| Seq | Timestamp | Type | Name | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0/0 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | flow | patch-triage |
14mArgs:null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"PAGE_OWNER",
"DEBUG_KERNEL",
"BPF_SYSCALL",
"DEBUG_INFO_BTF",
"MEMCG"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"page_owner_next_eligible",
"get_page_memcg_info",
"read_page_owner",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_new",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_next",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy",
"bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint",
"bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info",
"page_owner_seq_start",
"page_owner_seq_next",
"page_owner_seq_show",
"page_owner_iter_register"
],
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch series adds BPF iterator support for page_owner (both seq_file and open-coded iterators via kfuncs: bpf_iter_page_owner_new/next/destroy, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, and bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info), refactoring mm/page_owner.c to extract page_owner_next_eligible() and get_page_memcg_info().\n\nAnalysis of memory initialization and user-space exposure:\n1. `struct memcg_info`: Unconditionally zero-initialized via compound literal assignment `*info = (struct memcg_info){};` at the very beginning of `get_page_memcg_info()` and in error fallbacks. No padding or uninitialized fields can leak.\n2. `struct page_owner_scan`: Holds cursor state `pfn` (initialized before scan) and snapshot fields `po_snap` and `nid`. `page_owner_next_eligible()` populates all snapshot fields before returning true; on false, neither the iterator nor `read_page_owner()` consumes the uninitialized fields.\n3. `struct bpf_iter__page_owner ctx`: Zero-initialized via `= {}` before passing to BPF programs.\n4. Buffers in kfuncs (`buf__uninit`): Both `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint()` and `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info()` guarantee NUL-termination (`buf[0] = '\\0'`) on empty or error paths, and bounded string formatting (`stack_depot_snprint()`, `cgroup_path()`) on success.\n5. `read_page_owner()`: Allocates `kbuf`, populates it with `scnprintf`/`snprintf`, and copies to user space strictly using the returned character count `ret`.\n\nContrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability:\nThe primary risks in these changes relate to memory hotplug concurrency (e.g. holding get_online_mems() while resolving PFN to online page), RCU safety when accessing page_ext and cgroup objects, sleepable kfunc synchronization, and buffer boundary checks. These failure modes (use-after-free, NULL pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds access, locking bugs) are reliably detected by standard KASAN and LOCKDEP configurations. Because all stack and heap structures are thoroughly zeroed and initialized before being read or copied, there is no risk of uninitialized memory reads or information leaks that would require KMSAN.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false,
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies core memory management (mm/page_owner.c) and BPF subsystems by adding BPF iterator support (both seq_file and open-coded iterator kfuncs) for page_owner, along with helper kfuncs to retrieve memcg attribution and snprint stack traces. It also refactors the existing debugfs read_page_owner logic to share page iteration logic (page_owner_next_eligible) and memcg info extraction (get_page_memcg_info). These code paths are executable and directly reachable from user space via the BPF syscall and debugfs read operations.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
} |
| 1/1 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | action | read-patch-diff |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"PatchDiff": "commit f0be73a280a296cccf2bdde50b8b546dbbbf71ab\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate: Wed Oct 21 19:40:36 2026 +0000\n\n syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c\nindex 712dca5a2c5bd..bba9eeb076c37 100644\n--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c\n+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c\n@@ -4946,6 +4946,16 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_new, KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n #endif\n+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER\n+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_new,\n+\t KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_next,\n+\t KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy,\n+\t KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n+#endif\n BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, __bpf_trap)\n BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcmp, KF_PERFMON);\n BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcasecmp, KF_PERFMON);\ndiff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile\nindex e7245cb88c665..d7307b5a964c6 100644\n--- a/mm/Makefile\n+++ b/mm/Makefile\n@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK) += kmemleak.o\n obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST) += rodata_test.o\n obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE) += debug_vm_pgtable.o\n obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner.o\n+ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL\n+obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner_iter.o\n+endif\n obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION) += page_isolation.o\n obj-$(CONFIG_ZSMALLOC)\t+= zsmalloc.o\n obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP) += early_ioremap.o\ndiff --git a/mm/page_owner.c b/mm/page_owner.c\nindex fbbda7ba914ba..7470b5d002be4 100644\n--- a/mm/page_owner.c\n+++ b/mm/page_owner.c\n@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@\n #include \u003clinux/sched/clock.h\u003e\n \n #include \"page_alloc.h\"\n+#include \"page_owner.h\"\n \n /*\n * TODO: teach PAGE_OWNER_STACK_DEPTH (__dump_page_owner and save_stack)\n@@ -21,21 +22,6 @@\n */\n #define PAGE_OWNER_STACK_DEPTH (16)\n \n-struct page_owner {\n-\tunsigned short order;\n-\tshort last_migrate_reason;\n-\tgfp_t gfp_mask;\n-\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle;\n-\tdepot_stack_handle_t free_handle;\n-\tu64 ts_nsec;\n-\tu64 free_ts_nsec;\n-\tchar comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];\n-\tpid_t pid;\n-\tpid_t tgid;\n-\tpid_t free_pid;\n-\tpid_t free_tgid;\n-};\n-\n struct stack {\n \tstruct stack_record *stack_record;\n \tstruct stack *next;\n@@ -552,16 +538,22 @@ void pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount_print(struct seq_file *m,\n \n #ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG\n /*\n- * Looking for memcg information and print it out\n+ * Collect memcg information of @page into @info; when @buf and a\n+ * nonzero @size are given, also copy the full cgroup path of the\n+ * charged memcg into @buf.\n+ *\n+ * Return: 0 if @page is charged to an attributable memcg; -ENODATA\n+ * otherwise.\n */\n-static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,\n-\t\t\t\t\t struct page *page)\n+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,\n+\t\t\tchar *buf, int size)\n {\n \tunsigned long memcg_data;\n \tstruct obj_cgroup *objcg;\n \tstruct mem_cgroup *memcg;\n-\tbool online;\n-\tchar name[80];\n+\tint ret = -ENODATA;\n+\n+\t*info = (struct memcg_info){};\n \n \trcu_read_lock();\n \tmemcg_data = READ_ONCE(page-\u003ememcg_data);\n@@ -569,31 +561,68 @@ static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,\n \t\tgoto out_unlock;\n \n \tif (memcg_data \u0026 MEMCG_DATA_OBJEXTS) {\n-\t\tret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,\n-\t\t\t\t\"Slab cache page\\n\");\n+\t\tinfo-\u003eis_slab = true;\n \t\tgoto out_unlock;\n \t}\n \n \tobjcg = (void *)(memcg_data \u0026 ~OBJEXTS_FLAGS_MASK);\n-\tmemcg = objcg ? obj_cgroup_memcg(objcg) : NULL;\n+\tif (!objcg)\n+\t\tgoto out_unlock;\n+\n+\tmemcg = obj_cgroup_memcg(objcg);\n \tif (!memcg)\n \t\tgoto out_unlock;\n \n-\tonline = css_is_online(\u0026memcg-\u003ecss);\n-\tcgroup_name(memcg-\u003ecss.cgroup, name, sizeof(name));\n-\tret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,\n-\t\t\t\"Charged %sto %smemcg %s\\n\",\n-\t\t\t(memcg_data \u0026 MEMCG_DATA_KMEM) ? \"(via objcg) \" : \"\",\n-\t\t\tonline ? \"\" : \"offline \",\n-\t\t\tname);\n+\tinfo-\u003eis_kmem = (memcg_data \u0026 MEMCG_DATA_KMEM) != 0;\n+\tinfo-\u003eis_online = css_is_online(\u0026memcg-\u003ecss);\n+\tcgroup_name(memcg-\u003ecss.cgroup, info-\u003ename, sizeof(info-\u003ename));\n+\n+\tif (buf \u0026\u0026 size)\n+\t\tcgroup_path(memcg-\u003ecss.cgroup, buf, size);\n+\tret = 0;\n out_unlock:\n \trcu_read_unlock();\n \n+\tif (ret \u003c 0 \u0026\u0026 buf \u0026\u0026 size)\n+\t\tbuf[0] = '\\0';\n+\n+\treturn ret;\n+}\n+\n+/*\n+ * Print memcg information from memcg_info\n+ */\n+static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,\n+\t\t\t\t\t const struct memcg_info *info)\n+{\n+\tif (!info)\n+\t\treturn ret;\n+\n+\tif (info-\u003eis_slab)\n+\t\tret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,\n+\t\t\t\t\"Slab cache page\\n\");\n+\n+\tif (info-\u003ename[0])\n+\t\tret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,\n+\t\t\t\t\"Charged %sto %smemcg %s\\n\",\n+\t\t\t\tinfo-\u003eis_kmem ? \"(via objcg) \" : \"\",\n+\t\t\t\tinfo-\u003eis_online ? \"\" : \"offline \",\n+\t\t\t\tinfo-\u003ename);\n+\n \treturn ret;\n }\n #else\n+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,\n+\t\t\tchar *buf, int size)\n+{\n+\t*info = (struct memcg_info){};\n+\tif (buf \u0026\u0026 size)\n+\t\tbuf[0] = '\\0';\n+\treturn -EOPNOTSUPP;\n+}\n+\n static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,\n-\t\t\t\t\t struct page *page)\n+\t\t\t\t\t const struct memcg_info *info)\n {\n \treturn ret;\n }\n@@ -603,7 +632,8 @@ static ssize_t\n print_page_owner(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned long pfn,\n \t\tstruct page *page, struct page_owner *page_owner,\n \t\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle,\n-\t\tstruct page_owner_filter_state *state)\n+\t\tstruct page_owner_filter_state *state,\n+\t\tconst struct memcg_info *memcg_info)\n {\n \tint ret, pageblock_mt, page_mt;\n \tchar *kbuf;\n@@ -653,7 +683,7 @@ print_page_owner(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned long pfn,\n \t\t\tmigrate_reason_names[page_owner-\u003elast_migrate_reason]);\n \t}\n \n-\tret = print_page_owner_memcg(kbuf, count, ret, page);\n+\tret = print_page_owner_memcg(kbuf, count, ret, memcg_info);\n \n \tret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, \"\\n\");\n \tif (ret \u003e= count)\n@@ -725,37 +755,37 @@ void __dump_page_owner(const struct page *page)\n \tpage_ext_put(page_ext);\n }\n \n-static ssize_t\n-read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)\n+/*\n+ * NUMA node of @page, bypassing PF_POISONED_CHECK() in page_to_nid() to\n+ * avoid VM_BUG_ON on poisoned pages; -1 for poisoned pages.\n+ */\n+static int page_owner_get_nid(struct page *page)\n {\n-\tunsigned long pfn;\n-\tstruct page *page;\n-\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\n-\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\n-\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle;\n-\tstruct page_owner_filter_state *state = file-\u003eprivate_data;\n+\tmemdesc_flags_t page_flags = READ_ONCE(page-\u003eflags);\n \n-\tif (!static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited))\n-\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n+\tif (page_flags.f == PAGE_POISON_PATTERN)\n+\t\treturn -1;\n+\treturn memdesc_nid(\u0026page_flags);\n+}\n+\n+/*\n+ * Advance @scan to the next page eligible for page_owner output.\n+ * On a hit, fill scan-\u003epfn/po_snap/nid and return true; the caller\n+ * must advance scan-\u003epfn past the hit before calling again to resume\n+ * the scan.\n+ */\n+bool page_owner_next_eligible(struct page_owner_scan *scan)\n+{\n+\tunsigned long pfn = scan-\u003epfn;\n \n-\tpage = NULL;\n-\tif (*ppos == 0)\n-\t\tpfn = min_low_pfn;\n-\telse\n-\t\tpfn = *ppos;\n \t/* Find a valid PFN or the start of a MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES area */\n \twhile (!pfn_valid(pfn) \u0026\u0026 (pfn \u0026 (MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES - 1)) != 0)\n \t\tpfn++;\n \n-\t/* Find an allocated page */\n \tfor (; pfn \u003c max_pfn; pfn++) {\n-\t\t/*\n-\t\t * This temporary page_owner is required so\n-\t\t * that we can avoid the context switches while holding\n-\t\t * the rcu lock and copying the page owner information to\n-\t\t * user through copy_to_user() or GFP_KERNEL allocations.\n-\t\t */\n-\t\tstruct page_owner page_owner_tmp;\n+\t\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\n+\t\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\n+\t\tstruct page *page;\n \n \t\t/*\n \t\t * If the new page is in a new MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES area,\n@@ -766,13 +796,22 @@ read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)\n \t\t\tcontinue;\n \t\t}\n \n-\t\tpage = pfn_to_page(pfn);\n+\t\t/*\n+\t\t * Hold a mem-hotplug reader across the page derefs so the\n+\t\t * vmemmap isn't torn down mid-scan; released before\n+\t\t * cond_resched().\n+\t\t */\n+\t\tget_online_mems();\n+\t\tpage = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);\n+\t\tif (!page)\n+\t\t\tgoto put_online_continue;\n+\n \t\tif (skip_buddy_pages(\u0026pfn, page))\n-\t\t\tcontinue;\n+\t\t\tgoto put_online_continue;\n \n \t\tpage_ext = page_ext_get(page);\n \t\tif (unlikely(!page_ext))\n-\t\t\tcontinue;\n+\t\t\tgoto put_online_continue;\n \n \t\t/*\n \t\t * Some pages could be missed by concurrent allocation or free,\n@@ -798,37 +837,79 @@ read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)\n \t\t\tgoto ext_put_continue;\n \n \t\t/*\n-\t\t * Access to page_ext-\u003ehandle isn't synchronous so we should\n-\t\t * be careful to access it.\n+\t\t * Take a snapshot of the page_owner record inside the RCU\n+\t\t * window, then validate it, so that print_page_owner()\n+\t\t * reads the checked handle from the same snapshot.\n \t\t */\n-\t\thandle = READ_ONCE(page_owner-\u003ehandle);\n-\t\tif (!handle)\n+\t\tscan-\u003epfn = pfn;\n+\t\tscan-\u003epo_snap = *page_owner;\n+\n+\t\tif (!scan-\u003epo_snap.handle)\n \t\t\tgoto ext_put_continue;\n \n-\t\tif (state-\u003enid_filter_enabled) {\n-\t\t\tint nid;\n-\t\t\tmemdesc_flags_t page_flags = READ_ONCE(page-\u003eflags);\n+\t\tscan-\u003enid = page_owner_get_nid(page);\n+\t\tpage_ext_put(page_ext);\n+\t\tput_online_mems();\n+\t\treturn true;\n \n-\t\t\t/*\n-\t\t\t * Bypass PF_POISONED_CHECK() in page_to_nid() to avoid\n-\t\t\t * VM_BUG_ON when accessing poisoned pages.\n-\t\t\t */\n-\t\t\tif (page_flags.f == PAGE_POISON_PATTERN)\n-\t\t\t\tgoto ext_put_continue;\n-\t\t\tnid = memdesc_nid(\u0026page_flags);\n-\t\t\tif (!node_isset(nid, state-\u003enid_filter))\n-\t\t\t\tgoto ext_put_continue;\n+ext_put_continue:\n+\t\tpage_ext_put(page_ext);\n+put_online_continue:\n+\t\tput_online_mems();\n+\t\tcond_resched();\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn false;\n+}\n+\n+static ssize_t\n+read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)\n+{\n+\tstruct page_owner_scan scan;\n+\tstruct memcg_info memcg_info;\n+\tstruct page_owner_filter_state *state = file-\u003eprivate_data;\n+\n+\tif (!static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited))\n+\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n+\n+\tif (*ppos == 0)\n+\t\tscan.pfn = min_low_pfn;\n+\telse\n+\t\tscan.pfn = *ppos;\n+\n+\t/* Find an allocated page */\n+\twhile (page_owner_next_eligible(\u0026scan)) {\n+\t\tstruct page *page;\n+\t\tssize_t ret;\n+\n+\t\t/*\n+\t\t * The scan is lockless. Re-resolve the page under a mem-hotplug\n+\t\t * read-side lock so that we never access a hot-removed section.\n+\t\t */\n+\t\tget_online_mems();\n+\t\tpage = pfn_to_online_page(scan.pfn);\n+\t\tif (!page)\n+\t\t\tgoto skip_continue;\n+\n+\t\tif (state-\u003enid_filter_enabled) {\n+\t\t\tif (scan.nid \u003c 0 ||\n+\t\t\t !node_isset(scan.nid, state-\u003enid_filter))\n+\t\t\t\tgoto skip_continue;\n \t\t}\n \n \t\t/* Record the next PFN to read in the file offset */\n-\t\t*ppos = pfn + 1;\n-\n-\t\tpage_owner_tmp = *page_owner;\n-\t\tpage_ext_put(page_ext);\n-\t\treturn print_page_owner(buf, count, pfn, page,\n-\t\t\t\t\u0026page_owner_tmp, handle, state);\n-ext_put_continue:\n-\t\tpage_ext_put(page_ext);\n+\t\t*ppos = scan.pfn + 1;\n+\n+\t\tget_page_memcg_info(page, \u0026memcg_info, NULL, 0);\n+\t\tret = print_page_owner(buf, count, scan.pfn, page,\n+\t\t\t\t\u0026scan.po_snap, scan.po_snap.handle, state,\n+\t\t\t\t\u0026memcg_info);\n+\t\tput_online_mems();\n+\t\treturn ret;\n+\n+skip_continue:\n+\t\tput_online_mems();\n+\t\tscan.pfn++;\n \t\tcond_resched();\n \t}\n \n@@ -1169,6 +1250,11 @@ static int __init pageowner_init(void)\n \t\t\t \u0026stack_fops);\n \tdebugfs_create_file(\"count_threshold\", 0600, dir, NULL,\n \t\t\t \u0026threshold_fops);\n+\n+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL\n+\tif (page_owner_iter_register())\n+\t\tpr_warn(\"page_owner: failed to register bpf_iter target\\n\");\n+#endif\n \treturn 0;\n }\n late_initcall(pageowner_init)\ndiff --git a/mm/page_owner.h b/mm/page_owner.h\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000000..65598415af731\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mm/page_owner.h\n@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@\n+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */\n+/*\n+ * mm/ internal page_owner and page_owner_iter declarations\n+ */\n+\n+#ifndef __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H\n+#define __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H\n+\n+#include \u003clinux/jump_label.h\u003e\n+#include \u003clinux/page_ext.h\u003e\n+#include \u003clinux/sched.h\u003e\n+#include \u003clinux/stackdepot.h\u003e\n+\n+/*\n+ * mm/page_owner.c\n+ */\n+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(page_owner_inited);\n+\n+struct page_owner {\n+\tunsigned short order;\n+\tshort last_migrate_reason;\n+\tgfp_t gfp_mask;\n+\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle;\n+\tdepot_stack_handle_t free_handle;\n+\tu64 ts_nsec;\n+\tu64 free_ts_nsec;\n+\tchar comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];\n+\tpid_t pid;\n+\tpid_t tgid;\n+\tpid_t free_pid;\n+\tpid_t free_tgid;\n+};\n+\n+/*\n+ * Cursor and per-page result of page_owner_next_eligible().\n+ */\n+struct page_owner_scan {\n+\t/* resume point */\n+\tunsigned long pfn;\n+\tstruct page_owner po_snap;\n+\tint nid;\n+};\n+\n+struct memcg_info {\n+\tchar name[80];\n+\tbool is_slab;\n+\tbool is_kmem;\n+\tbool is_online;\n+};\n+\n+bool page_owner_next_eligible(struct page_owner_scan *scan);\n+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,\n+\t\t\tchar *buf, int size);\n+\n+/*\n+ * mm/page_owner_iter.c\n+ */\n+int page_owner_iter_register(void);\n+\n+#endif /* __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H */\ndiff --git a/mm/page_owner_iter.c b/mm/page_owner_iter.c\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000000..a649e1207e246\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/mm/page_owner_iter.c\n@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@\n+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\n+#include \u003clinux/bpf.h\u003e\n+#include \u003clinux/btf_ids.h\u003e\n+#include \u003clinux/memblock.h\u003e\n+#include \u003clinux/mm.h\u003e\n+#include \u003clinux/seq_file.h\u003e\n+#include \u003clinux/stackdepot.h\u003e\n+\n+#include \"page_owner.h\"\n+\n+struct bpf_iter__page_owner {\n+\t__bpf_md_ptr(struct bpf_iter_meta *, meta);\n+\t__bpf_md_ptr(struct page_owner *, po);\n+\tu64 pfn;\n+\tint nid;\n+};\n+\n+DEFINE_BPF_ITER_FUNC(page_owner, struct bpf_iter_meta *meta,\n+\t\t struct page_owner *po, u64 pfn, int nid)\n+\n+static void *page_owner_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *posp)\n+{\n+\tstruct page_owner_scan *scan = seq-\u003eprivate;\n+\n+\tif (*posp == 0)\n+\t\tscan-\u003epfn = min_low_pfn;\n+\n+\tif (!page_owner_next_eligible(scan))\n+\t\treturn NULL;\n+\treturn \u0026scan-\u003epo_snap;\n+}\n+\n+static void *page_owner_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *posp)\n+{\n+\tstruct page_owner_scan *scan = seq-\u003eprivate;\n+\n+\t++*posp;\n+\tscan-\u003epfn++;\n+\tif (!page_owner_next_eligible(scan))\n+\t\treturn NULL;\n+\n+\treturn \u0026scan-\u003epo_snap;\n+}\n+\n+static int page_owner_prog_seq_show(struct bpf_prog *prog,\n+\t\t\t\t struct bpf_iter_meta *meta, void *v)\n+{\n+\tstruct page_owner_scan *scan = meta-\u003eseq-\u003eprivate;\n+\tstruct bpf_iter__page_owner ctx = {};\n+\n+\tctx.meta = meta;\n+\tif (v) {\n+\t\t/* @po: hit-time snapshot, no RCU window needed. */\n+\t\tctx.po = \u0026scan-\u003epo_snap;\n+\t\tctx.pfn = scan-\u003epfn;\n+\t\tctx.nid = scan-\u003enid;\n+\t}\n+\n+\treturn bpf_iter_run_prog(prog, \u0026ctx);\n+}\n+\n+static int page_owner_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)\n+{\n+\tstruct bpf_iter_meta meta;\n+\tstruct bpf_prog *prog;\n+\n+\tmeta.seq = seq;\n+\tprog = bpf_iter_get_info(\u0026meta, false);\n+\tif (!prog)\n+\t\treturn 0;\n+\n+\treturn page_owner_prog_seq_show(prog, \u0026meta, v);\n+}\n+\n+static void page_owner_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)\n+{\n+\tif (!v) {\n+\t\tstruct bpf_iter_meta meta = { .seq = seq };\n+\t\tstruct bpf_prog *prog;\n+\n+\t\tprog = bpf_iter_get_info(\u0026meta, true);\n+\t\tif (prog)\n+\t\t\tpage_owner_prog_seq_show(prog, \u0026meta, NULL);\n+\t}\n+}\n+\n+static const struct seq_operations page_owner_iter_seq_ops = {\n+\t.start\t= page_owner_seq_start,\n+\t.next\t= page_owner_seq_next,\n+\t.stop\t= page_owner_seq_stop,\n+\t.show\t= page_owner_seq_show,\n+};\n+\n+static const struct bpf_iter_seq_info page_owner_iter_seq_info = {\n+\t.seq_ops\t\t= \u0026page_owner_iter_seq_ops,\n+\t.init_seq_private\t= NULL,\n+\t.fini_seq_private\t= NULL,\n+\t.seq_priv_size\t\t= sizeof(struct page_owner_scan),\n+};\n+\n+static struct bpf_iter_reg page_owner_iter_reg_info = {\n+\t.target\t\t\t= \"page_owner\",\n+\t.ctx_arg_info_size\t= 1,\n+\t.ctx_arg_info\t\t= {\n+\t\t{ offsetof(struct bpf_iter__page_owner, po),\n+\t\t PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL },\n+\t},\n+\t.seq_info\t\t= \u0026page_owner_iter_seq_info,\n+\t.feature\t\t= BPF_ITER_RESCHED,\n+};\n+\n+BTF_ID_LIST(page_owner_btf_ids)\n+BTF_ID(struct, page_owner)\n+\n+int page_owner_iter_register(void)\n+{\n+\tpage_owner_iter_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id =\n+\t\tpage_owner_btf_ids[0];\n+\n+\treturn bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026page_owner_iter_reg_info);\n+}\n+\n+/* opaque to BPF programs */\n+struct bpf_iter_page_owner {\n+\t__u64 __opaque[16];\n+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));\n+\n+struct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern {\n+\tstruct page_owner_scan scan;\n+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));\n+\n+__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\n+\n+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_page_owner_new(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)\n+{\n+\tstruct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern *kit = (void *)it;\n+\n+\tBUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*kit) \u003e sizeof(*it));\n+\tBUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*kit) != __alignof__(*it));\n+\n+\tkit-\u003escan.pfn = min_low_pfn - 1;\n+\treturn 0;\n+}\n+\n+__bpf_kfunc struct page_owner_scan *\n+bpf_iter_page_owner_next(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)\n+{\n+\tstruct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern *kit = (void *)it;\n+\n+\tif (!static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited))\n+\t\treturn NULL;\n+\n+\tcond_resched();\n+\n+\tkit-\u003escan.pfn++;\n+\tif (!page_owner_next_eligible(\u0026kit-\u003escan))\n+\t\treturn NULL;\n+\n+\treturn \u0026kit-\u003escan;\n+}\n+\n+__bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)\n+{\n+}\n+\n+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\n+\t\t\t\t\t char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)\n+{\n+\tint len = 0;\n+\n+\tif (!buf__uninit || !buf__sz)\n+\t\treturn 0;\n+\n+\tif (static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited))\n+\t\tlen = stack_depot_snprint(scan-\u003epo_snap.handle, buf__uninit,\n+\t\t\t\t\t buf__sz, 0);\n+\n+\tif (!len)\n+\t\tbuf__uninit[0] = '\\0';\n+\n+\treturn len;\n+}\n+\n+/**\n+ * bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info - Report the memcg charged for the current page\n+ * @scan: page_owner scan handle.\n+ * @info__uninit: output buffer for the memcg_info.\n+ * @buf__uninit: optional output buffer for the full cgroup path.\n+ * @buf__sz: size of @buf__uninit.\n+ *\n+ * Fills @info__uninit with the memcg charged for the page backing\n+ * @scan-\u003epfn. If @buf__uninit and @buf__sz are provided, the full\n+ * cgroup path is also copied out, so a BPF program can attribute a\n+ * page_owner allocation to a specific cgroup.\n+ *\n+ * @scan-\u003epfn is resolved to a struct page under get_online_mems(),\n+ * so the page cannot be accessed after its memory section is offlined\n+ * or removed.\n+ *\n+ * Returns:\n+ * * 0 on success\n+ * * -ENODATA if the page is not online or not charged to a memcg\n+ * * -EOPNOTSUPP if built without CONFIG_MEMCG\n+ */\n+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\n+\t\t\t\t\t struct memcg_info *info__uninit,\n+\t\t\t\t\t char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)\n+{\n+\tstruct page *page;\n+\tint ret = -ENODATA;\n+\n+\tif (!static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited))\n+\t\tgoto nodata;\n+\n+\tget_online_mems();\n+\tpage = pfn_to_online_page(scan-\u003epfn);\n+\tif (!page) {\n+\t\tput_online_mems();\n+\t\tgoto nodata;\n+\t}\n+\tret = get_page_memcg_info(page, info__uninit, buf__uninit, buf__sz);\n+\tput_online_mems();\n+\treturn ret;\n+\n+nodata:\n+\t*info__uninit = (struct memcg_info){};\n+\tif (buf__uninit \u0026\u0026 buf__sz)\n+\t\tbuf__uninit[0] = '\\0';\n+\treturn ret;\n+}\n+\n+__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();\ndiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config\nindex ea7044f30adc3..731bc3d798817 100644\n--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config\n+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config\n@@ -136,3 +136,5 @@ CONFIG_SMC_HS_CTRL_BPF=y\n CONFIG_DIBS=y\n CONFIG_DIBS_LO=y\n CONFIG_PM_WAKELOCKS=y\n+CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y\n+CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER=y\ndiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000000..3684ca3089355\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c\n@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@\n+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\n+/* Copyright (c) 2026 */\n+\n+#include \u003ctest_progs.h\u003e\n+#include \"bpf_iter_page_owner.skel.h\"\n+\n+#define DEBUGFS_PAGE_OWNER\t\"/sys/kernel/debug/page_owner\"\n+\n+static bool page_owner_available(void)\n+{\n+\treturn access(DEBUGFS_PAGE_OWNER, R_OK) == 0;\n+}\n+\n+/* Count link_fd output lines; -1 on error. */\n+static long iter_record_count(int link_fd)\n+{\n+\tchar *line = NULL;\n+\tsize_t len = 0;\n+\tlong count = 0;\n+\tint iter_fd;\n+\tFILE *f;\n+\n+\titer_fd = bpf_iter_create(link_fd);\n+\tif (!ASSERT_GE(iter_fd, 0, \"bpf_iter_create\"))\n+\t\treturn -1;\n+\n+\tf = fdopen(iter_fd, \"r\");\n+\tif (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(f, \"fdopen\")) {\n+\t\tclose(iter_fd);\n+\t\treturn -1;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfor (;;) {\n+\t\tif (getline(\u0026line, \u0026len, f) \u003e 0) {\n+\t\t\tcount++;\n+\t\t\tcontinue;\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tif (!ferror(f))\n+\t\t\tbreak;\t\t/* clean EOF */\n+\t\t/*\n+\t\t * bpf_seq_read() returns -EAGAIN when a chunk scanned.\n+\t\t * Not an error, just retry the read.\n+\t\t */\n+\t\tif (errno == EAGAIN) {\n+\t\t\tclearerr(f);\n+\t\t\tcontinue;\n+\t\t}\n+\t\tASSERT_OK(errno, \"iter_read\");\n+\t\tcount = -1;\n+\t\tbreak;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tfree(line);\n+\tfclose(f);\n+\treturn count;\n+}\n+\n+/* Validate bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info() results from the open-coded run. */\n+static void check_memcg_skel(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *skel)\n+{\n+\tfprintf(stderr,\n+\t\t\"memcg: seen=%u charged=%u online=%u nodata=%u notsup=%u bad=%u first='%s' name='%s' flags=%u\\n\",\n+\t\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_seen, skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_charged,\n+\t\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_online, skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_nodata,\n+\t\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_notsup, skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_bad,\n+\t\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_first_path, skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_first_name,\n+\t\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_first_flags);\n+\n+\tif (!ASSERT_GT(skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_seen, 0, \"memcg_seen_gt_0\"))\n+\t\treturn;\n+\n+\t/* all -EOPNOTSUPP: CONFIG_MEMCG is off */\n+\tif (skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_notsup == skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_seen) {\n+\t\tASSERT_EQ(skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_bad, 0, \"memcg_stub_invariants\");\n+\t\treturn;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tif (!ASSERT_EQ(skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_bad, 0, \"memcg_kfunc_invariants\"))\n+\t\treturn;\n+\n+\t/* Every call is either charged or nodata */\n+\tif (!ASSERT_EQ(skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_charged + skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_nodata,\n+\t\t skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_seen, \"memcg_ret_classified\"))\n+\t\treturn;\n+\n+\tif (!skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_first_saved)\n+\t\treturn;\n+\n+\tif (!ASSERT_EQ(skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_first_path[0], '/',\n+\t\t \"memcg_first_path_abs\"))\n+\t\treturn;\n+\n+\tif (skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_first_name[0])\n+\t\tASSERT_OK_PTR(strstr(skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_first_path,\n+\t\t\t\t skel-\u003ebss-\u003ememcg_first_name),\n+\t\t\t \"memcg_name_in_path\");\n+}\n+\n+void serial_test_page_owner_iter(void)\n+{\n+\tstruct bpf_iter_page_owner *skel = NULL;\n+\tLIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, opts);\n+\tlong iter_count, unfiltered_count, oc_diff, pid;\n+\tunsigned int printed_before;\n+\tint link_fd, prog_fd;\n+\n+\tif (!page_owner_available()) {\n+\t\tprintf(\"%s:SKIP:page_owner debugfs unavailable \"\n+\t\t \"(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER + page_owner=on)\\n\", __func__);\n+\t\ttest__skip();\n+\t\treturn;\n+\t}\n+\n+\tskel = bpf_iter_page_owner__open_and_load();\n+\tif (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, \"bpf_iter_page_owner__open_and_load\"))\n+\t\treturn;\n+\n+\t/* --- seq file iterator: unfiltered run --- */\n+\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003efilter_en = 0;\n+\n+\tif (!ASSERT_OK(bpf_iter_page_owner__attach(skel), \"skel_attach\"))\n+\t\tgoto destroy;\n+\n+\tlink_fd = bpf_link__fd(skel-\u003elinks.dump_page_owner);\n+\titer_count = iter_record_count(link_fd);\n+\tif (iter_count \u003c 0)\n+\t\tgoto destroy;\n+\tunfiltered_count = iter_count;\n+\n+\tfprintf(stderr, \"iter_count=%ld printed_lines=%u total_seen=%u\\n\",\n+\t\titer_count, skel-\u003ebss-\u003eprinted_lines, skel-\u003ebss-\u003etotal_seen);\n+\n+\tASSERT_GT(iter_count, 0, \"unfiltered_lines_gt_0\");\n+\n+\tASSERT_EQ((long)skel-\u003ebss-\u003eprinted_lines, iter_count,\n+\t\t \"lines_match_printed\");\n+\n+\t/* unfiltered: every visited page is printed, so the two must match */\n+\tASSERT_EQ(skel-\u003ebss-\u003etotal_seen, skel-\u003ebss-\u003eprinted_lines,\n+\t\t \"unfiltered_all_printed\");\n+\n+\t/* --- seq file iterator: pid-filtered run --- */\n+\tpid = getpid();\n+\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003efilter_en = 1;\n+\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003efilter_pid = (pid_t)pid;\n+\n+\t/* printed_lines is cumulative across runs: compare the delta */\n+\tprinted_before = skel-\u003ebss-\u003eprinted_lines;\n+\titer_count = iter_record_count(link_fd);\n+\tif (iter_count \u003c 0)\n+\t\tgoto destroy;\n+\n+\tfprintf(stderr,\n+\t\t\"pid=%ld iter_count=%ld printed_delta=%u\\n\",\n+\t\tpid, iter_count, skel-\u003ebss-\u003eprinted_lines - printed_before);\n+\n+\tASSERT_GT(iter_count, 0, \"filtered_lines_gt_0\");\n+\tASSERT_EQ(skel-\u003ebss-\u003eprinted_lines - printed_before, iter_count,\n+\t\t \"filtered_printed_match\");\n+\n+\t/* --- open-coded iterator parity --- */\n+\tprog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel-\u003eprogs.scan_open_coded);\n+\n+\tASSERT_OK(bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, \u0026opts), \"prog_test_run\");\n+\tfprintf(stderr,\n+\t\t\"open_coded_seen=%u nid_seen=%u first_nid=%d \"\n+\t\t\"stack_bytes=%u stack=[\\n%s]\\n\",\n+\t\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003eopen_coded_seen, skel-\u003ebss-\u003enid_seen,\n+\t\tskel-\u003edata-\u003efirst_nid, skel-\u003ebss-\u003estack_bytes,\n+\t\tskel-\u003ebss-\u003estack_text);\n+\n+\t/* same eligibility as the seq path: counts must be close */\n+\tASSERT_GT(skel-\u003ebss-\u003eopen_coded_seen, 0, \"oc_seen_gt_0\");\n+\toc_diff = (long)skel-\u003ebss-\u003eopen_coded_seen - unfiltered_count;\n+\tif (oc_diff \u003c 0)\n+\t\toc_diff = -oc_diff;\n+\tASSERT_LE(oc_diff, unfiltered_count / 100 + 64,\n+\t\t \"oc_seen_close_to_iter\");\n+\n+\t/* the nid kfunc returned a valid node for every page */\n+\tASSERT_EQ(skel-\u003ebss-\u003enid_seen, skel-\u003ebss-\u003eopen_coded_seen,\n+\t\t \"nid_valid_all\");\n+\tASSERT_GE(skel-\u003edata-\u003efirst_nid, 0, \"first_nid_valid\");\n+\n+\tASSERT_GT(skel-\u003ebss-\u003estack_bytes, 0, \"stack_snprint_ok\");\n+\tASSERT_OK_PTR(strstr(skel-\u003ebss-\u003estack_text, \"+0x\"), \"stack_frames\");\n+\tASSERT_OK_PTR(strchr(skel-\u003ebss-\u003estack_text, '\\n'), \"stack_lines\");\n+\n+\tcheck_memcg_skel(skel);\n+\n+destroy:\n+\tbpf_iter_page_owner__destroy(skel);\n+}\ndiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 0000000000000..1cd99956aff34\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c\n@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@\n+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\n+/* Copyright (c) 2026 */\n+\n+#include \u003cvmlinux.h\u003e\n+#include \u003cbpf/bpf_helpers.h\u003e\n+#include \u003cerrno.h\u003e\n+\n+char _license[] SEC(\"license\") = \"GPL\";\n+\n+__u32 filter_en;\n+__u32 filter_pid;\n+__u32 total_seen;\n+__u32 printed_lines;\n+\n+__u32 open_coded_seen;\n+__u32 nid_seen;\n+__s32 first_nid = -1;\n+char stack_text[2048];\n+__u32 stack_bytes;\n+\n+__u32 memcg_seen;\n+__u32 memcg_charged;\n+__u32 memcg_online;\n+__u32 memcg_nodata;\n+__u32 memcg_notsup;\n+__u32 memcg_bad;\n+__u32 memcg_first_saved;\n+__u32 memcg_first_flags;\t/* bit0 is_online, bit1 is_kmem */\n+__u32 memcg_first_path_len;\n+char memcg_pathbuf[4096];\n+char memcg_first_path[4096];\n+char memcg_first_name[80];\n+\n+#define MEMCG_F_ONLINE\t(1 \u003c\u003c 0)\n+#define MEMCG_F_OBJCG\t(1 \u003c\u003c 1)\n+\n+extern int bpf_iter_page_owner_new(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;\n+extern struct page_owner_scan *\n+bpf_iter_page_owner_next(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;\n+extern void bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;\n+extern int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\n+\t\t\t\t\tchar *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz) __ksym;\n+extern int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\n+\t\t\t\t\t struct memcg_info *info__uninit,\n+\t\t\t\t\t char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz) __ksym;\n+\n+static __u32 copy_str(char *dst, const char *src, const __u32 max)\n+{\n+\t__u32 i = 0;\n+\n+\twhile (i + 1 \u003c max \u0026\u0026 src[i]) {\n+\t\tdst[i] = src[i];\n+\t\ti++;\n+\t}\n+\tdst[i] = '\\0';\n+\treturn i;\n+}\n+\n+/*\n+ * Exercise bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info() until 32 pages charged to an\n+ * ONLINE memcg have been seen, checking its per-return contract:\n+ * - 0: buf holds an absolute cgroup path;\n+ * - -ENODATA: buf was NUL-terminated;\n+ * - -EOPNOTSUPP: counted (CONFIG_MEMCG is off);\n+ *\n+ * The first online charged sample is saved for userspace to print and\n+ * cross-check (name vs basename of path).\n+ */\n+static void check_memcg(struct page_owner_scan *scan)\n+{\n+\tstatic struct memcg_info info;\n+\tint err;\n+\n+\terr = bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(scan, \u0026info, memcg_pathbuf,\n+\t\t\t\t\t sizeof(memcg_pathbuf));\n+\tmemcg_seen++;\n+\n+\tif (err == 0) {\n+\t\tmemcg_charged++;\n+\n+\t\tif (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '/') {\n+\t\t\tmemcg_bad++;\n+\t\t\treturn;\n+\t\t}\n+\n+\t\tif (!info.is_online)\n+\t\t\treturn;\n+\t\tmemcg_online++;\n+\n+\t\t/* keep the first online sample for userspace */\n+\t\tif (!memcg_first_saved) {\n+\t\t\tmemcg_first_path_len = copy_str(memcg_first_path,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tmemcg_pathbuf,\n+\t\t\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(memcg_first_path));\n+\t\t\tcopy_str(memcg_first_name, info.name,\n+\t\t\t\t sizeof(memcg_first_name));\n+\t\t\tmemcg_first_flags = MEMCG_F_ONLINE |\n+\t\t\t\t\t (info.is_kmem ? MEMCG_F_OBJCG : 0);\n+\t\t\tmemcg_first_saved = 1;\n+\t\t}\n+\t} else if (err == -ENODATA) {\n+\t\tmemcg_nodata++;\n+\t\tif (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '\\0')\n+\t\t\tmemcg_bad++;\n+\t} else if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) {\n+\t\tmemcg_notsup++;\n+\t\tif (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '\\0')\n+\t\t\tmemcg_bad++;\n+\t} else {\n+\t\tmemcg_bad++;\n+\t}\n+}\n+\n+SEC(\"syscall\")\n+int scan_open_coded(const void *ctx)\n+{\n+\tstruct bpf_iter_page_owner it;\n+\tstruct page_owner_scan *scan;\n+\n+\tbpf_iter_page_owner_new(\u0026it);\n+\n+\twhile ((scan = bpf_iter_page_owner_next(\u0026it))) {\n+\t\topen_coded_seen++;\n+\t\tif (scan-\u003enid \u003e= 0)\n+\t\t\tnid_seen++;\n+\t\tif (memcg_online \u003c 32)\n+\t\t\tcheck_memcg(scan);\n+\t\t/* grab the stack of the 100th page for userspace to check */\n+\t\tif (open_coded_seen == 100) {\n+\t\t\tfirst_nid = scan-\u003enid;\n+\t\t\tif (scan-\u003epo_snap.handle)\n+\t\t\t\tstack_bytes = bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(\n+\t\t\t\t\tscan, stack_text, sizeof(stack_text));\n+\t\t}\n+\t}\n+\tbpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(\u0026it);\n+\treturn 0;\n+}\n+\n+SEC(\"iter/page_owner\")\n+int dump_page_owner(struct bpf_iter__page_owner *ctx)\n+{\n+\tstruct page_owner *po = ctx-\u003epo;\n+\n+\tif (!po)\n+\t\treturn 0;\n+\n+\ttotal_seen++;\n+\n+\tif (filter_en \u0026\u0026 po-\u003epid != (pid_t)filter_pid)\n+\t\treturn 0;\n+\n+\tBPF_SEQ_PRINTF(ctx-\u003emeta-\u003eseq, \"pfn %llu pid %d comm %s\\n\",\n+\t\t ctx-\u003epfn, po-\u003epid, po-\u003ecomm);\n+\tprinted_lines++;\n+\treturn 0;\n+}\n"
} |
| 2/1 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | agent | patch-evaluator |
2mModel:core Args: null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"PAGE_OWNER",
"DEBUG_KERNEL",
"BPF_SYSCALL",
"DEBUG_INFO_BTF",
"MEMCG"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"page_owner_next_eligible",
"get_page_memcg_info",
"read_page_owner",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_new",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_next",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy",
"bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint",
"bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info",
"page_owner_seq_start",
"page_owner_seq_next",
"page_owner_seq_show",
"page_owner_iter_register"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies core memory management (mm/page_owner.c) and BPF subsystems by adding BPF iterator support (both seq_file and open-coded iterator kfuncs) for page_owner, along with helper kfuncs to retrieve memcg attribution and snprint stack traces. It also refactors the existing debugfs read_page_owner logic to share page iteration logic (page_owner_next_eligible) and memcg info extraction (get_page_memcg_info). These code paths are executable and directly reachable from user space via the BPF syscall and debugfs read operations.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and evaluate whether it warrants fuzzing with syzkaller.
IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on internal assumptions. You must actively use your code access
tools to inspect the actual source code, callers, and surrounding context.
================================================================================
1. CORE TRIAGE PHILOSOPHY
================================================================================
The goal of patch fuzzing is to discover crashes, regressions, exposed latent bugs,
and newly triggered assertions introduced by the patch series.
- REACHABILITY IS THE PRIMARY GATE:
Fuzzing can only discover bugs in code that can actually execute in standard virtualized
environments (GCE or QEMU, utilizing software-emulated devices like USB gadgets, netdev, tun/tap).
If the modified code is structurally unreachable (see Section 2), it MUST NOT be fuzzed,
regardless of whether it adds assertions or complex logic.
- DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST "NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGE" (NFCI) OR "REFACTORING" CLAIMS:
Patch authors routinely label changes as "cleanups", "refactorings", or state
"No functional change intended". Do NOT take these claims at face value.
Code refactorings that rearrange logic, introduce helper functions, or alter state management
in core subsystems frequently introduce subtle semantic shifts or uncover latent kernel bugs.
If reachable executable code is modified or refactored, it MUST be fuzzed.
- NEW OR MODIFIED ASSERTIONS IN REACHABLE CODE MUST BE FUZZED:
When a patch introduces or modifies runtime checks or assertions (e.g., WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*,
BUG_ON*, lockdep_assert*) in reachable code paths, it enforces new or stricter invariants.
Even if the author believes the invariant always holds, fuzzing is essential to verify whether
an unusual sequence of operations can violate it.
================================================================================
2. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=false (NEGATIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=false ONLY IF all modified code falls strictly into one or more of these categories:
- Non-kernel and non-executable changes:
* Modifications to Documentation/, comments, or spelling fixes.
* User-space directories, self-tests, samples, or scripts (e.g., tools/, samples/, scripts/, usr/)
that do not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.
* Purely decorative logging (e.g., message strings in pr_err, printk, dev_info) or tracepoints
that do not alter control flow or data structures.
* Build system or Kconfig changes that do not alter compiled C logic.
- Structurally unreachable hardware:
* Vendor-specific PCIe switches, SmartNICs, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed,
ionic, amdgpu) requiring physical ASIC/PCIe cards not emulated in standard QEMU.
- Unreachable execution paths:
* Driver teardown callbacks (.remove, .shutdown, pci_unregister_driver) executed only during
physical PCI hot-unplug or manual sysfs driver unbinding.
* Code paths exclusive to architectures other than the target architecture.
================================================================================
3. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=true (POSITIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=true whenever the patch touches reachable executable code, including:
- Core Subsystems:
* Any logic modifications in memory management (mm/), synchronization/locking (kernel/locking/),
BPF, scheduler, core networking, VFS, or syscall handling.
- Refactorings and Code Cleanups:
* Any restructuring of reachable data structures, helper abstractions, or algorithm flows.
- Runtime Assertions and Defensive Checks:
* Any introduction or alteration of assertions (WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*, BUG_ON*, etc.) in reachable paths.
- Reachable Drivers and Protocols:
* Drivers accessible via virtual buses (virtio, USB gadget, loopback, netlink, binder, sockets, etc.).
================================================================================
4. EXTRACTING FocusSymbols (PREVENTING DILUTION)
================================================================================
When WorthFuzzing=true, you must extract specific kernel functions into FocusSymbols to guide the fuzzer:
- AVOID UBIQUITOUS LIFECYCLE HOT-PATHS:
Do NOT list generic, ubiquitous functions called by almost every program in the corpus
(including, but not limited to: general memory allocators and deallocators, page fault
and trap handlers, or core synchronization primitives; this is not an exhaustive list).
Listing ubiquitous functions causes the fuzzer to classify thousands of unrelated tests as "focused",
which severely dilutes fuzzing effort away from the actual changes.
- TARGET SPECIFIC FEATURE LOGIC AND ENTRYPOINTS:
List functions that specifically implement the logic being added or altered, or direct API entrypoints
for the subsystem feature under review.
- HANDLING STATIC INLINE FUNCTIONS IN HEADERS (.h):
Compiler-inlined static functions (such as static inlines in mm/*.h or include/linux/*.h) lack
distinct symbol addresses in vmlinux and cannot be targeted directly by symbol coverage filters.
If the changes are primarily in static inline helpers, identify non-static, feature-specific caller
functions in .c files that exercise them (avoiding ubiquitous lifecycle wrappers).
================================================================================
5. IDENTIFYING EnableConfigs
================================================================================
Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly compile and reach the modified code:
- Inspect Kconfig files and #ifdef guards; do not make assumptions.
- Check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs needed.
- Strip any 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Target architecture: amd64
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit f0be73a280a296cccf2bdde50b8b546dbbbf71ab
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date: Wed Oct 21 19:40:36 2026 +0000
syz-cluster: applied patch under review
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 712dca5a2c5bd..bba9eeb076c37 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -4946,6 +4946,16 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_new, KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE)
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_new,
+ KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_next,
+ KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy,
+ KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+#endif
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, __bpf_trap)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcmp, KF_PERFMON);
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcasecmp, KF_PERFMON);
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index e7245cb88c665..d7307b5a964c6 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK) += kmemleak.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST) += rodata_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE) += debug_vm_pgtable.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner.o
+ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner_iter.o
+endif
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION) += page_isolation.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ZSMALLOC) += zsmalloc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP) += early_ioremap.o
diff --git a/mm/page_owner.c b/mm/page_owner.c
index fbbda7ba914ba..7470b5d002be4 100644
--- a/mm/page_owner.c
+++ b/mm/page_owner.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
#include "page_alloc.h"
+#include "page_owner.h"
/*
* TODO: teach PAGE_OWNER_STACK_DEPTH (__dump_page_owner and save_stack)
@@ -21,21 +22,6 @@
*/
#define PAGE_OWNER_STACK_DEPTH (16)
-struct page_owner {
- unsigned short order;
- short last_migrate_reason;
- gfp_t gfp_mask;
- depot_stack_handle_t handle;
- depot_stack_handle_t free_handle;
- u64 ts_nsec;
- u64 free_ts_nsec;
- char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
- pid_t pid;
- pid_t tgid;
- pid_t free_pid;
- pid_t free_tgid;
-};
-
struct stack {
struct stack_record *stack_record;
struct stack *next;
@@ -552,16 +538,22 @@ void pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount_print(struct seq_file *m,
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
/*
- * Looking for memcg information and print it out
+ * Collect memcg information of @page into @info; when @buf and a
+ * nonzero @size are given, also copy the full cgroup path of the
+ * charged memcg into @buf.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if @page is charged to an attributable memcg; -ENODATA
+ * otherwise.
*/
-static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,
- struct page *page)
+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,
+ char *buf, int size)
{
unsigned long memcg_data;
struct obj_cgroup *objcg;
struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
- bool online;
- char name[80];
+ int ret = -ENODATA;
+
+ *info = (struct memcg_info){};
rcu_read_lock();
memcg_data = READ_ONCE(page->memcg_data);
@@ -569,31 +561,68 @@ static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,
goto out_unlock;
if (memcg_data & MEMCG_DATA_OBJEXTS) {
- ret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
- "Slab cache page\n");
+ info->is_slab = true;
goto out_unlock;
}
objcg = (void *)(memcg_data & ~OBJEXTS_FLAGS_MASK);
- memcg = objcg ? obj_cgroup_memcg(objcg) : NULL;
+ if (!objcg)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ memcg = obj_cgroup_memcg(objcg);
if (!memcg)
goto out_unlock;
- online = css_is_online(&memcg->css);
- cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, name, sizeof(name));
- ret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
- "Charged %sto %smemcg %s\n",
- (memcg_data & MEMCG_DATA_KMEM) ? "(via objcg) " : "",
- online ? "" : "offline ",
- name);
+ info->is_kmem = (memcg_data & MEMCG_DATA_KMEM) != 0;
+ info->is_online = css_is_online(&memcg->css);
+ cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, info->name, sizeof(info->name));
+
+ if (buf && size)
+ cgroup_path(memcg->css.cgroup, buf, size);
+ ret = 0;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (ret < 0 && buf && size)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print memcg information from memcg_info
+ */
+static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,
+ const struct memcg_info *info)
+{
+ if (!info)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (info->is_slab)
+ ret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+ "Slab cache page\n");
+
+ if (info->name[0])
+ ret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+ "Charged %sto %smemcg %s\n",
+ info->is_kmem ? "(via objcg) " : "",
+ info->is_online ? "" : "offline ",
+ info->name);
+
return ret;
}
#else
+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,
+ char *buf, int size)
+{
+ *info = (struct memcg_info){};
+ if (buf && size)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,
- struct page *page)
+ const struct memcg_info *info)
{
return ret;
}
@@ -603,7 +632,8 @@ static ssize_t
print_page_owner(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned long pfn,
struct page *page, struct page_owner *page_owner,
depot_stack_handle_t handle,
- struct page_owner_filter_state *state)
+ struct page_owner_filter_state *state,
+ const struct memcg_info *memcg_info)
{
int ret, pageblock_mt, page_mt;
char *kbuf;
@@ -653,7 +683,7 @@ print_page_owner(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned long pfn,
migrate_reason_names[page_owner->last_migrate_reason]);
}
- ret = print_page_owner_memcg(kbuf, count, ret, page);
+ ret = print_page_owner_memcg(kbuf, count, ret, memcg_info);
ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, "\n");
if (ret >= count)
@@ -725,37 +755,37 @@ void __dump_page_owner(const struct page *page)
page_ext_put(page_ext);
}
-static ssize_t
-read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+/*
+ * NUMA node of @page, bypassing PF_POISONED_CHECK() in page_to_nid() to
+ * avoid VM_BUG_ON on poisoned pages; -1 for poisoned pages.
+ */
+static int page_owner_get_nid(struct page *page)
{
- unsigned long pfn;
- struct page *page;
- struct page_ext *page_ext;
- struct page_owner *page_owner;
- depot_stack_handle_t handle;
- struct page_owner_filter_state *state = file->private_data;
+ memdesc_flags_t page_flags = READ_ONCE(page->flags);
- if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (page_flags.f == PAGE_POISON_PATTERN)
+ return -1;
+ return memdesc_nid(&page_flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Advance @scan to the next page eligible for page_owner output.
+ * On a hit, fill scan->pfn/po_snap/nid and return true; the caller
+ * must advance scan->pfn past the hit before calling again to resume
+ * the scan.
+ */
+bool page_owner_next_eligible(struct page_owner_scan *scan)
+{
+ unsigned long pfn = scan->pfn;
- page = NULL;
- if (*ppos == 0)
- pfn = min_low_pfn;
- else
- pfn = *ppos;
/* Find a valid PFN or the start of a MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES area */
while (!pfn_valid(pfn) && (pfn & (MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES - 1)) != 0)
pfn++;
- /* Find an allocated page */
for (; pfn < max_pfn; pfn++) {
- /*
- * This temporary page_owner is required so
- * that we can avoid the context switches while holding
- * the rcu lock and copying the page owner information to
- * user through copy_to_user() or GFP_KERNEL allocations.
- */
- struct page_owner page_owner_tmp;
+ struct page_owner *page_owner;
+ struct page_ext *page_ext;
+ struct page *page;
/*
* If the new page is in a new MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES area,
@@ -766,13 +796,22 @@ read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
continue;
}
- page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+ /*
+ * Hold a mem-hotplug reader across the page derefs so the
+ * vmemmap isn't torn down mid-scan; released before
+ * cond_resched().
+ */
+ get_online_mems();
+ page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
+ if (!page)
+ goto put_online_continue;
+
if (skip_buddy_pages(&pfn, page))
- continue;
+ goto put_online_continue;
page_ext = page_ext_get(page);
if (unlikely(!page_ext))
- continue;
+ goto put_online_continue;
/*
* Some pages could be missed by concurrent allocation or free,
@@ -798,37 +837,79 @@ read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
goto ext_put_continue;
/*
- * Access to page_ext->handle isn't synchronous so we should
- * be careful to access it.
+ * Take a snapshot of the page_owner record inside the RCU
+ * window, then validate it, so that print_page_owner()
+ * reads the checked handle from the same snapshot.
*/
- handle = READ_ONCE(page_owner->handle);
- if (!handle)
+ scan->pfn = pfn;
+ scan->po_snap = *page_owner;
+
+ if (!scan->po_snap.handle)
goto ext_put_continue;
- if (state->nid_filter_enabled) {
- int nid;
- memdesc_flags_t page_flags = READ_ONCE(page->flags);
+ scan->nid = page_owner_get_nid(page);
+ page_ext_put(page_ext);
+ put_online_mems();
+ return true;
- /*
- * Bypass PF_POISONED_CHECK() in page_to_nid() to avoid
- * VM_BUG_ON when accessing poisoned pages.
- */
- if (page_flags.f == PAGE_POISON_PATTERN)
- goto ext_put_continue;
- nid = memdesc_nid(&page_flags);
- if (!node_isset(nid, state->nid_filter))
- goto ext_put_continue;
+ext_put_continue:
+ page_ext_put(page_ext);
+put_online_continue:
+ put_online_mems();
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct page_owner_scan scan;
+ struct memcg_info memcg_info;
+ struct page_owner_filter_state *state = file->private_data;
+
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (*ppos == 0)
+ scan.pfn = min_low_pfn;
+ else
+ scan.pfn = *ppos;
+
+ /* Find an allocated page */
+ while (page_owner_next_eligible(&scan)) {
+ struct page *page;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /*
+ * The scan is lockless. Re-resolve the page under a mem-hotplug
+ * read-side lock so that we never access a hot-removed section.
+ */
+ get_online_mems();
+ page = pfn_to_online_page(scan.pfn);
+ if (!page)
+ goto skip_continue;
+
+ if (state->nid_filter_enabled) {
+ if (scan.nid < 0 ||
+ !node_isset(scan.nid, state->nid_filter))
+ goto skip_continue;
}
/* Record the next PFN to read in the file offset */
- *ppos = pfn + 1;
-
- page_owner_tmp = *page_owner;
- page_ext_put(page_ext);
- return print_page_owner(buf, count, pfn, page,
- &page_owner_tmp, handle, state);
-ext_put_continue:
- page_ext_put(page_ext);
+ *ppos = scan.pfn + 1;
+
+ get_page_memcg_info(page, &memcg_info, NULL, 0);
+ ret = print_page_owner(buf, count, scan.pfn, page,
+ &scan.po_snap, scan.po_snap.handle, state,
+ &memcg_info);
+ put_online_mems();
+ return ret;
+
+skip_continue:
+ put_online_mems();
+ scan.pfn++;
cond_resched();
}
@@ -1169,6 +1250,11 @@ static int __init pageowner_init(void)
&stack_fops);
debugfs_create_file("count_threshold", 0600, dir, NULL,
&threshold_fops);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ if (page_owner_iter_register())
+ pr_warn("page_owner: failed to register bpf_iter target\n");
+#endif
return 0;
}
late_initcall(pageowner_init)
diff --git a/mm/page_owner.h b/mm/page_owner.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..65598415af731
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/page_owner.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * mm/ internal page_owner and page_owner_iter declarations
+ */
+
+#ifndef __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H
+#define __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H
+
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/page_ext.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
+
+/*
+ * mm/page_owner.c
+ */
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(page_owner_inited);
+
+struct page_owner {
+ unsigned short order;
+ short last_migrate_reason;
+ gfp_t gfp_mask;
+ depot_stack_handle_t handle;
+ depot_stack_handle_t free_handle;
+ u64 ts_nsec;
+ u64 free_ts_nsec;
+ char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+ pid_t pid;
+ pid_t tgid;
+ pid_t free_pid;
+ pid_t free_tgid;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Cursor and per-page result of page_owner_next_eligible().
+ */
+struct page_owner_scan {
+ /* resume point */
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ struct page_owner po_snap;
+ int nid;
+};
+
+struct memcg_info {
+ char name[80];
+ bool is_slab;
+ bool is_kmem;
+ bool is_online;
+};
+
+bool page_owner_next_eligible(struct page_owner_scan *scan);
+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,
+ char *buf, int size);
+
+/*
+ * mm/page_owner_iter.c
+ */
+int page_owner_iter_register(void);
+
+#endif /* __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H */
diff --git a/mm/page_owner_iter.c b/mm/page_owner_iter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..a649e1207e246
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/page_owner_iter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
+
+#include "page_owner.h"
+
+struct bpf_iter__page_owner {
+ __bpf_md_ptr(struct bpf_iter_meta *, meta);
+ __bpf_md_ptr(struct page_owner *, po);
+ u64 pfn;
+ int nid;
+};
+
+DEFINE_BPF_ITER_FUNC(page_owner, struct bpf_iter_meta *meta,
+ struct page_owner *po, u64 pfn, int nid)
+
+static void *page_owner_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *posp)
+{
+ struct page_owner_scan *scan = seq->private;
+
+ if (*posp == 0)
+ scan->pfn = min_low_pfn;
+
+ if (!page_owner_next_eligible(scan))
+ return NULL;
+ return &scan->po_snap;
+}
+
+static void *page_owner_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *posp)
+{
+ struct page_owner_scan *scan = seq->private;
+
+ ++*posp;
+ scan->pfn++;
+ if (!page_owner_next_eligible(scan))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &scan->po_snap;
+}
+
+static int page_owner_prog_seq_show(struct bpf_prog *prog,
+ struct bpf_iter_meta *meta, void *v)
+{
+ struct page_owner_scan *scan = meta->seq->private;
+ struct bpf_iter__page_owner ctx = {};
+
+ ctx.meta = meta;
+ if (v) {
+ /* @po: hit-time snapshot, no RCU window needed. */
+ ctx.po = &scan->po_snap;
+ ctx.pfn = scan->pfn;
+ ctx.nid = scan->nid;
+ }
+
+ return bpf_iter_run_prog(prog, &ctx);
+}
+
+static int page_owner_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_meta meta;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+
+ meta.seq = seq;
+ prog = bpf_iter_get_info(&meta, false);
+ if (!prog)
+ return 0;
+
+ return page_owner_prog_seq_show(prog, &meta, v);
+}
+
+static void page_owner_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ if (!v) {
+ struct bpf_iter_meta meta = { .seq = seq };
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+
+ prog = bpf_iter_get_info(&meta, true);
+ if (prog)
+ page_owner_prog_seq_show(prog, &meta, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations page_owner_iter_seq_ops = {
+ .start = page_owner_seq_start,
+ .next = page_owner_seq_next,
+ .stop = page_owner_seq_stop,
+ .show = page_owner_seq_show,
+};
+
+static const struct bpf_iter_seq_info page_owner_iter_seq_info = {
+ .seq_ops = &page_owner_iter_seq_ops,
+ .init_seq_private = NULL,
+ .fini_seq_private = NULL,
+ .seq_priv_size = sizeof(struct page_owner_scan),
+};
+
+static struct bpf_iter_reg page_owner_iter_reg_info = {
+ .target = "page_owner",
+ .ctx_arg_info_size = 1,
+ .ctx_arg_info = {
+ { offsetof(struct bpf_iter__page_owner, po),
+ PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL },
+ },
+ .seq_info = &page_owner_iter_seq_info,
+ .feature = BPF_ITER_RESCHED,
+};
+
+BTF_ID_LIST(page_owner_btf_ids)
+BTF_ID(struct, page_owner)
+
+int page_owner_iter_register(void)
+{
+ page_owner_iter_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id =
+ page_owner_btf_ids[0];
+
+ return bpf_iter_reg_target(&page_owner_iter_reg_info);
+}
+
+/* opaque to BPF programs */
+struct bpf_iter_page_owner {
+ __u64 __opaque[16];
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
+struct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern {
+ struct page_owner_scan scan;
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
+__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_page_owner_new(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern *kit = (void *)it;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*kit) > sizeof(*it));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*kit) != __alignof__(*it));
+
+ kit->scan.pfn = min_low_pfn - 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc struct page_owner_scan *
+bpf_iter_page_owner_next(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern *kit = (void *)it;
+
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
+ return NULL;
+
+ cond_resched();
+
+ kit->scan.pfn++;
+ if (!page_owner_next_eligible(&kit->scan))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &kit->scan;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)
+{
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
+ char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+
+ if (!buf__uninit || !buf__sz)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
+ len = stack_depot_snprint(scan->po_snap.handle, buf__uninit,
+ buf__sz, 0);
+
+ if (!len)
+ buf__uninit[0] = '\0';
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info - Report the memcg charged for the current page
+ * @scan: page_owner scan handle.
+ * @info__uninit: output buffer for the memcg_info.
+ * @buf__uninit: optional output buffer for the full cgroup path.
+ * @buf__sz: size of @buf__uninit.
+ *
+ * Fills @info__uninit with the memcg charged for the page backing
+ * @scan->pfn. If @buf__uninit and @buf__sz are provided, the full
+ * cgroup path is also copied out, so a BPF program can attribute a
+ * page_owner allocation to a specific cgroup.
+ *
+ * @scan->pfn is resolved to a struct page under get_online_mems(),
+ * so the page cannot be accessed after its memory section is offlined
+ * or removed.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -ENODATA if the page is not online or not charged to a memcg
+ * * -EOPNOTSUPP if built without CONFIG_MEMCG
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
+ struct memcg_info *info__uninit,
+ char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)
+{
+ struct page *page;
+ int ret = -ENODATA;
+
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
+ goto nodata;
+
+ get_online_mems();
+ page = pfn_to_online_page(scan->pfn);
+ if (!page) {
+ put_online_mems();
+ goto nodata;
+ }
+ ret = get_page_memcg_info(page, info__uninit, buf__uninit, buf__sz);
+ put_online_mems();
+ return ret;
+
+nodata:
+ *info__uninit = (struct memcg_info){};
+ if (buf__uninit && buf__sz)
+ buf__uninit[0] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
index ea7044f30adc3..731bc3d798817 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
@@ -136,3 +136,5 @@ CONFIG_SMC_HS_CTRL_BPF=y
CONFIG_DIBS=y
CONFIG_DIBS_LO=y
CONFIG_PM_WAKELOCKS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..3684ca3089355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2026 */
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "bpf_iter_page_owner.skel.h"
+
+#define DEBUGFS_PAGE_OWNER "/sys/kernel/debug/page_owner"
+
+static bool page_owner_available(void)
+{
+ return access(DEBUGFS_PAGE_OWNER, R_OK) == 0;
+}
+
+/* Count link_fd output lines; -1 on error. */
+static long iter_record_count(int link_fd)
+{
+ char *line = NULL;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ long count = 0;
+ int iter_fd;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ iter_fd = bpf_iter_create(link_fd);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(iter_fd, 0, "bpf_iter_create"))
+ return -1;
+
+ f = fdopen(iter_fd, "r");
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(f, "fdopen")) {
+ close(iter_fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (getline(&line, &len, f) > 0) {
+ count++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!ferror(f))
+ break; /* clean EOF */
+ /*
+ * bpf_seq_read() returns -EAGAIN when a chunk scanned.
+ * Not an error, just retry the read.
+ */
+ if (errno == EAGAIN) {
+ clearerr(f);
+ continue;
+ }
+ ASSERT_OK(errno, "iter_read");
+ count = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ free(line);
+ fclose(f);
+ return count;
+}
+
+/* Validate bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info() results from the open-coded run. */
+static void check_memcg_skel(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *skel)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "memcg: seen=%u charged=%u online=%u nodata=%u notsup=%u bad=%u first='%s' name='%s' flags=%u\n",
+ skel->bss->memcg_seen, skel->bss->memcg_charged,
+ skel->bss->memcg_online, skel->bss->memcg_nodata,
+ skel->bss->memcg_notsup, skel->bss->memcg_bad,
+ skel->bss->memcg_first_path, skel->bss->memcg_first_name,
+ skel->bss->memcg_first_flags);
+
+ if (!ASSERT_GT(skel->bss->memcg_seen, 0, "memcg_seen_gt_0"))
+ return;
+
+ /* all -EOPNOTSUPP: CONFIG_MEMCG is off */
+ if (skel->bss->memcg_notsup == skel->bss->memcg_seen) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->memcg_bad, 0, "memcg_stub_invariants");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->memcg_bad, 0, "memcg_kfunc_invariants"))
+ return;
+
+ /* Every call is either charged or nodata */
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->memcg_charged + skel->bss->memcg_nodata,
+ skel->bss->memcg_seen, "memcg_ret_classified"))
+ return;
+
+ if (!skel->bss->memcg_first_saved)
+ return;
+
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->memcg_first_path[0], '/',
+ "memcg_first_path_abs"))
+ return;
+
+ if (skel->bss->memcg_first_name[0])
+ ASSERT_OK_PTR(strstr(skel->bss->memcg_first_path,
+ skel->bss->memcg_first_name),
+ "memcg_name_in_path");
+}
+
+void serial_test_page_owner_iter(void)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_page_owner *skel = NULL;
+ LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, opts);
+ long iter_count, unfiltered_count, oc_diff, pid;
+ unsigned int printed_before;
+ int link_fd, prog_fd;
+
+ if (!page_owner_available()) {
+ printf("%s:SKIP:page_owner debugfs unavailable "
+ "(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER + page_owner=on)\n", __func__);
+ test__skip();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ skel = bpf_iter_page_owner__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "bpf_iter_page_owner__open_and_load"))
+ return;
+
+ /* --- seq file iterator: unfiltered run --- */
+ skel->bss->filter_en = 0;
+
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(bpf_iter_page_owner__attach(skel), "skel_attach"))
+ goto destroy;
+
+ link_fd = bpf_link__fd(skel->links.dump_page_owner);
+ iter_count = iter_record_count(link_fd);
+ if (iter_count < 0)
+ goto destroy;
+ unfiltered_count = iter_count;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "iter_count=%ld printed_lines=%u total_seen=%u\n",
+ iter_count, skel->bss->printed_lines, skel->bss->total_seen);
+
+ ASSERT_GT(iter_count, 0, "unfiltered_lines_gt_0");
+
+ ASSERT_EQ((long)skel->bss->printed_lines, iter_count,
+ "lines_match_printed");
+
+ /* unfiltered: every visited page is printed, so the two must match */
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->total_seen, skel->bss->printed_lines,
+ "unfiltered_all_printed");
+
+ /* --- seq file iterator: pid-filtered run --- */
+ pid = getpid();
+ skel->bss->filter_en = 1;
+ skel->bss->filter_pid = (pid_t)pid;
+
+ /* printed_lines is cumulative across runs: compare the delta */
+ printed_before = skel->bss->printed_lines;
+ iter_count = iter_record_count(link_fd);
+ if (iter_count < 0)
+ goto destroy;
+
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "pid=%ld iter_count=%ld printed_delta=%u\n",
+ pid, iter_count, skel->bss->printed_lines - printed_before);
+
+ ASSERT_GT(iter_count, 0, "filtered_lines_gt_0");
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->printed_lines - printed_before, iter_count,
+ "filtered_printed_match");
+
+ /* --- open-coded iterator parity --- */
+ prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.scan_open_coded);
+
+ ASSERT_OK(bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &opts), "prog_test_run");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "open_coded_seen=%u nid_seen=%u first_nid=%d "
+ "stack_bytes=%u stack=[\n%s]\n",
+ skel->bss->open_coded_seen, skel->bss->nid_seen,
+ skel->data->first_nid, skel->bss->stack_bytes,
+ skel->bss->stack_text);
+
+ /* same eligibility as the seq path: counts must be close */
+ ASSERT_GT(skel->bss->open_coded_seen, 0, "oc_seen_gt_0");
+ oc_diff = (long)skel->bss->open_coded_seen - unfiltered_count;
+ if (oc_diff < 0)
+ oc_diff = -oc_diff;
+ ASSERT_LE(oc_diff, unfiltered_count / 100 + 64,
+ "oc_seen_close_to_iter");
+
+ /* the nid kfunc returned a valid node for every page */
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->nid_seen, skel->bss->open_coded_seen,
+ "nid_valid_all");
+ ASSERT_GE(skel->data->first_nid, 0, "first_nid_valid");
+
+ ASSERT_GT(skel->bss->stack_bytes, 0, "stack_snprint_ok");
+ ASSERT_OK_PTR(strstr(skel->bss->stack_text, "+0x"), "stack_frames");
+ ASSERT_OK_PTR(strchr(skel->bss->stack_text, '\n'), "stack_lines");
+
+ check_memcg_skel(skel);
+
+destroy:
+ bpf_iter_page_owner__destroy(skel);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..1cd99956aff34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2026 */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+__u32 filter_en;
+__u32 filter_pid;
+__u32 total_seen;
+__u32 printed_lines;
+
+__u32 open_coded_seen;
+__u32 nid_seen;
+__s32 first_nid = -1;
+char stack_text[2048];
+__u32 stack_bytes;
+
+__u32 memcg_seen;
+__u32 memcg_charged;
+__u32 memcg_online;
+__u32 memcg_nodata;
+__u32 memcg_notsup;
+__u32 memcg_bad;
+__u32 memcg_first_saved;
+__u32 memcg_first_flags; /* bit0 is_online, bit1 is_kmem */
+__u32 memcg_first_path_len;
+char memcg_pathbuf[4096];
+char memcg_first_path[4096];
+char memcg_first_name[80];
+
+#define MEMCG_F_ONLINE (1 << 0)
+#define MEMCG_F_OBJCG (1 << 1)
+
+extern int bpf_iter_page_owner_new(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;
+extern struct page_owner_scan *
+bpf_iter_page_owner_next(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;
+extern void bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;
+extern int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
+ char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz) __ksym;
+extern int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
+ struct memcg_info *info__uninit,
+ char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz) __ksym;
+
+static __u32 copy_str(char *dst, const char *src, const __u32 max)
+{
+ __u32 i = 0;
+
+ while (i + 1 < max && src[i]) {
+ dst[i] = src[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+ dst[i] = '\0';
+ return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exercise bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info() until 32 pages charged to an
+ * ONLINE memcg have been seen, checking its per-return contract:
+ * - 0: buf holds an absolute cgroup path;
+ * - -ENODATA: buf was NUL-terminated;
+ * - -EOPNOTSUPP: counted (CONFIG_MEMCG is off);
+ *
+ * The first online charged sample is saved for userspace to print and
+ * cross-check (name vs basename of path).
+ */
+static void check_memcg(struct page_owner_scan *scan)
+{
+ static struct memcg_info info;
+ int err;
+
+ err = bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(scan, &info, memcg_pathbuf,
+ sizeof(memcg_pathbuf));
+ memcg_seen++;
+
+ if (err == 0) {
+ memcg_charged++;
+
+ if (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '/') {
+ memcg_bad++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!info.is_online)
+ return;
+ memcg_online++;
+
+ /* keep the first online sample for userspace */
+ if (!memcg_first_saved) {
+ memcg_first_path_len = copy_str(memcg_first_path,
+ memcg_pathbuf,
+ sizeof(memcg_first_path));
+ copy_str(memcg_first_name, info.name,
+ sizeof(memcg_first_name));
+ memcg_first_flags = MEMCG_F_ONLINE |
+ (info.is_kmem ? MEMCG_F_OBJCG : 0);
+ memcg_first_saved = 1;
+ }
+ } else if (err == -ENODATA) {
+ memcg_nodata++;
+ if (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '\0')
+ memcg_bad++;
+ } else if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ memcg_notsup++;
+ if (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '\0')
+ memcg_bad++;
+ } else {
+ memcg_bad++;
+ }
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+int scan_open_coded(const void *ctx)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_page_owner it;
+ struct page_owner_scan *scan;
+
+ bpf_iter_page_owner_new(&it);
+
+ while ((scan = bpf_iter_page_owner_next(&it))) {
+ open_coded_seen++;
+ if (scan->nid >= 0)
+ nid_seen++;
+ if (memcg_online < 32)
+ check_memcg(scan);
+ /* grab the stack of the 100th page for userspace to check */
+ if (open_coded_seen == 100) {
+ first_nid = scan->nid;
+ if (scan->po_snap.handle)
+ stack_bytes = bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(
+ scan, stack_text, sizeof(stack_text));
+ }
+ }
+ bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(&it);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("iter/page_owner")
+int dump_page_owner(struct bpf_iter__page_owner *ctx)
+{
+ struct page_owner *po = ctx->po;
+
+ if (!po)
+ return 0;
+
+ total_seen++;
+
+ if (filter_en && po->pid != (pid_t)filter_pid)
+ return 0;
+
+ BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(ctx->meta->seq, "pfn %llu pid %d comm %s\n",
+ ctx->pfn, po->pid, po->comm);
+ printed_lines++;
+ return 0;
+}
|
| 3/2 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 15280 output: 39 thoughts: 781 Thoughts: **Initial Assessment of the Syzkaller Fuzzing Patch Series** Okay, let's dive into this patch series and see what we're dealing with for syzkaller fuzzing. First, I need to understand what's being changed. The diff points us to a few key areas: `kernel/bpf/helpers.c`, `mm/Makefile`, `mm/page_owner.c`, `mm/page_owner.h`, `mm/page_owner_iter.c`, and some selftests under `tools/testing/selftests/bpf/...`. My initial thoughts are that this is likely related to improving page owner tracking and exposure via BPF, which makes sense for fuzzing. We're registering BTF ID flags for several BPF kfuncs (`bpf_iter_page_owner_new`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_next`, etc.) in `kernel/bpf/helpers.c`. Interesting. The `mm/Makefile` addition of `page_owner_iter.o` under `CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER` and `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` is a key indicator. We have `mm/page_owner.c` refactoring, defining struct `page_owner` in `mm/page_owner.h`. And importantly, there's new BPF iterator functionality in `mm/page_owner_iter.c` implemented with `DEFINE_BPF_ITER_FUNC` and kfuncs such as `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`. The selftests are standard, though useful. Now, the crucial question for fuzzing, the "reachability" gate. Can this code *actually* run in a typical fuzzing environment (GCE or QEMU)? My brain immediately flags `CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER`. This is a significant clue. Does `page_owner` require a boot parameter? This isn't always obvious from the config alone. I need to understand how the `page_owner` functionality is initialized and enabled. I'll need to check the `mm/page_owner.c` code itself. Let's use `grepper` or `read-file` to get to the initialization. Hopefully, there's a clear indication there! This patch series' value for fuzzing hinges on that accessibility. |
| 4/2 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "page_owner_inited|page_owner=",
"PathPrefixes": [
"mm/page_owner.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "mm/page_owner.c=61=static bool page_owner_enabled __initdata;\nmm/page_owner.c:62:DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(page_owner_inited);\nmm/page_owner.c-63-\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=126=static __init void init_page_owner(void)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-143-\tstack_list = \u0026dummy_stack;\nmm/page_owner.c:144:\tstatic_branch_enable(\u0026page_owner_inited);\nmm/page_owner.c-145-}\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=866=read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-871-\nmm/page_owner.c:872:\tif (!static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited))\nmm/page_owner.c-873-\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=1228=static int __init pageowner_init(void)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-1231-\nmm/page_owner.c:1232:\tif (!static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited)) {\nmm/page_owner.c-1233-\t\tpr_info(\"page_owner is disabled\\n\");\n"
} |
| 5/2 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 16977 output: 33 thoughts: 23 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Investigating Initialization and Ownership** Right, let's dive in. I need to understand the control flow surrounding how the `init_page_owner` or `page_owner_enabled` settings are established. I'm thinking I need to trace this back. Is it a compile-time option? Config file? Runtime initialization sequence? The way this is set up will impact a number of areas I'm looking at. I'll need to know which path is taken and when. Is there any dynamic decision making happening here? Are there any conditional calls? I need to figure out the actual mechanism of its initialisation. I am going to need to dig into the relevant source files and potentially trace the execution to see what's what. Understanding how this variable is initially configured is essential for debugging and potentially optimizing the related code paths. So let's start with the code base and see where this rabbit hole takes me... |
| 6/2 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "page_owner_enabled",
"PathPrefixes": [
"mm/page_owner.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "mm/page_owner.c=55=struct page_owner_filter_state {\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-60-\nmm/page_owner.c:61:static bool page_owner_enabled __initdata;\nmm/page_owner.c-62-DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(page_owner_inited);\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=86=static int __init early_page_owner_param(char *buf)\nmm/page_owner.c-87-{\nmm/page_owner.c:88:\tint ret = kstrtobool(buf, \u0026page_owner_enabled);\nmm/page_owner.c-89-\nmm/page_owner.c:90:\tif (page_owner_enabled)\nmm/page_owner.c-91-\t\tstack_depot_request_early_init();\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=97=static __init bool need_page_owner(void)\nmm/page_owner.c-98-{\nmm/page_owner.c:99:\treturn page_owner_enabled;\nmm/page_owner.c-100-}\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=126=static __init void init_page_owner(void)\nmm/page_owner.c-127-{\nmm/page_owner.c:128:\tif (!page_owner_enabled)\nmm/page_owner.c-129-\t\treturn;\n"
} |
| 7/2 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17618 output: 36 thoughts: 260 Thoughts: **My Line of Inquiry: Page Owner and Syzkaller Interactions**
Okay, let's break this down. First, the crucial link is that `page_owner_enabled` gets its value from `early_page_owner_param`, which is triggered by the boot parameter `page_owner=on`. Now, a key question arises: is Syzkaller *actually* being run with `page_owner=on`? This is critical.
