\tu16 num_secr_stored;\n 426:\t\tu16 total_num_secrets;\n 427:\t\tu16 next_secret_idx;\n 428:\t\tu16 reserved_06;\n 429:\t\tu64 reserved_08;\n 430:\t\tstruct uv_secret_list_item secrets[85];\n 431:\t} __packed __aligned(8);\n 432:\tstatic_assert(sizeof(struct uv_secret_list) == PAGE_SIZE);\n 433:\t\n 434:\tstatic inline int __uv_call(unsigned long r1, unsigned long r2)\n 435:\t{\n 436:\t\tint cc;\n 437:\t\n 438:\t\tasm volatile(\n 439:\t\t\t\"\t.insn\t rrf,0xb9a40000,%[r1],%[r2],0,0\\n\"\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 5862
							output: 225
							thoughts: 462
						

**My Assessment of the Patch's KMSAN Implications**

Okay, after reviewing this patch, here's my understanding and reasoning. The core of the patch addresses two related bugs within the Ultravisor secret listing functionality. Essentially, it's about correcting how we traverse and access the secrets within a specific structure.

The first issue was a simple bounds check error. It was using `total_num_secrets` where it should have been using `num_secr_stored`. `total_num_secrets` represents the *overall* number of secrets associated with the guest, while `num_secr_stored` is specific to *this* secret list (and capped at 85). If `total_num_secrets` was greater than 85, this caused an out-of-bounds read from the `list->secrets` array; if it was less than or equal to 85 but still larger than `num_secr_stored`, we'd be reading uninitialized memory in the array. This is a clear bug, and the patch fixes it by making the correct comparison.

The second bug was in the logic of `uv_find_secret`. The loop was terminating prematurely, and now it's correctly updated to properly iterate over multiple pages of secrets.

Importantly, this patch *fixes* these issues. It doesn't introduce any new data structures, allocations, or pathways that could lead to new instances of uninitialized memory being exposed to user space. It is purely a correction of existing access patterns and bounds. This means there's no real need to run a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session for this change. The risk that would have been identified by KMSAN was already present in the existing code, and this patch just cleans it up. A fuzzing session is not necessary as this is a bug fix. Therefore, I'm confident that `NeedsKMSAN` should be false for this patch.

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch fixes two bugs in the Ultravisor secret listing logic:\n1. It changes the loop bound in `find_secret_in_page` from `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` (total secrets in the guest) to `list-\u003enum_secr_stored` (secrets stored in the current page). This prevents reading past the valid entries in the `list-\u003esecrets` array, which could have resulted in out-of-bounds reads (caught by KASAN) or reading uninitialized memory.\n2. It fixes the loop condition in `uv_find_secret` to correctly iterate over multiple pages of secrets by updating `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop rather than the end.\n\nThese changes are purely bug fixes for iteration logic and bounds checking. They do not introduce any new allocations, structures, or data paths to user space that could expose uninitialized memory. Therefore, a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not necessary.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch fixes two bugs in the Ultravisor secret listing logic:\n1. It changes the loop bound in `find_secret_in_page` from `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` (total secrets in the guest) to `list-\u003enum_secr_stored` (secrets stored in the current page). This prevents reading past the valid entries in the `list-\u003esecrets` array, which could have resulted in out-of-bounds reads (caught by KASAN) or reading uninitialized memory.\n2. It fixes the loop condition in `uv_find_secret` to correctly iterate over multiple pages of secrets by updating `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop rather than the end.\n\nThese changes are purely bug fixes for iteration logic and bounds checking. They do not introduce any new allocations, structures, or data paths to user space that could expose uninitialized memory. Therefore, a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not necessary.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}