| Seq | Timestamp | Type | Name | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0/0 | 2026/10/07 02:38 | flow | finding-triage |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"Introduced": false,
"Reasoning": "The crash report indicates hung tasks (`task blocked for more than 143 seconds`) in the XFS filesystem layer. Multiple tasks are blocked on XFS locks and log grant head space reservations (`xfs_ilock`, `xlog_grant_head_wait`, `down_write` in `vfs_utimes`) during concurrent XFS operations (`xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata`, `vfs_setxattr`, `vfs_mkdir`).\n\nThe patch series being tested modifies only the x86 FPU subsystem (`arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h`) to address kernel address leaks via `fninit` on AMD CPUs with `X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK`. It does not touch filesystem code, locking primitives, or any code paths in the stack trace. The hung task in XFS is unrelated to the tested patch series."
} |
| 1/1 | 2026/10/07 02:38 | action | prepare-finding-overview |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"DiffStat": "arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 14 --------------\n arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++\n arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h | 14 ++++++++++++++\n arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h | 5 +++++\n 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)",
"HasCover": false,
"PatchCount": 1,
"PatchList": "The patch series contains 1 patch:\n[1] [PATCH] x86/fpu: Avoid kernel-address leaks in the FXSAVE workaround"
} |
| 2/1 | 2026/10/07 02:38 | agent | finding-triage-evaluator |
0mModel:core Args: null Results: {
"Introduced": false,
"Reasoning": "The crash report indicates hung tasks (`task blocked for more than 143 seconds`) in the XFS filesystem layer. Multiple tasks are blocked on XFS locks and log grant head space reservations (`xfs_ilock`, `xlog_grant_head_wait`, `down_write` in `vfs_utimes`) during concurrent XFS operations (`xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata`, `vfs_setxattr`, `vfs_mkdir`).\n\nThe patch series being tested modifies only the x86 FPU subsystem (`arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h`) to address kernel address leaks via `fninit` on AMD CPUs with `X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK`. It does not touch filesystem code, locking primitives, or any code paths in the stack trace. The hung task in XFS is unrelated to the tested patch series."
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer specializing
in crash triage and root-cause analysis.
Your job is to review a kernel crash report (finding) and determine if it was introduced / caused
by the patch series being tested, or if it is a pre-existing / unrelated bug.
IMPORTANT: The entire patch series has ALREADY been applied and committed as a single squashed commit
at HEAD (or on top of the base commit) in your workspace.
Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively use your tools to examine
the source code, inspect workspace diffs, and confirm any assumptions.
Available Tools:
- git-show: View the squashed patch series commit or historical commits. Call with Commit="HEAD" (default)
and optional 'File' parameter to restrict the diff to a specific file or directory, or 'Stat=true' for a diffstat.
- series-patches: Browse the original patch series. Call without arguments to list all patch titles,
or PatchNum=<N> to view the full description and diff of a specific patch (or cover letter, if present).
- read-file & codesearch-dir-index: Read exact source code files and directory contents in the workspace.
- grepper: Regex search across files in the workspace (git grep).
- git-blame: Inspect line authorship and find which commit last modified specific lines of code.
Triage Procedure:
1. Analyze the Crash Report:
- Identify the crash type (e.g. NULL dereference, KASAN use-after-free, out-of-bounds read/write,
assertion failure, deadlock).
- Carefully examine the stack trace(s) — both the faulting call stack and, if applicable (e.g., KASAN UAF),
the allocation and free stacks.
- Note the faulting function, file name, line numbers, and the specific variables or data structures involved.
2. Inspect Workspace Changes & Patch Series:
- Check if any files or functions from the stack trace appear in the modified files overview or the patch series.
- Use git-show with Commit="HEAD" and 'File' to inspect the exact diffs for relevant files
in the squashed commit.
- If needed, use series-patches with PatchNum=<N> to inspect the author's commit description
and rationale for individual patches in the series.
- Use read-file to inspect the actual source code at the faulting lines.
3. Determine Causality:
- Set Introduced=true ONLY IF you are absolutely certain:
* There is clear, unambiguous, and conclusive evidence that the crash was directly introduced
or caused by the patch series.