Can the code path to `read_page_owner` be taken without that setting? Is there a possibility that BPF programs could call `bpf_iter_page_owner_new` even if `page_owner_inited` is false? I need to understand that potential vector.
Aha! Let's examine `bpf_iter_page_owner_next` closely. Specifically:
```c
__bpf_kfunc struct page_owner_scan *
bpf_iter_page_owner_next(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)
{
struct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern *kit = (void *)it;
if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
return NULL;
```
That `static_branch_unlikely` check is extremely relevant. If `page_owner_inited` is false, it returns `NULL`. That is likely the key to what is going on here.
Now, I need to check the impact on `read_page_owner` in `/sys/kernel/debug/page_owner`.
Lastly, let's go back and examine `pageowner_init`. Let's focus on lines 1225-1260 in `mm/page_owner.c`. This is where all the initialization logic happens.
|
| 8/2 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "mm/page_owner.c",
"FirstLine": 1225,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": "1225:\t\n1226:\tDEFINE_SIMPLE_ATTRIBUTE(threshold_fops, \u0026threshold_get, \u0026threshold_set, \"%llu\\n\");\n1227:\t\n1228:\tstatic int __init pageowner_init(void)\n1229:\t{\n1230:\t\tstruct dentry *dir;\n1231:\t\n1232:\t\tif (!static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited)) {\n1233:\t\t\tpr_info(\"page_owner is disabled\\n\");\n1234:\t\t\treturn 0;\n1235:\t\t}\n1236:\t\n1237:\t\tdebugfs_create_file(\"page_owner\", 0600, NULL, NULL, \u0026page_owner_fops);\n1238:\t\tdir = debugfs_create_dir(\"page_owner_stacks\", NULL);\n1239:\t\tdebugfs_create_file(\"show_stacks\", 0400, dir,\n1240:\t\t\t\t (void *)(STACK_PRINT_FLAG_STACK |\n1241:\t\t\t\t\t STACK_PRINT_FLAG_PAGES),\n1242:\t\t\t\t \u0026stack_fops);\n1243:\t\tdebugfs_create_file(\"show_handles\", 0400, dir,\n1244:\t\t\t\t (void *)(STACK_PRINT_FLAG_HANDLE |\n1245:\t\t\t\t\t STACK_PRINT_FLAG_PAGES),\n1246:\t\t\t\t \u0026stack_fops);\n1247:\t\tdebugfs_create_file(\"show_stacks_handles\", 0400, dir,\n1248:\t\t\t\t (void *)(STACK_PRINT_FLAG_STACK |\n1249:\t\t\t\t\t STACK_PRINT_FLAG_HANDLE),\n1250:\t\t\t\t \u0026stack_fops);\n1251:\t\tdebugfs_create_file(\"count_threshold\", 0600, dir, NULL,\n1252:\t\t\t\t \u0026threshold_fops);\n1253:\t\n1254:\t#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL\n1255:\t\tif (page_owner_iter_register())\n1256:\t\t\tpr_warn(\"page_owner: failed to register bpf_iter target\\n\");\n1257:\t#endif\n1258:\t\treturn 0;\n1259:\t}\n1260:\tlate_initcall(pageowner_init)\n"
} |
| 9/2 | 2026/10/21 19:40 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 18927 output: 28 thoughts: 148 Thoughts: **Investigating Page Owner Initialization** Okay, let's dive into this `pageowner_init` function. The code starts with a check using `static_branch_unlikely` on `page_owner_inited`. If that evaluates to false, which is the unlikely case, it indicates that page owner is disabled. Seems straightforward enough. The output informs us the feature is disabled. Then, there's the conditional inclusion of a BPF syscall registration, specifically `page_owner_iter_register`. And there is a warning if that fails. Hold on, wait a second... This makes me think. Does Syzkaller – our powerful fuzzer – even fuzz with `page_owner=on`? It's crucial for understanding how the fuzzer operates with this memory debugging feature. I should check what configs are needed for `CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER`. Let me go to `mm/Kconfig.debug`. I need to figure out how this is enabled. |
| 10/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "config PAGE_OWNER",
"PathPrefixes": [
"mm/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "mm/Kconfig.debug=73=config SLUB_RCU_DEBUG\n--\nmm/Kconfig.debug-104-\nmm/Kconfig.debug:105:config PAGE_OWNER\nmm/Kconfig.debug-106-\tbool \"Track page owner\"\n"
} |
| 11/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 19392 output: 34 thoughts: 19 Thoughts: Here's my take on the thought process, tailored for an expert audience: **Diving into Kconfig.debug - Line 105** Okay, let's get down to brass tacks. My initial thought process is to zero in on `mm/Kconfig.debug`. I know that file intimately, and I'm particularly interested in the vicinity of line 105. This suggests that we're dealing with something related to memory management debugging or configuration options within that subsystem. My immediate goal is to understand the specific context around that line – the surrounding options, dependencies, and any conditional logic that might be relevant. I expect it'll relate to some debug option. I'm expecting some kind of conditional statement or option definition, perhaps a more fine-grained debugging feature for memory management. Let's see what we find. |
| 12/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "mm/Kconfig.debug",
"FirstLine": 100,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": " 100:\t\t This is designed as a debugging feature, not a security feature.\n 101:\t\t Objects are sometimes recycled without RCU delay under memory pressure.\n 102:\t\n 103:\t\t If unsure, say N.\n 104:\t\n 105:\tconfig PAGE_OWNER\n 106:\t\tbool \"Track page owner\"\n 107:\t\tdepends on DEBUG_KERNEL \u0026\u0026 STACKTRACE_SUPPORT\n 108:\t\tselect DEBUG_FS\n 109:\t\tselect STACKTRACE\n 110:\t\tselect STACKDEPOT\n 111:\t\tselect PAGE_EXTENSION\n 112:\t\thelp\n 113:\t\t This keeps track of what call chain is the owner of a page, may\n 114:\t\t help to find bare alloc_page(s) leaks. Even if you include this\n 115:\t\t feature on your build, it is disabled in default. You should pass\n 116:\t\t \"page_owner=on\" to boot parameter in order to enable it. Eats\n 117:\t\t a fair amount of memory if enabled. See tools/mm/page_owner_sort.c\n 118:\t\t for user-space helper.\n 119:\t\n 120:\t\t If unsure, say N.\n 121:\t\n 122:\tconfig PAGE_TABLE_CHECK\n 123:\t\tbool \"Check for invalid mappings in user page tables\"\n 124:\t\tdepends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_PAGE_TABLE_CHECK\n 125:\t\tdepends on EXCLUSIVE_SYSTEM_RAM\n 126:\t\tselect PAGE_EXTENSION\n 127:\t\thelp\n 128:\t\t Check that anonymous page is not being mapped twice with read write\n 129:\t\t permissions. Check that anonymous and file pages are not being\n 130:\t\t erroneously shared. Since the checking is performed at the time\n 131:\t\t entries are added and removed to user page tables, leaking, corruption\n 132:\t\t and double mapping problems are detected synchronously.\n 133:\t\n 134:\t\t If unsure say \"n\".\n 135:\t\n 136:\tconfig PAGE_TABLE_CHECK_ENFORCED\n 137:\t\tbool \"Enforce the page table checking by default\"\n 138:\t\tdepends on PAGE_TABLE_CHECK\n 139:\t\thelp\n"
} |
| 13/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 20232 output: 27 thoughts: 312 Thoughts: **BPF KFunc Investigation** Okay, hold on a second! I need to circle back to those BPF kfuncs. My immediate thought is, "Where exactly are these registered, and how does the BPF infrastructure handle their registration?" Let's dig into that. First, I'll check `kernel/bpf/helpers.c`. Aha! I see these BTF_ID_FLAGS macros defined with the `bpf_iter_page_owner_*` and `bpf_page_owner_*` prefixes. It looks like these are the kfuncs related to page ownership, which is interesting. They are leveraging `KF_ITER_NEW`, `KF_ITER_NEXT`, `KF_ITER_DESTROY`, `KF_SLEEPABLE`, `KF_PERFMON` flags, as expected. But wait a minute... are these kfuncs part of some larger, predefined kfunc set? I need to understand how they are integrated. To do this I will grep the codebase for `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info` or `page_owner_kfunc`, or anything relating to registration of these kfuncs, to get a better overview of how these kfuncs are implemented. |
| 14/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info"
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/helpers.c=4956=BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4957:BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4958-#endif\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c=166=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-184-/**\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:185: * bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info - Report the memcg charged for the current page\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-186- * @scan: page_owner scan handle.\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-204- */\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:205:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-206-\t\t\t\t\t struct memcg_info *info__uninit,\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c=15=static long iter_record_count(int link_fd)\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c-57-\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c:58:/* Validate bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info() results from the open-coded run. */\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c-59-static void check_memcg_skel(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *skel)\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c=41=extern int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c-42-\t\t\t\t\tchar *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz) __ksym;\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c:43:extern int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c-44-\t\t\t\t\t struct memcg_info *info__uninit,\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c=47=static __u32 copy_str(char *dst, const char *src, const __u32 max)\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c-59-/*\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c:60: * Exercise bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info() until 32 pages charged to an\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c-61- * ONLINE memcg have been seen, checking its per-return contract:\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c=69=static void check_memcg(struct page_owner_scan *scan)\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c-73-\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c:74:\terr = bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(scan, \u0026info, memcg_pathbuf,\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c-75-\t\t\t\t\t sizeof(memcg_pathbuf));\n"
} |
| 15/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 21902 output: 37 thoughts: 22 Thoughts: Here's my summary, as if I were thinking these thoughts: **Analyzing the eBPF Helper Implementation** Okay, time to dive into this problem. Based on what I've seen so far, my intuition points me towards the eBPF helper function implementations. Specifically, I should probably check out `kernel/bpf/helpers.c`. I'm going to start with a focused look around line 4946. That area seems like a likely candidate given the issues I'm tracking. Let's see what's happening there and if there's any obvious vulnerability or unexpected behavior. |
| 16/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/helpers.c",
"FirstLine": 4940,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": "4940:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_from_user_str_dynptr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4941:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_from_user_task_dynptr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4942:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_from_user_task_str_dynptr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4943:\t#endif\n4944:\t#ifdef CONFIG_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER\n4945:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_new, KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n4946:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n4947:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n4948:\t#endif\n4949:\t#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER\n4950:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_new,\n4951:\t\t KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4952:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_next,\n4953:\t\t KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4954:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy,\n4955:\t\t KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4956:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4957:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4958:\t#endif\n4959:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, __bpf_trap)\n4960:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcmp, KF_PERFMON);\n4961:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcasecmp, KF_PERFMON);\n4962:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strncasecmp, KF_PERFMON);\n4963:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strchr, KF_PERFMON);\n4964:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strchrnul, KF_PERFMON);\n4965:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnchr, KF_PERFMON);\n4966:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strrchr, KF_PERFMON);\n4967:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strlen, KF_PERFMON);\n4968:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnlen, KF_PERFMON);\n4969:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strspn, KF_PERFMON);\n4970:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcspn, KF_PERFMON);\n4971:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strstr, KF_PERFMON);\n4972:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcasestr, KF_PERFMON);\n4973:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnstr, KF_PERFMON);\n4974:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strncasestr, KF_PERFMON);\n4975:\t#if defined(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) \u0026\u0026 defined(CONFIG_CGROUPS)\n4976:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cgroup_read_xattr, KF_RCU)\n4977:\t#endif\n4978:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_stream_vprintk, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_SPINLOCK_SAFE | KF_PERFMON)\n4979:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_stream_print_stack, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_SPINLOCK_SAFE | KF_PERFMON)\n"
} |
| 17/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 23273 output: 37 thoughts: 42 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, from an expert's perspective: **Diving into BTF Kfunc Sets** Alright, so I'm poking around in the kernel's BPF helper code, specifically looking at `kernel/bpf/helpers.c`. I see these `BTF_KFUNCS_START(generic_kfunc_set)` macros or something similar – essentially, they define sets of kernel functions exposed to BPF programs. My immediate thought is, "Okay, that's interesting. What *precisely* is included in *this* set, and what's its purpose?" Knowing the name helps, but I need to see what's *in* it to understand its relevance to my work. I need to trace back where `generic_kfunc_set` is actually defined or utilized within the kernel's BPF infrastructure. I'll need to follow the trail to determine what specific functionality it makes available and in what contexts. I need to understand this `kfunc_set` to grok its implications for my BPF design and if it would be useful to my project. |
| 18/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "BTF_KFUNCS_START",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/helpers.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/helpers.c=4784=void bpf_task_work_cancel_and_free(void *val)\n--\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4804-\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4805:BTF_KFUNCS_START(generic_btf_ids)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4806-#ifdef CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP\n--\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c=4881=BTF_ID(func, bpf_cgroup_release_dtor)\n--\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4883-\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4884:BTF_KFUNCS_START(common_btf_ids)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4885-BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cast_to_kern_ctx, KF_FASTCALL)\n"
} |
| 19/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 23831 output: 22 thoughts: 3188 Thoughts: **Analysis of BPF Iterator and Page Owner Feature for Fuzzing** Okay, so I've been digging into this code, trying to figure out if it's fuzzable in syzkaller. The initial setup looks like a BPF iterator is being registered for the "page_owner" target. User space can then create a BPF link for this iterator, open a file descriptor, and read data using `read()`. The registration is done in `page_owner_iter_reg_info`, and the relevant BPF program type is `BPF_PROG_TYPE_TRACING` with `BPF_TRACE_ITER`. The critical question is, does this depend on `page_owner` being enabled? The `pageowner_init` function, called at `late_initcall`, checks `page_owner_inited`. If `page_owner` isn't enabled (no `page_owner=on` on the kernel command line), the function early returns. However, the BPF iterator kfuncs like `bpf_iter_page_owner_next` are registered in `common_btf_ids` and are still present in the kernel image, independent of the `pageowner_init` call. Now, a crucial detail – inside `bpf_iter_page_owner_next`, there's a check for `page_owner_inited`. If it's false, the function immediately returns `NULL`. Other kfuncs like `bpf_iter_page_owner_new`, and `bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy` also exist, along with kfuncs `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` and `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`, all with similar checks. But what if `page_owner` is enabled? That's what I have to check. The syzkaller guidelines are pretty clear. I need to see if syzkaller can configure or boot with `CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER` enabled. It doesn't fall under any of the "negative" categories that would make it not fuzzable (non-kernel, structurally unreachable, or driver teardown callbacks). It *does* modify core subsystems (mm/ and BPF), so it satisfies the "positive" criteria for `WorthFuzzing=true`. Therefore, this *is* something we should fuzz. I need to nail down the specifics of what's changed and then select the right focus symbols. The key changes are the addition of the BPF iterators, modifications to the page owner code, and changes in the mm/ subsystem. Here's the breakdown of the changes: 1. **`kernel/bpf/helpers.c`**: Added `BTF_ID_FLAGS` for kfuncs related to the page owner iterator (new, next, destroy, stack print, and memcg info). 2. **`mm/Makefile`**: `page_owner.o` is built if `CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER` is set, and `page_owner_iter.o` is built when both `CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER` and `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` are set. 3. **`mm/page_owner.c`**: Refactored `print_page_owner_memcg`, added helper `page_owner_get_nid` and helper `page_owner_next_eligible`, refactored `read_page_owner` to use `page_owner_next_eligible`, and calls `page_owner_iter_register` in `pageowner_init`. 4. **`mm/page_owner_iter.c`**: Implemented BPF iterator seq_ops and related kfuncs and helper kfuncs and registers `page_owner_iter_reg_info` as a BPF target. Now, which functions should I flag as FocusSymbols? I have to avoid generic functions. Let's list the relevant non-static functions added or modified: * In `mm/page_owner.c`: `get_page_memcg_info`, `page_owner_next_eligible` * In `mm/page_owner_iter.c`: `page_owner_iter_register`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_new`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_next`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy`, `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`, `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info` The seq\_file functions are static, so I can exclude them. The BPF kfuncs, flagged with `__bpf_kfunc` are promising, and the helper functions also should be considered. Now, I |
| 20/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "#define __bpf_kfunc"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/linux/btf.h-90- */\ninclude/linux/btf.h:91:#define __bpf_kfunc __used __retain __noclone noinline\ninclude/linux/btf.h-92-\ninclude/linux/btf.h:93:#define __bpf_kfunc_start_defs()\t\t\t\t\t \\\ninclude/linux/btf.h-94-\t__diag_push();\t\t\t\t\t\t\t \\\n--\ninclude/linux/btf.h-99-\ninclude/linux/btf.h:100:#define __bpf_kfunc_end_defs() __diag_pop()\ninclude/linux/btf.h-101-#define __bpf_hook_start() __bpf_kfunc_start_defs()\n"
} |
| 21/2 | 2026/10/21 19:41 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 28265 output: 38 thoughts: 770 Thoughts: **My Analysis of Page Owner and BPF Interaction** Okay, so `__bpf_kfunc` is declared `__used __retain __noclone noinline`, which means it *definitely* exists as a symbol in vmlinux. That's good to know. Now, let's think about `get_page_memcg_info` and `page_owner_next_eligible`. Those are non-static functions, defined in `mm/page_owner.c` and declared in `mm/page_owner.h`, so they are also symbols. What about `read_page_owner`? Is that static? Yes, it's defined as `static ssize_t read_page_owner(...)` in `mm/page_owner.c`. However, even though it's static, the address is used by `file_operations page_owner_fops`, so it won't be inlined and *will* have a symbol unless full LTO is in play. Similarly, `page_owner_iter_seq_ops` takes the addresses of its methods like `page_owner_seq_start`, `page_owner_seq_next`, and `page_owner_seq_show`, so they will also have symbols. Alright, let's review the full list of functions under consideration: `bpf_iter_page_owner_new`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_next`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy`, `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`, `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`, `page_owner_next_eligible`, `get_page_memcg_info`, and `read_page_owner`. Now, let's think about the configuration options required for this code to be compiled and executed. Let's inspect the makefiles and source code. In `mm/Makefile`, I see that `obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner.o` and, if `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` is enabled, `obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner_iter.o` is compiled. In `kernel/bpf/helpers.c`, there's a reference to `CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER`, and `BTF_ID_FLAGS` is used, so BPF functions are being registered. In `mm/page_owner.c`, there is a condition on `CONFIG_MEMCG` with respect to `get_page_memcg_info`, which is used if `CONFIG_MEMCG` is enabled, otherwise a placeholder is used. It also calls `page_owner_iter_register` if `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` is set. Let's check `CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER` in `mm/Kconfig.debug`. It looks like it depends on `DEBUG_KERNEL`, `STACKTRACE_SUPPORT`, and also selects `DEBUG_FS`, `STACKTRACE`, `STACKDEPOT`, and `PAGE_EXTENSION`. Finally, I need to check `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` in `kernel/bpf/Kconfig`. |
| 22/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "config BPF_SYSCALL",
"PathPrefixes": [
"init/",
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/Kconfig=25=menu \"BPF subsystem\"\nkernel/bpf/Kconfig-26-\nkernel/bpf/Kconfig:27:config BPF_SYSCALL\nkernel/bpf/Kconfig-28-\tbool \"Enable bpf() system call\"\n"
} |
| 23/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 29846 output: 34 thoughts: 19 Thoughts: Here's my take on the situation: **Investigating the BPF Kernel Configuration** Okay, let's dive into this. My initial hunch, given the context, is that we need to examine the configuration options for BPF within the kernel. The specific file to target is `kernel/bpf/Kconfig`. And, since we're starting this investigation without any other information, I'm going to start around line 27. It's usually a good starting point to identify the fundamental settings and dependencies there. We'll start there and see what's what. |
| 24/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/Kconfig",
"FirstLine": 25,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 25:\tmenu \"BPF subsystem\"\n 26:\t\n 27:\tconfig BPF_SYSCALL\n 28:\t\tbool \"Enable bpf() system call\"\n 29:\t\tselect BPF\n 30:\t\tselect IRQ_WORK\n 31:\t\tselect NEED_TASKS_RCU\n 32:\t\tselect TASKS_TRACE_RCU\n 33:\t\tselect BINARY_PRINTF\n 34:\t\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG if NET\n 35:\t\tselect NET_XGRESS if NET\n 36:\t\tselect PAGE_POOL if NET\n 37:\t\tdefault n\n 38:\t\thelp\n 39:\t\t Enable the bpf() system call that allows to manipulate BPF programs\n 40:\t\t and maps via file descriptors.\n 41:\t\n 42:\tconfig BPF_JIT\n 43:\t\tbool \"Enable BPF Just In Time compiler\"\n 44:\t\tdepends on BPF\n"
} |
| 25/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 30274 output: 34 thoughts: 243 Thoughts: **My Configuration Considerations** Okay, so I'm thinking about the necessary kernel configurations for some specific functionality. First, `CONFIG_MEMCG` is clearly essential. Without it, `get_page_memcg_info` just returns `-EOPNOTSUPP`, which is obviously not what I want. That's a critical dependency. Then I had to consider `CONFIG_DEBUG_FS`. While `PAGE_OWNER` selects `DEBUG_FS`, it's worth a specific note. But, I see now that `PAGE_OWNER` implicitly selects `DEBUG_FS`, `STACKTRACE`, `STACKDEPOT`, and `PAGE_EXTENSION`, so I'll keep that in mind. And *that* in turn depends on `DEBUG_KERNEL && STACKTRACE_SUPPORT`, which I'll have to consider in the context of my project. I also need to check `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` – but wait, I should really prioritize getting a solid list of configs needed for BTF, kfuncs, and `bpf_iter`. Let's check if `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF` is needed for kfuncs and BPF iterators! I’ll need to make sure I have the right settings in place for those. Okay, let's dive into the kernel source and specifically search for either `BPF_TRACE_ITER` or `bpf_iter_reg_target` within the `kernel/bpf/` directory. That should immediately reveal what config options guard bpf iterators and kfuncs. That's the best way to get a definitive answer here. |
| 26/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "bpf_iter_reg_target",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c=283=const struct file_operations bpf_iter_fops = {\n--\nkernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c-291- * a const static variable and passed as an argument to\nkernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c:292: * bpf_iter_reg_target().\nkernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c-293- */\nkernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c:294:int bpf_iter_reg_target(const struct bpf_iter_reg *reg_info)\nkernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c-295-{\n--\nkernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c=302=static int __init bpf_cgroup_iter_init(void)\n--\nkernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c-304-\tbpf_cgroup_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id = bpf_cgroup_btf_id[0];\nkernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c:305:\treturn bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026bpf_cgroup_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c-306-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c=138=static int __init dmabuf_iter_init(void)\n--\nkernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c-140-\tbpf_dmabuf_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id = bpf_dmabuf_btf_id[0];\nkernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c:141:\treturn bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026bpf_dmabuf_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c-142-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c=232=static int __init bpf_kmem_cache_iter_init(void)\n--\nkernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c-234-\tbpf_kmem_cache_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id = bpf_kmem_cache_btf_id[0];\nkernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c:235:\treturn bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026bpf_kmem_cache_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c-236-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/link_iter.c=100=static int __init bpf_link_iter_init(void)\n--\nkernel/bpf/link_iter.c-102-\tbpf_link_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id = *btf_bpf_link_id;\nkernel/bpf/link_iter.c:103:\treturn bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026bpf_link_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/link_iter.c-104-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/map_iter.c=187=static int __init bpf_map_iter_init(void)\n--\nkernel/bpf/map_iter.c-191-\tbpf_map_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id = *btf_bpf_map_id;\nkernel/bpf/map_iter.c:192:\tret = bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026bpf_map_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/map_iter.c-193-\tif (ret)\n--\nkernel/bpf/map_iter.c-195-\nkernel/bpf/map_iter.c:196:\treturn bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026bpf_map_elem_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/map_iter.c-197-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/prog_iter.c=100=static int __init bpf_prog_iter_init(void)\n--\nkernel/bpf/prog_iter.c-102-\tbpf_prog_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id = *btf_bpf_prog_id;\nkernel/bpf/prog_iter.c:103:\treturn bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026bpf_prog_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/prog_iter.c-104-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c=1202=static int __init task_iter_init(void)\n--\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1212-\ttask_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_TASK];\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c:1213:\tret = bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026task_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1214-\tif (ret)\n--\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1218-\ttask_file_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[1].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_FILE];\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c:1219:\tret = bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026task_file_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1220-\tif (ret)\n--\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1224-\ttask_vma_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[1].btf_id = btf_tracing_ids[BTF_TRACING_TYPE_VMA];\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c:1225:\treturn bpf_iter_reg_target(\u0026task_vma_reg_info);\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1226-}\n"
} |
| 27/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 32397 output: 32 thoughts: 26 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, and written as if they are my own internal monologue: **Investigating the BPF Iteration Build Process** Right, let's drill down into how `bpf_iter.c` gets built. I need to refresh my memory on the exact build process, specifically within the BPF subsystem. I'm going to jump into `kernel/bpf/Makefile` to see precisely how that particular source file is handled. I want to understand if there's anything unusual or specific to the iteration functionality that needs consideration. I'm looking for any special flags, linking dependencies, or build rules that might influence its behavior. This should give me the context I need. |
| 28/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "bpf_iter.o",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/Makefile=9=obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += syscall.o verifier.o inode.o helpers.o tnum.o cnum.o log.o token.o liveness.o const_fold.o diagnostics.o\nkernel/bpf/Makefile:10:obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += bpf_iter.o map_iter.o task_iter.o prog_iter.o link_iter.o\nkernel/bpf/Makefile-11-obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += hashtab.o arraymap.o percpu_freelist.o bpf_lru_list.o lpm_trie.o map_in_map.o bloom_filter.o\n"
} |
| 29/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 32803 output: 34 thoughts: 116 Thoughts: Okay, let's break this down. **Investigating the BPF Compilation Configuration** Right, so `bpf_iter.o` gets built only if `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` is enabled. That's straightforward enough. Now, the question that comes to mind is the relationship with `DEBUG_INFO_BTF`. I need to figure out if `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF` is a requirement for BTF IDs, especially those that end up in `vmlinux`. I should investigate how BTF IDs are used, and whether their construction relies on `DEBUG_INFO_BTF`. Specifically, I recall seeing `BTF_ID_LIST` and some BTF ID usage in `helpers.c` and `page_owner_iter.c`. I need to confirm whether this is the case. To be thorough, I should search within `kernel/bpf/` for any direct references to `DEBUG_INFO_BTF` to uncover their interdependence. |
| 30/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/Makefile=40=ifeq ($(CONFIG_SYSFS),y)\nkernel/bpf/Makefile:41:obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF) += sysfs_btf.o\nkernel/bpf/Makefile-42-endif\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=6438=static struct btf *btf_parse_base(struct btf_verifier_env *env, const char *name,\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-6443-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:6444:\tif (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF))\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-6445-\t\treturn ERR_PTR(-ENOENT);\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=6524=__u32 btf_relocate_id(const struct btf *btf, __u32 id)\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-6530-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:6531:#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-6532-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=6533=static struct btf *btf_parse_module(const char *module_name, const void *data,\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-6628-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:6629:#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES */\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-6630-\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=8545=enum {\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8548-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8549:#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8550-struct btf_module {\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=8687=fs_initcall(btf_module_init);\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8688:#endif /* CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES */\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8689-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=8690=struct module *btf_try_get_module(const struct btf *btf)\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8692-\tstruct module *res = NULL;\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8693:#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8694-\tstruct btf_module *btf_mod, *tmp;\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=8720=struct btf *btf_get_module_btf(const struct module *module)\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8721-{\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8722:#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8723-\tstruct btf_module *btf_mod, *tmp;\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8733-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8734:#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8735-\tmutex_lock(\u0026btf_module_mutex);\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=8750=static int check_btf_kconfigs(const struct module *module, const char *feature)\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8751-{\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8752:\tif (!module \u0026\u0026 IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) {\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8753-\t\tpr_err(\"missing vmlinux BTF, cannot register %s\\n\", feature);\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8755-\t}\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8756:\tif (module \u0026\u0026 IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES))\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8757-\t\tpr_warn(\"missing module BTF, cannot register %s\\n\", feature);\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=8898=static int btf_check_kfunc_name(struct btf *btf, const char *func_name, u32 kind)\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8899-{\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8900:#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8901-\tstruct btf_module *btf_mod, *tmp;\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8914-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:8915:#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-8916-\tguard(mutex)(\u0026btf_module_mutex);\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c=9563=static struct bpf_cand_cache *populate_cand_cache(struct bpf_cand_cache *cands,\n--\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-9590-\nkernel/bpf/btf.c:9591:#ifdef CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nkernel/bpf/btf.c-9592-static void __purge_cand_cache(struct btf *btf, struct bpf_cand_cache **cache,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=2804=int bpf_add_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 func_id, u16 offset)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-2820-\t\tif (!btf_vmlinux) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:2821:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"calling kernel function is not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\\n\");\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-2822-\t\t\treturn -ENOTSUPP;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=6156=static int check_ptr_to_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6170-\tif (!btf_vmlinux) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:6171:\t\tverbose(env, \"map_ptr access not supported without CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF\\n\");\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6172-\t\treturn -ENOTSUPP;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=18776=static int check_pseudo_btf_id(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-18792-\t\tif (!btf_vmlinux) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:18793:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"kernel is missing BTF, make sure CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y is specified in Kconfig.\\n\");\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-18794-\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=20691=struct btf *bpf_get_btf_vmlinux(void)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-20695-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:20696:\tif (!btf \u0026\u0026 IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF)) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-20697-\t\tmutex_lock(\u0026btf_vmlinux_lock);\n"
} |
| 31/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 35119 output: 30 thoughts: 112 Thoughts: **BPF Kfuncs and BTF Dependency** Okay, so I'm looking at `verifier.c` and it's pretty clear: I can't call kernel functions in the BPF code without `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF`. The error message is direct: the kernel is missing BTF, so I need to make sure `CONFIG_DEBUG_INFO_BTF=y` is specified in the `Kconfig`. Got it, `DEBUG_INFO_BTF` is *essential* for BPF kfuncs to work. Now, I'll need to double check the dependencies for `DEBUG_INFO_BTF`. A quick `grep` for `config DEBUG_INFO_BTF` in `lib/Kconfig.debug` should give me the full picture. |
| 32/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "config DEBUG_INFO_BTF",
"PathPrefixes": [
"lib/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "lib/Kconfig.debug=378=config DEBUG_INFO_SPLIT\n--\nlib/Kconfig.debug-397-\nlib/Kconfig.debug:398:config DEBUG_INFO_BTF\nlib/Kconfig.debug-399-\tbool \"Generate BTF type information\"\n--\nlib/Kconfig.debug=419=config PAHOLE_HAS_LANG_EXCLUDE\n--\nlib/Kconfig.debug-427-\nlib/Kconfig.debug:428:config DEBUG_INFO_BTF_MODULES\nlib/Kconfig.debug-429-\tbool \"Generate BTF type information for kernel modules\"\n"
} |
| 33/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 35599 output: 34 thoughts: 19 Thoughts: Here's my take on the thought process, tailored for an expert audience: **Diving into Debugging Configuration** Okay, so we're talking debugging, and I need to get to the heart of the matter. Let's start with `lib/Kconfig.debug`. It's usually the go-to place for debug-related options in the kernel build system. The logical approach is to trace the relevant configurations, and since `Kconfig` files are organized with structure, let's zero in around line 398. That's a good starting point to hunt for the core debug options. I expect to find things like trace buffer sizes, debug symbols, or printk control there, or perhaps some branching logic that relates to this feature. It's a quick and efficient way to explore the dependencies and how they interact to achieve debugging functionalities, by starting with the most typical files in the relevant directory. |
| 34/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "lib/Kconfig.debug",
"FirstLine": 395,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 395:\t\t to know about the .dwo files and include them.\n 396:\t\t Incompatible with older versions of ccache.\n 397:\t\n 398:\tconfig DEBUG_INFO_BTF\n 399:\t\tbool \"Generate BTF type information\"\n 400:\t\tdepends on !DEBUG_INFO_SPLIT \u0026\u0026 !DEBUG_INFO_REDUCED\n 401:\t\tdepends on !GCC_PLUGIN_RANDSTRUCT || COMPILE_TEST\n 402:\t\tdepends on BPF_SYSCALL\n 403:\t\tdepends on PAHOLE_VERSION \u003e= 122\n 404:\t\t# pahole uses elfutils, which does not have support for Hexagon relocations\n 405:\t\tdepends on !HEXAGON\n 406:\t\thelp\n 407:\t\t Generate deduplicated BTF type information from DWARF debug info.\n 408:\t\t Turning this on requires pahole v1.22 or later, which will convert\n 409:\t\t DWARF type info into equivalent deduplicated BTF type info.\n 410:\t\n 411:\tconfig PAHOLE_HAS_BTF_TAG\n 412:\t\tdef_bool PAHOLE_VERSION \u003e= 123\n 413:\t\tdepends on CC_IS_CLANG\n 414:\t\thelp\n"
} |
| 35/2 | 2026/10/21 19:42 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 36188 output: 327 thoughts: 1578 Thoughts: **Analysis of Page Owner BPF Iterator for Fuzzing** Alright, let's break this down. First, I need to confirm the dependency of `CONFIG_MEMCG` on the `PAGE_OWNER` functionality. The code in `mm/page_owner.c` clearly shows that while `get_page_memcg_info` exists regardless, `CONFIG_MEMCG` enables the actual memcg attribution, which is essential for this feature. This is also used by `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`. So, that's a key requirement. Next, I'm verifying the necessary kernel configurations. We need `PAGE_OWNER`, obviously, along with `BPF_SYSCALL` (since this is about a BPF iterator), `DEBUG_INFO_BTF` for debugging and symbol information, and `MEMCG` because, well, the feature centers around it. Wait...`PAGE_OWNER` also depends on `DEBUG_KERNEL` and `STACKTRACE_SUPPORT`, so we can't forget `DEBUG_KERNEL`. Got it. Now, let's hone in on the important symbols. I've got a list of target functions to focus on: `page_owner_next_eligible`, `get_page_memcg_info`, `read_page_owner`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_new`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_next`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy`, `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`, `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`, `page_owner_seq_start`, `page_owner_seq_next`, `page_owner_seq_show`, and `page_owner_iter_register`. These are all part of the core feature implementation or API entrypoints. The sequence file functions are static, but are used in a struct, so symbols should be available even without LTO. The question then is whether these are *ubiquitous*. According to the guidance, we need to focus on functions that are specific to the feature being reviewed. None of these functions fit the bill of something that would be called everywhere or in a common lifecycle, they are specific to this page owner BPF iterator. That's good. My reasoning here is pretty straightforward: this patch introduces a BPF iterator for `page_owner`, including seq-file and open-coded iterator, along with kfuncs and memcg-related information. It also refactors `read_page_owner` to use a shared helper. All of this is in the core mm and BPF subsystems. It's user-reachable through debugfs and the BPF syscall, meaning it's reachable executable code. Therefore, it's worth fuzzing. Let me double-check: `WorthFuzzing` is true, the focus symbols are listed above, the required configurations are accurate, and I have a clear, concise explanation. Yep, everything is in order. Let's `set-results`. |
| 36/2 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"EnableConfigs": [
"PAGE_OWNER",
"DEBUG_KERNEL",
"BPF_SYSCALL",
"DEBUG_INFO_BTF",
"MEMCG"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"page_owner_next_eligible",
"get_page_memcg_info",
"read_page_owner",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_new",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_next",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy",
"bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint",
"bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info",
"page_owner_seq_start",
"page_owner_seq_next",
"page_owner_seq_show",
"page_owner_iter_register"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies core memory management (mm/page_owner.c) and BPF subsystems by adding BPF iterator support (both seq_file and open-coded iterator kfuncs) for page_owner, along with helper kfuncs to retrieve memcg attribution and snprint stack traces. It also refactors the existing debugfs read_page_owner logic to share page iteration logic (page_owner_next_eligible) and memcg info extraction (get_page_memcg_info). These code paths are executable and directly reachable from user space via the BPF syscall and debugfs read operations.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"PAGE_OWNER",
"DEBUG_KERNEL",
"BPF_SYSCALL",
"DEBUG_INFO_BTF",
"MEMCG"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"page_owner_next_eligible",
"get_page_memcg_info",
"read_page_owner",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_new",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_next",
"bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy",
"bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint",
"bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info",
"page_owner_seq_start",
"page_owner_seq_next",
"page_owner_seq_show",
"page_owner_iter_register"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies core memory management (mm/page_owner.c) and BPF subsystems by adding BPF iterator support (both seq_file and open-coded iterator kfuncs) for page_owner, along with helper kfuncs to retrieve memcg attribution and snprint stack traces. It also refactors the existing debugfs read_page_owner logic to share page iteration logic (page_owner_next_eligible) and memcg info extraction (get_page_memcg_info). These code paths are executable and directly reachable from user space via the BPF syscall and debugfs read operations.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
} |
| 37/1 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | action | If |
12mArgs:{
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Results: null |
| 38/2 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | agent | kmsan-evaluator |
12mModel:core Args: null Results: {
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch series adds BPF iterator support for page_owner (both seq_file and open-coded iterators via kfuncs: bpf_iter_page_owner_new/next/destroy, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, and bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info), refactoring mm/page_owner.c to extract page_owner_next_eligible() and get_page_memcg_info().\n\nAnalysis of memory initialization and user-space exposure:\n1. `struct memcg_info`: Unconditionally zero-initialized via compound literal assignment `*info = (struct memcg_info){};` at the very beginning of `get_page_memcg_info()` and in error fallbacks. No padding or uninitialized fields can leak.\n2. `struct page_owner_scan`: Holds cursor state `pfn` (initialized before scan) and snapshot fields `po_snap` and `nid`. `page_owner_next_eligible()` populates all snapshot fields before returning true; on false, neither the iterator nor `read_page_owner()` consumes the uninitialized fields.\n3. `struct bpf_iter__page_owner ctx`: Zero-initialized via `= {}` before passing to BPF programs.\n4. Buffers in kfuncs (`buf__uninit`): Both `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint()` and `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info()` guarantee NUL-termination (`buf[0] = '\\0'`) on empty or error paths, and bounded string formatting (`stack_depot_snprint()`, `cgroup_path()`) on success.\n5. `read_page_owner()`: Allocates `kbuf`, populates it with `scnprintf`/`snprintf`, and copies to user space strictly using the returned character count `ret`.\n\nContrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability:\nThe primary risks in these changes relate to memory hotplug concurrency (e.g. holding get_online_mems() while resolving PFN to online page), RCU safety when accessing page_ext and cgroup objects, sleepable kfunc synchronization, and buffer boundary checks. These failure modes (use-after-free, NULL pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds access, locking bugs) are reliably detected by standard KASAN and LOCKDEP configurations. Because all stack and heap structures are thoroughly zeroed and initialized before being read or copied, there is no risk of uninitialized memory reads or information leaks that would require KMSAN.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel security engineer specializing in kernel memory
error detectors (KASAN and KMSAN). Your job is to review the provided patch series and
determine if the code changes justify spawning a dedicated KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer)
fuzzing session in addition to standard KASAN fuzzing.
CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KASAN AND KMSAN:
- Standard KASAN kernel builds (upstream-apparmor-kasan.config) already enable
a comprehensive suite of debugging tools and sanitizers, including KASAN
(out-of-bounds accesses, use-after-free, double free, invalid free), LOCKDEP
(locking bugs and deadlocks), UB-sanitizers, and memory corruption checks.
- KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer) detects reads of UNINITIALIZED memory (stack, heap,
or page allocations) and kernel-to-user memory info-leaks.
Rule: THERE IS NO SENSE IN RUNNING A KMSAN SESSION IF A BUG CAN BE CAUGHT BY KASAN,
LOCKDEP, OR OTHER STANDARD BUG DETECTORS.
A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session incurs significant resource costs. You must ONLY
set NeedsKMSAN=true if the code changes introduce or expose UNINITIALIZED MEMORY risks
that are detected ONLY by KMSAN.
Look holistically at the patch series and surrounding code. Even if no direct
uninitialized field accesses or new buffer allocations are added in the diff itself,
a patch may alter control flow, bounds checking, or data length calculations in ways
that change how the rest of the code operates on existing buffers (e.g. allowing
uninitialized stack/heap memory to be read, copied to user space, or used in control
flow). Do not hesitate to use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code,
called functions, and callers.
Set NeedsKMSAN=true ONLY IF the patch introduces or modifies:
1. Kernel structures sent to user space (via copy_to_user, put_user, netlink skb
attributes, ioctl output arguments, socket options, or BPF buffers) where fields
or structure padding might not be fully initialized/zeroed.
2. Conditional logic or branching that depends on potentially uninitialized variables
or struct fields.
3. Allocation or initialization of complex data structures where uninitialized fields
could be read later in reachable code paths.
4. Bounds checks, lengths, or logic in a way that allows surrounding code to access
uninitialized bytes of existing buffers.
Set NeedsKMSAN=false IF:
- The code changes primarily risk out-of-bounds access, array overflows, NULL pointer
dereferences, locking deadlocks, or use-after-free bugs (these are already caught
by KASAN, LOCKDEP, or standard bug detectors).
- All stack/heap structures touched or introduced by the patch are fully zeroed
or initialized (e.g. using = {0}, memset, kzalloc) before being read or copied.
- The patch does not introduce any risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks.
Use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code if necessary, then provide
detailed KMSANReasoning contrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability for this patch.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Target architecture: amd64
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit f0be73a280a296cccf2bdde50b8b546dbbbf71ab
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date: Wed Oct 21 19:40:36 2026 +0000
syz-cluster: applied patch under review
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
index 712dca5a2c5bd..bba9eeb076c37 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/helpers.c
@@ -4946,6 +4946,16 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_new, KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE)
#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_new,
+ KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_next,
+ KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy,
+ KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)
+#endif
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, __bpf_trap)
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcmp, KF_PERFMON);
BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcasecmp, KF_PERFMON);
diff --git a/mm/Makefile b/mm/Makefile
index e7245cb88c665..d7307b5a964c6 100644
--- a/mm/Makefile
+++ b/mm/Makefile
@@ -115,6 +115,9 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_KMEMLEAK) += kmemleak.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_RODATA_TEST) += rodata_test.o
obj-$(CONFIG_DEBUG_VM_PGTABLE) += debug_vm_pgtable.o
obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner.o
+ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER) += page_owner_iter.o
+endif
obj-$(CONFIG_MEMORY_ISOLATION) += page_isolation.o
obj-$(CONFIG_ZSMALLOC) += zsmalloc.o
obj-$(CONFIG_GENERIC_EARLY_IOREMAP) += early_ioremap.o
diff --git a/mm/page_owner.c b/mm/page_owner.c
index fbbda7ba914ba..7470b5d002be4 100644
--- a/mm/page_owner.c
+++ b/mm/page_owner.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <linux/sched/clock.h>
#include "page_alloc.h"
+#include "page_owner.h"
/*
* TODO: teach PAGE_OWNER_STACK_DEPTH (__dump_page_owner and save_stack)
@@ -21,21 +22,6 @@
*/
#define PAGE_OWNER_STACK_DEPTH (16)
-struct page_owner {
- unsigned short order;
- short last_migrate_reason;
- gfp_t gfp_mask;
- depot_stack_handle_t handle;
- depot_stack_handle_t free_handle;
- u64 ts_nsec;
- u64 free_ts_nsec;
- char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
- pid_t pid;
- pid_t tgid;
- pid_t free_pid;
- pid_t free_tgid;
-};
-
struct stack {
struct stack_record *stack_record;
struct stack *next;
@@ -552,16 +538,22 @@ void pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount_print(struct seq_file *m,
#ifdef CONFIG_MEMCG
/*
- * Looking for memcg information and print it out
+ * Collect memcg information of @page into @info; when @buf and a
+ * nonzero @size are given, also copy the full cgroup path of the
+ * charged memcg into @buf.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 if @page is charged to an attributable memcg; -ENODATA
+ * otherwise.
*/
-static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,
- struct page *page)
+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,
+ char *buf, int size)
{
unsigned long memcg_data;
struct obj_cgroup *objcg;
struct mem_cgroup *memcg;
- bool online;
- char name[80];
+ int ret = -ENODATA;
+
+ *info = (struct memcg_info){};
rcu_read_lock();
memcg_data = READ_ONCE(page->memcg_data);
@@ -569,31 +561,68 @@ static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,
goto out_unlock;
if (memcg_data & MEMCG_DATA_OBJEXTS) {
- ret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
- "Slab cache page\n");
+ info->is_slab = true;
goto out_unlock;
}
objcg = (void *)(memcg_data & ~OBJEXTS_FLAGS_MASK);
- memcg = objcg ? obj_cgroup_memcg(objcg) : NULL;
+ if (!objcg)
+ goto out_unlock;
+
+ memcg = obj_cgroup_memcg(objcg);
if (!memcg)
goto out_unlock;
- online = css_is_online(&memcg->css);
- cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, name, sizeof(name));
- ret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
- "Charged %sto %smemcg %s\n",
- (memcg_data & MEMCG_DATA_KMEM) ? "(via objcg) " : "",
- online ? "" : "offline ",
- name);
+ info->is_kmem = (memcg_data & MEMCG_DATA_KMEM) != 0;
+ info->is_online = css_is_online(&memcg->css);
+ cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, info->name, sizeof(info->name));
+
+ if (buf && size)
+ cgroup_path(memcg->css.cgroup, buf, size);
+ ret = 0;
out_unlock:
rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (ret < 0 && buf && size)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print memcg information from memcg_info
+ */
+static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,
+ const struct memcg_info *info)
+{
+ if (!info)
+ return ret;
+
+ if (info->is_slab)
+ ret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+ "Slab cache page\n");
+
+ if (info->name[0])
+ ret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,
+ "Charged %sto %smemcg %s\n",
+ info->is_kmem ? "(via objcg) " : "",
+ info->is_online ? "" : "offline ",
+ info->name);
+
return ret;
}
#else
+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,
+ char *buf, int size)
+{
+ *info = (struct memcg_info){};
+ if (buf && size)
+ buf[0] = '\0';
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline int print_page_owner_memcg(char *kbuf, size_t count, int ret,
- struct page *page)
+ const struct memcg_info *info)
{
return ret;
}
@@ -603,7 +632,8 @@ static ssize_t
print_page_owner(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned long pfn,
struct page *page, struct page_owner *page_owner,
depot_stack_handle_t handle,
- struct page_owner_filter_state *state)
+ struct page_owner_filter_state *state,
+ const struct memcg_info *memcg_info)
{
int ret, pageblock_mt, page_mt;
char *kbuf;
@@ -653,7 +683,7 @@ print_page_owner(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned long pfn,
migrate_reason_names[page_owner->last_migrate_reason]);
}
- ret = print_page_owner_memcg(kbuf, count, ret, page);
+ ret = print_page_owner_memcg(kbuf, count, ret, memcg_info);
ret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, "\n");
if (ret >= count)
@@ -725,37 +755,37 @@ void __dump_page_owner(const struct page *page)
page_ext_put(page_ext);
}
-static ssize_t
-read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+/*
+ * NUMA node of @page, bypassing PF_POISONED_CHECK() in page_to_nid() to
+ * avoid VM_BUG_ON on poisoned pages; -1 for poisoned pages.
+ */
+static int page_owner_get_nid(struct page *page)
{
- unsigned long pfn;
- struct page *page;
- struct page_ext *page_ext;
- struct page_owner *page_owner;
- depot_stack_handle_t handle;
- struct page_owner_filter_state *state = file->private_data;
+ memdesc_flags_t page_flags = READ_ONCE(page->flags);
- if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
- return -EINVAL;
+ if (page_flags.f == PAGE_POISON_PATTERN)
+ return -1;
+ return memdesc_nid(&page_flags);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Advance @scan to the next page eligible for page_owner output.
+ * On a hit, fill scan->pfn/po_snap/nid and return true; the caller
+ * must advance scan->pfn past the hit before calling again to resume
+ * the scan.
+ */
+bool page_owner_next_eligible(struct page_owner_scan *scan)
+{
+ unsigned long pfn = scan->pfn;
- page = NULL;
- if (*ppos == 0)
- pfn = min_low_pfn;
- else
- pfn = *ppos;
/* Find a valid PFN or the start of a MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES area */
while (!pfn_valid(pfn) && (pfn & (MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES - 1)) != 0)
pfn++;
- /* Find an allocated page */
for (; pfn < max_pfn; pfn++) {
- /*
- * This temporary page_owner is required so
- * that we can avoid the context switches while holding
- * the rcu lock and copying the page owner information to
- * user through copy_to_user() or GFP_KERNEL allocations.
- */
- struct page_owner page_owner_tmp;
+ struct page_owner *page_owner;
+ struct page_ext *page_ext;
+ struct page *page;
/*
* If the new page is in a new MAX_ORDER_NR_PAGES area,
@@ -766,13 +796,22 @@ read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
continue;
}
- page = pfn_to_page(pfn);
+ /*
+ * Hold a mem-hotplug reader across the page derefs so the
+ * vmemmap isn't torn down mid-scan; released before
+ * cond_resched().
+ */
+ get_online_mems();
+ page = pfn_to_online_page(pfn);
+ if (!page)
+ goto put_online_continue;
+
if (skip_buddy_pages(&pfn, page))
- continue;
+ goto put_online_continue;
page_ext = page_ext_get(page);
if (unlikely(!page_ext))
- continue;
+ goto put_online_continue;
/*
* Some pages could be missed by concurrent allocation or free,
@@ -798,37 +837,79 @@ read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
goto ext_put_continue;
/*
- * Access to page_ext->handle isn't synchronous so we should
- * be careful to access it.
+ * Take a snapshot of the page_owner record inside the RCU
+ * window, then validate it, so that print_page_owner()
+ * reads the checked handle from the same snapshot.
*/
- handle = READ_ONCE(page_owner->handle);
- if (!handle)
+ scan->pfn = pfn;
+ scan->po_snap = *page_owner;
+
+ if (!scan->po_snap.handle)
goto ext_put_continue;
- if (state->nid_filter_enabled) {
- int nid;
- memdesc_flags_t page_flags = READ_ONCE(page->flags);
+ scan->nid = page_owner_get_nid(page);
+ page_ext_put(page_ext);
+ put_online_mems();
+ return true;
- /*
- * Bypass PF_POISONED_CHECK() in page_to_nid() to avoid
- * VM_BUG_ON when accessing poisoned pages.
- */
- if (page_flags.f == PAGE_POISON_PATTERN)
- goto ext_put_continue;
- nid = memdesc_nid(&page_flags);
- if (!node_isset(nid, state->nid_filter))
- goto ext_put_continue;
+ext_put_continue:
+ page_ext_put(page_ext);
+put_online_continue:
+ put_online_mems();
+ cond_resched();
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+static ssize_t
+read_page_owner(struct file *file, char __user *buf, size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct page_owner_scan scan;
+ struct memcg_info memcg_info;
+ struct page_owner_filter_state *state = file->private_data;
+
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (*ppos == 0)
+ scan.pfn = min_low_pfn;
+ else
+ scan.pfn = *ppos;
+
+ /* Find an allocated page */
+ while (page_owner_next_eligible(&scan)) {
+ struct page *page;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ /*
+ * The scan is lockless. Re-resolve the page under a mem-hotplug
+ * read-side lock so that we never access a hot-removed section.
+ */
+ get_online_mems();
+ page = pfn_to_online_page(scan.pfn);
+ if (!page)
+ goto skip_continue;
+
+ if (state->nid_filter_enabled) {
+ if (scan.nid < 0 ||
+ !node_isset(scan.nid, state->nid_filter))
+ goto skip_continue;
}
/* Record the next PFN to read in the file offset */
- *ppos = pfn + 1;
-
- page_owner_tmp = *page_owner;
- page_ext_put(page_ext);
- return print_page_owner(buf, count, pfn, page,
- &page_owner_tmp, handle, state);
-ext_put_continue:
- page_ext_put(page_ext);
+ *ppos = scan.pfn + 1;
+
+ get_page_memcg_info(page, &memcg_info, NULL, 0);
+ ret = print_page_owner(buf, count, scan.pfn, page,
+ &scan.po_snap, scan.po_snap.handle, state,
+ &memcg_info);
+ put_online_mems();
+ return ret;
+
+skip_continue:
+ put_online_mems();
+ scan.pfn++;
cond_resched();
}
@@ -1169,6 +1250,11 @@ static int __init pageowner_init(void)
&stack_fops);
debugfs_create_file("count_threshold", 0600, dir, NULL,
&threshold_fops);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL
+ if (page_owner_iter_register())
+ pr_warn("page_owner: failed to register bpf_iter target\n");
+#endif
return 0;
}
late_initcall(pageowner_init)
diff --git a/mm/page_owner.h b/mm/page_owner.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..65598415af731
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/page_owner.h
@@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0 */
+/*
+ * mm/ internal page_owner and page_owner_iter declarations
+ */
+
+#ifndef __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H
+#define __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H
+
+#include <linux/jump_label.h>
+#include <linux/page_ext.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
+
+/*
+ * mm/page_owner.c
+ */
+DECLARE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(page_owner_inited);
+
+struct page_owner {
+ unsigned short order;
+ short last_migrate_reason;
+ gfp_t gfp_mask;
+ depot_stack_handle_t handle;
+ depot_stack_handle_t free_handle;
+ u64 ts_nsec;
+ u64 free_ts_nsec;
+ char comm[TASK_COMM_LEN];
+ pid_t pid;
+ pid_t tgid;
+ pid_t free_pid;
+ pid_t free_tgid;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Cursor and per-page result of page_owner_next_eligible().
+ */
+struct page_owner_scan {
+ /* resume point */
+ unsigned long pfn;
+ struct page_owner po_snap;
+ int nid;
+};
+
+struct memcg_info {
+ char name[80];
+ bool is_slab;
+ bool is_kmem;
+ bool is_online;
+};
+
+bool page_owner_next_eligible(struct page_owner_scan *scan);
+int get_page_memcg_info(struct page *page, struct memcg_info *info,
+ char *buf, int size);
+
+/*
+ * mm/page_owner_iter.c
+ */
+int page_owner_iter_register(void);
+
+#endif /* __MM_PAGE_OWNER_H */
diff --git a/mm/page_owner_iter.c b/mm/page_owner_iter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..a649e1207e246
--- /dev/null
+++ b/mm/page_owner_iter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,232 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <linux/btf_ids.h>
+#include <linux/memblock.h>
+#include <linux/mm.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/stackdepot.h>
+
+#include "page_owner.h"
+
+struct bpf_iter__page_owner {
+ __bpf_md_ptr(struct bpf_iter_meta *, meta);
+ __bpf_md_ptr(struct page_owner *, po);
+ u64 pfn;
+ int nid;
+};
+
+DEFINE_BPF_ITER_FUNC(page_owner, struct bpf_iter_meta *meta,
+ struct page_owner *po, u64 pfn, int nid)
+
+static void *page_owner_seq_start(struct seq_file *seq, loff_t *posp)
+{
+ struct page_owner_scan *scan = seq->private;
+
+ if (*posp == 0)
+ scan->pfn = min_low_pfn;
+
+ if (!page_owner_next_eligible(scan))
+ return NULL;
+ return &scan->po_snap;
+}
+
+static void *page_owner_seq_next(struct seq_file *seq, void *v, loff_t *posp)
+{
+ struct page_owner_scan *scan = seq->private;
+
+ ++*posp;
+ scan->pfn++;
+ if (!page_owner_next_eligible(scan))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &scan->po_snap;
+}
+
+static int page_owner_prog_seq_show(struct bpf_prog *prog,
+ struct bpf_iter_meta *meta, void *v)
+{
+ struct page_owner_scan *scan = meta->seq->private;
+ struct bpf_iter__page_owner ctx = {};
+
+ ctx.meta = meta;
+ if (v) {
+ /* @po: hit-time snapshot, no RCU window needed. */
+ ctx.po = &scan->po_snap;
+ ctx.pfn = scan->pfn;
+ ctx.nid = scan->nid;
+ }
+
+ return bpf_iter_run_prog(prog, &ctx);
+}
+
+static int page_owner_seq_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_meta meta;
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+
+ meta.seq = seq;
+ prog = bpf_iter_get_info(&meta, false);
+ if (!prog)
+ return 0;
+
+ return page_owner_prog_seq_show(prog, &meta, v);
+}
+
+static void page_owner_seq_stop(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)
+{
+ if (!v) {
+ struct bpf_iter_meta meta = { .seq = seq };
+ struct bpf_prog *prog;
+
+ prog = bpf_iter_get_info(&meta, true);
+ if (prog)
+ page_owner_prog_seq_show(prog, &meta, NULL);
+ }
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations page_owner_iter_seq_ops = {
+ .start = page_owner_seq_start,
+ .next = page_owner_seq_next,
+ .stop = page_owner_seq_stop,
+ .show = page_owner_seq_show,
+};
+
+static const struct bpf_iter_seq_info page_owner_iter_seq_info = {
+ .seq_ops = &page_owner_iter_seq_ops,
+ .init_seq_private = NULL,
+ .fini_seq_private = NULL,
+ .seq_priv_size = sizeof(struct page_owner_scan),
+};
+
+static struct bpf_iter_reg page_owner_iter_reg_info = {
+ .target = "page_owner",
+ .ctx_arg_info_size = 1,
+ .ctx_arg_info = {
+ { offsetof(struct bpf_iter__page_owner, po),
+ PTR_TO_BTF_ID_OR_NULL },
+ },
+ .seq_info = &page_owner_iter_seq_info,
+ .feature = BPF_ITER_RESCHED,
+};
+
+BTF_ID_LIST(page_owner_btf_ids)
+BTF_ID(struct, page_owner)
+
+int page_owner_iter_register(void)
+{
+ page_owner_iter_reg_info.ctx_arg_info[0].btf_id =
+ page_owner_btf_ids[0];
+
+ return bpf_iter_reg_target(&page_owner_iter_reg_info);
+}
+
+/* opaque to BPF programs */
+struct bpf_iter_page_owner {
+ __u64 __opaque[16];
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
+struct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern {
+ struct page_owner_scan scan;
+} __attribute__((aligned(8)));
+
+__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_page_owner_new(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern *kit = (void *)it;
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*kit) > sizeof(*it));
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*kit) != __alignof__(*it));
+
+ kit->scan.pfn = min_low_pfn - 1;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc struct page_owner_scan *
+bpf_iter_page_owner_next(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_page_owner_kern *kit = (void *)it;
+
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
+ return NULL;
+
+ cond_resched();
+
+ kit->scan.pfn++;
+ if (!page_owner_next_eligible(&kit->scan))
+ return NULL;
+
+ return &kit->scan;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)
+{
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
+ char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+
+ if (!buf__uninit || !buf__sz)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
+ len = stack_depot_snprint(scan->po_snap.handle, buf__uninit,
+ buf__sz, 0);
+
+ if (!len)
+ buf__uninit[0] = '\0';
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info - Report the memcg charged for the current page
+ * @scan: page_owner scan handle.
+ * @info__uninit: output buffer for the memcg_info.
+ * @buf__uninit: optional output buffer for the full cgroup path.
+ * @buf__sz: size of @buf__uninit.
+ *
+ * Fills @info__uninit with the memcg charged for the page backing
+ * @scan->pfn. If @buf__uninit and @buf__sz are provided, the full
+ * cgroup path is also copied out, so a BPF program can attribute a
+ * page_owner allocation to a specific cgroup.
+ *
+ * @scan->pfn is resolved to a struct page under get_online_mems(),
+ * so the page cannot be accessed after its memory section is offlined
+ * or removed.
+ *
+ * Returns:
+ * * 0 on success
+ * * -ENODATA if the page is not online or not charged to a memcg
+ * * -EOPNOTSUPP if built without CONFIG_MEMCG
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
+ struct memcg_info *info__uninit,
+ char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)
+{
+ struct page *page;
+ int ret = -ENODATA;
+
+ if (!static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
+ goto nodata;
+
+ get_online_mems();
+ page = pfn_to_online_page(scan->pfn);
+ if (!page) {
+ put_online_mems();
+ goto nodata;
+ }
+ ret = get_page_memcg_info(page, info__uninit, buf__uninit, buf__sz);
+ put_online_mems();
+ return ret;
+
+nodata:
+ *info__uninit = (struct memcg_info){};
+ if (buf__uninit && buf__sz)
+ buf__uninit[0] = '\0';
+ return ret;
+}
+
+__bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
index ea7044f30adc3..731bc3d798817 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/config
@@ -136,3 +136,5 @@ CONFIG_SMC_HS_CTRL_BPF=y
CONFIG_DIBS=y
CONFIG_DIBS_LO=y
CONFIG_PM_WAKELOCKS=y
+CONFIG_DEBUG_KERNEL=y
+CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER=y
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..3684ca3089355
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/page_owner_iter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2026 */
+
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include "bpf_iter_page_owner.skel.h"
+
+#define DEBUGFS_PAGE_OWNER "/sys/kernel/debug/page_owner"
+
+static bool page_owner_available(void)
+{
+ return access(DEBUGFS_PAGE_OWNER, R_OK) == 0;
+}
+
+/* Count link_fd output lines; -1 on error. */
+static long iter_record_count(int link_fd)
+{
+ char *line = NULL;
+ size_t len = 0;
+ long count = 0;
+ int iter_fd;
+ FILE *f;
+
+ iter_fd = bpf_iter_create(link_fd);
+ if (!ASSERT_GE(iter_fd, 0, "bpf_iter_create"))
+ return -1;
+
+ f = fdopen(iter_fd, "r");
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(f, "fdopen")) {
+ close(iter_fd);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ for (;;) {
+ if (getline(&line, &len, f) > 0) {
+ count++;
+ continue;
+ }
+ if (!ferror(f))
+ break; /* clean EOF */
+ /*
+ * bpf_seq_read() returns -EAGAIN when a chunk scanned.
+ * Not an error, just retry the read.
+ */
+ if (errno == EAGAIN) {
+ clearerr(f);
+ continue;
+ }
+ ASSERT_OK(errno, "iter_read");
+ count = -1;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ free(line);
+ fclose(f);
+ return count;
+}
+
+/* Validate bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info() results from the open-coded run. */
+static void check_memcg_skel(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *skel)
+{
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "memcg: seen=%u charged=%u online=%u nodata=%u notsup=%u bad=%u first='%s' name='%s' flags=%u\n",
+ skel->bss->memcg_seen, skel->bss->memcg_charged,
+ skel->bss->memcg_online, skel->bss->memcg_nodata,
+ skel->bss->memcg_notsup, skel->bss->memcg_bad,
+ skel->bss->memcg_first_path, skel->bss->memcg_first_name,
+ skel->bss->memcg_first_flags);
+
+ if (!ASSERT_GT(skel->bss->memcg_seen, 0, "memcg_seen_gt_0"))
+ return;
+
+ /* all -EOPNOTSUPP: CONFIG_MEMCG is off */
+ if (skel->bss->memcg_notsup == skel->bss->memcg_seen) {
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->memcg_bad, 0, "memcg_stub_invariants");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->memcg_bad, 0, "memcg_kfunc_invariants"))
+ return;
+
+ /* Every call is either charged or nodata */
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->memcg_charged + skel->bss->memcg_nodata,
+ skel->bss->memcg_seen, "memcg_ret_classified"))
+ return;
+
+ if (!skel->bss->memcg_first_saved)
+ return;
+
+ if (!ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->memcg_first_path[0], '/',
+ "memcg_first_path_abs"))
+ return;
+
+ if (skel->bss->memcg_first_name[0])
+ ASSERT_OK_PTR(strstr(skel->bss->memcg_first_path,
+ skel->bss->memcg_first_name),
+ "memcg_name_in_path");
+}
+
+void serial_test_page_owner_iter(void)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_page_owner *skel = NULL;
+ LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, opts);
+ long iter_count, unfiltered_count, oc_diff, pid;
+ unsigned int printed_before;
+ int link_fd, prog_fd;
+
+ if (!page_owner_available()) {
+ printf("%s:SKIP:page_owner debugfs unavailable "
+ "(CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER + page_owner=on)\n", __func__);
+ test__skip();
+ return;
+ }
+
+ skel = bpf_iter_page_owner__open_and_load();
+ if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "bpf_iter_page_owner__open_and_load"))
+ return;
+
+ /* --- seq file iterator: unfiltered run --- */
+ skel->bss->filter_en = 0;
+
+ if (!ASSERT_OK(bpf_iter_page_owner__attach(skel), "skel_attach"))
+ goto destroy;
+
+ link_fd = bpf_link__fd(skel->links.dump_page_owner);
+ iter_count = iter_record_count(link_fd);
+ if (iter_count < 0)
+ goto destroy;
+ unfiltered_count = iter_count;
+
+ fprintf(stderr, "iter_count=%ld printed_lines=%u total_seen=%u\n",
+ iter_count, skel->bss->printed_lines, skel->bss->total_seen);
+
+ ASSERT_GT(iter_count, 0, "unfiltered_lines_gt_0");
+
+ ASSERT_EQ((long)skel->bss->printed_lines, iter_count,
+ "lines_match_printed");
+
+ /* unfiltered: every visited page is printed, so the two must match */
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->total_seen, skel->bss->printed_lines,
+ "unfiltered_all_printed");
+
+ /* --- seq file iterator: pid-filtered run --- */
+ pid = getpid();
+ skel->bss->filter_en = 1;
+ skel->bss->filter_pid = (pid_t)pid;
+
+ /* printed_lines is cumulative across runs: compare the delta */
+ printed_before = skel->bss->printed_lines;
+ iter_count = iter_record_count(link_fd);
+ if (iter_count < 0)
+ goto destroy;
+
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "pid=%ld iter_count=%ld printed_delta=%u\n",
+ pid, iter_count, skel->bss->printed_lines - printed_before);
+
+ ASSERT_GT(iter_count, 0, "filtered_lines_gt_0");
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->printed_lines - printed_before, iter_count,
+ "filtered_printed_match");
+
+ /* --- open-coded iterator parity --- */
+ prog_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.scan_open_coded);
+
+ ASSERT_OK(bpf_prog_test_run_opts(prog_fd, &opts), "prog_test_run");
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "open_coded_seen=%u nid_seen=%u first_nid=%d "
+ "stack_bytes=%u stack=[\n%s]\n",
+ skel->bss->open_coded_seen, skel->bss->nid_seen,
+ skel->data->first_nid, skel->bss->stack_bytes,
+ skel->bss->stack_text);
+
+ /* same eligibility as the seq path: counts must be close */
+ ASSERT_GT(skel->bss->open_coded_seen, 0, "oc_seen_gt_0");
+ oc_diff = (long)skel->bss->open_coded_seen - unfiltered_count;
+ if (oc_diff < 0)
+ oc_diff = -oc_diff;
+ ASSERT_LE(oc_diff, unfiltered_count / 100 + 64,
+ "oc_seen_close_to_iter");
+
+ /* the nid kfunc returned a valid node for every page */
+ ASSERT_EQ(skel->bss->nid_seen, skel->bss->open_coded_seen,
+ "nid_valid_all");
+ ASSERT_GE(skel->data->first_nid, 0, "first_nid_valid");
+
+ ASSERT_GT(skel->bss->stack_bytes, 0, "stack_snprint_ok");
+ ASSERT_OK_PTR(strstr(skel->bss->stack_text, "+0x"), "stack_frames");
+ ASSERT_OK_PTR(strchr(skel->bss->stack_text, '\n'), "stack_lines");
+
+ check_memcg_skel(skel);
+
+destroy:
+ bpf_iter_page_owner__destroy(skel);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000000000..1cd99956aff34
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c
@@ -0,0 +1,157 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2026 */
+
+#include <vmlinux.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
+
+__u32 filter_en;
+__u32 filter_pid;
+__u32 total_seen;
+__u32 printed_lines;
+
+__u32 open_coded_seen;
+__u32 nid_seen;
+__s32 first_nid = -1;
+char stack_text[2048];
+__u32 stack_bytes;
+
+__u32 memcg_seen;
+__u32 memcg_charged;
+__u32 memcg_online;
+__u32 memcg_nodata;
+__u32 memcg_notsup;
+__u32 memcg_bad;
+__u32 memcg_first_saved;
+__u32 memcg_first_flags; /* bit0 is_online, bit1 is_kmem */
+__u32 memcg_first_path_len;
+char memcg_pathbuf[4096];
+char memcg_first_path[4096];
+char memcg_first_name[80];
+
+#define MEMCG_F_ONLINE (1 << 0)
+#define MEMCG_F_OBJCG (1 << 1)
+
+extern int bpf_iter_page_owner_new(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;
+extern struct page_owner_scan *
+bpf_iter_page_owner_next(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;
+extern void bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it) __ksym;
+extern int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
+ char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz) __ksym;
+extern int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
+ struct memcg_info *info__uninit,
+ char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz) __ksym;
+
+static __u32 copy_str(char *dst, const char *src, const __u32 max)
+{
+ __u32 i = 0;
+
+ while (i + 1 < max && src[i]) {
+ dst[i] = src[i];
+ i++;
+ }
+ dst[i] = '\0';
+ return i;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Exercise bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info() until 32 pages charged to an
+ * ONLINE memcg have been seen, checking its per-return contract:
+ * - 0: buf holds an absolute cgroup path;
+ * - -ENODATA: buf was NUL-terminated;
+ * - -EOPNOTSUPP: counted (CONFIG_MEMCG is off);
+ *
+ * The first online charged sample is saved for userspace to print and
+ * cross-check (name vs basename of path).
+ */
+static void check_memcg(struct page_owner_scan *scan)
+{
+ static struct memcg_info info;
+ int err;
+
+ err = bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(scan, &info, memcg_pathbuf,
+ sizeof(memcg_pathbuf));
+ memcg_seen++;
+
+ if (err == 0) {
+ memcg_charged++;
+
+ if (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '/') {
+ memcg_bad++;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (!info.is_online)
+ return;
+ memcg_online++;
+
+ /* keep the first online sample for userspace */
+ if (!memcg_first_saved) {
+ memcg_first_path_len = copy_str(memcg_first_path,
+ memcg_pathbuf,
+ sizeof(memcg_first_path));
+ copy_str(memcg_first_name, info.name,
+ sizeof(memcg_first_name));
+ memcg_first_flags = MEMCG_F_ONLINE |
+ (info.is_kmem ? MEMCG_F_OBJCG : 0);
+ memcg_first_saved = 1;
+ }
+ } else if (err == -ENODATA) {
+ memcg_nodata++;
+ if (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '\0')
+ memcg_bad++;
+ } else if (err == -EOPNOTSUPP) {
+ memcg_notsup++;
+ if (memcg_pathbuf[0] != '\0')
+ memcg_bad++;
+ } else {
+ memcg_bad++;
+ }
+}
+
+SEC("syscall")
+int scan_open_coded(const void *ctx)
+{
+ struct bpf_iter_page_owner it;
+ struct page_owner_scan *scan;
+
+ bpf_iter_page_owner_new(&it);
+
+ while ((scan = bpf_iter_page_owner_next(&it))) {
+ open_coded_seen++;
+ if (scan->nid >= 0)
+ nid_seen++;
+ if (memcg_online < 32)
+ check_memcg(scan);
+ /* grab the stack of the 100th page for userspace to check */
+ if (open_coded_seen == 100) {
+ first_nid = scan->nid;
+ if (scan->po_snap.handle)
+ stack_bytes = bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(
+ scan, stack_text, sizeof(stack_text));
+ }
+ }
+ bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy(&it);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+SEC("iter/page_owner")
+int dump_page_owner(struct bpf_iter__page_owner *ctx)
+{
+ struct page_owner *po = ctx->po;
+
+ if (!po)
+ return 0;
+
+ total_seen++;
+
+ if (filter_en && po->pid != (pid_t)filter_pid)
+ return 0;
+
+ BPF_SEQ_PRINTF(ctx->meta->seq, "pfn %llu pid %d comm %s\n",
+ ctx->pfn, po->pid, po->comm);
+ printed_lines++;
+ return 0;
+}
|
| 39/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 14492 output: 20 thoughts: 1215 Thoughts: **KMSAN Fuzzing Session Evaluation**
Okay, let's break this down. The task is to determine if this patch series warrants a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session. My expertise tells me that KMSAN is resource-intensive, so I need to be precise. Standard KASAN builds already catch a lot: KASAN, LOCKDEP, UBSan, and memory corruption issues. KMSAN's specialty is detecting reads of *uninitialized* memory, both on the stack, heap, and within page allocations, *and* kernel-to-user memory leaks. My rule of thumb is: if KASAN or other standard tools can likely catch the bug, there's no need for KMSAN. I'll only greenlight NeedsKMSAN if uninitialized memory risks are *specific* to KMSAN.
So, the patch introduces BPF iterator support for `page_owner`, refactors `mm/page_owner.c`, and includes selftests. The key is where uninitialized memory *could* be introduced or exposed. I need to look for kernel structures sent to userspace, conditional logic that might depend on uninitialized values, complex data structure allocations that might leave fields uninitialized, or opportunities for surrounding code to access uninitialized bytes.
First, let's examine `get_page_memcg_info`. I see the `*info = (struct memcg_info){};` in multiple places. That's good; it means `info` is being explicitly zeroed out, preventing any immediate uninitialized memory issues. Similarly, in `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`, `*info__uninit = (struct memcg_info){};` is also zeroing out the structure. It *looks* safe so far.
But, I need to zoom in and check exactly what `cgroup_path` does. That call is potentially problematic if it *doesn't* null-terminate when the buffer is smaller than the path length. I will need to verify if the string is nul-terminated, otherwise there could be a leak of kernel memory. The patch is probably safe, but I am not certain, so I would have to look up the cgroup_path implementation to be absolutely sure.
|
| 40/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "int cgroup_path\\("
}Results: {
"Output": "include/linux/cgroup.h=748=static inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen)\n--\ninclude/linux/cgroup.h-752-\ninclude/linux/cgroup.h:753:static inline int cgroup_path(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen)\ninclude/linux/cgroup.h-754-{\n"
} |
| 41/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 16324 output: 36 thoughts: 34 Thoughts: Here's my take on the thought process, as requested: **Diving into cgroup Implementation Details** Okay, time to dig into the nitty-gritty of how `cgroup_path` actually *works*. I need to understand its implementation to properly assess its behavior, so I'm going to head straight to the source. Let's see... the most likely places to find the code for this function are either in the header file, `include/linux/cgroup.h`, where it might be declared inline, or, more likely, in the kernel's core cgroup implementation file, `kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c`. Gotta love a good grep, but a direct code review is better! This should reveal the details I need. |
| 42/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "include/linux/cgroup.h",
"FirstLine": 745,
"LineCount": 25
}Results: {
"Contents": " 745:\t * counterparts and can be called under any context.\n 746:\t */\n 747:\t\n 748:\tstatic inline int cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen)\n 749:\t{\n 750:\t\treturn kernfs_name(cgrp-\u003ekn, buf, buflen);\n 751:\t}\n 752:\t\n 753:\tstatic inline int cgroup_path(struct cgroup *cgrp, char *buf, size_t buflen)\n 754:\t{\n 755:\t\treturn kernfs_path(cgrp-\u003ekn, buf, buflen);\n 756:\t}\n 757:\t\n 758:\tstatic inline void pr_cont_cgroup_name(struct cgroup *cgrp)\n 759:\t{\n 760:\t\tpr_cont_kernfs_name(cgrp-\u003ekn);\n 761:\t}\n 762:\t\n 763:\tstatic inline void pr_cont_cgroup_path(struct cgroup *cgrp)\n 764:\t{\n 765:\t\tpr_cont_kernfs_path(cgrp-\u003ekn);\n 766:\t}\n 767:\t\n 768:\tbool cgroup_psi_enabled(void);\n 769:\t\n"
} |
| 43/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 16925 output: 20 thoughts: 10 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person: **Analyzing the `kernfs_path` Variable** Alright, let's dive in. My immediate thought is to examine `kernfs_path`. This variable is crucial, obviously, and I need to understand its context. Where is it being used? What's its purpose? Is it a configuration parameter, a runtime variable, or something else entirely? Depending on the specifics, its value and how it's being handled could reveal potential issues with security, performance or reliability. I'll need to trace its usage, identify any potential areas where it might be exposed to user input or otherwise untrusted sources, and assess how it's validated and sanitized. My instinct tells me this is likely a critical point for determining how the kernel interacts with the filesystem, and any vulnerabilities here would have significant ramifications. I'll start by checking the surrounding code for clues. |
| 44/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "int kernfs_path\\("
}Results: {
"Output": "include/linux/kernfs.h=599=static inline void kernfs_init(void) { }\n--\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h-614- */\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h:615:static inline int kernfs_path(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h-616-{\n"
} |
| 45/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17269 output: 36 thoughts: 21 Thoughts: Here's a first-person summary, tailored for an expert audience, based on the provided "thoughts": **Diving into kernfs.h - Line 615** Alright, time to dig into `include/linux/kernfs.h` again. Specifically, I want to refresh my memory, or perhaps troubleshoot a potential issue, around line 615. I'm focusing in that region because something there has piqued my interest. Could be related to attribute handling, maybe lifecycle management of kernfs objects, or perhaps I'm looking for a specific data structure definition. Let me quickly scan the surrounding code context to get my bearings and see what’s going on. I'm expecting something related to... (I'll fill in the specific focus based on what I see once I'm there) |
| 46/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "include/linux/kernfs.h",
"FirstLine": 610,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 610:\t *\n 611:\t * Returns the length of the full path. If the full length is equal to or\n 612:\t * greater than @buflen, @buf contains the truncated path with the trailing\n 613:\t * '\\0'. On error, -errno is returned.\n 614:\t */\n 615:\tstatic inline int kernfs_path(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)\n 616:\t{\n 617:\t\treturn kernfs_path_from_node(kn, NULL, buf, buflen);\n 618:\t}\n 619:\t\n 620:\tstatic inline struct kernfs_node *\n 621:\tkernfs_find_and_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *name)\n 622:\t{\n 623:\t\treturn kernfs_find_and_get_ns(kn, name, NULL);\n 624:\t}\n 625:\t\n 626:\tstatic inline struct kernfs_node *\n 627:\tkernfs_walk_and_get(struct kernfs_node *kn, const char *path)\n 628:\t{\n 629:\t\treturn kernfs_walk_and_get_ns(kn, path, NULL);\n"
} |
| 47/3 | 2026/10/21 19:43 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17850 output: 29 thoughts: 260 Thoughts: **Analyzing `kernfs_path_from_node` and BPF Verification** Okay, so `kernfs_path_from_node` is supposed to populate `buf` with a null-terminated string. But what if it exits early? What about the remainder of the buffer? I need to think through the error conditions here. Then I saw `buf__uninit` in BPF. Ah, right! The `__uninit` suffix in a BPF context. The verifier uses that to know the memory can be uninitialized. This needs further examination, it's important. I need to understand how the BPF verifier deals with functions using the `__uninit` suffix, especially if a BPF program is reading from the buffer. Okay, let's look at examples. I need to understand how the functions work in practice. The function `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` takes a `char *buf__uninit`. Also, `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info` which also includes `char *buf__uninit`, with the `__uninit` suffix on the `buf` argument. So I have a clearer picture of what I am looking at. Now, what *exactly* does the verifier do with parameters that have this `__uninit` suffix? I need to understand this to make sure the verification is doing its job and to fully understand this issue. Time to search the kernel source, specifically `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`, and investigate the verifier's logic when it encounters `__uninit` parameters. |
| 48/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "__uninit",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/helpers.c=3220=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_clone(const struct bpf_dynptr *p,\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:3221:\t\t\t\t struct bpf_dynptr *clone__uninit)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-3222-{\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:3223:\tstruct bpf_dynptr_kern *clone = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)clone__uninit;\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-3224-\tconst struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)p;\n--\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c=4679=static int make_file_dynptr(struct file *file, u32 flags, bool may_sleep,\n--\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4702-\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4703:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_from_file(struct file *file, u32 flags, struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4704-{\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4705:\treturn make_file_dynptr(file, flags, false, (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)ptr__uninit);\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4706-}\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4707-\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4708:int bpf_dynptr_from_file_sleepable(struct file *file, u32 flags, struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4709-{\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4710:\treturn make_file_dynptr(file, flags, true, (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)ptr__uninit);\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4711-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=11446=static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11447-{\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:11448:\treturn btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, \"__uninit\");\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11449-}\n"
} |
| 49/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 19102 output: 35 thoughts: 28 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my summary, taking on the persona you requested: **Deconstructing `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` in kernel/bpf/verifier.c** Alright, so I need to understand this `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` function. The filename points me right to the BPF verifier in the kernel – a critical component. This suggests we're dealing with a function designed to analyze BPF bytecode, specifically looking at how arguments to kernel functions (kfuncs) are handled. The name itself, "is_kfunc_arg_uninit," screams that it's probably about detecting whether an argument passed to a kfunc might be used before it's been initialized. That's a classic source of security vulnerabilities and undefined behavior, so it makes perfect sense to have a dedicated check for it within the verifier. I bet this function plays a crucial role in preventing memory leaks and data corruption within the BPF context. I should check how it interacts with other parts of the verifier, particularly the dataflow analysis, to get the full picture. I wonder if it's looking for pointers that might not have a valid backing value before being dereferenced within the kernel. Time to dig in and see how it works! |
| 50/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "is_kfunc_arg_uninit",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=11441=static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11445-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:11446:static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11447-{\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=12687=static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12957-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:12958:\t\t\tif (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, \u0026args[i]))\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12959-\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=13547=s64 bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13601-\t\treturn -size;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13602:\tif (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, \u0026args[arg]))\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13603-\t\treturn -size;\n"
} |
| 51/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 19843 output: 38 thoughts: 30 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those code locations, assuming I'm already pretty familiar with BPF and the verifier: **Diving into the BPF Verifier: Lines 12958 and 13600** Alright, let's refresh our memory on what the BPF verifier is up to around those specific lines. Based on the line numbers, I'm guessing we're looking at fairly significant portions of the verification process. Line 12958... that sounds like we are deep in the details. Maybe we are in the middle of a major phase of analysis, or perhaps it's a critical check. It could be related to data flow analysis, register state tracking, instruction validation, or even handling specific BPF features. The line numbers are important, though, so this is going to be some serious code. Then, line 13600... Hmm, that's further down. This likely means we've moved on to a different stage, a different "check," or possibly an entirely separate aspect of the verifier's task. Considering the distance between those line numbers, I think this could be in a specific section of the program. It could be related to memory access, potential bounds violations, loop analysis, or something related to control flow. It could even be post-processing or error reporting. The organization of the code has meaning here. It's going to be interesting to see how these sections relate. One might build on the other, or they could be parallel checks that are part of the overall guarantee of a BPF program's safety. I'm going to pay close attention to the variables and data structures involved, as those will give a lot of clues about the verifier's internal state and what it's trying to accomplish. Let's see what we've got. |
| 52/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 12940,
"LineCount": 50
}Results: {
"Contents": "12940:\t\t\t\t}\n12941:\t\t\t\tif (!reg_is_referenced(env, reg)) {\n12942:\t\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"allocated object must be referenced\\n\");\n12943:\t\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_call_arg_fmt(env, insn_idx, argno, func_name,\n12944:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t \"Pass the owned object pointer before it is released or transferred.\",\n12945:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t \"the allocated object pointer in %s must still carry verifier-tracked ownership, but this pointer no longer owns a live resource\",\n12946:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t reg_arg_name(env, argno));\n12947:\t\t\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n12948:\t\t\t\t}\n12949:\t\t\t\tif (meta-\u003ebtf == btf_vmlinux) {\n12950:\t\t\t\t\tmeta-\u003earg_btf = reg-\u003ebtf;\n12951:\t\t\t\t\tmeta-\u003earg_btf_id = reg-\u003ebtf_id;\n12952:\t\t\t\t}\n12953:\t\t\t\tbreak;\n12954:\t\t\tcase KF_ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR:\n12955:\t\t\t{\n12956:\t\t\t\tenum bpf_arg_type dynptr_arg_type = ARG_PTR_TO_DYNPTR;\n12957:\t\n12958:\t\t\t\tif (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, \u0026args[i]))\n12959:\t\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT;\n12960:\t\n12961:\t\t\t\tif (meta-\u003efunc_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb]) {\n12962:\t\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB;\n12963:\t\t\t\t} else if (meta-\u003efunc_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_xdp]) {\n12964:\t\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_XDP;\n12965:\t\t\t\t} else if (meta-\u003efunc_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta]) {\n12966:\t\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_SKB_META;\n12967:\t\t\t\t} else if (meta-\u003efunc_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_from_file]) {\n12968:\t\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE;\n12969:\t\t\t\t} else if (meta-\u003efunc_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_file_discard]) {\n12970:\t\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= DYNPTR_TYPE_FILE | OBJ_RELEASE;\n12971:\t\t\t\t} else if (meta-\u003efunc_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] \u0026\u0026\n12972:\t\t\t\t\t (dynptr_arg_type \u0026 MEM_UNINIT)) {\n12973:\t\t\t\t\tenum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta-\u003edynptr.type;\n12974:\t\n12975:\t\t\t\t\tif (parent_type == BPF_DYNPTR_TYPE_INVALID) {\n12976:\t\t\t\t\t\tverifier_bug(env, \"no dynptr type for parent of clone\");\n12977:\t\t\t\t\t\treturn -EFAULT;\n12978:\t\t\t\t\t}\n12979:\t\n12980:\t\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= (unsigned int)get_dynptr_type_flag(parent_type);\n12981:\t\t\t\t}\n12982:\t\n12983:\t\t\t\tret = process_dynptr_func(env, reg, argno, insn_idx, func_name,\n12984:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t dynptr_arg_type, \u0026meta-\u003eref_obj, \u0026meta-\u003edynptr);\n12985:\t\t\t\tif (ret \u003c 0)\n12986:\t\t\t\t\treturn ret;\n12987:\t\t\t\tbreak;\n12988:\t\t\t}\n12989:\t\t\tcase KF_ARG_PTR_TO_ITER:\n"
} |
| 53/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 21378 output: 35 thoughts: 64 Thoughts: Here's my summary, as the expert: **Investigating the Behavior of `check_kfunc_args` with `KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM` and `__uninit`** Alright, let's dig into the nitty-gritty of the BPF verifier. My current thought process revolves around understanding how `check_kfunc_args` specifically handles the combination of `KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM` and the `__uninit` attribute. I suspect there might be subtle, and potentially critical, behaviors at play here that warrant close examination. To that end, I'll need to locate the relevant code within the kernel. My immediate plan is to use `grep` within `kernel/bpf/verifier.c` to identify instances where `KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM` is explicitly handled. That should quickly get me to the heart of the matter and allow me to see the conditional logic that might be triggered when `__uninit` is also present. This will provide some information in determining whether the verifier is handling this combination correctly. From there, I can analyze the surrounding code to determine how that specifically contributes to potential vulnerabilities or optimizations in the verification process. |
| 54/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=11678=enum kfunc_ptr_arg_type {\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11691-\tKF_ARG_PTR_TO_BTF_ID,\t /* Also covers reg2btf_ids conversions */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:11692:\tKF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11693-\tKF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=11954=get_kfunc_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12062-\t\t}\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:12063:\t\targ_type = KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12064-\t} else if (btf_type_is_struct(ref_t))\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12078-\t\t}\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:12079:\t\targ_type = KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_FIXED_SIZE;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12080-\t}\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=12687=static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12803-\t\tcase KF_ARG_PTR_TO_RB_NODE:\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:12804:\t\tcase KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12805-\t\tcase KF_ARG_PTR_TO_CALLBACK:\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13156-\t\t\t */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13157:\t\t\tkf_arg_type = KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_FIXED_SIZE;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13158-\t\t\tfallthrough;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13159:\t\tcase KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13160-\t\t\tif (kf_arg_type \u0026 MEM_FIXED_SIZE) {\n"
} |
| 55/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 22361 output: 38 thoughts: 28 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those lines of code: **Analyzing BPF Verifier Logic in kernel/bpf/verifier.c** Alright, I'm going to start by focusing on lines 13155 through 13220 within `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`. My primary interest here is in understanding how the BPF verifier is handling potential issues. Based on the context, I'm expecting this section to deal with some aspect of state analysis. Perhaps it is focusing on the specific register states. Maybe it's checking for uninitialized reads, bounds violations, or other memory safety issues. Given the location within the verifier, I'm anticipating that this might be some core logic that is essential to the overall safety checks. I'll need to pay close attention to any error codes or return values, to see how the verifier signals problems and attempts to recover or terminate a failed program. I'll need to consider what assumptions are in place regarding the input BPF program at this stage of the verification process. I'll look to understand the exact conditions which trigger the code's execution, in order to contextualize its role within the verifier's entire suite of checks. |
| 56/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 13155,
"LineCount": 60
}Results: {
"Contents": "13155:\t\t\t\t * scalar-only struct, allow verifying it as a fixed size memory.\n13156:\t\t\t\t */\n13157:\t\t\t\tkf_arg_type = KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM | MEM_FIXED_SIZE;\n13158:\t\t\t\tfallthrough;\n13159:\t\t\tcase KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM:\n13160:\t\t\t\tif (kf_arg_type \u0026 MEM_FIXED_SIZE) {\n13161:\t\t\t\t\tbool known_memory;\n13162:\t\n13163:\t\t\t\t\tresolve_ret = btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, \u0026type_size);\n13164:\t\t\t\t\tif (IS_ERR(resolve_ret)) {\n13165:\t\t\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"%s reference type('%s %s') size cannot be determined: %ld\\n\",\n13166:\t\t\t\t\t\t\treg_arg_name(env, argno), btf_type_str(ref_t),\n13167:\t\t\t\t\t\t\tref_tname, PTR_ERR(resolve_ret));\n13168:\t\t\t\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n13169:\t\t\t\t\t}\n13170:\t\t\t\t\tret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, argno, type_size, BPF_READ | BPF_WRITE,\n13171:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t meta, \u0026known_memory);\n13172:\t\t\t\t\tif (ret \u003c 0) {\n13173:\t\t\t\t\t\tconst char *expected_type;\n13174:\t\n13175:\t\t\t\t\t\texpected_type = bpf_diag_fmt_btf_type(env, btf, ref_id);\n13176:\t\t\t\t\t\tif (known_memory)\n13177:\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_call_arg_fmt(\n13178:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tenv, insn_idx, argno, func_name,\n13179:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"Pass memory with at least the required number of accessible bytes and suitable read and write access.\",\n13180:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"the kfunc expects %u bytes of memory for %s, but the verifier cannot prove that %s provides a readable and writable range of that size\",\n13181:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttype_size, expected_type,\n13182:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_reg_type_plain(env, reg-\u003etype));\n13183:\t\t\t\t\t\telse\n13184:\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_call_arg_fmt(\n13185:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tenv, insn_idx, argno, func_name,\n13186:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"Pass stack, map, context, or other verifier-known memory of the expected type and size, not an integer cast to a pointer.\",\n13187:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\"the kfunc expects %u bytes of memory for %s, but it is %s and not verifier-known memory\",\n13188:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\ttype_size, expected_type,\n13189:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_reg_type_plain(env, reg-\u003etype));\n13190:\t\t\t\t\t\treturn ret;\n13191:\t\t\t\t\t}\n13192:\t\t\t\t}\n13193:\t\t\t\tbreak;\n13194:\t\t\tcase KF_ARG_CONST_MEM_SIZE:\n13195:\t\t\t\tret = process_const_arg(env, reg, argno, meta);\n13196:\t\t\t\tif (ret \u003c 0) {\n13197:\t\t\t\t\tif (ret == -EINVAL)\n13198:\t\t\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_call_arg_fmt(env, insn_idx, argno, func_name,\n13199:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t \"Pass a compile-time constant or a value the verifier can prove is constant at this call.\",\n13200:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t \"the kfunc requires this memory size to be a verifier-known constant, but %s is variable on this path\",\n13201:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t reg_arg_name(env, argno));\n13202:\t\t\t\t\treturn ret;\n13203:\t\t\t\t}\n13204:\t\t\t\tfallthrough;\n13205:\t\t\tcase KF_ARG_MEM_SIZE:\n13206:\t\t\t{\n13207:\t\t\t\tstruct bpf_reg_state *buff_reg = get_func_arg_reg(caller, regs, i - 1);\n13208:\t\t\t\tstruct bpf_reg_state *size_reg = reg;\n13209:\t\t\t\targno_t buff_argno = argno_from_arg(i);\n13210:\t\t\t\tenum bpf_mem_size_failure failure;\n13211:\t\n13212:\t\t\t\tif (reg-\u003etype != SCALAR_VALUE) {\n13213:\t\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"%s is not a scalar\\n\", reg_arg_name(env, argno));\n13214:\t\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_call_arg_fmt(env, insn_idx, argno, func_name,\n"
} |
| 57/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 23937 output: 38 thoughts: 73 Thoughts: Here's my analysis of what I'm thinking, rendered in the first person, as requested: **Deconstructing Verifier Logic** Alright, let's dive into this code. I'm focusing on how the verifier handles memory checks and uninitialized kernel function arguments, specifically within the BPF context. My initial thought is to trace the flow, starting with `check_mem_reg` and `is_kfunc_arg_uninit`. I need to understand how these functions are intertwined. My immediate question is: where *exactly* does `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` get employed within `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`? I have a strong suspicion that the relationships between `check_mem_reg`, uninitialized arguments, and verification logic are critical. To efficiently map the code, I'll leverage a `grep` search. I'll need to locate *every* instance of `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` in order to fully comprehend its role within the verifier's operation. This direct approach will shed light on the surrounding code, and help me discern the key interactions at play. |
| 58/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "is_kfunc_arg_uninit",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=11441=static bool is_kfunc_arg_alloc_obj(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11445-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:11446:static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11447-{\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=12687=static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12957-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:12958:\t\t\tif (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, \u0026args[i]))\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12959-\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=13547=s64 bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13601-\t\treturn -size;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13602:\tif (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, \u0026args[arg]))\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13603-\t\treturn -size;\n"
} |
| 59/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 24695 output: 38 thoughts: 44 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those lines of code: **Analyzing `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes` in the BPF Verifier** Alright, let's take a look at `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes`. Time to jump into `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`, specifically lines 13547 through 13610. I need to understand how the verifier handles stack access within kernel functions, and this function looks like the key. I suspect it plays a crucial role in validating memory access patterns on the BPF stack, ensuring that programs don't try to read or write beyond their allocated stack frames, and that the verifier's assumptions about stack layout are correct. It's likely involved in preventing out-of-bounds access vulnerabilities, and other memory safety issues. I'll be looking closely at the logic flow to confirm this. I need to grasp how it determines the allowed access range, how it handles potential overflows and underflows, and what specific checks are performed. Any interaction with other verification components, such as range propagation or type checking, will be particularly interesting. |
| 60/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 13547,
"LineCount": 60
}Results: {
"Contents": "13547:\ts64 bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\n13548:\t\t\t\t\t int arg, int insn_idx)\n13549:\t{\n13550:\t\tstruct bpf_insn_aux_data *aux = \u0026env-\u003einsn_aux_data[insn_idx];\n13551:\t\tstruct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;\n13552:\t\tconst struct btf_param *args;\n13553:\t\tconst struct btf_type *t, *ref_t;\n13554:\t\tconst struct btf *btf;\n13555:\t\tu32 nargs, type_size;\n13556:\t\ts64 size;\n13557:\t\n13558:\t\tif (bpf_fetch_kfunc_arg_meta(env, insn-\u003eimm, insn-\u003eoff, \u0026meta) \u003c 0)\n13559:\t\t\treturn S64_MIN;\n13560:\t\n13561:\t\tbtf = meta.btf;\n13562:\t\targs = btf_params(meta.func_proto);\n13563:\t\tnargs = btf_type_vlen(meta.func_proto);\n13564:\t\tif (arg \u003e= nargs)\n13565:\t\t\treturn 0;\n13566:\t\n13567:\t\tt = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, args[arg].type, NULL);\n13568:\t\tif (!btf_type_is_ptr(t))\n13569:\t\t\treturn 0;\n13570:\t\n13571:\t\t/* dynptr: fixed 16-byte on-stack representation */\n13572:\t\tif (is_kfunc_arg_dynptr(btf, \u0026args[arg])) {\n13573:\t\t\tsize = BPF_DYNPTR_SIZE;\n13574:\t\t\tgoto out;\n13575:\t\t}\n13576:\t\n13577:\t\t/* ptr + __sz/__szk pair: size is in the next register */\n13578:\t\tif (arg + 1 \u003c nargs \u0026\u0026\n13579:\t\t (btf_param_match_suffix(btf, \u0026args[arg + 1], \"__sz\") ||\n13580:\t\t btf_param_match_suffix(btf, \u0026args[arg + 1], \"__szk\"))) {\n13581:\t\t\tint size_reg = BPF_REG_1 + arg + 1;\n13582:\t\n13583:\t\t\tif (aux-\u003econst_reg_mask \u0026 BIT(size_reg)) {\n13584:\t\t\t\tsize = (s64)aux-\u003econst_reg_vals[size_reg];\n13585:\t\t\t\tgoto out;\n13586:\t\t\t}\n13587:\t\t\treturn MAX_BPF_STACK;\n13588:\t\t}\n13589:\t\n13590:\t\t/* fixed-size pointed-to type: resolve via BTF */\n13591:\t\tref_t = btf_type_skip_modifiers(btf, t-\u003etype, NULL);\n13592:\t\tif (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(btf, ref_t, \u0026type_size))) {\n13593:\t\t\tsize = type_size;\n13594:\t\t\tgoto out;\n13595:\t\t}\n13596:\t\n13597:\t\treturn S64_MIN;\n13598:\tout:\n13599:\t\t/* KF_ITER_NEW kfuncs initialize the iterator state at arg 0 */\n13600:\t\tif (arg == 0 \u0026\u0026 meta.kfunc_flags \u0026 KF_ITER_NEW)\n13601:\t\t\treturn -size;\n13602:\t\tif (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, \u0026args[arg]))\n13603:\t\t\treturn -size;\n13604:\t\treturn size;\n13605:\t}\n13606:\t\n"
} |
| 61/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 26123 output: 37 thoughts: 73 Thoughts: Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this myself: **Investigating `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes` and Uninitialized Arguments** Okay, so I'm digging into how stack access is handled in BPF kfuncs. Let's take a look at what `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes` is actually doing. Ah, right. I see it returns `-size` if `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` is true. That's the key: it's flagging uninitialized arguments, and the return value is a signal of that. Now, where is this function used? Let's check the callers of `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes`. This will be interesting, and help me build my understanding. |
| 62/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/liveness.c=1393=static int record_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1409-\t} else if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) {\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c:1410:\t\tbytes = bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(env, insn, arg_idx, insn_idx);\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1411-\t} else {\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=13429=s64 bpf_helper_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13546- */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13547:s64 bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13548-\t\t\t\t int arg, int insn_idx)\n"
} |
| 63/3 | 2026/10/21 19:44 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
1mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 26703 output: 38 thoughts: 30 Thoughts: Here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience: **Diving into `record_arg_access` and `-size`** Okay, so I'm looking at `kernel/bpf/liveness.c` and specifically how `record_arg_access` handles the `-size` argument, which is crucial for BPF analysis. I need to understand this interaction thoroughly. My intuition tells me this function likely tracks memory access patterns, and the `-size` flag probably influences *how* these accesses are recorded. Is it a granularity setting? Does it impact the data structures used to store this access information? I'm wondering if a larger `-size` value equates to less precise tracking, perhaps aggregating accesses over larger memory chunks for performance reasons. Conversely, a smaller `-size` would give more granular detail but potentially at a higher overhead. It's also possible `-size` interacts with how liveness analysis is performed, influencing what gets considered "live" at different points. I need to dig into the implementation details of `record_arg_access` and its surrounding code to be certain. I'll probably start by looking at its immediate calls and any related definitions. |
| 64/3 | 2026/10/21 19:45 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/liveness.c",
"FirstLine": 1400,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": "1400:\t\tint frame = at-\u003eframe;\n1401:\t\tint err = 0;\n1402:\t\ts64 bytes;\n1403:\t\n1404:\t\tif (!arg_is_fp(at))\n1405:\t\t\treturn 0;\n1406:\t\n1407:\t\tif (bpf_helper_call(insn)) {\n1408:\t\t\tbytes = bpf_helper_stack_access_bytes(env, insn, arg_idx, insn_idx);\n1409:\t\t} else if (bpf_pseudo_kfunc_call(insn)) {\n1410:\t\t\tbytes = bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes(env, insn, arg_idx, insn_idx);\n1411:\t\t} else {\n1412:\t\t\tfor (int f = 0; f \u003c= depth; f++) {\n1413:\t\t\t\terr = mark_stack_read(instance, f, insn_idx, SPIS_ALL);\n1414:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1415:\t\t\t\t\treturn err;\n1416:\t\t\t}\n1417:\t\t\treturn 0;\n1418:\t\t}\n1419:\t\tif (bytes == 0)\n1420:\t\t\treturn 0;\n1421:\t\n1422:\t\tif (frame \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 frame \u003c= depth)\n1423:\t\t\terr = record_stack_access(instance, at, bytes, frame, insn_idx);\n1424:\t\telse if (frame == ARG_IMPRECISE)\n1425:\t\t\terr = record_imprecise(instance, at-\u003emask, insn_idx);\n1426:\t\treturn err;\n1427:\t}\n1428:\t\n1429:\t/* Record stack access for a given 'at' state of helper/kfunc 'insn' */\n1430:\tstatic int record_call_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\n1431:\t\t\t\t struct func_instance *instance,\n1432:\t\t\t\t struct arg_track *at,\n1433:\t\t\t\t int insn_idx)\n1434:\t{\n1435:\t\tstruct bpf_insn *insn = \u0026env-\u003eprog-\u003einsnsi[insn_idx];\n1436:\t\tstruct bpf_call_summary cs;\n1437:\t\tint r, err, num_params = 5;\n1438:\t\n1439:\t\tif (bpf_pseudo_call(insn))\n"
} |
| 65/3 | 2026/10/21 19:45 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 27681 output: 31 thoughts: 21 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this code. **Investigating Negative Byte Access in `record_stack_access`** Alright, I'm going to take a look at how this `record_stack_access` function handles scenarios where the `bytes` parameter is negative. This situation is likely an edge case, and I want to understand the function's behavior in these circumstances. It's a common practice to consider these kinds of scenarios when writing robust code. Is it handled gracefully, producing an error, or are there potential vulnerabilities or unexpected side effects? I'll probably start by looking at the conditional statements and error handling within the function. My goal is a comprehensive understanding of what happens. This analysis might expose a subtle bug, reveal a design decision that might need revisiting, or simply confirm that the function's behavior is as expected and well-considered. Let's see... |
| 66/3 | 2026/10/21 19:45 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "record_stack_access",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/liveness.c=1089=static void arg_track_xfer(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1233- */\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c:1234:static int record_stack_access_off(struct func_instance *instance, s64 fp_off,\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1235-\t\t\t\t s64 access_bytes, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1278- */\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c:1279:static int record_stack_access(struct func_instance *instance,\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1280-\t\t\t const struct arg_track *arg,\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1296-\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c arg-\u003eoff_cnt; i++) {\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c:1297:\t\terr = record_stack_access_off(instance, arg-\u003eoff[i], access_bytes, frame, insn_idx);\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1298-\t\tif (err)\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c=1326=static int record_load_store_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1341-\t * access. Skip so the slot's tracked value isn't confused with the\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c:1342:\t * base register that record_stack_access() expects.\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1343-\t */\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1385-\tif (ptr-\u003eframe \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 ptr-\u003eframe \u003c= depth)\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c:1386:\t\treturn record_stack_access(instance, ptr, sz, ptr-\u003eframe, insn_idx);\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1387-\tif (ptr-\u003eframe == ARG_IMPRECISE)\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c=1393=static int record_arg_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\n--\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1422-\tif (frame \u003e= 0 \u0026\u0026 frame \u003c= depth)\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c:1423:\t\terr = record_stack_access(instance, at, bytes, frame, insn_idx);\nkernel/bpf/liveness.c-1424-\telse if (frame == ARG_IMPRECISE)\n"
} |
| 67/3 | 2026/10/21 19:45 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 28607 output: 38 thoughts: 25 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person: **Diving into the BPF Liveness Checks** Alright, my internal radar just pinged on a specific function: `record_stack_access_off` within the `kernel/bpf/liveness.c` file. My immediate thought is, "Ah, right, we're talking about managing stack access for BPF programs, specifically in the context of liveness analysis." This suggests we're tracking potential reads and writes on the stack to ensure registers, typically, retain the value the program expects them to have. Since it's "off," I'm inferring this likely means we're disabling or deferring some stack access tracking related to liveness, for the purpose of, possibly, optimization or within a particular context. I need to understand what's triggering this call. Is it during a specific compilation path, a particular BPF program type, or maybe a dynamic feature related to the liveness analyzer's state? Context is key. I'll need to remember that disabling these checks has implications for our static analysis, so I'll want to review the exact logic around this function call and determine the trade-offs at play. Let's see how this interacts with the overall liveness tracking process. |
| 68/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/liveness.c",
"FirstLine": 1234,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": "1234:\tstatic int record_stack_access_off(struct func_instance *instance, s64 fp_off,\n1235:\t\t\t\t\t s64 access_bytes, u32 frame, u32 insn_idx)\n1236:\t{\n1237:\t\ts32 slot_hi, slot_lo;\n1238:\t\tspis_t mask;\n1239:\t\n1240:\t\tif (fp_off \u003e= 0)\n1241:\t\t\t/*\n1242:\t\t\t * out of bounds stack access doesn't contribute\n1243:\t\t\t * into actual stack liveness. It will be rejected\n1244:\t\t\t * by the main verifier pass later.\n1245:\t\t\t */\n1246:\t\t\treturn 0;\n1247:\t\tif (access_bytes == S64_MIN) {\n1248:\t\t\t/* helper/kfunc read unknown amount of bytes from fp_off until fp+0 */\n1249:\t\t\tslot_hi = (-fp_off - 1) / STACK_SLOT_SZ;\n1250:\t\t\tmask = SPIS_ZERO;\n1251:\t\t\tspis_or_range(\u0026mask, 0, slot_hi);\n1252:\t\t\treturn mark_stack_read(instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);\n1253:\t\t}\n1254:\t\tif (access_bytes \u003e 0) {\n1255:\t\t\t/* Mark any touched slot as use */\n1256:\t\t\tslot_hi = (-fp_off - 1) / STACK_SLOT_SZ;\n1257:\t\t\tslot_lo = max_t(s32, (-fp_off - access_bytes) / STACK_SLOT_SZ, 0);\n1258:\t\t\tmask = SPIS_ZERO;\n1259:\t\t\tspis_or_range(\u0026mask, slot_lo, slot_hi);\n1260:\t\t\treturn mark_stack_read(instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);\n1261:\t\t} else if (access_bytes \u003c 0) {\n1262:\t\t\t/* Mark only fully covered slots as def */\n1263:\t\t\taccess_bytes = -access_bytes;\n1264:\t\t\tslot_hi = (-fp_off) / STACK_SLOT_SZ - 1;\n1265:\t\t\tslot_lo = max_t(s32, (-fp_off - access_bytes + STACK_SLOT_SZ - 1) / STACK_SLOT_SZ, 0);\n1266:\t\t\tif (slot_lo \u003c= slot_hi) {\n1267:\t\t\t\tmask = SPIS_ZERO;\n1268:\t\t\t\tspis_or_range(\u0026mask, slot_lo, slot_hi);\n1269:\t\t\t\treturn mark_stack_write(instance, frame, insn_idx, mask);\n1270:\t\t\t}\n1271:\t\t}\n1272:\t\treturn 0;\n1273:\t}\n"
} |
| 69/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 29719 output: 17 thoughts: 749 Thoughts: **BPF Verifier & Uninitialized Memory: A Deep Dive**
Okay, so I'm looking at this `mark_stack_write` call, specifically how it interacts with uninitialized memory in the BPF world. It's clear that when `bytes < 0`, the verifier flags stack slots as 'defined' or 'written'. I noticed that the verifier marks an entire buffer of `buf__sz` bytes on the stack as written/initialized when calling the `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` helper. This stems from a bit of code in `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes` and related routines.
Specifically, `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` is interesting here:
```c
__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,
char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)
{
int len = 0;
if (!buf__uninit || !buf__sz)
return 0;
if (static_branch_unlikely(&page_owner_inited))
len = stack_depot_snprint(scan->po_snap.handle, buf__uninit,
buf__sz, 0);
if (!len)
buf__uninit[0] = '\0';
return len;
}
```
The key observation is that `buf__uninit` is the buffer and `buf__sz` is its size. The helper uses the `__uninit` suffix to indicate that it is initializing the memory pointed to by `buf__uninit`. The verifier calculates the size as the negative value, and uses the `mark_stack_write` code to mark the stack as written.
Then I saw this:
```c
/* ptr + __sz/__szk pair: size is in the next register */
if (arg + 1 < nargs &&
(btf_param_match_suffix(btf, &args[arg + 1], "__sz") ||
btf_param_match_suffix(btf, &args[arg + 1], "__szk"))) {
int size_reg = BPF_REG_1 + arg + 1;
if (aux->const_reg_mask & BIT(size_reg)) {
size = (s64)aux->const_reg_vals[size_reg];
goto out;
}
return MAX_BPF_STACK;
}
```
...and my immediate thought was "does `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes` actually mark the whole `buf__sz` bytes as written, even if the helper doesn't write that many bytes?"
If `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` is true, then `out:` returns `-size` (which is `-buf__sz`), and `record_stack_access_off` then marks `-access_bytes` (that is, `buf__sz` bytes) as `mark_stack_write`.
That's when it hit me. `stack_depot_snprint` *doesn't* necessarily write `buf__sz` bytes! It formats a stack trace *into* the buffer, returning the number of bytes written (`len`). So, if `len` is 100 but `buf__sz` is 200, the *remaining* 100 bytes of the buffer are *not* written by `stack_depot_snprint`. But, if the verifier *thinks* the helper initialized the whole `buf__sz` bytes, does the BPF program also *believe* the entire buffer is initialized?
That’s where I started to wonder: is this how `__uninit` actually works in BPF? If so, the BPF program could be reading uninitialized data. That's a potential vulnerability. To get a better handle on this I will now check other examples of `__uninit` being used in other kernel kfuncs. So, I will grep for `__uninit` across all kernel files to investigate.