* The crash occurs directly in new or modified code introduced by the patch series, or the patch series
altered data structures, locking, object lifetimes, or preconditions in a way that directly
triggered the failure in existing code.
- Set Introduced=false IF:
* There is any doubt, ambiguity, or lack of conclusive proof that the patch series caused the bug.
* The crash occurs in an unrelated subsystem or unmodified code path whose behavior is independent
of the patch series.
* The crash is a pre-existing kernel issue that was randomly triggered during fuzzing.
4. Formulate Output:
- Set Introduced to true or false.
- In Reasoning, provide a clear, step-by-step technical explanation detailing the crash type,
the key stack frames, whether the affected code/structures were modified by the patch series,
and the causal justification for your verdict.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Target architecture: amd64
The kernel crash report to triage is:
INFO: task syz.7.322:7429 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Tainted: G L syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz.7.322 state:D stack:23328 pid:7429 tgid:7428 ppid:7022 task_flags:0x440140 flags:0x00080002
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x17db/0x58f0
schedule+0x164/0x2b0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x30
rwsem_down_read_slowpath+0x6ba/0x920
down_read_nested+0x9e/0x330
xfs_ilock+0x109/0x380
xchk_nlinks_collect_dir+0x63/0x3b0
xchk_nlinks_collect+0x194/0x510
xchk_nlinks+0xc1/0x2a0
xfs_scrub_metadata+0xbe3/0x1910
xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata+0x7ac/0xb70
xfs_file_ioctl+0x916/0x1590
__se_sys_ioctl+0xfc/0x170
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1421b9e199
RSP: 002b:00007f1422a13028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1421e25fa0 RCX: 00007f1421b9e199
RDX: 0000200000000240 RSI: 00000000c0285840 RDI: 0000000000000006
RBP: 00007f1421c350b8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f1421e26038 R14: 00007f1421e25fa0 R15: 00007ffcdb3eb9e8
</TASK>
INFO: task syz.7.322:7501 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Tainted: G L syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz.7.322 state:D stack:26616 pid:7501 tgid:7428 ppid:7022 task_flags:0x440140 flags:0x00080002
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x17db/0x58f0
schedule+0x164/0x2b0
xlog_grant_head_wait+0x441/0xa00
xlog_grant_head_check+0x286/0x420
xfs_log_reserve+0x2bc/0x780
xfs_trans_alloc+0x28a/0x990
xfs_trans_alloc_inode+0x141/0x4a0
xfs_attr_set+0x7f3/0x13e0
xfs_xattr_set+0x188/0x2a0
__vfs_setxattr+0x442/0x480
__vfs_setxattr_noperm+0x12a/0x660
vfs_setxattr+0x163/0x360
filename_setxattr+0x296/0x630
path_setxattrat+0x408/0x450
__x64_sys_setxattr+0xbc/0xe0
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1421b9e199
RSP: 002b:00007f14229f2028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000bc
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1421e26090 RCX: 00007f1421b9e199
RDX: 0000200000000b40 RSI: 0000200000000000 RDI: 0000200000000180
RBP: 00007f1421c350b8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 000000000000fe1c R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f1421e26128 R14: 00007f1421e26090 R15: 00007ffcdb3eb9e8
</TASK>
INFO: task syz.7.322:7507 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Tainted: G L syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz.7.322 state:D stack:28680 pid:7507 tgid:7428 ppid:7022 task_flags:0x400040 flags:0x00080002
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x17db/0x58f0
schedule+0x164/0x2b0
schedule_preempt_disabled+0x13/0x30
rwsem_down_write_slowpath+0x87d/0x1080
down_write+0x1bc/0x200
vfs_utimes+0x3f4/0x650
do_utimes+0x1ba/0x2c0
__x64_sys_utime+0x138/0x200
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1421b9e199
RSP: 002b:00007f14229d1028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000084
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f1421e26180 RCX: 00007f1421b9e199
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000200000000140
RBP: 00007f1421c350b8 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f1421e26218 R14: 00007f1421e26180 R15: 00007ffcdb3eb9e8
</TASK>
INFO: task syz.7.322:7511 blocked for more than 143 seconds.
Tainted: G L syzkaller #0
"echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/hung_task_timeout_secs" disables this message.
task:syz.7.322 state:D stack:27136 pid:7511 tgid:7428 ppid:7022 task_flags:0x440040 flags:0x00080002
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__schedule+0x17db/0x58f0
schedule+0x164/0x2b0
xlog_grant_head_wait+0x441/0xa00
xlog_grant_head_check+0x286/0x420
xfs_log_reserve+0x2bc/0x780
xfs_trans_alloc+0x28a/0x990
xfs_trans_alloc_icreate+0x59/0x260
xfs_create+0x523/0xa60
xfs_generic_create+0x410/0xb30
xfs_vn_mkdir+0x31/0x40
vfs_mkdir+0x40c/0x620
filename_mkdirat+0x285/0x510
__se_sys_mkdirat+0x35/0x150
do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f1421b9d007
RSP: 002b:00007f14229afe58 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000102
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f14229afee0 RCX: 00007f1421b9d007
RDX: 00000000000001ff RSI: 0000200000000280 RDI: 00000000ffffff9c
RBP: 0000200000000040 R08: 00002000000007c0 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000200000000040 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000200000000280
R13: 00007f14229afea0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
</TASK>
Showing all locks held in the system:
locks held by kworker/0:1/10: 5, last CPU#0:
#0: ffff888104ec7540 ((wq_completion)usb_hub_wq){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x97a/0x1630
#1: ffffc900000f7c40 ((work_completion)(&hub->events)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x97a/0x1630
#2: ffff88810d43c1d8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: hub_event+0x184/0x4d30
#3: ffff888104ab11d8 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x88/0x450
#4: ffff888104ab21a0 (&dev->mutex){....}-{4:4}, at: __device_attach+0x88/0x450
locks held by pr/ttyS0/16: 2, last CPU#0:
#0: ffffffff8ec36498 (console_srcu){....}-{0:0}, at: console_srcu_read_lock+0x30/0x60
#1: ffffffff9ad452f8 (&port_lock_key){-...}-{3:3}, at: univ8250_console_device_lock+0x67/0xc0
locks held by khungtaskd/36: 1, last CPU#1:
#0: ffffffff8ed5c860 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: debug_show_all_locks+0x2e/0x180
locks held by udevd/5041: 1, last CPU#0:
#0: ffffffff8ed5c860 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: sock_def_readable+0xae/0x550
locks held by getty/5420: 2, on CPU#1:
#0: ffff888118dc30a0 (&tty->ldisc_sem){++++}-{0:0}, at: tty_ldisc_ref_wait+0x25/0x70
#1: ffffc900034762e8 (&ldata->atomic_read_lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: n_tty_read+0x45a/0x1360
locks held by kworker/1:3/5653: 3, on CPU#1:
#0: ffff88810006b140 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x97a/0x1630
#1: ffffc90004fb7c40 ((work_completion)(&helper->damage_work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x97a/0x1630
#2: ffff888103b9aa70 (&helper->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: drm_fb_helper_damage_work+0x15b/0xf20
locks held by kworker/1:4/5667: 2, on CPU#1:
#0: ffff8881b7bd5140 ((wq_completion)xfs-sync/loop7){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x97a/0x1630
#1: ffffc9000621fc40 ((work_completion)(&(&log->l_work)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x97a/0x1630
locks held by syz.7.322/7429: 2, on CPU#1:
#0: ffff8881be096460 (sb_writers#28){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write_file+0x60/0x200
#1: ffff88802ac88a90 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key){++++}-{4:4}, at: xfs_ilock+0x109/0x380
locks held by syz.7.322/7501: 3, on CPU#0:
#0: ffff8881be096460 (sb_writers#28){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90
#1: ffff88802ac88a90 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key){++++}-{4:4}, at: vfs_setxattr+0x13e/0x360
#2: ffff8881be096650 (sb_internal#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: xfs_trans_alloc+0xcf/0x990
locks held by syz.7.322/7507: 2, on CPU#1:
#0: ffff8881be096460 (sb_writers#28){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90
#1: ffff88802ac88a90 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key){++++}-{4:4}, at: vfs_utimes+0x3f4/0x650
locks held by syz.7.322/7511: 3, on CPU#1:
#0: ffff8881be096460 (sb_writers#28){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: mnt_want_write+0x41/0x90
#1: ffff8881a5db1210 (&inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key/1){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: filename_create+0x200/0x370