|
| 70/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "__uninit"
}Results: {
"Output": "\nFull output is too long, showing 200 out of 218 lines.\nUse more precise expression or PathPrefixes if possible.\n\nNumber of matching lines per file (19 files in total):\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst:2\narch/arm64/include/asm/simd.h:1\narch/s390/include/asm/bitops.h:1\narch/s390/include/asm/fpu-types.h:1\narch/s390/include/asm/processor.h:1\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c:2\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xsk.c:1\ninclude/linux/bpf.h:1\ninclude/linux/compiler_attributes.h:3\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h:3\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:6\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:1\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:15\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c:4\nnet/core/filter.c:10\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h:3\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/bpf_iter_page_owner.c:3\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/ksock_common.h:1\ntools/testing/selftests/exec/nix_origin.bpf.c:1\n\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst=162=suffix should be used.\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst-163-\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst:164:2.3.3 __uninit Annotation\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst-165--------------------------\n--\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst=170=An example is given below::\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst-171-\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst:172: __bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_from_skb(..., struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr__uninit)\nDocumentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst-173- {\n--\narch/arm64/include/asm/simd.h=46=DEFINE_LOCK_GUARD_1(ksimd,\n--\narch/arm64/include/asm/simd.h-51-#define __scoped_ksimd(_label)\t\t\t\t\t\\\narch/arm64/include/asm/simd.h:52:\tfor (struct user_fpsimd_state __uninitialized __st;\t\\\narch/arm64/include/asm/simd.h-53-\t true; ({ goto _label; }))\t\t\t\t\\\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/bitops.h=135=static __always_inline __attribute_const__ unsigned long __flogr(unsigned long word)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/bitops.h-168-\t} else {\narch/s390/include/asm/bitops.h:169:\t\tunion register_pair rp __uninitialized;\narch/s390/include/asm/bitops.h-170-\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/fpu-types.h=37=KERNEL_FPU_STRUCT(32);\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/fpu-types.h-39-#define DECLARE_KERNEL_FPU_ONSTACK(vxr_size, name)\t\t\\\narch/s390/include/asm/fpu-types.h:40:\tstruct kernel_fpu_##vxr_size name __uninitialized\narch/s390/include/asm/fpu-types.h-41-\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/processor.h=309=static __always_inline void __load_psw_mask(unsigned long mask)\narch/s390/include/asm/processor.h-310-{\narch/s390/include/asm/processor.h:311:\tpsw_t psw __uninitialized;\narch/s390/include/asm/processor.h-312-\tunsigned long addr;\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c=384=static int idpf_xdpmo_rx_hash(const struct xdp_md *ctx, u32 *hash,\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c-387-\tconst struct libeth_xdp_buff *xdp = (typeof(xdp))ctx;\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c:388:\tstruct idpf_xdp_rx_desc desc __uninitialized;\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c-389-\tconst struct idpf_rx_queue *rxq;\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c=406=static int idpf_xdpmo_rx_timestamp(const struct xdp_md *ctx, u64 *timestamp)\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c-408-\tconst struct libeth_xdp_buff *xdp = (typeof(xdp))ctx;\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c:409:\tstruct idpf_xdp_rx_desc desc __uninitialized;\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xdp.c-410-\tconst struct idpf_rx_queue *rxq;\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xsk.c=467=int idpf_xskrq_poll(struct idpf_rx_queue *rxq, u32 budget)\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xsk.c-488-\t\tconst struct virtchnl2_rx_flex_desc_adv_nic_3 *rx_desc;\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xsk.c:489:\t\tstruct idpf_xdp_rx_desc desc __uninitialized;\ndrivers/net/ethernet/intel/idpf/xsk.c-490-\t\tstruct idpf_buf_queue *bufq;\n--\ninclude/linux/bpf.h=710=int bpf_dynptr_from_file_sleepable(struct file *file, u32 flags,\ninclude/linux/bpf.h:711:\t\t\t\t struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit);\ninclude/linux/bpf.h-712-\n--\ninclude/linux/compiler_attributes.h-337- */\ninclude/linux/compiler_attributes.h:338:#if __has_attribute(__uninitialized__)\ninclude/linux/compiler_attributes.h:339:# define __uninitialized\t\t__attribute__((__uninitialized__))\ninclude/linux/compiler_attributes.h-340-#else\ninclude/linux/compiler_attributes.h:341:# define __uninitialized\ninclude/linux/compiler_attributes.h-342-#endif\n--\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h=61=static_assert(IS_ALIGNED(sizeof(struct xdp_buff_xsk),\n--\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h-81-\t\t LIBETH_XDP_PRIV_SZ(__VA_ARGS__ + 0),\t\t \\\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h:82:\t\t __uninitialized);\t\t\t\t\t \\\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h-83-\tLIBETH_XDP_ASSERT_PRIV_SZ(__VA_ARGS__ + 0)\n--\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h=384=struct libeth_xdp_tx_bulk {\n--\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h-402-#define LIBETH_XDP_ONSTACK_BULK(bq)\t\t\t\t\t \\\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h:403:\tstruct libeth_xdp_tx_bulk bq __uninitialized\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h-404-\n--\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h=517=libeth_xdp_tx_xmit_bulk(const struct libeth_xdp_tx_frame *bulk, void *xdpsq,\n--\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h-525-{\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h:526:\tstruct libeth_xdpsq sq __uninitialized;\ninclude/net/libeth/xdp.h-527-\tu32 this, batched, off = 0;\n--\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c=3220=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_clone(const struct bpf_dynptr *p,\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:3221:\t\t\t\t struct bpf_dynptr *clone__uninit)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-3222-{\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:3223:\tstruct bpf_dynptr_kern *clone = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)clone__uninit;\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-3224-\tconst struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)p;\n--\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c=4679=static int make_file_dynptr(struct file *file, u32 flags, bool may_sleep,\n--\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4702-\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4703:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_from_file(struct file *file, u32 flags, struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4704-{\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4705:\treturn make_file_dynptr(file, flags, false, (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)ptr__uninit);\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4706-}\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4707-\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4708:int bpf_dynptr_from_file_sleepable(struct file *file, u32 flags, struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit)\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4709-{\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c:4710:\treturn make_file_dynptr(file, flags, true, (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)ptr__uninit);\nkernel/bpf/helpers.c-4711-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=11446=static bool is_kfunc_arg_uninit(const struct btf *btf, const struct btf_param *arg)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11447-{\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:11448:\treturn btf_param_match_suffix(btf, arg, \"__uninit\");\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-11449-}\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c=166=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:167:\t\t\t\t\t char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-168-{\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-170-\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:171:\tif (!buf__uninit || !buf__sz)\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-172-\t\treturn 0;\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-174-\tif (static_branch_unlikely(\u0026page_owner_inited))\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:175:\t\tlen = stack_depot_snprint(scan-\u003epo_snap.handle, buf__uninit,\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-176-\t\t\t\t\t buf__sz, 0);\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-178-\tif (!len)\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:179:\t\tbuf__uninit[0] = '\\0';\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-180-\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-186- * @scan: page_owner scan handle.\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:187: * @info__uninit: output buffer for the memcg_info.\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:188: * @buf__uninit: optional output buffer for the full cgroup path.\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:189: * @buf__sz: size of @buf__uninit.\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-190- *\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:191: * Fills @info__uninit with the memcg charged for the page backing\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:192: * @scan-\u003epfn. If @buf__uninit and @buf__sz are provided, the full\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-193- * cgroup path is also copied out, so a BPF program can attribute a\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c=205=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info(struct page_owner_scan *scan,\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:206:\t\t\t\t\t struct memcg_info *info__uninit,\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:207:\t\t\t\t\t char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz)\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-208-{\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-220-\t}\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:221:\tret = get_page_memcg_info(page, info__uninit, buf__uninit, buf__sz);\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-222-\tput_online_mems();\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-225-nodata:\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:226:\t*info__uninit = (struct memcg_info){};\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:227:\tif (buf__uninit \u0026\u0026 buf__sz)\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:228:\t\tbuf__uninit[0] = '\\0';\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-229-\treturn ret;\n--\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c=49=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\n--\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c-65- * @opts__sz:\tSize of the opts struct.\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c:66: * @err__uninit:\tInteger to store error code when NULL is returned.\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c-67- */\n--\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c=69=bpf_ksock_create(const struct bpf_ksock_create_opts *opts, u32 opts__sz,\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c:70:\t\t int *err__uninit)\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c-71-{\n--\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c-137-\trefcount_set(\u0026ks-\u003eusage, 1);\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c:138:\tput_unaligned(0, err__uninit);\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c-139-\treturn ks;\n--\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c-143-err_out:\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c:144:\tput_unaligned(err, err__uninit);\nnet/core/bpf_ksock.c-145-\treturn NULL;\n--\nnet/core/filter.c=12413=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_from_skb(struct __sk_buff *s, u64 flags,\nnet/core/filter.c:12414:\t\t\t\t struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit)\nnet/core/filter.c-12415-{\nnet/core/filter.c:12416:\tstruct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)ptr__uninit;\nnet/core/filter.c-12417-\tstruct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)s;\n--\nnet/core/filter.c-12432- * @flags: future use, must be zero\nnet/core/filter.c:12433: * @ptr__uninit: dynptr to initialize\nnet/core/filter.c-12434- *\n--\nnet/core/filter.c=12443=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_from_skb_meta(struct __sk_buff *skb_, u64 flags,\nnet/core/filter.c:12444:\t\t\t\t\t struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit)\nnet/core/filter.c-12445-{\nnet/core/filter.c:12446:\tstruct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)ptr__uninit;\nnet/core/filter.c-12447-\tstruct sk_buff *skb = (struct sk_buff *)skb_;\n--\nnet/core/filter.c=12459=__bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_from_xdp(struct xdp_md *x, u64 flags,\nnet/core/filter.c:12460:\t\t\t\t struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit)\nnet/core/filter.c-12461-{\nnet/core/filter.c:12462:\tstruct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)ptr__uninit;\nnet/core/filter.c-12463-\tstruct xdp_buff *xdp = (struct xdp_buff *)x;\n--\nnet/core/filter.c=12787=int bpf_dynptr_from_skb_rdonly(struct __sk_buff *skb, u64 flags,\nnet/core/filter.c:12788:\t\t\t struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit)\nnet/core/filter.c-12789-{\nnet/core/filter.c:12790:\tstruct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)ptr__uninit;\nnet/core/filter.c-12791-\tint err;\nnet/core/filter.c-12792-\nnet/core/filter.c:12793:\terr = bpf_dynptr_from_skb(skb, flags, ptr__uninit);\nnet/core/filter.c-12794-\tif (err)\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h=11=extern int bpf_dynptr_from_skb(struct __sk_buff *skb, __u64 flags,\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h:12: struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit) __ksym __weak;\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h-13-\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h=19=extern int bpf_dynptr_from_xdp(struct xdp_md *xdp, __u64 flags,\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h:20:\t\t\t struct bpf_dynptr *ptr__uninit) __ksym __weak;\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/bpf_kfuncs.h-21-\n\n"
} |
| 71/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 36457 output: 37 thoughts: 35 Thoughts: Here's my take on the thought process, tailored for an expert audience and presented as a first-person summary: **Diving into eBPF Kernel Functionality** Okay, time to get my hands dirty. I need to understand more about the specifics of these `kfuncs`. My intuition says that the details will be in the core documentation, so let's start with `Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst`. I recall it being a fairly thorough resource. Specifically, I'm thinking I should start by focusing in on section 2.3.3. Let's see what's covered there. Should be a good primer before digging into the code. |
| 72/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "Documentation/bpf/kfuncs.rst",
"FirstLine": 160,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": " 160:\tHence, whenever a constant scalar argument is accepted by a kfunc which is not a\n 161:\tsize parameter, and the value of the constant matters for program safety, __k\n 162:\tsuffix should be used.\n 163:\t\n 164:\t2.3.3 __uninit Annotation\n 165:\t-------------------------\n 166:\t\n 167:\tThis annotation is used to indicate that the argument will be treated as\n 168:\tuninitialized.\n 169:\t\n 170:\tAn example is given below::\n 171:\t\n 172:\t __bpf_kfunc int bpf_dynptr_from_skb(..., struct bpf_dynptr_kern *ptr__uninit)\n 173:\t {\n 174:\t ...\n 175:\t }\n 176:\t\n 177:\tHere, the dynptr will be treated as an uninitialized dynptr. Without this\n 178:\tannotation, the verifier will reject the program if the dynptr passed in is\n 179:\tnot initialized.\n 180:\t\n 181:\t2.3.4 __nullable Annotation\n 182:\t---------------------------\n 183:\t\n 184:\tThis annotation is used to indicate that the pointer argument may be NULL.\n 185:\tThe verifier will allow passing NULL for such arguments.\n 186:\t\n 187:\tAn example is given below::\n 188:\t\n 189:\t __bpf_kfunc void bpf_task_release(struct task_struct *task__nullable)\n 190:\t {\n 191:\t ...\n 192:\t }\n 193:\t\n 194:\tHere, the task pointer may be NULL. The kfunc is responsible for checking if\n 195:\tthe pointer is NULL before dereferencing it.\n 196:\t\n 197:\tThe __nullable annotation can be combined with other annotations. For example,\n 198:\twhen used with __sz or __szk annotations for memory and size pairs, the\n 199:\tverifier will skip size validation when a NULL pointer is passed, but will\n"
} |
| 73/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 37254 output: 22 thoughts: 200 Thoughts: **Uninitialized Buffer Concerns in BPF Programs** Okay, so I'm looking at this `__uninit` thing, and it looks like it lets us pass an uninitialized buffer, whether it's on the stack, heap, or in a map, directly to a kfunc. The gears in my head are spinning a bit here... what if a BPF program ends up reading this `buf__uninit` *after* a call to something like `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` or `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`? That could be problematic. I need to understand the implications of this. Let's consider a practical example. Say a BPF program allocates an uninitialized buffer on the stack, like `char buf[128];` and then immediately calls `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` with it. I have a hunch that this is the crux of the matter. Aha! It looks like `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` calls `stack_depot_snprint(scan->po_snap.handle, buf__uninit, buf__sz, 0)`. Now we're getting somewhere. I need to dive into the `stack_depot_snprint` implementation. This is where the potential vulnerability likely resides, and I need to fully understand its behaviour to assess the risks. |
| 74/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "int stack_depot_snprint"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/linux/stackdepot.h=207=void stack_depot_print(depot_stack_handle_t stack);\n--\ninclude/linux/stackdepot.h-218- */\ninclude/linux/stackdepot.h:219:int stack_depot_snprint(depot_stack_handle_t handle, char *buf, size_t size,\ninclude/linux/stackdepot.h-220-\t\t int spaces);\n--\nlib/stackdepot.c=817=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(stack_depot_print);\nlib/stackdepot.c-818-\nlib/stackdepot.c:819:int stack_depot_snprint(depot_stack_handle_t handle, char *buf, size_t size,\nlib/stackdepot.c-820-\t\t int spaces)\n"
} |
| 75/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 38007 output: 35 thoughts: 20 Thoughts: Here's a summary of my thought process, tailored for an expert like you: **Diving into `lib/stackdepot.c`** Okay, let's zero in on `lib/stackdepot.c`. My immediate thought is to check around line 819. I'm assuming that's likely where a critical function, data structure, or some specific logic resides. Given the context of "stackdepot," I'm expecting this section to deal with either stack management, potential data storage/retrieval operations, or maybe even dependency tracking within a stack-based system. I need to get a handle on the exact nature of the problem, so a targeted scan of this section seems like the most efficient approach to start. I'll likely be looking for function calls, conditional statements, or potentially memory management routines that might be relevant to the issue at hand. Let's get to it. |
| 76/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "lib/stackdepot.c",
"FirstLine": 815,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": " 815:\t\t\tstack_trace_print(entries, nr_entries, 0);\n 816:\t}\n 817:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(stack_depot_print);\n 818:\t\n 819:\tint stack_depot_snprint(depot_stack_handle_t handle, char *buf, size_t size,\n 820:\t\t\t int spaces)\n 821:\t{\n 822:\t\tunsigned long *entries;\n 823:\t\tunsigned int nr_entries;\n 824:\t\n 825:\t\tnr_entries = stack_depot_fetch(handle, \u0026entries);\n 826:\t\treturn nr_entries ? stack_trace_snprint(buf, size, entries, nr_entries,\n 827:\t\t\t\t\t\t\tspaces) : 0;\n 828:\t}\n 829:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(stack_depot_snprint);\n 830:\t\n 831:\tdepot_stack_handle_t __must_check stack_depot_set_extra_bits(\n 832:\t\t\t\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle, unsigned int extra_bits)\n 833:\t{\n 834:\t\tunion handle_parts parts = { .handle = handle };\n 835:\t\n 836:\t\t/* Don't set extra bits on empty handles. */\n 837:\t\tif (!handle)\n 838:\t\t\treturn 0;\n 839:\t\n 840:\t\tparts.extra = extra_bits;\n 841:\t\treturn parts.handle;\n 842:\t}\n 843:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL(stack_depot_set_extra_bits);\n 844:\t\n 845:\tunsigned int stack_depot_get_extra_bits(depot_stack_handle_t handle)\n 846:\t{\n 847:\t\tunion handle_parts parts = { .handle = handle };\n 848:\t\n 849:\t\treturn parts.extra;\n 850:\t}\n 851:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL(stack_depot_get_extra_bits);\n 852:\t\n 853:\tstatic int stats_show(struct seq_file *seq, void *v)\n 854:\t{\n"
} |
| 77/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 38859 output: 21 thoughts: 15 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those thoughts, as if they're my own: **Investigating `stack_trace_snprint`** Alright, time to get my hands dirty. I need to understand this `stack_trace_snprint` function. I'm going to start by really digging into its purpose and how it functions. I expect it to involve some string formatting, potentially building up a string representation of a call stack. I need to see exactly how it acquires the stack information. Does it use the standard libraries? Is it platform-specific? What level of detail does it provide? I need to understand the underlying mechanisms so I can assess its effectiveness and potential limitations in this particular context. This is the starting point for my analysis, really. |
| 78/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "int stack_trace_snprint"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/linux/stacktrace.h=66=void stack_trace_print(const unsigned long *trace, unsigned int nr_entries,\ninclude/linux/stacktrace.h-67-\t\t int spaces);\ninclude/linux/stacktrace.h:68:int stack_trace_snprint(char *buf, size_t size, const unsigned long *entries,\ninclude/linux/stacktrace.h-69-\t\t\tunsigned int nr_entries, int spaces);\n--\nkernel/stacktrace.c=35=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(stack_trace_print);\n--\nkernel/stacktrace.c-46- */\nkernel/stacktrace.c:47:int stack_trace_snprint(char *buf, size_t size, const unsigned long *entries,\nkernel/stacktrace.c-48-\t\t\tunsigned int nr_entries, int spaces)\n"
} |
| 79/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 39278 output: 33 thoughts: 18 Thoughts: Here's a first-person summary, tailored for an expert audience, based on the prompt: **Diving into `kernel/stacktrace.c` - Line 47** Okay, let's pull up the source code for `kernel/stacktrace.c` and zero in on that section around line 47. I'm going to quickly refresh my mental map of how the stack tracing mechanism is implemented in this particular kernel. What's the context here? Are we looking at the core unwinding logic, a symbol lookup function, or perhaps an interface for accessing the stack frames? Given the file name, my gut tells me this is where the critical stack walking happens. I need to understand how they are handling frame pointers (or lack thereof, if it's based on some other unwinding metadata). Let me see if there's any clever trickery or any potential gotchas that might be lurking around this section of code. I anticipate that I may need to recall the calling convention details of the target architecture to fully appreciate the code's effectiveness. Line 47... alright, let's see what's being done. |
| 80/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/stacktrace.c",
"FirstLine": 40,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": " 40:\t * @size:\tSize of the print buffer\n 41:\t * @entries:\tPointer to storage array\n 42:\t * @nr_entries:\tNumber of entries in the storage array\n 43:\t * @spaces:\tNumber of leading spaces to print\n 44:\t *\n 45:\t * Return: Number of bytes printed.\n 46:\t */\n 47:\tint stack_trace_snprint(char *buf, size_t size, const unsigned long *entries,\n 48:\t\t\t\tunsigned int nr_entries, int spaces)\n 49:\t{\n 50:\t\tunsigned int generated, i, total = 0;\n 51:\t\n 52:\t\tif (WARN_ON(!entries))\n 53:\t\t\treturn 0;\n 54:\t\n 55:\t\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c nr_entries \u0026\u0026 size; i++) {\n 56:\t\t\tgenerated = snprintf(buf, size, \"%*c%pS\\n\", 1 + spaces, ' ',\n 57:\t\t\t\t\t (void *)entries[i]);\n 58:\t\n 59:\t\t\ttotal += generated;\n 60:\t\t\tif (generated \u003e= size) {\n 61:\t\t\t\tbuf += size;\n 62:\t\t\t\tsize = 0;\n 63:\t\t\t} else {\n 64:\t\t\t\tbuf += generated;\n 65:\t\t\t\tsize -= generated;\n 66:\t\t\t}\n 67:\t\t}\n 68:\t\n 69:\t\treturn total;\n 70:\t}\n 71:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(stack_trace_snprint);\n 72:\t\n 73:\t#ifdef CONFIG_ARCH_STACKWALK\n 74:\t\n 75:\tstruct stacktrace_cookie {\n 76:\t\tunsigned long\t*store;\n 77:\t\tunsigned int\tsize;\n 78:\t\tunsigned int\tskip;\n 79:\t\tunsigned int\tlen;\n"
} |
| 81/3 | 2026/10/21 19:46 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
1mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 40070 output: 33 thoughts: 4041 Thoughts: **Deep Dive into `page_owner` Initialization and Usage** Okay, so I've been dissecting how `page_owner` information is handled, especially focusing on potential uninitialized states. It looks like `snprintf` is safe, as expected, because it ensures null termination within the given size. The code does zero out `memcg_info` structs via compound literal initialization, so that's good. The size of the struct is also verified, ensuring there's no padding where data would be missed. The real interesting point is around where and when `page_owner_scan` is initialized. In the context of `read_page_owner`, the `scan` struct *is* allocated on the stack and uninitialized, but `pfn` *is* initialized. Importantly, `page_owner_next_eligible()` is used to iterate through pages. Inside the function, `scan->po_snap` is assigned. Critical part: `scan.pfn` is only valid after `page_owner_next_eligible` returns `true`. If `page_owner_next_eligible` returns true, then `scan.po_snap` will hold valid data, the struct `scan` is fully initialized, and `scan.nid` is assigned. The BPF iterator initialization is another place to consider: `bpf_iter_page_owner_new` *does* initialize `scan.pfn`, and `bpf_iter_page_owner_next` ensures the struct members are all written to if the `page_owner_next_eligible` call returns true, otherwise, the function returns NULL. The seq_file uses kzalloc and `seq->private` is allocated and initialized to zero, before `page_owner_next_eligible` is called, and is updated each time a new `page` is returned. So that seems safe. When `page_owner_next_eligible` returns true, it initializes the `po_snap` of the `scan` struct. The `bpf_iter__page_owner ctx` passed to the BPF program is also zero-initialized. Now, I need to see *where* and *how* the `page_owner` data itself is actually set. I'll need to dig into `mm/page_owner.c` to trace the allocation and initialization of `page_owner` within a `page_ext`. That's the next step to confirm this! |
| 82/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "struct page_owner ",
"PathPrefixes": [
"mm/page_owner.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "mm/page_owner.c=147=struct page_ext_operations page_owner_ops = {\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-153-\nmm/page_owner.c:154:static inline struct page_owner *get_page_owner(struct page_ext *page_ext)\nmm/page_owner.c-155-{\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=248=static inline void __update_page_owner_handle(struct page *page,\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-256-\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\nmm/page_owner.c:257:\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-258-\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=277=static inline void __update_page_owner_free_handle(struct page *page,\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-284-\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\nmm/page_owner.c:285:\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-286-\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=302=void __reset_page_owner(struct page *page, unsigned short order)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-306-\tdepot_stack_handle_t alloc_handle;\nmm/page_owner.c:307:\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-308-\tu64 free_ts_nsec = local_clock();\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=352=void __folio_set_owner_migrate_reason(struct folio *folio, enum migrate_reason reason)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-354-\tstruct page_ext *page_ext = page_ext_get(\u0026folio-\u003epage);\nmm/page_owner.c:355:\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-356-\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=365=void __split_page_owner(struct page *page, int old_order, int new_order)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-368-\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\nmm/page_owner.c:369:\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-370-\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=379=void __folio_copy_owner(struct folio *newfolio, struct folio *old)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-382-\tstruct page_ext_iter iter;\nmm/page_owner.c:383:\tstruct page_owner *old_page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c:384:\tstruct page_owner *new_page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-385-\tdepot_stack_handle_t migrate_handle;\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=462=void pagetypeinfo_showmixedcount_print(struct seq_file *m,\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-466-\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\nmm/page_owner.c:467:\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-468-\tunsigned long pfn, block_end_pfn;\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=632=print_page_owner(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned long pfn,\nmm/page_owner.c:633:\t\tstruct page *page, struct page_owner *page_owner,\nmm/page_owner.c-634-\t\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle,\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=703=void __dump_page_owner(const struct page *page)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-705-\tstruct page_ext *page_ext = page_ext_get((void *)page);\nmm/page_owner.c:706:\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-707-\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle;\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=777=bool page_owner_next_eligible(struct page_owner_scan *scan)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-785-\tfor (; pfn \u003c max_pfn; pfn++) {\nmm/page_owner.c:786:\t\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\nmm/page_owner.c-787-\t\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\n"
} |
| 83/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 45823 output: 34 thoughts: 25 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Diving into Page Owner Initialization** Alright, let's get down to brass tacks. I'm focusing in on the lifecycle of `page_owner` initialization. Specifically, I want to understand exactly how this crucial metadata is set when a page is initially allocated. My immediate instinct is to trace that initialization back to its source. It seems like the obvious place to start digging is in the vicinity of `__set_page_owner`. That's where I anticipate the low-level work is being done, and where I can gain a real understanding of the logic involved. I expect I'll probably find some interesting conditional checks and perhaps some subtle interactions with different memory management subsystems, so this warrants some deeper scrutiny. |
| 84/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "__set_page_owner",
"PathPrefixes": [
"mm/page_owner.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "mm/page_owner.c=302=void __reset_page_owner(struct page *page, unsigned short order)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-338-\nmm/page_owner.c:339:noinline void __set_page_owner(struct page *page, unsigned short order,\nmm/page_owner.c-340-\t\t\t\t\tgfp_t gfp_mask)\n"
} |
| 85/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 46162 output: 35 thoughts: 23 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. I'm going to pull up `mm/page_owner.c` and specifically focus on lines 330 through 355. This is where the real interesting stuff happens, usually related to page ownership tracking or some critical allocation/freeing logic within that subsystem. I need to refresh my memory on the context around those lines. I’m expecting a section that either handles the core data structures used for the page owner feature, or maybe the actual instrumentation calls that track allocations, or even some subtle race condition protection involving those data structures. I'll need to see how the code interfaces with the rest of the memory management system, maybe how it affects the `struct page` definition itself, perhaps how it interacts with the more general memory statistics. Given the line range, I'm guessing we're looking at core functionality or an important conditional block. Let's get to the code and find out. |
| 86/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "mm/page_owner.c",
"FirstLine": 330,
"LineCount": 30
}Results: {
"Contents": " 330:\t\t\t * early_handle is being set as a handle for all those\n 331:\t\t\t * early allocated pages. See init_pages_in_zone().\n 332:\t\t\t * Since their refcount is not being incremented because\n 333:\t\t\t * the machinery is not ready yet, we cannot decrement\n 334:\t\t\t * their refcount either.\n 335:\t\t\t */\n 336:\t\t\tdec_stack_record_count(alloc_handle, 1 \u003c\u003c order);\n 337:\t}\n 338:\t\n 339:\tnoinline void __set_page_owner(struct page *page, unsigned short order,\n 340:\t\t\t\t\t\tgfp_t gfp_mask)\n 341:\t{\n 342:\t\tu64 ts_nsec = local_clock();\n 343:\t\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle;\n 344:\t\n 345:\t\thandle = save_stack(gfp_mask);\n 346:\t\t__update_page_owner_handle(page, handle, order, gfp_mask, MR_NEVER,\n 347:\t\t\t\t\t ts_nsec, current-\u003epid, current-\u003etgid,\n 348:\t\t\t\t\t current-\u003ecomm);\n 349:\t\tinc_stack_record_count(handle, gfp_mask, 1 \u003c\u003c order);\n 350:\t}\n 351:\t\n 352:\tvoid __folio_set_owner_migrate_reason(struct folio *folio, enum migrate_reason reason)\n 353:\t{\n 354:\t\tstruct page_ext *page_ext = page_ext_get(\u0026folio-\u003epage);\n 355:\t\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\n 356:\t\n 357:\t\tif (unlikely(!page_ext))\n 358:\t\t\treturn;\n 359:\t\n"
} |
| 87/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 46904 output: 35 thoughts: 16 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. I'm taking a look at `__update_page_owner_handle`. I need to understand its role within this system, its purpose, and the implications of its execution. I'm going to carefully consider its interactions with the broader architecture and what it's responsible for. I know how critical these internal mechanisms can be, so I'm paying close attention to potential race conditions, atomicity, and any locking that might be involved. Understanding this function's logic is essential for the effective management of page ownership. I will be looking out for edge cases and exceptions. I need to make sure I understand the error handling too. |
| 88/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "mm/page_owner.c",
"FirstLine": 245,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": " 245:\t\t\t\thandle);\n 246:\t}\n 247:\t\n 248:\tstatic inline void __update_page_owner_handle(struct page *page,\n 249:\t\t\t\t\t\t depot_stack_handle_t handle,\n 250:\t\t\t\t\t\t unsigned short order,\n 251:\t\t\t\t\t\t gfp_t gfp_mask,\n 252:\t\t\t\t\t\t short last_migrate_reason, u64 ts_nsec,\n 253:\t\t\t\t\t\t pid_t pid, pid_t tgid, char *comm)\n 254:\t{\n 255:\t\tstruct page_ext_iter iter;\n 256:\t\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\n 257:\t\tstruct page_owner *page_owner;\n 258:\t\n 259:\t\trcu_read_lock();\n 260:\t\tfor_each_page_ext(page, 1 \u003c\u003c order, page_ext, iter) {\n 261:\t\t\tpage_owner = get_page_owner(page_ext);\n 262:\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003ehandle = handle;\n 263:\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003eorder = order;\n 264:\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003egfp_mask = gfp_mask;\n 265:\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003elast_migrate_reason = last_migrate_reason;\n 266:\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003epid = pid;\n 267:\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003etgid = tgid;\n 268:\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003ets_nsec = ts_nsec;\n 269:\t\t\tstrscpy(page_owner-\u003ecomm, comm,\n 270:\t\t\t\tsizeof(page_owner-\u003ecomm));\n 271:\t\t\t__set_bit(PAGE_EXT_OWNER, \u0026page_ext-\u003eflags);\n 272:\t\t\t__set_bit(PAGE_EXT_OWNER_ALLOCATED, \u0026page_ext-\u003eflags);\n 273:\t\t}\n 274:\t\trcu_read_unlock();\n 275:\t}\n 276:\t\n 277:\tstatic inline void __update_page_owner_free_handle(struct page *page,\n 278:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t depot_stack_handle_t handle,\n 279:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t unsigned short order,\n 280:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t pid_t pid, pid_t tgid,\n 281:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t u64 free_ts_nsec)\n 282:\t{\n 283:\t\tstruct page_ext_iter iter;\n 284:\t\tstruct page_ext *page_ext;\n"
} |
| 89/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 47756 output: 28 thoughts: 76 Thoughts: Here's my summary, as I delve into this code: **Deep Dive into Memory Allocation and Initialization** Alright, let's trace this. I need to understand the lifecycle of these crucial memory-management variables: `free_handle`, `free_pid`, `free_tgid`, and `free_ts_nsec`. My initial focus is to pinpoint where these are allocated, initialized, and how their values evolve. Hmm, something important clicks. The `page_ext` memory, which I know is fundamental here, is allocated very early on – potentially during boot or memory hotplug operations. That initialization step is key. I need to refresh my memory on the initialization process. Let me quickly examine `init_page_owner` or `page_ext_init` to understand how these early-stage allocations are set up and zeroed. I want to confirm my understanding of the pre-initialized state. This should provide the foundational context for the rest of my investigation. |
| 90/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "page_owner_ops",
"PathPrefixes": [
"mm/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "mm/page_ext.c=80=static struct page_ext_operations *page_ext_ops[] __initdata = {\nmm/page_ext.c-81-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER\nmm/page_ext.c:82:\t\u0026page_owner_ops,\nmm/page_ext.c-83-#endif\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=126=static __init void init_page_owner(void)\n--\nmm/page_owner.c-146-\nmm/page_owner.c:147:struct page_ext_operations page_owner_ops = {\nmm/page_owner.c-148-\t.size = sizeof(struct page_owner),\n--\nmm/page_owner.c=154=static inline struct page_owner *get_page_owner(struct page_ext *page_ext)\nmm/page_owner.c-155-{\nmm/page_owner.c:156:\treturn page_ext_data(page_ext, \u0026page_owner_ops);\nmm/page_owner.c-157-}\n"
} |
| 91/3 | 2026/10/21 19:48 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 48346 output: 26 thoughts: 3101 Thoughts: **Deep Dive into `page_owner` Iteration and BPF Interactions** Okay, so I'm working through this `page_owner` code, and here's what's going on in my head. First, I'm noting that `page_ext` is zero-allocated, which is good. Then, looking at `page_owner.c`, I see the `struct page_owner` has been moved to a header file, a solid organizational choice. The function `read_page_owner` has undergone changes. The original version directly accessed `page_owner`, but the current code uses `page_owner_next_eligible` and passes `scan` and a snapshot to `print_page_owner`. I went back and checked `read_page_owner`. The `scan` struct is allocated on the stack. I needed to ensure that fields within `scan` weren't being read before they were written. I traced the initialization: `scan.pfn` gets its initial value from `*ppos` or `min_low_pfn`. Then I verified `page_owner_next_eligible` uses `scan->pfn`, which is initialized, and that all fields of `scan` are populated when a page is found, before any are read. If `skip_continue` happens, then I am only reading from initialized fields within `scan`. Next, I examined `get_page_memcg_info` and `print_page_owner`. I confirmed that `memcg_info` is also stack allocated and zero-initialized. I made sure that `print_page_owner` only accesses fields that are populated after initialization. The data eventually makes it to userspace via `copy_to_user`, and all the pieces are initialized before they are copied to userspace. Now, let's switch gears and go through the BPF side! I then moved on to the BPF side. I saw `bpf_iter_page_owner_new` initializing a BPF iterator. I am thinking, I needed to check what happens if BPF programs access the iterator directly, so I focused on verifying if the BPF verifier handles the iterator states correctly. The `bpf_iter_page_owner` struct is opaque to BPF, and the verifier treats iterator states specially. The verifier tracks this as `STACK_ITER`. BPF programs don't directly read/write `it`. When `bpf_iter_page_owner_next` is called, it returns `&kit->scan` or `NULL`. I made sure the struct's fields are set before being returned. I confirmed that `page_owner_next_eligible` initializes all the fields of `kit->scan` before returning. Now I have to think about padding within the structs. `struct page_owner_scan` contains: `pfn`, `po_snap` and `nid`. I verified the size of these, and then I calculated the size of the whole `page_owner_scan` struct. I asked myself: Can a BPF program read the padding, or send it to userspace? That's when I had to check how BPF programs access fields of kernel structs. The verifier only allows access to fields defined in BTF and that it's forbidden to read padding directly. A `PTR_TO_BTF_ID` must only be accessed within defined struct members. That is, direct dereference in BPF is checked by `check_ptr_to_btf_id()` or `btf_struct_access()`. The function `btf_struct_access()` checks whether the read is inside a valid BTF member. What if they use `bpf_probe_read_kernel`? I'd have to make sure that even in that case the padding isn't exposed. I verified the source of `it`, the iterator, in open-coded iterators: it is allocated on the BPF stack! I needed to check if the BPF stack is zeroed to prevent unintended information disclosure. Now, I will look at BPF verifier/interpreter/JIT stack zeroing. Now, I'll search for other open-coded iterators in the kernel, such as `bpf_iter_num_new`, `bpf_iter_task_new`, `bpf_iter_css_new`, `bpf_iter_dmabuf_new`, etc., to get a wider perspective on the patterns. |
| 92/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_"
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c=768=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\nkernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c-769-\nkernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c:770:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_num_new(struct bpf_iter_num *it, int start, int end)\nkernel/bpf/bpf_iter.c-771-{\n--\nkernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c=320=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\nkernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c-321-\nkernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c:322:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_css_new(struct bpf_iter_css *it,\nkernel/bpf/cgroup_iter.c-323-\t\tstruct cgroup_subsys_state *start, unsigned int flags)\n--\nkernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c=159=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\nkernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c-160-\nkernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c:161:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_dmabuf_new(struct bpf_iter_dmabuf *it)\nkernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c-162-{\n--\nkernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c=22=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\nkernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c-23-\nkernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c:24:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_kmem_cache_new(struct bpf_iter_kmem_cache *it)\nkernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c-25-{\n--\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c=861=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-862-\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c:863:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_task_vma_new(struct bpf_iter_task_vma *it,\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-864-\t\t\t\t struct task_struct *task, u64 addr)\n--\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c=1049=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1050-\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c:1051:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_css_task_new(struct bpf_iter_css_task *it,\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1052-\t\tstruct cgroup_subsys_state *css, unsigned int flags)\n--\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c=1118=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1119-\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c:1120:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_task_new(struct bpf_iter_task *it,\nkernel/bpf/task_iter.c-1121-\t\tstruct task_struct *task__nullable, unsigned int flags)\n--\nkernel/sched/ext/ext.c=9877=__bpf_kfunc void scx_bpf_destroy_dsq(u64 dsq_id, const struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)\n--\nkernel/sched/ext/ext.c-9897- */\nkernel/sched/ext/ext.c:9898:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_scx_dsq_new(struct bpf_iter_scx_dsq *it, u64 dsq_id,\nkernel/sched/ext/ext.c-9899-\t\t\t\t u64 flags, const struct bpf_prog_aux *aux)\n--\nmm/page_owner_iter.c=132=__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-133-\nmm/page_owner_iter.c:134:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_page_owner_new(struct bpf_iter_page_owner *it)\nmm/page_owner_iter.c-135-{\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c=196=bpf_testmod_test_mod_kfunc(int i)\n--\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c-200-\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c:201:__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_testmod_seq_new(struct bpf_iter_testmod_seq *it, s64 value, int cnt)\ntools/testing/selftests/bpf/test_kmods/bpf_testmod.c-202-{\n"
} |
| 93/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 53728 output: 40 thoughts: 61 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. I'm curious about the implementation of these BPF iterator functions, specifically `bpf_iter_dmabuf_new` and `bpf_iter_kmem_cache_new`. My plan is to zero in on how they're structured, so I'm going to consult the source code. Let's start with `kernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c`, specifically lines 15 through 40. I want to see how the kmem cache iterator is built as a baseline for understanding the broader BPF iteration approach. I'll focus on the data structures and control flow within that section to extract the relevant architectural patterns. |
| 94/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/kmem_cache_iter.c",
"FirstLine": 15,
"LineCount": 35
}Results: {
"Contents": " 15:\t\n 16:\tstruct bpf_iter_kmem_cache_kern {\n 17:\t\tstruct kmem_cache *pos;\n 18:\t} __attribute__((aligned(8)));\n 19:\t\n 20:\t#define KMEM_CACHE_POS_START ((void *)1L)\n 21:\t\n 22:\t__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\n 23:\t\n 24:\t__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_kmem_cache_new(struct bpf_iter_kmem_cache *it)\n 25:\t{\n 26:\t\tstruct bpf_iter_kmem_cache_kern *kit = (void *)it;\n 27:\t\n 28:\t\tBUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*kit) \u003e sizeof(*it));\n 29:\t\tBUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*kit) != __alignof__(*it));\n 30:\t\n 31:\t\tkit-\u003epos = KMEM_CACHE_POS_START;\n 32:\t\treturn 0;\n 33:\t}\n 34:\t\n 35:\t__bpf_kfunc struct kmem_cache *bpf_iter_kmem_cache_next(struct bpf_iter_kmem_cache *it)\n 36:\t{\n 37:\t\tstruct bpf_iter_kmem_cache_kern *kit = (void *)it;\n 38:\t\tstruct kmem_cache *prev = kit-\u003epos;\n 39:\t\tstruct kmem_cache *next;\n 40:\t\tbool destroy = false;\n 41:\t\n 42:\t\tif (!prev)\n 43:\t\t\treturn NULL;\n 44:\t\n 45:\t\tmutex_lock(\u0026slab_mutex);\n 46:\t\n 47:\t\tif (list_empty(\u0026slab_caches)) {\n 48:\t\t\tmutex_unlock(\u0026slab_mutex);\n 49:\t\t\treturn NULL;\n"
} |
| 95/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 54486 output: 40 thoughts: 20 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on examining `kernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c`: **Deep Dive into `kernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c`** Alright, so the task at hand is to dissect this particular file, `kernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c`. My immediate thought is, "Ah, DMA-BUF iterators within the BPF context. This is where things get interesting in terms of kernel interaction and performance optimization, or, potentially, where it goes south." I need to understand how the BPF programs are interacting with DMA-BUF memory regions. My primary focus will be on the data flow and any potential bottlenecks. I'll be looking for how the iterator interacts with the `dmabuf`'s memory management, including considerations of caching and synchronization. Are they doing the right locking here? Is it efficient? I'll be paying close attention to any uses of atomic operations, memory barriers, and potential contention points within the iterator implementation. The BPF context is particularly sensitive to these, so I'll be hunting for any potential for unexpected context switches or race conditions, because this can cause all kinds of pain in terms of performance and, even worse, data corruption. I'll also keep a lookout for any opportunities for optimization. Is there anything that could be done better? Are they handling errors correctly? Are they checking for null pointers etc. Are there any chances to improve the iterator's efficiency with respect to modern hardware features? This is going to be about understanding the complete workflow, from the BPF program accessing the DMA-BUF memory, to the actual iteration and handling of the data. I'm keen to get a solid grasp of this because it's directly relevant to the performance and stability of the system. |
| 96/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/dmabuf_iter.c",
"FirstLine": 150,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": " 150:\t\t */\n 151:\t\t__u64 __opaque[1];\n 152:\t} __aligned(8);\n 153:\t\n 154:\t/* Non-opaque version of bpf_iter_dmabuf */\n 155:\tstruct bpf_iter_dmabuf_kern {\n 156:\t\tstruct dma_buf *dmabuf;\n 157:\t} __aligned(8);\n 158:\t\n 159:\t__bpf_kfunc_start_defs();\n 160:\t\n 161:\t__bpf_kfunc int bpf_iter_dmabuf_new(struct bpf_iter_dmabuf *it)\n 162:\t{\n 163:\t\tstruct bpf_iter_dmabuf_kern *kit = (void *)it;\n 164:\t\n 165:\t\tBUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(*kit) \u003e sizeof(*it));\n 166:\t\tBUILD_BUG_ON(__alignof__(*kit) != __alignof__(*it));\n 167:\t\n 168:\t\tkit-\u003edmabuf = NULL;\n 169:\t\treturn 0;\n 170:\t}\n 171:\t\n 172:\t__bpf_kfunc struct dma_buf *bpf_iter_dmabuf_next(struct bpf_iter_dmabuf *it)\n 173:\t{\n 174:\t\tstruct bpf_iter_dmabuf_kern *kit = (void *)it;\n 175:\t\n 176:\t\tif (kit-\u003edmabuf)\n 177:\t\t\tkit-\u003edmabuf = dma_buf_iter_next(kit-\u003edmabuf);\n 178:\t\telse\n 179:\t\t\tkit-\u003edmabuf = dma_buf_iter_begin();\n 180:\t\n 181:\t\treturn kit-\u003edmabuf;\n 182:\t}\n 183:\t\n 184:\t__bpf_kfunc void bpf_iter_dmabuf_destroy(struct bpf_iter_dmabuf *it)\n 185:\t{\n 186:\t\tstruct bpf_iter_dmabuf_kern *kit = (void *)it;\n 187:\t\n 188:\t\tif (kit-\u003edmabuf)\n 189:\t\t\tdma_buf_put(kit-\u003edmabuf);\n"
} |
| 97/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 55572 output: 37 thoughts: 488 Thoughts: **Investigating BTF IDs for Page Owner Iterators** Okay, let's dive in. I'm taking a look at how the BPF helper functions related to the `page_owner` iterator are set up. First, I'm checking `kernel/bpf/helpers.c` to see how the BTF ID flags are defined for the `bpf_iter_page_owner_new`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_next`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy`, `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`, and `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info` functions. Looks like we have flags like `KF_ITER_NEW`, `KF_SLEEPABLE`, and `KF_PERFMON` attached to the appropriate functions. Good, good. Now, I'm shifting focus to `page_owner_iter.c` to see how these BTF IDs are actually used and registered. I see the `BTF_ID_LIST` for `page_owner_btf_ids` and the `BTF_ID` for the `page_owner` struct. It seems the `page_owner_iter_register` function is using `page_owner_btf_ids[0]` (likely the `page_owner` struct itself) for some context argument information when registering the target iterator. But wait a minute... I'm missing something. I'm suddenly concerned about `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` and `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`. Are they registered in the relevant BTF kfunc ID sets? I don't see them explicitly registered in the iterator registration. Hmm, I need to check where `register_btf_kfunc_id_set` might be used for these kfuncs. Are these helper functions *actually* part of a BTF kfunc ID set? I need to track down how these are registered! Let's check `kernel/bpf/helpers.c` again, specifically around line 4946, to see if there's any relevant registration logic there. I'm hoping I can find the answer there. |
| 98/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/helpers.c",
"FirstLine": 4940,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": "4940:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_from_user_str_dynptr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4941:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_from_user_task_dynptr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4942:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_copy_from_user_task_str_dynptr, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4943:\t#endif\n4944:\t#ifdef CONFIG_DMA_SHARED_BUFFER\n4945:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_new, KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n4946:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_next, KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n4947:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_dmabuf_destroy, KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE)\n4948:\t#endif\n4949:\t#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_OWNER\n4950:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_new,\n4951:\t\t KF_ITER_NEW | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4952:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_next,\n4953:\t\t KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_RET_NULL | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4954:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_iter_page_owner_destroy,\n4955:\t\t KF_ITER_DESTROY | KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4956:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4957:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_PERFMON)\n4958:\t#endif\n4959:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, __bpf_trap)\n4960:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcmp, KF_PERFMON);\n4961:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcasecmp, KF_PERFMON);\n4962:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strncasecmp, KF_PERFMON);\n4963:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strchr, KF_PERFMON);\n4964:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strchrnul, KF_PERFMON);\n4965:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnchr, KF_PERFMON);\n4966:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strrchr, KF_PERFMON);\n4967:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strlen, KF_PERFMON);\n4968:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnlen, KF_PERFMON);\n4969:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strspn, KF_PERFMON);\n4970:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcspn, KF_PERFMON);\n4971:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strstr, KF_PERFMON);\n4972:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strcasestr, KF_PERFMON);\n4973:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strnstr, KF_PERFMON);\n4974:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_strncasestr, KF_PERFMON);\n4975:\t#if defined(CONFIG_BPF_LSM) \u0026\u0026 defined(CONFIG_CGROUPS)\n4976:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_cgroup_read_xattr, KF_RCU)\n4977:\t#endif\n4978:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_stream_vprintk, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_SPINLOCK_SAFE | KF_PERFMON)\n4979:\tBTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_stream_print_stack, KF_IMPLICIT_ARGS | KF_SPINLOCK_SAFE | KF_PERFMON)\n"
} |
| 99/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 57756 output: 35 thoughts: 1301 Thoughts: **Analyzing Potential Uninitialized Memory Leaks in `read_page_owner`**
Okay, so I've identified the function `read_page_owner` within the page owner functionality. My initial thought is to determine if any uninitialized memory could be leaked to user space or used in branches or calculations, a critical aspect of kernel security. Let's delve into this code.