#2: ffff8881be096650 (sb_internal#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: xfs_trans_alloc+0xcf/0x990
locks held by syz-executor/9619: 1, last CPU#0:
#0: ffffffff8ed5c860 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:3}, at: path_init+0x124/0x1330
locks held by kworker/1:9/10128: 8, last CPU#1:
#0: ffff88810006b140 ((wq_completion)events){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x97a/0x1630
#1: ffffc9000356fc40 (console_work){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x97a/0x1630
#2: ffffffff8ed4ec00 (console_lock){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: console_callback+0x69/0x450
#3: ffff888103b9aa70 (&helper->lock){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: drm_fb_helper_pan_display+0xbe/0xbe0
#4: ffff8881694dc128 (&dev->master_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: drm_master_internal_acquire+0x20/0x80
#5: ffff888103b9a890 (&client->modeset_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: drm_client_modeset_commit_locked+0x4c/0x4d0
#6: ffffc9000356f450 (crtc_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x11a/0x7e0
#7: ffffc9000356f478 (crtc_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: drm_client_modeset_commit_atomic+0x11a/0x7e0
=============================================
NMI backtrace for cpu 1
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 36 Comm: khungtaskd Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xe8/0x150
nmi_cpu_backtrace+0x274/0x2d0
nmi_trigger_cpumask_backtrace+0x17d/0x390
sys_info+0x135/0x170
watchdog+0xfd7/0x1030
kthread+0x38b/0x480
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 16 Comm: pr/ttyS0 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full)
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:io_serial_out+0x7c/0xc0
Code: 59 54 fc 44 89 f9 d3 e5 49 83 c6 40 4c 89 f0 48 c1 e8 03 42 80 3c 20 00 74 08 4c 89 f7 e8 ac 6e c4 fc 41 03 2e 89 d8 89 ea ee <5b> 41 5c 41 5e 41 5f 5d c3 cc cc cc cc cc 44 89 f9 80 e1 07 38 c1
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000157900 EFLAGS: 00000002
RAX: 0000000000000068 RBX: 0000000000000068 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: 00000000000003f8 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000020
RBP: 00000000000003f8 R08: 0000000000000003 R09: 0000000000000004
R10: dffffc0000000000 R11: ffffffff8573b4a0 R12: dffffc0000000000
R13: 0000000000000068 R14: ffffffff9ad45320 R15: 0000000000000000
FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff88818d6c6000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00005555643b44e8 CR3: 00000001bf708000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
Call Trace:
<TASK>
__serial8250_console_fifo_write+0x1e6/0x3e0
serial8250_console_write+0xa7e/0x1200
nbcon_emit_next_record+0xef5/0x1a90
nbcon_kthread_func+0x679/0x880
kthread+0x38b/0x480
ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
</TASK>
Overview of modified files in the workspace:
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 14 --------------
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h | 14 ++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h | 5 +++++
4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
The patch series contains 1 patch:
[1] [PATCH] x86/fpu: Avoid kernel-address leaks in the FXSAVE workaround
|
| 3/2 | 2026/10/07 02:38 | llm | finding-triage-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 9186 output: 10 thoughts: 574 Thoughts: **Analyzing a Kernel Crash Report - My Initial Thoughts** Okay, so I've been given a kernel crash report and I need to figure out what's happening. The report indicates a "hung task timeout" – a task, specifically `syz.7.322:7429`, has been blocked for over 143 seconds. That's a red flag, and the report goes on to reveal that multiple tasks are blocked within XFS operations. This narrows things down significantly; XFS is the likely culprit. Looking deeper, task 7429, the initially hung task, is caught in a recursive call stack within the XFS code, touching `xfs_ilock`, `xchk_nlinks_collect_dir`, `xchk_nlinks_collect`, `xchk_nlinks`, `xfs_scrub_metadata`, and finally `xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata`. This suggests a metadata scrubbing operation is blocked, perhaps waiting on a resource held by another task. Other tasks are also blocked, which is a symptom of some deeper problem. Task 7501 appears to be stuck in a transaction allocation flow, specifically within the log reservation process (xlog_grant_head_wait, xfs_log_reserve, xfs_trans_alloc), and related inode creation and attribute setting. This, coupled with 7507, blocked on a write semaphore, in the context of `vfs_utimes`. And 7511, stuck allocating a transaction and icreating, is also an indicator. Given their commonalities in XFS log-related calls, this further points towards a logging or transaction management issue, which is probably locking related. Now, the interesting part: I've also been given the list of files modified in the workspace. It's a patch series involving the x86 FPU code – `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h`, and `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h`. This raises my eyebrows. While the patch title mentions preventing kernel address leaks in an FXSAVE workaround, I need to understand if there is a cross-talk between this code and XFS. While I don't see an obvious connection, it's worth exploring if some subtle interaction between FPU state handling and the XFS code path could be causing this. Perhaps the FPU state is not being handled correctly in some interrupt context, and it's leading to some unexpected behavior in XFS that causes deadlocks. This is a very likely explanation. My next step is to examine the patch itself. I'll use `git show` or `series-patches` to analyze the code changes. I need to understand the details of the "FXSAVE workaround" and see if there are any subtle interactions that might have introduced a regression within XFS. I will be looking closely at the locking or interrupt contexts and all code paths. The crash report provides the symptoms, the patch gives me the possible cause. Let's dig in. |
| 4/2 | 2026/10/07 02:39 | tool | git-show |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"Output": "commit 1110700cad4b61e610863cc015dff322170ae59a\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate: Wed Oct 7 02:38:45 2026 +0000\n\n syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c\nindex d1aeecd57f5ed..9113f55b80d87 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c\n+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c\n@@ -161,20 +161,6 @@ void save_fpregs_to_fpstate(struct fpu *fpu)\n \n void restore_fpregs_from_fpstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 mask)\n {\n-\t/*\n-\t * AMD K7/K8 and later CPUs up to Zen don't save/restore\n-\t * FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception is pending. Clear the x87 state\n-\t * here by setting it to fixed values. \"m\" is a random variable\n-\t * that should be in L1.\n-\t */\n-\tif (unlikely(static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK))) {\n-\t\tasm volatile(\n-\t\t\t\"fnclex\\n\\t\"\n-\t\t\t\"emms\\n\\t\"\n-\t\t\t\"fildl %[addr]\"\t/* set F?P to defined value */\n-\t\t\t: : [addr] \"m\" (*fpstate));\n-\t}\n-\n \tif (use_xsave()) {\n \t\t/*\n \t\t * Dynamically enabled features are enabled in XCR0, but\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h\nindex 975de070c9c98..3b4d178edc31d 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h\n@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@\n #ifndef __X86_KERNEL_FPU_INTERNAL_H\n #define __X86_KERNEL_FPU_INTERNAL_H\n \n+#include \u003casm/cpufeature.h\u003e\n+#include \u003casm/fpu/types.h\u003e\n+\n extern struct fpstate init_fpstate;\n \n /* CPU feature check wrappers */\n@@ -15,6 +18,22 @@ static __always_inline __pure bool use_fxsr(void)\n \treturn cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FXSR);\n }\n \n+/*\n+ * AMD CPUs without XSaveErPtr may leave FDP/FIP/FOP unchanged on restore\n+ * when no x87 exception is pending. Using an x87 load to overwrite them\n+ * leaks the kernel instruction and operand addresses through FNSTENV.\n+ *\n+ * FNINIT clears the pointers without recording any new ones. Only do this\n+ * when the x87 state is about to be replaced; a partial XRSTOR must leave\n+ * unrequested components alone.