I've got the code for `read_page_owner` in front of me. Immediately, I see a potential area of concern: the local variable `memcg_info`, which is uninitialized, but then it's used as an input to `get_page_memcg_info`. I need to understand what `get_page_memcg_info` does to this local variable. Diving in, I see that the very first statement, regardless of configuration, is `*info = (struct memcg_info){};`, which zero-initializes the struct. Good. That eliminates a direct leak of garbage data.
Looking at `print_page_owner_memcg`, the zeroed struct's fields are then being accessed (`info->is_slab`, `info->name[0]`, `info->is_kmem`, `info->is_online`, `info->name`), and that could be okay. The important check is, *where* is `info->name` coming from? It appears that it gets filled by `cgroup_name` after the zeroing. Then I see `cgroup_name(memcg->css.cgroup, info->name, sizeof(info->name));`. Looking at `cgroup_name`, it copies the name and does a NUL-termination. Therefore, `info->name` is populated safely, and there's no leak.
So, in conclusion, the code initializes the `memcg_info` to zero using the compound literal, and the fields that *might* be used are either initialized during the initialization process, or by the explicit assignments in `cgroup_name`, so there's no way uninitialized memory can leak here.
|
| 100/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "mm/page_owner.c",
"FirstLine": 630,
"LineCount": 70
}Results: {
"Contents": " 630:\t\n 631:\tstatic ssize_t\n 632:\tprint_page_owner(char __user *buf, size_t count, unsigned long pfn,\n 633:\t\t\tstruct page *page, struct page_owner *page_owner,\n 634:\t\t\tdepot_stack_handle_t handle,\n 635:\t\t\tstruct page_owner_filter_state *state,\n 636:\t\t\tconst struct memcg_info *memcg_info)\n 637:\t{\n 638:\t\tint ret, pageblock_mt, page_mt;\n 639:\t\tchar *kbuf;\n 640:\t\tenum page_owner_print_mode print_mode;\n 641:\t\n 642:\t\tcount = min_t(size_t, count, PAGE_SIZE);\n 643:\t\tkbuf = kmalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);\n 644:\t\tif (!kbuf)\n 645:\t\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n 646:\t\n 647:\t\tprint_mode = state-\u003eprint_mode;\n 648:\t\n 649:\t\tret = scnprintf(kbuf, count,\n 650:\t\t\t\t\"Page allocated via order %u, mask %#x(%pGg), pid %d, tgid %d (%s), ts %llu ns\\n\",\n 651:\t\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003eorder, page_owner-\u003egfp_mask,\n 652:\t\t\t\t\u0026page_owner-\u003egfp_mask, page_owner-\u003epid,\n 653:\t\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003etgid, page_owner-\u003ecomm,\n 654:\t\t\t\tpage_owner-\u003ets_nsec);\n 655:\t\n 656:\t\t/* Print information relevant to grouping pages by mobility */\n 657:\t\tpageblock_mt = get_pageblock_migratetype(page);\n 658:\t\tpage_mt = gfp_migratetype(page_owner-\u003egfp_mask);\n 659:\t\tret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,\n 660:\t\t\t\t\"PFN 0x%lx type %s Block %lu type %s Flags %pGp\\n\",\n 661:\t\t\t\tpfn,\n 662:\t\t\t\tmigratetype_names[page_mt],\n 663:\t\t\t\tpfn \u003e\u003e pageblock_order,\n 664:\t\t\t\tmigratetype_names[pageblock_mt],\n 665:\t\t\t\t\u0026page-\u003eflags.f);\n 666:\t\n 667:\t\tif (print_mode != PAGE_OWNER_PRINT_HANDLE) {\n 668:\t\t\tret += stack_depot_snprint(handle, kbuf + ret, count - ret, 0);\n 669:\t\t\tif (ret \u003e= count)\n 670:\t\t\t\tgoto err;\n 671:\t\t}\n 672:\t\n 673:\t\tif (print_mode != PAGE_OWNER_PRINT_STACK) {\n 674:\t\t\tret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, \"handle: %u\\n\",\n 675:\t\t\t\t\t handle);\n 676:\t\t\tif (ret \u003e= count)\n 677:\t\t\t\tgoto err;\n 678:\t\t}\n 679:\t\n 680:\t\tif (page_owner-\u003elast_migrate_reason != MR_NEVER) {\n 681:\t\t\tret += scnprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret,\n 682:\t\t\t\t\"Page has been migrated, last migrate reason: %s\\n\",\n 683:\t\t\t\tmigrate_reason_names[page_owner-\u003elast_migrate_reason]);\n 684:\t\t}\n 685:\t\n 686:\t\tret = print_page_owner_memcg(kbuf, count, ret, memcg_info);\n 687:\t\n 688:\t\tret += snprintf(kbuf + ret, count - ret, \"\\n\");\n 689:\t\tif (ret \u003e= count)\n 690:\t\t\tgoto err;\n 691:\t\n 692:\t\tif (copy_to_user(buf, kbuf, ret))\n 693:\t\t\tret = -EFAULT;\n 694:\t\n 695:\t\tkfree(kbuf);\n 696:\t\treturn ret;\n 697:\t\n 698:\terr:\n 699:\t\tkfree(kbuf);\n"
} |
| 101/3 | 2026/10/21 19:49 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 60667 output: 33 thoughts: 1198 Thoughts: **Analyzing BPF Verifier Behavior with Uninitialized Buffers in kfuncs** Okay, so I'm looking at how the `print_page_owner` functionality has been updated. The core part involves using `scnprintf` and `snprintf` to fill a kernel buffer, `kbuf`, and then copying the contents to user space with `copy_to_user`. The main change is that now `print_page_owner_memcg` uses `memcg_info` rather than doing the RCU lookup directly, and importantly `memcg_info` is *fully* initialized. Now, let's zoom in on `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`. I see the `__bpf_kfunc` declaration, and I notice that there is a buffer passed to it that is designed to be written: `char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz`. The first question that pops into my head is, what happens if `buf__uninit` is NULL or `buf__sz` is zero? It looks like those cases are handled, because in the function `get_page_memcg_info` (which is what `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info` calls), there's a check `if (buf && size)`. And in the `nodata` case that handles the zero buffer condition, the buffer is set to NULL, so we are safe. But, what if they're *not* NULL or zero? Then, `info__uninit` *is* written to, and then `cgroup_path` is called, copying into the buffer. But, what if the `cgroup_path` function fails, or returns early, or only partially fills the buffer? That's the real problem, because it means we could have an uninitialized buffer that gets returned. This leads me to the memory safety aspect of BPF. Specifically, the verifier and this kfunc stack access. How does the BPF verifier handle the `char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz` arguments? Remember `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes` and the verifier assumptions about the stack buffer! I need to re-examine that code. So, when a kfunc takes these `__uninit` and `__sz` arguments, I remember that the verifier does certain checks. We're looking at `btf_param_match_suffix` to find `__sz`. If we have a constant size, we can use that, and then it checks if it's `is_kfunc_arg_uninit`. That's important. Then there's `record_call_access`, and specifically `record_stack_access_off`, which calls `mark_stack_write`. But, is `record_call_access` *the only* thing the verifier does? I need to understand what `liveness.c` is doing. I wonder if it's solely about dead code elimination. Or, does the main verifier do other checks related to `MEM_UNINIT`? I need to search for that in `verifier.c`. This is where the crucial memory safety of BPF code lies, and I want to make *sure* that the verifier is correctly handling the partial initialization scenario. I need to be *certain* that the verifier is correctly tracking the potential for uninitialized data. |
| 102/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "MEM_UNINIT",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=7582=__printf(6, 7) static void bpf_diag_call_arg_fmt(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 insn_idx,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7589- * @dynptr is both input and output. It is populated when the argument is\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7590: * tagged with MEM_UNINIT (i.e., the dynptr argument that will be constructed)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7591- * and consumed when the argument is expecting to be an initialized dynptr.\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=7609=static int process_dynptr_func(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7627-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7628:\t/* MEM_UNINIT - Points to memory that is an appropriate candidate for\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7629-\t *\t\t constructing a mutable bpf_dynptr object.\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7641-\t */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7642:\tif (arg_type \u0026 MEM_UNINIT) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7643-\t\tint i;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=8082=static bool arg_type_is_raw_mem(enum bpf_arg_type type)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8090-\t\tbase_type(type) == ARG_PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE) \u0026\u0026\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:8091:\t type \u0026 MEM_UNINIT;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8092-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=12687=static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12958-\t\t\tif (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, \u0026args[i]))\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:12959:\t\t\t\tdynptr_arg_type |= MEM_UNINIT;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12960-\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12971-\t\t\t} else if (meta-\u003efunc_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_dynptr_clone] \u0026\u0026\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:12972:\t\t\t\t (dynptr_arg_type \u0026 MEM_UNINIT)) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12973-\t\t\t\tenum bpf_dynptr_type parent_type = meta-\u003edynptr.type;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=13429=s64 bpf_helper_stack_access_bytes(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13508-\t\t\t */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13509:\t\t\tif (at \u0026 MEM_UNINIT)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13510-\t\t\t\treturn 0;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13528-\t/*\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13529:\t * MEM_UNINIT args are write-only: the helper initializes the\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13530-\t * buffer without reading it.\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13531-\t */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13532:\tif (at \u0026 MEM_UNINIT)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13533-\t\treturn -size;\n"
} |
| 103/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 63608 output: 50 thoughts: 173 Thoughts: **Analyzing BPF Verifier Argument Handling** Okay, let's dissect this. I need to understand how the BPF verifier handles memory arguments, specifically focusing on uninitialized memory regions. I'm starting by examining lines 13528-13533 of this code, the section noting `MEM_UNINIT` args as write-only. It immediately returns an error, which makes sense; we can't be reading from uninitialized memory. Now, I'm shifting my focus to `check_kfunc_args` within `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`. This is where the real argument validation logic lies. The core question is: how does `check_kfunc_args` treat arguments declared as `KF_ARG_MEM_SIZE` or `KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM`? My immediate goal is to trace the flow of control within that function. I need to determine if it calls other memory-checking routines like `check_mem_size_reg`, `check_helper_mem_access`, or `check_mem_reg`. These functions will hold the more granular details. I'll need to understand the relationship between these helper functions and the higher-level argument checks. |
| 104/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "check_mem_reg|check_mem_size_reg|check_helper_mem_access",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=4319=static int __check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-4356-/* check read/write into a memory region with possible variable offset */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:4357:static int check_mem_region_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-4358-\t\t\t\t int off, int size, u32 mem_size,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=4761=static int check_map_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-4769-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:4770:\terr = check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, off, size, mem_size, zero_size_allowed);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-4771-\tif (err)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=4866=static int check_packet_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno, int off,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-4875-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:4876:\terr = check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, off, size, reg-\u003erange, zero_size_allowed);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-4877-\tif (err)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=4931=static int check_ctx_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-4943-\tif (var_off_ok)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:4944:\t\terr = check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, off, access_size, U16_MAX, false);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-4945-\telse\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=6386=static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6407-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:6408:\t\terr = check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, off, size,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6409-\t\t\t\t\t reg-\u003emap_ptr-\u003ekey_size, false);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6474-\t\tif (!rdonly_untrusted)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:6475:\t\t\terr = check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, off, size,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6476-\t\t\t\t\t\t reg-\u003emem_size, false);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=6895=static int check_stack_range_initialized(\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7014-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7015:static int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7016-\t\t\t\t argno_t argno, int access_size,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7036-\t\t}\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7037:\t\treturn check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, 0, access_size,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7038-\t\t\t\t\t reg-\u003emap_ptr-\u003ekey_size, false);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7051-\t\t}\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7052:\t\treturn check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, 0,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7053-\t\t\t\t\t access_size, reg-\u003emem_size,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7080-\t\tif (is_var_ctx_off_allowed(env-\u003eprog)) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7081:\t\t\tint err = check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, 0, access_size, U16_MAX,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7082-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t zero_size_allowed);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=7105=enum bpf_mem_size_failure {\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7115- */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7116:static int check_mem_size_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7117-\t\t\t struct bpf_reg_state *mem_reg,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7168-\tif (access_type \u0026 BPF_READ)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7169:\t\terr = check_helper_mem_access(env, mem_reg, mem_argno, reg_umax(size_reg),\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7170-\t\t\t\t\t BPF_READ, zero_size_allowed, meta, NULL);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7171-\tif (!err \u0026\u0026 access_type \u0026 BPF_WRITE)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7172:\t\terr = check_helper_mem_access(env, mem_reg, mem_argno, reg_umax(size_reg),\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7173-\t\t\t\t\t BPF_WRITE, zero_size_allowed, meta, NULL);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7187-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7188:static int check_mem_reg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7189-\t\t\t argno_t argno, u32 mem_size, enum bpf_access_type access_type,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7211-\tif (access_type \u0026 BPF_READ)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7212:\t\terr = check_helper_mem_access(env, reg, argno, size, BPF_READ, true, meta,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7213-\t\t\t\t\t known_memory);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7214-\tif (!err \u0026\u0026 (access_type \u0026 BPF_WRITE))\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7215:\t\terr = check_helper_mem_access(env, reg, argno, size, BPF_WRITE, true, meta,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7216-\t\t\t\t\t known_memory);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=8738=static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8840-\t\tkey_size = meta-\u003emap.ptr-\u003ekey_size;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:8841:\t\terr = check_helper_mem_access(env, reg, argno, key_size, BPF_READ, false, NULL,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8842-\t\t\t\t\t NULL);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8876-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:8877:\t\terr = check_helper_mem_access(env, reg, argno, meta-\u003emap.ptr-\u003evalue_size,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8878-\t\t\t\t\t arg_type \u0026 MEM_WRITE ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8919-\t\tif (arg_type \u0026 MEM_FIXED_SIZE) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:8920:\t\t\terr = check_mem_reg(env, reg, argno_from_reg(regno), fn-\u003earg_size[arg],\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8921-\t\t\t\t\t arg_type \u0026 MEM_WRITE ? BPF_WRITE : BPF_READ, meta, NULL);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8928-\tcase ARG_MEM_SIZE:\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:8929:\t\terr = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg_state(env, regno - 1), reg,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8930-\t\t\t\t\t argno_from_reg(regno - 1), argno,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8934-\tcase ARG_MEM_SIZE_OR_ZERO:\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:8935:\t\terr = check_mem_size_reg(env, reg_state(env, regno - 1), reg,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8936-\t\t\t\t\t argno_from_reg(regno - 1), argno,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=9682=static int btf_check_func_arg_match(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int subprog,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-9749-\t\t\t\treturn ret;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:9750:\t\t\tif (check_mem_reg(env, reg, argno, arg-\u003emem_size, BPF_READ | BPF_WRITE, NULL,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-9751-\t\t\t\t\t NULL))\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=11954=get_kfunc_arg_type(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12069-\t\t * Otherwise this is a fixed-size memory buffer supported by\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:12070:\t\t * check_helper_mem_access(): a pointer to a scalar or a struct of\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-12071-\t\t * scalars. The access size is derived from the pointed-to BTF type.\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=12687=static int check_kfunc_args(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13169-\t\t\t\t}\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13170:\t\t\t\tret = check_mem_reg(env, reg, argno, type_size, BPF_READ | BPF_WRITE,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13171-\t\t\t\t\t\t meta, \u0026known_memory);\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13224-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13225:\t\t\tret = check_mem_size_reg(env, buff_reg, size_reg, buff_argno, argno,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13226-\t\t\t\t\t\t BPF_READ | BPF_WRITE, true, meta, \u0026failure);\n"
} |
| 105/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 66993 output: 37 thoughts: 140 Thoughts: **Analyzing Potential BPF Read/Write Vulnerabilities** Okay, so I'm digging into this BPF verifier code again. I'm focusing on lines 13224-13226 in `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`. Specifically, I see this call to `check_mem_size_reg`: `ret = check_mem_size_reg(env, buff_reg, size_reg, buff_argno, argno, BPF_READ | BPF_WRITE, true, meta, &failure);`. Hold on a minute... `BPF_READ | BPF_WRITE`? Interesting. That's a potential area for some serious analysis. My immediate thought is, what's happening within `check_helper_mem_access` when this `BPF_READ` flag comes into play? We need to understand how the read access is being handled in conjunction with the write. To get a handle on this potential risk, I'll need to go directly to the source. Let's dive right into `check_helper_mem_access` within `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`. Time to see how the verifier handles this. |
| 106/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 7014,
"LineCount": 45
}Results: {
"Contents": "7014:\t\n7015:\tstatic int check_helper_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg,\n7016:\t\t\t\t\t argno_t argno, int access_size,\n7017:\t\t\t\t\t enum bpf_access_type access_type, bool zero_size_allowed,\n7018:\t\t\t\t\t struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta, bool *known_memory)\n7019:\t{\n7020:\t\tstruct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);\n7021:\t\tu32 *max_access;\n7022:\t\n7023:\t\tif (known_memory)\n7024:\t\t\t*known_memory = true;\n7025:\t\n7026:\t\tswitch (base_type(reg-\u003etype)) {\n7027:\t\tcase PTR_TO_PACKET:\n7028:\t\tcase PTR_TO_PACKET_META:\n7029:\t\t\treturn check_packet_access(env, reg, argno, 0, access_size,\n7030:\t\t\t\t\t\t zero_size_allowed);\n7031:\t\tcase PTR_TO_MAP_KEY:\n7032:\t\t\tif (access_type == BPF_WRITE) {\n7033:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"%s cannot write into %s\\n\",\n7034:\t\t\t\t\treg_arg_name(env, argno), reg_type_str(env, reg-\u003etype));\n7035:\t\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n7036:\t\t\t}\n7037:\t\t\treturn check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, 0, access_size,\n7038:\t\t\t\t\t\t reg-\u003emap_ptr-\u003ekey_size, false);\n7039:\t\tcase PTR_TO_MAP_VALUE:\n7040:\t\t\tif (check_map_access_type(env, reg, 0, access_size, access_type))\n7041:\t\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n7042:\t\t\treturn check_map_access(env, reg, argno, 0, access_size,\n7043:\t\t\t\t\t\tzero_size_allowed, ACCESS_HELPER);\n7044:\t\tcase PTR_TO_MEM:\n7045:\t\t\tif (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg-\u003etype)) {\n7046:\t\t\t\tif (access_type == BPF_WRITE) {\n7047:\t\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"%s cannot write into %s\\n\",\n7048:\t\t\t\t\t\treg_arg_name(env, argno), reg_type_str(env, reg-\u003etype));\n7049:\t\t\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n7050:\t\t\t\t}\n7051:\t\t\t}\n7052:\t\t\treturn check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, 0,\n7053:\t\t\t\t\t\t access_size, reg-\u003emem_size,\n7054:\t\t\t\t\t\t zero_size_allowed);\n7055:\t\tcase PTR_TO_BUF:\n7056:\t\t\tif (type_is_rdonly_mem(reg-\u003etype)) {\n7057:\t\t\t\tif (access_type == BPF_WRITE) {\n7058:\t\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"%s cannot write into %s\\n\",\n"
} |
| 107/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 68270 output: 37 thoughts: 25 Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing that thought process, tailored for an expert audience: **Analyzing `PTR_TO_STACK` in `check_helper_mem_access`** Alright, let's dive into the core of this memory access validation. My focus right now is pinpointing how the `PTR_TO_STACK` check functions specifically within the `check_helper_mem_access` routine. I need to understand its role in either allowing or denying access to stack memory. I'm keen to see the exact logic implemented. Is it a simple bounds check? Does it involve some sort of offset calculation? Does it play nicely (or clash) with other memory protections in place? I'm anticipating that understanding the nuances of `PTR_TO_STACK` here is key to solidifying my assessment of this entire function's security. This is where I can really see what the developers have implemented, and anticipate the ramifications. |
| 108/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 7065,
"LineCount": 45
}Results: {
"Contents": "7065:\t\t\t\tmax_access = \u0026env-\u003eprog-\u003eaux-\u003emax_rdwr_access;\n7066:\t\t\t}\n7067:\t\t\treturn check_buffer_access(env, reg, argno, 0,\n7068:\t\t\t\t\t\t access_size, zero_size_allowed,\n7069:\t\t\t\t\t\t max_access);\n7070:\t\tcase PTR_TO_STACK:\n7071:\t\t\treturn check_stack_range_initialized(\n7072:\t\t\t\t\tenv, reg,\n7073:\t\t\t\t\targno, 0, access_size,\n7074:\t\t\t\t\tzero_size_allowed, access_type, meta);\n7075:\t\tcase PTR_TO_BTF_ID:\n7076:\t\t\treturn check_ptr_to_btf_access(env, regs, reg, argno, 0,\n7077:\t\t\t\t\t\t access_size, access_type, -1);\n7078:\t\tcase PTR_TO_CTX:\n7079:\t\t\t/* Only permit reading or writing syscall context using helper calls. */\n7080:\t\t\tif (is_var_ctx_off_allowed(env-\u003eprog)) {\n7081:\t\t\t\tint err = check_mem_region_access(env, reg, argno, 0, access_size, U16_MAX,\n7082:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t zero_size_allowed);\n7083:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n7084:\t\t\t\t\treturn err;\n7085:\t\t\t\tif (env-\u003eprog-\u003eaux-\u003emax_ctx_offset \u003c reg_umax(reg) + access_size)\n7086:\t\t\t\t\tenv-\u003eprog-\u003eaux-\u003emax_ctx_offset = reg_umax(reg) + access_size;\n7087:\t\t\t\treturn 0;\n7088:\t\t\t}\n7089:\t\t\tfallthrough;\n7090:\t\tdefault: /* scalar_value or invalid ptr */\n7091:\t\t\t/* Allow zero-byte read from NULL, regardless of pointer type */\n7092:\t\t\tif (zero_size_allowed \u0026\u0026 access_size == 0 \u0026\u0026\n7093:\t\t\t bpf_register_is_null(reg))\n7094:\t\t\t\treturn 0;\n7095:\t\t\tif (known_memory \u0026\u0026 base_type(reg-\u003etype) != PTR_TO_CTX)\n7096:\t\t\t\t*known_memory = false;\n7097:\t\n7098:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"%s type=%s \", reg_arg_name(env, argno),\n7099:\t\t\t\treg_type_str(env, reg-\u003etype));\n7100:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"expected=%s\\n\", reg_type_str(env, PTR_TO_STACK));\n7101:\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n7102:\t\t}\n7103:\t}\n7104:\t\n7105:\tenum bpf_mem_size_failure {\n7106:\t\tBPF_MEM_SIZE_FAIL_NONE,\n7107:\t\tBPF_MEM_SIZE_FAIL_MEMORY,\n7108:\t\tBPF_MEM_SIZE_FAIL_SIZE,\n7109:\t};\n"
} |
| 109/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 69330 output: 37 thoughts: 21 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this code. **Analyzing `check_stack_range_initialized`** Alright, my focus is now on the `check_stack_range_initialized` function. I need to get a clear picture of what's going on around line 6895. I want to understand how it's being used, what parameters it's taking, and what exactly it is supposed to be doing. My immediate goal is to understand its role in memory management or stack validation, or whatever else is happening in this part of the codebase. I need to figure out its purpose within the wider system and determine its potential impact on performance or security. Let's see what the code says. |
| 110/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 6895,
"LineCount": 55
}Results: {
"Contents": "6895:\tstatic int check_stack_range_initialized(\n6896:\t\t\tstruct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno, int off,\n6897:\t\t\tint access_size, bool zero_size_allowed,\n6898:\t\t\tenum bpf_access_type type, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)\n6899:\t{\n6900:\t\tstruct bpf_func_state *state = bpf_func(env, reg);\n6901:\t\tint err, min_off, max_off, i, j, slot, spi;\n6902:\t\t/* Some accesses can write anything into the stack, others are\n6903:\t\t * read-only.\n6904:\t\t */\n6905:\t\tbool clobber = type == BPF_WRITE;\n6906:\t\t/*\n6907:\t\t * Negative access_size signals global subprog arg check where\n6908:\t\t * STACK_POISON slots are acceptable. static stack liveness\n6909:\t\t * might have determined that subprog doesn't read them,\n6910:\t\t * but BTF based global subprog validation isn't accurate enough.\n6911:\t\t */\n6912:\t\tbool allow_poison = access_size \u003c 0 || clobber;\n6913:\t\t/* The call will initialize the memory; uninitialized stack allowed */\n6914:\t\tbool raw_mode = meta \u0026\u0026 meta-\u003earg_raw_mem.regno == reg_from_argno(argno);\n6915:\t\n6916:\t\taccess_size = abs(access_size);\n6917:\t\n6918:\t\tif (access_size == 0 \u0026\u0026 !zero_size_allowed) {\n6919:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"invalid zero-sized read\\n\");\n6920:\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n6921:\t\t}\n6922:\t\n6923:\t\terr = check_stack_access_within_bounds(env, reg, argno, off, access_size, type);\n6924:\t\tif (err)\n6925:\t\t\treturn err;\n6926:\t\n6927:\t\tif (tnum_is_const(reg-\u003evar_off)) {\n6928:\t\t\tmin_off = max_off = reg-\u003evar_off.value + off;\n6929:\t\t} else {\n6930:\t\t\t/* Variable offset is prohibited for unprivileged mode for\n6931:\t\t\t * simplicity since it requires corresponding support in\n6932:\t\t\t * Spectre masking for stack ALU.\n6933:\t\t\t * See also retrieve_ptr_limit().\n6934:\t\t\t */\n6935:\t\t\tif (!env-\u003ebypass_spec_v1) {\n6936:\t\t\t\tchar tn_buf[48];\n6937:\t\n6938:\t\t\t\ttnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg-\u003evar_off);\n6939:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"%s variable offset stack access prohibited for !root, var_off=%s\\n\",\n6940:\t\t\t\t\treg_arg_name(env, argno), tn_buf);\n6941:\t\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n6942:\t\t\t}\n6943:\t\t\t/* Only initialized buffer on stack is allowed to be accessed\n6944:\t\t\t * with variable offset. With uninitialized buffer it's hard to\n6945:\t\t\t * guarantee that whole memory is marked as initialized on\n6946:\t\t\t * helper return since specific bounds are unknown what may\n6947:\t\t\t * cause uninitialized stack leaking.\n6948:\t\t\t */\n6949:\t\t\traw_mode = false;\n"
} |
| 111/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 70490 output: 37 thoughts: 17 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person: **Analyzing the Next Step in Stack Range Initialization** Alright, I'm at the point in the code where we're about to delve into `check_stack_range_initialized`. My focus is laser-sharp on what *specifically* is going to happen next within this function. I'm not just idly following control flow; I'm actively anticipating the checks, the comparisons, and the potential outcomes. I'm mentally tracing the memory accesses that are about to occur, projecting the scenarios based on prior function calls and the current state. I need to understand if there are any subtle edge cases in stack initialization which I am not aware of, or if some obscure hardware or software configuration may cause problems. I'm ready to evaluate whether the stack range is what it should be, and to identify how the code handles different initialization states and the possible implications of those states. This is about ensuring robustness, identifying potential vulnerabilities, and confirming our assumptions about memory management are on point. |
| 112/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 6950,
"LineCount": 55
}Results: {
"Contents": "6950:\t\n6951:\t\t\tmin_off = reg_smin(reg) + off;\n6952:\t\t\tmax_off = reg_smax(reg) + off;\n6953:\t\t}\n6954:\t\n6955:\t\tif (raw_mode) {\n6956:\t\t\tmeta-\u003earg_raw_mem.size = access_size;\n6957:\t\t\treturn 0;\n6958:\t\t}\n6959:\t\n6960:\t\tfor (i = min_off; i \u003c max_off + access_size; i++) {\n6961:\t\t\tu8 *stype;\n6962:\t\n6963:\t\t\tslot = -i - 1;\n6964:\t\t\tspi = slot / BPF_REG_SIZE;\n6965:\t\t\tif (state-\u003eallocated_stack \u003c= slot) {\n6966:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"allocated_stack too small\\n\");\n6967:\t\t\t\treturn -EFAULT;\n6968:\t\t\t}\n6969:\t\n6970:\t\t\tstype = \u0026state-\u003estack[spi].slot_type[slot % BPF_REG_SIZE];\n6971:\t\t\tif (*stype == STACK_MISC)\n6972:\t\t\t\tgoto mark;\n6973:\t\t\tif ((*stype == STACK_ZERO) ||\n6974:\t\t\t (*stype == STACK_INVALID \u0026\u0026 env-\u003eallow_uninit_stack)) {\n6975:\t\t\t\tif (clobber) {\n6976:\t\t\t\t\t/* helper can write anything into the stack */\n6977:\t\t\t\t\t*stype = STACK_MISC;\n6978:\t\t\t\t}\n6979:\t\t\t\tgoto mark;\n6980:\t\t\t}\n6981:\t\n6982:\t\t\tif (bpf_is_spilled_reg(\u0026state-\u003estack[spi]) \u0026\u0026\n6983:\t\t\t (state-\u003estack[spi].spilled_ptr.type == SCALAR_VALUE ||\n6984:\t\t\t env-\u003eallow_ptr_leaks)) {\n6985:\t\t\t\tif (clobber) {\n6986:\t\t\t\t\t__mark_reg_unknown(env, \u0026state-\u003estack[spi].spilled_ptr);\n6987:\t\t\t\t\tfor (j = 0; j \u003c BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)\n6988:\t\t\t\t\t\tscrub_spilled_slot(\u0026state-\u003estack[spi].slot_type[j]);\n6989:\t\t\t\t}\n6990:\t\t\t\tgoto mark;\n6991:\t\t\t}\n6992:\t\n6993:\t\t\tif (*stype == STACK_POISON) {\n6994:\t\t\t\tif (allow_poison)\n6995:\t\t\t\t\tgoto mark;\n6996:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"reading from stack %s off %d+%d size %d, slot poisoned by dead code elimination\\n\",\n6997:\t\t\t\t\treg_arg_name(env, argno), min_off, i - min_off, access_size);\n6998:\t\t\t} else if (tnum_is_const(reg-\u003evar_off)) {\n6999:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"invalid read from stack %s off %d+%d size %d\\n\",\n7000:\t\t\t\t\treg_arg_name(env, argno), min_off, i - min_off, access_size);\n7001:\t\t\t} else {\n7002:\t\t\t\tchar tn_buf[48];\n7003:\t\n7004:\t\t\t\ttnum_strn(tn_buf, sizeof(tn_buf), reg-\u003evar_off);\n"
} |
| 113/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 71693 output: 34 thoughts: 77 Thoughts: Here's my thought process, as requested: **Debugging a Potential `raw_mode` Issue in BPF** Okay, so I'm looking at this `raw_mode` flag, and it seems like it's determined by this conditional: `bool raw_mode = meta && meta->arg_raw_mem.regno == reg_from_argno(argno);`. I need to figure out how this `meta->arg_raw_mem` field is actually being populated. That's the crux of this. Without understanding where that memory region is being set, I'm just guessing. Right, so to get a handle on this, the next logical step is to track down where `arg_raw_mem` gets assigned. Grepping is the quickest way to do that. I'll launch a `grep` in the `kernel/bpf/verifier.c` directory (assuming that's where the verifier code lives). That seems like the most likely place based on the function names and related code. Hopefully, that will give me a clear picture of how `meta->arg_raw_mem` is initialized and potentially give me the information I need to understand this `raw_mode` condition. |
| 114/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "arg_raw_mem",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=6895=static int check_stack_range_initialized(\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6913-\t/* The call will initialize the memory; uninitialized stack allowed */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:6914:\tbool raw_mode = meta \u0026\u0026 meta-\u003earg_raw_mem.regno == reg_from_argno(argno);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6915-\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6955-\tif (raw_mode) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:6956:\t\tmeta-\u003earg_raw_mem.size = access_size;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-6957-\t\treturn 0;\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=8738=static int check_func_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, u32 arg,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8874-\t\t meta-\u003emap.ptr-\u003emap_type == BPF_MAP_TYPE_BLOOM_FILTER)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:8875:\t\t\tmeta-\u003earg_raw_mem.regno = 0;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-8876-\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=9260=static bool check_raw_mode_ok(const struct bpf_func_proto *fn, struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-9268-\t\t\tcontinue;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:9269:\t\tif (meta-\u003earg_raw_mem.regno)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-9270-\t\t\treturn false;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:9271:\t\tmeta-\u003earg_raw_mem.regno = i + 1;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-9272-\t}\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=10836=static int check_helper_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-10940-\t */\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:10941:\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c meta.arg_raw_mem.size; i++) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:10942:\t\terr = check_mem_access(env, insn_idx, regs + meta.arg_raw_mem.regno,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:10943:\t\t\t\t argno_from_reg(meta.arg_raw_mem.regno), i, BPF_B,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-10944-\t\t\t\t BPF_WRITE, -1, false, false);\n"
} |
| 115/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 72782 output: 25 thoughts: 1862 Thoughts: **Unraveling the `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` Uninitialization Vulnerability** Okay, so I'm looking at how the BPF verifier handles arguments for kfuncs, specifically `KF_ARG_MEM_SIZE` and the potential for uninitialized stack memory. The initial call is `arg_raw_mem`, which I know is for standard BPF helpers, not kfuncs. Now, I need to check `check_kfunc_args` for kfuncs to see how things are set up. I see `check_kfunc_args` calling `check_mem_size_reg`, and inside that I find `check_mem_size_reg` calling `check_helper_mem_access` with `BPF_READ | BPF_WRITE`. This flags the memory region for both read *and* write access. When `BPF_READ` is in play, it calls `check_stack_range_initialized`. The critical question is, does the verifier correctly consider whether `KF_ARG_MEM_SIZE` enforces a read? I start thinking about `meta->arg_raw_mem.regno` and if it is 0, since it wasn't set by `check_raw_mode_ok` then `raw_mode` is false and unless `env->allow_uninit_stack` is true, the BPF verifier mandates that stack memory passed to `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` must be INITIALIZED if `BPF_READ` is checked. Now, I'm thinking about the implications of the `__uninit` suffix. Does it actually get recognized for `KF_ARG_PTR_TO_MEM`? Let me look back at the `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` function. I can see it is being used with `__uninit` in a couple of places in `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`. I see it's used for `dynptr` (in `check_kfunc_args`!) and for `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes`! Ah-ha! That's it! In `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`, `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` is ONLY used for `dynptr` and `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes`. Okay, but what about `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`? The parameter is named `buf__uninit`! The `is_kfunc_arg_uninit` function is NOT used here. So in `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes`: `if (is_kfunc_arg_uninit(btf, &args[arg])) return -size;` So `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes` returns `-size`. And that informs `record_stack_access_off` that it's a def/write! Now the potential vulnerability really starts to dawn on me. Inside `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`: ```c __bpf_kfunc int bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint(struct page_owner_scan *scan, char *buf__uninit, u32 buf__sz) ``` Even if `stack_depot_snprint` writes only, say, 50 bytes, the verifier will *still* mark the entire `buf` as initialized. It seems to mark all 128 bytes as initialized. If the verifier marks all 128 bytes as initialized, can a BPF program read `buf[50..127]`? If the program allocates `char buf[128];` on its stack (part of the kernel stack for the BPF execution), and a local variable on the BPF stack is uninitialized, it contains uninitialized kernel stack garbage. This means the BPF verifier WILL ALLOW the BPF program to read this potentially uninitialized region. Now the BPF program could copy `buf[50..127]` into a BPF map, or send it to userspace via `bpf_perf_event_output()` or `bpf_ringbuf_output()`! I'm starting to see a serious issue here. I need to be sure. Is the BPF stack zeroed by the kernel/JIT, or does KMSAN catch these uninitialized reads? I must check if KMSAN even instruments BPF or if it reports uninitialized memory in BPF programs! I need to search the kernel codebase for KMSAN and BPF right away. This is potentially a serious uninitialization memory disclosure vulnerability. |
| 116/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | tool | grepper |
0mError:no matches Args: {
"Expression": "kmsan.*bpf|bpf.*kmsan"
}Results: {
"error": "no matches"
} |
| 117/3 | 2026/10/21 19:50 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
1mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 75704 output: 39 thoughts: 34 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Investigating Potential KMSAN Issues in BPF JIT Compilation** Alright, time to dive into this. My immediate thought is to zero in on a potential KMSAN issue. Given my experience, the areas most likely to harbor this kind of memory safety problem related to BPF are going to be where the BPF code is being compiled and executed. Specifically, I'm thinking either directly within the BPF code itself or the interaction with core kernel components. Therefore, I'll start by focusing my search within two key areas. The `kernel/bpf/` directory feels like the obvious starting point; anything related to BPF instruction handling, verification, and helpers could be a vector for KMSAN-related problems. However, based on my past experience with JIT compilers, the area that is likely to be vulnerable would be the JIT compiler itself. So, I will also examine `arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c`, as this file is likely where the BPF instructions are translated into native x86 code. This compilation process can often introduce subtle memory access issues that KMSAN would be able to detect. I'll need to meticulously review the allocation, use, and deallocation of memory within the JIT compilation process, as well as look for off-by-one errors in memory addressing, uninitialized memory reads, and any potential data races. Let's start there and see what we find. |
| 118/3 | 2026/10/21 19:52 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "kmsan",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/",
"arch/x86/net/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/core.c=2418=static unsigned int PROG_NAME(stack_size)(const void *ctx, const struct bpf_insn *insn) \\\n--\nkernel/bpf/core.c-2422-\\\nkernel/bpf/core.c:2423:\tkmsan_unpoison_memory(stack, sizeof(stack)); \\\nkernel/bpf/core.c-2424-\tFP = (u64) (unsigned long) \u0026stack[ARRAY_SIZE(stack)]; \\\n--\nkernel/bpf/core.c=2431=static u64 PROG_NAME_ARGS(stack_size)(u64 r1, u64 r2, u64 r3, u64 r4, u64 r5, \\\n--\nkernel/bpf/core.c-2436-\\\nkernel/bpf/core.c:2437:\tkmsan_unpoison_memory(stack, sizeof(stack)); \\\nkernel/bpf/core.c-2438-\tFP = (u64) (unsigned long) \u0026stack[ARRAY_SIZE(stack)]; \\\n"
} |
| 119/3 | 2026/10/21 19:52 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 76385 output: 23 thoughts: 3083 Thoughts: **Analysis of Potential KMSAN Issues in BPF Iterators and `page_owner` Data Structures**
Okay, so I'm looking at this code and immediately I see a potential area for concern. The initial KMSAN check in `kernel/bpf/core.c` makes me think about JIT, but it's quickly apparent that JITed BPF code isn't instrumented. That's fine, but I need to make sure helpers and kfuncs called from BPF are safe. Those are C code and KMSAN does track memory passed in/out.
Now, let's go back to the rule about NeedsKMSAN. Item 1 is the most relevant: Kernel structures sent to user space where uninitialized fields are possible. That makes me look at `bpf_iter_page_owner_new`. The BPF program allocates `it` on the stack (uninitialized!), casts it to a kernel structure, and *only* initializes `scan.pfn`.
Critically, `bpf_iter_page_owner_next` *returns* a pointer to `kit->scan`, which is part of the original uninitialized struct allocated on the BPF program's stack. Then I see that `page_owner_next_eligible` uses `scan->po_snap` but copies from `page_owner` struct, so I need to check `struct page_owner` and `struct page_owner_scan`.
I need to confirm there's no uninitialized data being passed back to userspace. After looking at the struct definitions closely, `struct page_owner` has *no* padding and is 64 bytes, and `struct page_owner_scan` has 4 bytes of padding at the end. However, `scan` itself is *never* copied to userspace directly!