\n+ */\n+static inline void fpregs_restore_prepare(u64 mask)\n+{\n+\tif (unlikely(static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK)) \u0026\u0026\n+\t (mask \u0026 XFEATURE_MASK_FP))\n+\t\tasm volatile(\"fninit\");\n+}\n+\n #ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU\n # define WARN_ON_FPU(x) WARN_ON_ONCE(x)\n #else\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h\nindex 098f367bb8a72..fe825c9a00c75 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h\n@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@\n \n #include \u003casm/fpu/types.h\u003e\n \n+#include \"internal.h\"\n+\n extern unsigned int mxcsr_feature_mask;\n \n static inline void ldmxcsr(u32 mxcsr)\n@@ -63,6 +65,8 @@ static inline int fxsave_to_user_sigframe(struct fxregs_state __user *fx)\n \n static inline void fxrstor(struct fxregs_state *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \tif (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))\n \t\tkernel_insn(fxrstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n \telse\n@@ -71,6 +75,8 @@ static inline void fxrstor(struct fxregs_state *fx)\n \n static inline int fxrstor_safe(struct fxregs_state *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \tif (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))\n \t\treturn kernel_insn_err(fxrstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n \telse\n@@ -79,6 +85,8 @@ static inline int fxrstor_safe(struct fxregs_state *fx)\n \n static inline int fxrstor_from_user_sigframe(struct fxregs_state __user *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \tif (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))\n \t\treturn user_insn(fxrstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n \telse\n@@ -87,16 +95,22 @@ static inline int fxrstor_from_user_sigframe(struct fxregs_state __user *fx)\n \n static inline void frstor(struct fregs_state *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \tkernel_insn(frstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n }\n \n static inline int frstor_safe(struct fregs_state *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \treturn kernel_insn_err(frstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n }\n \n static inline int frstor_from_user_sigframe(struct fregs_state __user *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \treturn user_insn(frstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n }\n \ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h\nindex 38a2862f09d35..ac378d8395347 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h\n@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@\n #include \u003casm/fpu/xcr.h\u003e\n #include \u003casm/msr.h\u003e\n \n+#include \"internal.h\"\n+\n #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64\n DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, xfd_state);\n #endif\n@@ -240,6 +242,7 @@ static inline void os_xrstor(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 mask)\n \tu32 hmask = mask \u003e\u003e 32;\n \n \txfd_validate_state(fpstate, mask, true);\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(mask);\n \tXSTATE_XRESTORE(\u0026fpstate-\u003eregs.xsave, lmask, hmask);\n }\n \n@@ -334,6 +337,7 @@ static inline int xrstor_from_user_sigframe(struct xregs_state __user *buf, u64\n \tint err;\n \n \txfd_validate_state(x86_task_fpu(current)-\u003efpstate, mask, true);\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(mask);\n \n \tstac();\n \tXSTATE_OP(XRSTOR, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);\n@@ -355,6 +359,7 @@ static inline int os_xrstor_safe(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 mask)\n \n \t/* Ensure that XFD is up to date */\n \txfd_update_state(fpstate);\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(mask);\n \n \tif (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))\n \t\tXSTATE_OP(XRSTORS, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);\n"
} |
| 5/2 | 2026/10/07 02:39 | llm | finding-triage-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 12785 output: 10 thoughts: 1325 Thoughts: **Analyzing a Potential FPU-Related Hang** Okay, so I'm looking at this crash report, and the first thing that jumps out is the context. This patch modifies x86 FPU code, specifically save/restore instructions. The core of the problem is a hung task timeout, and I'm seeing multiple threads blocked. The trace shows a deadlock within the XFS filesystem. My initial thought is that these two issues are completely unrelated. The patch touches the FPU, but the crash points directly to XFS lock contention and/or log space exhaustion. I can see from the stack traces of the blocked tasks, specifically threads 7429, 7501, 7507, and 7511, that we're dealing with issues around `xfs_ilock`, `xfs_log_reserve`, `xfs_trans_alloc`, and calls related to setting attributes, scrubbing metadata, and file creation – all core XFS operations. The tasks are all waiting on different locks. It's a classic XFS deadlock scenario, typical with concurrent operations on potentially corrupted or fuzzed