Next, `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info` might be a potential issue but it initializes the `struct memcg_info` to zero using `{}` so that resolves that potential issue.
Okay, so after examining all of that, it looks like there isn't a *direct* leak of uninitialized data to userspace because the struct passed to user space is zeroed.
|
| 120/3 | 2026/10/21 19:52 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "int kernfs_path_from_node"
}Results: {
"Output": "fs/kernfs/dir.c=65=static struct kernfs_node *kernfs_common_ancestor(struct kernfs_node *a,\n--\nfs/kernfs/dir.c-124- */\nfs/kernfs/dir.c:125:static int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to,\nfs/kernfs/dir.c-126-\t\t\t\t\tstruct kernfs_node *kn_from,\n--\nfs/kernfs/dir.c=190=int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)\n--\nfs/kernfs/dir.c-221- */\nfs/kernfs/dir.c:222:int kernfs_path_from_node(struct kernfs_node *to, struct kernfs_node *from,\nfs/kernfs/dir.c-223-\t\t\t char *buf, size_t buflen)\n--\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h=406=int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen);\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h:407:int kernfs_path_from_node(struct kernfs_node *kn_to, struct kernfs_node *kn_from,\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h-408-\t\t\t char *buf, size_t buflen);\n--\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h=489=static inline int kernfs_name(struct kernfs_node *kn, char *buf, size_t buflen)\n--\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h-491-\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h:492:static inline int kernfs_path_from_node(struct kernfs_node *root_kn,\ninclude/linux/kernfs.h-493-\t\t\t\t\tstruct kernfs_node *kn,\n"
} |
| 121/3 | 2026/10/21 19:52 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 80446 output: 36 thoughts: 27 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, assuming I'm already deep in kernel internals: **Diving into kernfs_path_from_node_locked** Alright, time to crack open `kernfs_path_from_node_locked`. I know where that's located, `fs/kernfs/dir.c`. I'm guessing I'm going to want to understand how a path is constructed within the kernfs subsystem, specifically when a node is already protected by a lock. This probably means I'm troubleshooting an issue where concurrency might be a factor, or I need to understand path retrieval under specific locking conditions. I'm likely interested in how the path is built and what data structures it depends on. Let's see what the function is doing. |
| 122/3 | 2026/10/21 19:52 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "fs/kernfs/dir.c",
"FirstLine": 125,
"LineCount": 50
}Results: {
"Contents": " 125:\tstatic int kernfs_path_from_node_locked(struct kernfs_node *kn_to,\n 126:\t\t\t\t\t\tstruct kernfs_node *kn_from,\n 127:\t\t\t\t\t\tchar *buf, size_t buflen)\n 128:\t{\n 129:\t\tstruct kernfs_node *kn, *common;\n 130:\t\tconst char parent_str[] = \"/..\";\n 131:\t\tsize_t depth_from, depth_to, len = 0;\n 132:\t\tssize_t copied;\n 133:\t\tint i, j;\n 134:\t\n 135:\t\tif (!kn_to)\n 136:\t\t\treturn strscpy(buf, \"(null)\", buflen);\n 137:\t\n 138:\t\tif (!kn_from)\n 139:\t\t\tkn_from = kernfs_root(kn_to)-\u003ekn;\n 140:\t\n 141:\t\tif (kn_from == kn_to)\n 142:\t\t\treturn strscpy(buf, \"/\", buflen);\n 143:\t\n 144:\t\tcommon = kernfs_common_ancestor(kn_from, kn_to);\n 145:\t\tif (WARN_ON(!common))\n 146:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n 147:\t\n 148:\t\tdepth_to = kernfs_depth(common, kn_to);\n 149:\t\tdepth_from = kernfs_depth(common, kn_from);\n 150:\t\n 151:\t\tbuf[0] = '\\0';\n 152:\t\n 153:\t\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c depth_from; i++) {\n 154:\t\t\tcopied = strscpy(buf + len, parent_str, buflen - len);\n 155:\t\t\tif (copied \u003c 0)\n 156:\t\t\t\treturn copied;\n 157:\t\t\tlen += copied;\n 158:\t\t}\n 159:\t\n 160:\t\t/* Calculate how many bytes we need for the rest */\n 161:\t\tfor (i = depth_to - 1; i \u003e= 0; i--) {\n 162:\t\t\tconst char *name;\n 163:\t\n 164:\t\t\tfor (kn = kn_to, j = 0; j \u003c i; j++)\n 165:\t\t\t\tkn = rcu_dereference(kn-\u003e__parent);\n 166:\t\n 167:\t\t\tname = rcu_dereference(kn-\u003ename);\n 168:\t\t\tlen += scnprintf(buf + len, buflen - len, \"/%s\", name);\n 169:\t\t}\n 170:\t\n 171:\t\treturn len;\n 172:\t}\n 173:\t\n 174:\t/**\n"
} |
| 123/3 | 2026/10/21 19:52 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 81422 output: 35 thoughts: 1178 Thoughts: **Analyzing Potential Buffer Overflows in BPF Stack Operations** Okay, let's break this down. First, I noticed a pattern where several functions (`kernfs_path_from_node_locked`, `get_page_memcg_info`, `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info`, and `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`) explicitly NUL-terminate a buffer (`buf`) on error or when no data is written. This is good practice for ensuring string safety. However, `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint` is interesting as it potentially calls `stack_depot_snprint`, which may or may not NUL-terminate. I need to verify that. So, let's examine `stack_trace_snprint`. The loop inside it uses `snprintf`, which *should* always NUL-terminate the string, either at `buf[generated]` if the data fit, or at `buf[size-1]` if it was truncated, which means `buf[0..len]` is a valid NUL-terminated C string. But, what about the *rest* of the buffer? If the buffer is larger than what's written, the untouched part could contain garbage. My immediate thought is: can a BPF program or userspace access that "garbage" data? I have to consider how BPF works. If the buffer is declared on the stack, like `char stack_text[2048]`, can a BPF program read past the written length? The selftest example, with `char stack_text[2048]`, is in the BSS (Block Started by Symbol) section, which is zeroed, so that's safe. However, the critical question is: how big can the BPF stack be? Ah, right, the BPF stack size limit is `MAX_BPF_STACK` = 512 bytes! So, if a BPF program declares, say, `char buf[128]` on the stack and passes it to `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`, what does the BPF verifier allow? The crucial point is this: can a BPF program read past `len`, even if the stack is used? And if the `buf` on the BPF stack *was not* initialized before the function call, what happens? Before the call, stack slots are uninitialized (`STACK_INVALID`). I remember looking at `bpf_kfunc_stack_access_bytes` and `record_stack_access_off`, where uninitialized stack data access is flagged, potentially by returning `-size`. And also saw `liveness.c`, used for dead code elimination and stack slot pruning. But, the verifier has to be doing something during abstract interpretation (`do_check()`). I need to check the code! Let's see where `check_kfunc_call` is in `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`. |
| 124/3 | 2026/10/21 19:52 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "check_kfunc_call",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=13781=static int check_return_code(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int regno, const char *reg_name);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13782-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:13783:static int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-13784-\t\t\t int *insn_idx_p)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=18294=static int do_check_insn(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, bool *do_print_state)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-18366-\t\t\tif (insn-\u003esrc_reg == BPF_PSEUDO_KFUNC_CALL)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:18367:\t\t\t\treturn check_kfunc_call(env, insn, \u0026env-\u003einsn_idx);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-18368-\t\t\treturn check_helper_call(env, insn, \u0026env-\u003einsn_idx);\n"
} |
| 125/3 | 2026/10/21 19:52 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 83577 output: 38 thoughts: 34 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those thoughts, as if they're my own: **Analyzing `check_kfunc_call` in the Kernel BPF Verifier** Alright, time to get my hands dirty and examine the inner workings of `check_kfunc_call` within `kernel/bpf/verifier.c`. My primary interest here, as always, lies in understanding how this function specifically handles two crucial aspects of BPF program execution: the allocation and management of stack slots and, crucially, how return values are handled and verified. I need to refresh my understanding of how the verifier ensures the safety and correctness of these interactions, especially with the complexities added by kfuncs. I need to confirm whether any recent patches have altered this core functionality, or if there is new functionality related to stack slot or return value manipulation. I'm going to pay close attention to the logic flow and any error handling related to stack bounds checking and return value type validation. This is where the magic (or the bugs!) typically hide. I want to see how these checks relate to the overall BPF instruction set and how the verifier's state is updated after each call. Let's see what gems we can find in the code! |
| 126/3 | 2026/10/21 19:53 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 13783,
"LineCount": 60
}Results: {
"Contents": "13783:\tstatic int check_kfunc_call(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_insn *insn,\n13784:\t\t\t\t int *insn_idx_p)\n13785:\t{\n13786:\t\tbool sleepable, rcu_lock, rcu_unlock, preempt_disable, preempt_enable;\n13787:\t\tenum bpf_prog_type prog_type = resolve_prog_type(env-\u003eprog);\n13788:\t\tstruct bpf_reg_state *regs = cur_regs(env);\n13789:\t\tconst char *func_name, *ptr_type_name;\n13790:\t\tconst struct btf_type *t, *ptr_type;\n13791:\t\tstruct bpf_call_arg_meta meta;\n13792:\t\tstruct bpf_insn_aux_data *insn_aux;\n13793:\t\tconst char *operation;\n13794:\t\tint err, insn_idx = *insn_idx_p;\n13795:\t\tu32 i, nargs, ptr_type_id;\n13796:\t\tstruct bpf_kfunc_desc *desc;\n13797:\t\tstruct btf *desc_btf;\n13798:\t\tint id;\n13799:\t\n13800:\t\t/* skip for now, but return error when we find this in fixup_kfunc_call */\n13801:\t\tif (!insn-\u003eimm)\n13802:\t\t\treturn 0;\n13803:\t\n13804:\t\terr = bpf_fetch_kfunc_arg_meta(env, insn-\u003eimm, insn-\u003eoff, \u0026meta);\n13805:\t\tif (err == -EACCES \u0026\u0026 meta.func_name) {\n13806:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"calling kernel function %s is not allowed\\n\", meta.func_name);\n13807:\t\t\toperation = bpf_diag_fmt(env, \"kfunc %s\", meta.func_name);\n13808:\t\t\tbpf_diag_policy(\n13809:\t\t\t\tenv, insn_idx, operation, \"this program cannot call the kfunc\",\n13810:\t\t\t\t\"Use a kfunc allowed for this program type and attach point, or change the program context.\");\n13811:\t\t}\n13812:\t\tif (err)\n13813:\t\t\treturn err;\n13814:\t\tdesc_btf = meta.btf;\n13815:\t\tfunc_name = meta.func_name;\n13816:\t\tinsn_aux = \u0026env-\u003einsn_aux_data[insn_idx];\n13817:\t\n13818:\t\tdesc = find_kfunc_desc(env-\u003eprog, insn-\u003eimm, insn-\u003eoff);\n13819:\t\tif (!desc) {\n13820:\t\t\tverifier_bug(env, \"kfunc descriptor not found for func_id %u\", insn-\u003eimm);\n13821:\t\t\treturn -EFAULT;\n13822:\t\t}\n13823:\t\tmeta.fn = \u0026desc-\u003eproto;\n13824:\t\n13825:\t\tinsn_aux-\u003eis_iter_next = bpf_is_iter_next_kfunc(\u0026meta);\n13826:\t\n13827:\t\tif (!insn-\u003eoff \u0026\u0026\n13828:\t\t (insn-\u003eimm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] ||\n13829:\t\t insn-\u003eimm == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave])) {\n13830:\t\t\tstruct bpf_verifier_state *branch;\n13831:\t\t\tstruct bpf_reg_state *regs;\n13832:\t\n13833:\t\t\tbranch = push_stack(env, env-\u003einsn_idx + 1, env-\u003einsn_idx, false);\n13834:\t\t\tif (IS_ERR(branch)) {\n13835:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"failed to push state for failed lock acquisition\\n\");\n13836:\t\t\t\treturn PTR_ERR(branch);\n13837:\t\t\t}\n13838:\t\n13839:\t\t\tregs = branch-\u003eframe[branch-\u003ecurframe]-\u003eregs;\n13840:\t\n13841:\t\t\t/* Clear r0-r5 registers in forked state */\n13842:\t\t\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++)\n"
} |
| 127/3 | 2026/10/21 19:53 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
1mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 85112 output: 38 thoughts: 31 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those lines of code, as if they were my own internal thought process: **Diving into `check_kfunc_call`** Alright, I'm going to dig into the `check_kfunc_call` function a little deeper now. Specifically, I want to zero in on the area around lines 13900 to 14050. This is where the real meat of the logic probably resides – the part that's actually doing the heavy lifting in determining what's happening with these kernel function calls. I'm hoping to get a clearer picture of how it validates the calls, what potential issues it's looking for, and what context it considers during the evaluation. I need to understand this function's purpose better, how it interfaces with other parts of the system, and what specific checks it performs. Understanding the nuances of this section is going to be key to whatever I'm troubleshooting, or whatever analysis I am trying to perform. I'm expecting some interesting control flow, and hopefully some good clues to what's going on. Let's see what we find. |
| 128/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 13950,
"LineCount": 70
}Results: {
"Contents": "13950:\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_ctx_underflow(\n13951:\t\t\t\t\tenv, insn_idx, func_name, BPF_DIAG_CONTEXT_RCU,\n13952:\t\t\t\t\t\"Remove the extra bpf_rcu_read_unlock() call, or ensure this path first enters an RCU read lock region.\");\n13953:\t\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n13954:\t\t\t}\n13955:\t\t\tenv-\u003ecur_state-\u003eactive_rcu_locks--;\n13956:\t\t\tbpf_diag_record_context(env, insn_idx, BPF_DIAG_CONTEXT_RCU, false,\n13957:\t\t\t\t\t\tenv-\u003ecur_state-\u003eactive_rcu_locks);\n13958:\t\t\tif (!in_rcu_cs(env))\n13959:\t\t\t\tinvalidate_rcu_protected_refs(env);\n13960:\t\t} else if (preempt_disable) {\n13961:\t\t\tenv-\u003ecur_state-\u003eactive_preempt_locks++;\n13962:\t\t\tbpf_diag_record_context(env, insn_idx, BPF_DIAG_CONTEXT_PREEMPT, true,\n13963:\t\t\t\t\t\tenv-\u003ecur_state-\u003eactive_preempt_locks);\n13964:\t\t} else if (preempt_enable) {\n13965:\t\t\tif (env-\u003ecur_state-\u003eactive_preempt_locks == 0) {\n13966:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"unmatched attempt to enable preemption (kernel function %s)\\n\", func_name);\n13967:\t\t\t\tbpf_diag_ctx_underflow(\n13968:\t\t\t\t\tenv, insn_idx, func_name, BPF_DIAG_CONTEXT_PREEMPT,\n13969:\t\t\t\t\t\"Remove the extra bpf_preempt_enable() call, or ensure this path first disables preemption.\");\n13970:\t\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n13971:\t\t\t}\n13972:\t\t\tenv-\u003ecur_state-\u003eactive_preempt_locks--;\n13973:\t\t\tbpf_diag_record_context(env, insn_idx, BPF_DIAG_CONTEXT_PREEMPT, false,\n13974:\t\t\t\t\t\tenv-\u003ecur_state-\u003eactive_preempt_locks);\n13975:\t\t\tif (!in_rcu_cs(env))\n13976:\t\t\t\tinvalidate_rcu_protected_refs(env);\n13977:\t\t}\n13978:\t\n13979:\t\tif (sleepable \u0026\u0026 !in_sleepable_context(env)) {\n13980:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"kernel func %s is sleepable within %s\\n\",\n13981:\t\t\t\tfunc_name, non_sleepable_context_description(env));\n13982:\t\t\toperation = bpf_diag_fmt(env, \"sleepable kfunc %s\", func_name);\n13983:\t\t\tbpf_diag_ctx_forbidden(env, insn_idx, operation,\n13984:\t\t\t\t\"Move the kfunc call outside the critical section, or use a non-sleepable kfunc.\");\n13985:\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n13986:\t\t}\n13987:\t\n13988:\t\tif (in_rbtree_lock_required_cb(env) \u0026\u0026 (rcu_lock || rcu_unlock)) {\n13989:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"Calling bpf_rcu_read_{lock,unlock} in unnecessary rbtree callback\\n\");\n13990:\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n13991:\t\t}\n13992:\t\n13993:\t\tif (is_kfunc_rcu_protected(\u0026meta) \u0026\u0026 !in_rcu_cs(env)) {\n13994:\t\t\tverbose(env, \"kernel func %s requires RCU critical section protection\\n\", func_name);\n13995:\t\t\tbpf_diag_ctx_required(\n13996:\t\t\t\tenv, insn_idx, func_name, BPF_DIAG_CONTEXT_RCU,\n13997:\t\t\t\t\"Call this kfunc between bpf_rcu_read_lock() and bpf_rcu_read_unlock(), keeping all exit paths balanced.\");\n13998:\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n13999:\t\t}\n14000:\t\n14001:\t\t/* In case of release function, we get register number of refcounted\n14002:\t\t * PTR_TO_BTF_ID in bpf_kfunc_arg_meta, do the release now.\n14003:\t\t */\n14004:\t\tif (meta.release_regno) {\n14005:\t\t\terr = release_reg(env, \u0026regs[meta.release_regno], false, !!meta.dynptr.id);\n14006:\t\t\tif (err)\n14007:\t\t\t\treturn err;\n14008:\t\t}\n14009:\t\n14010:\t\tif (is_bpf_list_push_kfunc(meta.func_id) || is_bpf_rbtree_add_kfunc(meta.func_id)) {\n14011:\t\t\tid = regs[BPF_REG_2].id;\n14012:\t\t\tinsn_aux-\u003einsert_off = regs[BPF_REG_2].var_off.value;\n14013:\t\t\tinsn_aux-\u003ekptr_struct_meta = btf_find_struct_meta(meta.arg_btf, meta.arg_btf_id);\n14014:\t\t\tref_convert_owning_non_owning(env, id);\n14015:\t\t}\n14016:\t\n14017:\t\tif (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_throw]) {\n14018:\t\t\tif (!bpf_jit_supports_exceptions()) {\n14019:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"JIT does not support calling kfunc %s#%d\\n\",\n"
} |
| 129/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 86966 output: 38 thoughts: 30 Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, as requested, aimed at an expert audience and in the first person: **Navigating `check_kfunc_call`** Alright, I need to get a deeper understanding of this function's logic, specifically the `check_kfunc_call` function. I should focus my attention on the code within the region around lines 14020 to 14150. That should give me a good chunk of context to understand how the process works. Let me delve in and see what's going on within that range. |
| 130/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 14020,
"LineCount": 80
}Results: {
"Contents": "14020:\t\t\t\t\tfunc_name, meta.func_id);\n14021:\t\t\t\treturn -ENOTSUPP;\n14022:\t\t\t}\n14023:\t\t\tenv-\u003eseen_exception = true;\n14024:\t\n14025:\t\t\t/* In the case of the default callback, the cookie value passed\n14026:\t\t\t * to bpf_throw becomes the return value of the program.\n14027:\t\t\t */\n14028:\t\t\tif (!env-\u003eexception_callback_subprog) {\n14029:\t\t\t\terr = check_return_code(env, BPF_REG_1, \"R1\");\n14030:\t\t\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n14031:\t\t\t\t\treturn err;\n14032:\t\t\t}\n14033:\t\t}\n14034:\t\n14035:\t\tbpf_diag_record_caller_saved(env, regs);\n14036:\t\tbpf_diag_mod_begin(env, \u0026regs[BPF_REG_0], NULL, BPF_DIAG_MOD_WRITE);\n14037:\t\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c CALLER_SAVED_REGS; i++) {\n14038:\t\t\tu32 regno = caller_saved[i];\n14039:\t\n14040:\t\t\tbpf_mark_reg_not_init(env, \u0026regs[regno]);\n14041:\t\t}\n14042:\t\tinvalidate_outgoing_stack_args(env, cur_func(env));\n14043:\t\n14044:\t\t/* Check return type */\n14045:\t\tt = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, meta.func_proto-\u003etype, NULL);\n14046:\t\n14047:\t\tif (is_kfunc_acquire(\u0026meta) \u0026\u0026 !btf_type_is_struct_ptr(meta.btf, t)) {\n14048:\t\t\tif (meta.btf != btf_vmlinux ||\n14049:\t\t\t (!is_bpf_obj_new_kfunc(meta.func_id) \u0026\u0026\n14050:\t\t\t !is_bpf_percpu_obj_new_kfunc(meta.func_id) \u0026\u0026\n14051:\t\t\t !is_bpf_refcount_acquire_kfunc(meta.func_id))) {\n14052:\t\t\t\tverbose(env, \"acquire kernel function does not return PTR_TO_BTF_ID\\n\");\n14053:\t\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n14054:\t\t\t}\n14055:\t\t}\n14056:\t\n14057:\t\tif (btf_type_is_scalar(t)) {\n14058:\t\t\tmark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);\n14059:\t\t\tif (meta.btf == btf_vmlinux \u0026\u0026 (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock] ||\n14060:\t\t\t meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_res_spin_lock_irqsave]))\n14061:\t\t\t\t__mark_reg_const_zero(env, \u0026regs[BPF_REG_0]);\n14062:\t\t} else if (btf_type_is_ptr(t)) {\n14063:\t\t\tptr_type = btf_type_skip_modifiers(desc_btf, t-\u003etype, \u0026ptr_type_id);\n14064:\t\t\terr = check_special_kfunc(env, \u0026meta, regs, insn_aux, ptr_type, desc_btf);\n14065:\t\t\tif (err) {\n14066:\t\t\t\tif (err \u003c 0)\n14067:\t\t\t\t\treturn err;\n14068:\t\t\t} else if (btf_type_is_void(ptr_type)) {\n14069:\t\t\t\t/* kfunc returning 'void *' is equivalent to returning scalar */\n14070:\t\t\t\tmark_reg_unknown(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);\n14071:\t\t\t} else if (!__btf_type_is_struct(ptr_type)) {\n14072:\t\t\t\tif (!meta.ret_mem.found) {\n14073:\t\t\t\t\t__u32 sz;\n14074:\t\n14075:\t\t\t\t\tif (!IS_ERR(btf_resolve_size(desc_btf, ptr_type, \u0026sz))) {\n14076:\t\t\t\t\t\tmeta.ret_mem.found = true;\n14077:\t\t\t\t\t\tmeta.ret_mem.size = sz;\n14078:\t\t\t\t\t\tmeta.r0_rdonly = true;\n14079:\t\t\t\t\t}\n14080:\t\n14081:\t\t\t\t\tif (meta.func_id == special_kfunc_list[KF_bpf_session_cookie])\n14082:\t\t\t\t\t\tmeta.r0_rdonly = false;\n14083:\t\t\t\t}\n14084:\t\t\t\tif (!meta.ret_mem.found) {\n14085:\t\t\t\t\tptr_type_name = btf_name_by_offset(desc_btf,\n14086:\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t\t ptr_type-\u003ename_off);\n14087:\t\t\t\t\tverbose(env,\n14088:\t\t\t\t\t\t\"kernel function %s returns pointer type %s %s is not supported\\n\",\n14089:\t\t\t\t\t\tfunc_name,\n14090:\t\t\t\t\t\tbtf_type_str(ptr_type),\n14091:\t\t\t\t\t\tptr_type_name);\n14092:\t\t\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n14093:\t\t\t\t}\n14094:\t\n14095:\t\t\t\tmark_reg_known_zero(env, regs, BPF_REG_0);\n14096:\t\t\t\tregs[BPF_REG_0].type = PTR_TO_MEM;\n14097:\t\t\t\tregs[BPF_REG_0].mem_size = meta.ret_mem.size;\n14098:\t\n14099:\t\t\t\tif (meta.r0_rdonly)\n"
} |
| 131/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 88747 output: 34 thoughts: 3316 Thoughts: **Analysis of Page Owner Iteration and Memory Safety** Okay, so I've been diving deep into the `page_owner` implementation, specifically focusing on its interaction with BPF and memory safety. The initial concern was around how the iterators and the underlying data structures handle uninitialized memory and potential race conditions. My analysis started by confirming the initialization of fixed-size memory buffers through `check_kfunc_args` and `check_mem_reg`, ensuring `info__uninit` and other similar structures are always properly zeroed before use. The key realization here is that because these are fixed-size structs, the checks mandate that they are valid memory. The zero-initialization performed in various paths of the code (including the `nodata` label) consistently ensures all fields are populated, even if with zero values, so the data is always well-defined. Next, I looked closely at how the BPF iterator `bpf_iter__page_owner` works. Initially, the iterator context `ctx` is zeroed. The important thing to remember is the `v` pointer. If `v` is set in the `page_owner_prog_seq_show` function, then the `ctx.po`, `ctx.pfn`, and `ctx.nid` fields are updated. If `v` is NULL, then the context is zeroed, which is fine because these values are not used in that context. Thus, there are no uninitialized variables being used within the BPF context, depending on how the iterator is set up. Then, I shifted my attention to the `read_page_owner()` function and its interaction with `page_owner_next_eligible()`. A subtle but critical point emerged: the initial value of `scan.pfn` is taken from `*ppos`, which is an external value. I needed to ensure this wasn't abused. The use of `page_owner_next_eligible(&scan)` is critical to the process. The crux of the matter is that *if* `page_owner_next_eligible` encounters a PFN greater than or equal to `max_pfn`, the loop within it does not execute, and it immediately returns `false`. This short-circuits the rest of the logic in `read_page_owner`, exiting the while loop and returning 0. Essentially, the function handles out-of-bounds `ppos` by terminating the loop gracefully. I had to ensure that `scan.po_snap` and `scan.nid` are set, and it's conditional. It's only safe if `!scan->po_snap.handle` is false. This leads to `ext_put_continue`, and `pfn++` is called, so on the next iteration these values are updated if `page_owner_next_eligible` returns `true`. The most critical thing is: If `scan.po_snap.handle` is NULL, those values don't matter, and the loop goes on to the next one. Otherwise, they are initialized from the existing eligible page. Furthermore, `scan.nid` is reliably initialized, as `page_owner_get_nid` always returns a valid int. Finally, I moved into the BPF open-coded iterator implementation with `bpf_iter_page_owner_new` and `bpf_iter_page_owner_next`. I confirmed that `bpf_iter_page_owner_new` initializes `kit->scan.pfn`, but not `kit->scan.po_snap` or `kit->scan.nid`, which requires `bpf_iter_page_owner_next` to make them safe. Importantly, I traced the scenario where `bpf_iter_page_owner_next` returns NULL (at the end of memory), and subsequent calls. Because `kit->scan.pfn++` happens *before* the check of `page_owner_next_eligible`, and the maximum page is already in the scan, no bad memory is read. The subsequent call will return NULL. The BPF verifier enforces that iterator methods must be called after the `_new` function. I also confirmed that even with an uninitialized iterator (on the stack), the BPF verifier is fine. The verifier treats the stack slots as initialized during the BPF verification (`KF_ITER_NEW`). Once the iterator is destroyed, reads of the memory will not be performed because the stack memory will be marked as no longer holding a valid iterator. Overall, this combination ensures memory safety and correct iteration through the page owner data. |
| 132/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "KF_ITER_DESTROY",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=7720=static bool is_iter_kfunc(struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7721-{\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7722:\treturn meta-\u003ekfunc_flags \u0026 (KF_ITER_NEW | KF_ITER_NEXT | KF_ITER_DESTROY);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7723-}\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=7730=static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7731-{\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7732:\treturn meta-\u003ekfunc_flags \u0026 KF_ITER_DESTROY;\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7733-}\n"
} |
| 133/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 93301 output: 37 thoughts: 21 Thoughts: Here's your summary: **Analyzing `is_iter_destroy_kfunc` Stack Slots** Okay, let's dive into the guts of `is_iter_destroy_kfunc`. I need to figure out how the stack slots are being handled in this function. I want to understand their lifecycle – where they're allocated, what data they might hold, and when they're potentially released or overwritten. Given my background, I'm particularly interested in any subtle optimizations or potential pitfalls related to stack usage within this kernel function. Are there any unusual stack frame manipulations I should look for? Are there any potential stack overflows, even if unlikely? I'll probably start by tracing the data flow through the function, looking at the instructions that allocate, write to, and read from the stack. I'll need to pay close attention to the calling conventions and how parameters are passed, as these would typically influence stack slot usage. Furthermore, understanding the scope and lifetime of any local variables is crucial. The ultimate goal is to ascertain the efficiency and safety of this specific function. |
| 134/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "is_iter_destroy_kfunc",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=7725=static bool is_iter_new_kfunc(struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7729-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7730:static bool is_iter_destroy_kfunc(struct bpf_call_arg_meta *meta)\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7731-{\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=7748=static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno, int insn_idx,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7844-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7845:\t\tif (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7846-\t\t\terr = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots);\n"
} |
| 135/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 93842 output: 37 thoughts: 28 Thoughts: Okay, here's my summary, presented as a stream of thought: **Diving into `unmark_stack_slots_iter` in the BPF Verifier** Alright, time to get my hands dirty and understand exactly what's going on with `unmark_stack_slots_iter`. Let's zero in on `kernel/bpf/verifier.c` and that function specifically. I need to refresh my memory on how the stack slot marking works within the BPF verifier. I know it's crucial for tracking potential issues and ensuring that the BPF programs operate safely. I'm hoping to understand how it's used to identify slots that can be safely used after they've been previously allocated or accessed. What criteria are considered here for marking those slots as "unmarked," and what implications does that have downstream in the verification process? Perhaps it deals with freeing up the slots for reuse, or signaling to later checks that the contents are no longer valid. I'm anticipating this is a key piece in ensuring memory safety, preventing leakage of information between programs, and optimizing resource usage. |
| 136/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "unmark_stack_slots_iter",
"PathPrefixes": [
"kernel/bpf/verifier.c"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c=933=static int mark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-975-\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:976:static int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-977-\t\t\t\t struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots)\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c=7748=static int process_iter_arg(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, struct bpf_reg_state *reg, argno_t argno, int insn_idx,\n--\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7845-\t\tif (is_iter_destroy_kfunc(meta)) {\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c:7846:\t\t\terr = unmark_stack_slots_iter(env, reg, nr_slots);\nkernel/bpf/verifier.c-7847-\t\t\tif (err)\n"
} |
| 137/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 94412 output: 36 thoughts: 21 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this code. I'm going to start by examining `unmark_stack_slots_iter`. Let's pinpoint that around line 976, that's where the heart of it is. I need to understand its role within the larger picture, so I'll be looking at how it interacts with the surrounding functions and data structures. What's the context here? Is this part of the garbage collection process, memory management, or something else entirely? The name itself suggests we're dealing with stack slot management, likely involving marking or unmarking, but a thorough analysis is necessary. I'll focus on its purpose, the algorithms it employs, and what data structures it operates on. My expertise allows me to quickly identify potential areas of concern, bottlenecks, or optimizations, but a methodical approach will ensure I don't miss any critical details. Let's get to it. |
| 138/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "kernel/bpf/verifier.c",
"FirstLine": 975,
"LineCount": 25
}Results: {
"Contents": " 975:\t\n 976:\tstatic int unmark_stack_slots_iter(struct bpf_verifier_env *env,\n 977:\t\t\t\t\t struct bpf_reg_state *reg, int nr_slots)\n 978:\t{\n 979:\t\tstruct bpf_func_state *state = bpf_func(env, reg);\n 980:\t\tint spi, i, j;\n 981:\t\n 982:\t\tspi = iter_get_spi(env, reg, nr_slots);\n 983:\t\tif (spi \u003c 0)\n 984:\t\t\treturn spi;\n 985:\t\n 986:\t\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c nr_slots; i++) {\n 987:\t\t\tstruct bpf_stack_state *slot = \u0026state-\u003estack[spi - i];\n 988:\t\t\tstruct bpf_reg_state *st = \u0026slot-\u003espilled_ptr;\n 989:\t\n 990:\t\t\tif (i == 0)\n 991:\t\t\t\tWARN_ON_ONCE(release_reference(env, st-\u003eid));\n 992:\t\n 993:\t\t\tbpf_mark_reg_not_init(env, st);\n 994:\t\n 995:\t\t\tfor (j = 0; j \u003c BPF_REG_SIZE; j++)\n 996:\t\t\t\tslot-\u003eslot_type[j] = STACK_INVALID;\n 997:\t\n 998:\t\t\tmark_stack_slot_scratched(env, spi - i);\n 999:\t\t}\n"
} |
| 139/3 | 2026/10/21 19:54 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 95079 output: 577 thoughts: 3268 Thoughts: **KMSAN Assessment: page_owner BPF Iterator Implementation**
Okay, so I've been digging into this patch, specifically the implementation of the BPF iterator for `page_owner`. I've gone over the code and I'm really trying to make sure there are no uninitialized memory reads or information leaks.
My initial thought was to double-check that `unmark_stack_slots_iter` actually invalidates those stack slots. That seems solid; the verifier would catch any attempt to read them after `destroy`. Great, that's one thing I don't have to worry about anymore.
Now, I checked the kfuncs `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info` and `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`. I have verified that if these kfuncs are used, the output buffers are always properly handled. Specifically, I confirmed that `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info` initializes the `memcg_info` struct and handles cases where the `scan` pointer might be NULL, the buffer size is zero or the `page` is unavailable. This means that if it *doesn't* get valid data, it at least *zeroes* the struct and null-terminates the string buffer. The same is true for `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint`; it either returns zero if the buffer is bad or null-terminates the string. The fact that the logic handles null or zero-sized buffers is great. I also confirmed that both `memcg_info` and the output string buffers are initialized appropriately.
Then I checked the `nid` field in the `scan` structure, making sure it's always initialized before being used, especially in relation to the node filter. I've re-read the code for `skip_buddy_pages`, and it's being handled in the new code as well as in the previous code. That's good.
Next, I followed the `scan->pfn` logic and ensured it's incrementing properly in all the iterator functions (`page_owner_seq_next`, `bpf_iter_page_owner_next`). I traced how the initial value is set, and how it is advanced in the iterator logic. This is also solid. The incrementing happens correctly in all the iterator functions.
Now, the important part. Could this code *possibly* expose uninitialized memory to user space? I reread the KMSAN criteria very carefully.
I went line-by-line and confirmed that there are no uninitialized kernel data structures sent to userspace. In `read_page_owner`, the output buffer is filled with formatted strings, with length checks, and the `kbuf` is fully initialized. The `ctx` in the seq file iterator is initialized with `= {}`. The open-coded iterator passes `&kit->scan`, but everything in `scan` is populated properly. `memcg_info` is always zeroed out. The string buffers are always nul-terminated.
There's no conditional logic that depends on uninitialized variables. The `scan->pfn` is always initialized. The other struct fields are always valid because they come directly from the kernel's own page metadata.
There are no allocations or initializations of complex data structures with uninitialized fields. `struct memcg_info` and `bpf_iter__page_owner` are zero-initialized.
The code avoids uninitialized bytes due to bounds issues. Lengths are checked. String formatting uses the provided buffer size and so on.
Now, if KMSAN isn't the right tool, then what are the possible bugs? I think that this patch is more vulnerable to concurrency problems (hotplug, data races on page_ext or page_owner), BPF verifier issues, and format string or buffer overflow problems. But all of *those* are areas where KASAN, LOCKDEP, and standard kernel checks excel. KMSAN isn't really the right tool for those things. The structures are initialized, the code has been carefully reviewed, and there's no way to read uninitialized memory. Therefore, I believe the KMSAN flag should be false.
Let's summarize this:
1. This patch is introducing BPF iterator support.
2. I've verified that all the data structures are initialized.
* `memcg_info` is properly zeroed.
* `page_owner_scan` is fully populated.
* String buffers are handled and null-terminated.
3. The main risks are not uninitialized memory bugs, but instead concurrency problems, kfunc-related errors and buffer/format string problems. Those are what KASAN and standard kernel debug facilities are for, not KMSAN.
So, I'm confident in saying `
|
| 140/3 | 2026/10/21 19:55 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch series adds BPF iterator support for page_owner (both seq_file and open-coded iterators via kfuncs: bpf_iter_page_owner_new/next/destroy, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, and bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info), refactoring mm/page_owner.c to extract page_owner_next_eligible() and get_page_memcg_info().\n\nAnalysis of memory initialization and user-space exposure:\n1. `struct memcg_info`: Unconditionally zero-initialized via compound literal assignment `*info = (struct memcg_info){};` at the very beginning of `get_page_memcg_info()` and in error fallbacks. No padding or uninitialized fields can leak.\n2. `struct page_owner_scan`: Holds cursor state `pfn` (initialized before scan) and snapshot fields `po_snap` and `nid`. `page_owner_next_eligible()` populates all snapshot fields before returning true; on false, neither the iterator nor `read_page_owner()` consumes the uninitialized fields.\n3. `struct bpf_iter__page_owner ctx`: Zero-initialized via `= {}` before passing to BPF programs.\n4. Buffers in kfuncs (`buf__uninit`): Both `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint()` and `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info()` guarantee NUL-termination (`buf[0] = '\\0'`) on empty or error paths, and bounded string formatting (`stack_depot_snprint()`, `cgroup_path()`) on success.\n5. `read_page_owner()`: Allocates `kbuf`, populates it with `scnprintf`/`snprintf`, and copies to user space strictly using the returned character count `ret`.\n\nContrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability:\nThe primary risks in these changes relate to memory hotplug concurrency (e.g. holding get_online_mems() while resolving PFN to online page), RCU safety when accessing page_ext and cgroup objects, sleepable kfunc synchronization, and buffer boundary checks. These failure modes (use-after-free, NULL pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds access, locking bugs) are reliably detected by standard KASAN and LOCKDEP configurations. Because all stack and heap structures are thoroughly zeroed and initialized before being read or copied, there is no risk of uninitialized memory reads or information leaks that would require KMSAN.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
}Results: {
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch series adds BPF iterator support for page_owner (both seq_file and open-coded iterators via kfuncs: bpf_iter_page_owner_new/next/destroy, bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint, and bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info), refactoring mm/page_owner.c to extract page_owner_next_eligible() and get_page_memcg_info().\n\nAnalysis of memory initialization and user-space exposure:\n1. `struct memcg_info`: Unconditionally zero-initialized via compound literal assignment `*info = (struct memcg_info){};` at the very beginning of `get_page_memcg_info()` and in error fallbacks. No padding or uninitialized fields can leak.\n2. `struct page_owner_scan`: Holds cursor state `pfn` (initialized before scan) and snapshot fields `po_snap` and `nid`. `page_owner_next_eligible()` populates all snapshot fields before returning true; on false, neither the iterator nor `read_page_owner()` consumes the uninitialized fields.\n3. `struct bpf_iter__page_owner ctx`: Zero-initialized via `= {}` before passing to BPF programs.\n4. Buffers in kfuncs (`buf__uninit`): Both `bpf_page_owner_stack_snprint()` and `bpf_page_owner_get_memcg_info()` guarantee NUL-termination (`buf[0] = '\\0'`) on empty or error paths, and bounded string formatting (`stack_depot_snprint()`, `cgroup_path()`) on success.\n5. `read_page_owner()`: Allocates `kbuf`, populates it with `scnprintf`/`snprintf`, and copies to user space strictly using the returned character count `ret`.\n\nContrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability:\nThe primary risks in these changes relate to memory hotplug concurrency (e.g. holding get_online_mems() while resolving PFN to online page), RCU safety when accessing page_ext and cgroup objects, sleepable kfunc synchronization, and buffer boundary checks. These failure modes (use-after-free, NULL pointer dereferences, out-of-bounds access, locking bugs) are reliably detected by standard KASAN and LOCKDEP configurations. Because all stack and heap structures are thoroughly zeroed and initialized before being read or copied, there is no risk of uninitialized memory reads or information leaks that would require KMSAN.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
} |
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| Total Calls | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
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