file systems. The locks held by the processes confirm this: we have `sb_writers`, `inode->i_sb->s_type->i_mutex_dir_key`, and `sb_internal`. The "SOFTLOCKUP" and serial console write in progress are typical symptoms of this kind of deadlock. Now, could there be *any* connection to the FPU patch? My gut says unlikely, but I need to be thorough. The functions related to FPU save/restore are not involved in any of the stack traces that I'm seeing. None of the files modified by the patch are related to XFS. The patch is titled "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Avoid kernel-address leaks in the FXSAVE workaround". So, the focus is on mitigating information leaks. It's not a change that is likely to affect the XFS lock contention. I'll need to double-check that the patch series is exactly the same as what I am seeing. This looks like a red herring and I need to file a bug report against XFS, and most likely the fuzzing methodology. |
| 6/2 | 2026/10/07 02:39 | tool | series-patches |
0mError:missing argument "PatchNum" Args: null Results: {
"error": "missing argument \"PatchNum\""
} |
| 7/2 | 2026/10/07 02:39 | llm | finding-triage-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 14610 output: 15 thoughts: 15 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Initiating Patch Application - series-patches with PatchNum=1** Alright, so the immediate goal is to apply the patch designated as `PatchNum=1` using the `series-patches` tool. I'm choosing this specific patch first, which suggests a deliberate sequencing strategy. There's a reason behind prioritizing this patch – perhaps it's a prerequisite, a foundational fix, a critical security update, or simply the smallest to test with. Understanding *why* this one's first is key to interpreting the overall workflow and anticipating any potential dependencies or conflicts down the line. We need to be vigilant for what happens next! |
| 8/2 | 2026/10/07 02:39 | tool | series-patches |
0mArgs:{
"PatchNum": 1
}Results: {
"Output": "Patch [1] [PATCH] x86/fpu: Avoid kernel-address leaks in the FXSAVE workaround:\n\nOn AMD CPUs without XSaveErPtr, restoring x87 state without a pending\nexception can leave FDP/FIP/FOP unchanged. The existing workaround\nreplaces the previous context's pointers by executing FILD on a kernel\nfpstate. This exposes the kernel instruction and operand addresses\ninstead. On TCG qemu64, an unprivileged task can recover the kernel\ntext slide with FNSTENV at ELF entry, even though FXSAVE64 reports zero\nerror pointers.\n\nUse FNINIT to clear the pointers without recording new addresses. It\nalso clears pending exceptions without waiting for them, and the\nfollowing restore reloads the intended x87 state.\n\nApply the workaround in the FXRSTOR and FP-capable XRSTOR helpers,\nincluding the safe and user-sigframe variants. This also covers the\ninit-state and direct sigreturn paths, which must not retain pointers\nfrom kernel FPU use or another task. Retain preparation for the\nno-FXSR FRSTOR fallback too: it was covered by the old common\nworkaround, and TCG qemu64 can also leave the legacy pointers unchanged\nafter that restore. Only initialize x87 when the restore mask includes\nFP, so partial and supervisor-only restores keep the unrequested state\nintact.\n\nFixes: 18bd057b1408 (\"[PATCH] i386/x86-64: Fix x87 information leak between processes\")\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nAssisted-by: Codex:gpt-6-astra\nSigned-off-by: Kyle Zeng \u003ckylebot@openai.com\u003e\n---\n arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c | 14 --------------\n arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h | 19 +++++++++++++++++++\n arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h | 14 ++++++++++++++\n arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h | 5 +++++\n 4 files changed, 38 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)\n\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c\nindex d1aeecd57f5e..9113f55b80d8 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c\n+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c\n@@ -161,20 +161,6 @@ void save_fpregs_to_fpstate(struct fpu *fpu)\n \n void restore_fpregs_from_fpstate(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 mask)\n {\n-\t/*\n-\t * AMD K7/K8 and later CPUs up to Zen don't save/restore\n-\t * FDP/FIP/FOP unless an exception is pending. Clear the x87 state\n-\t * here by setting it to fixed values. \"m\" is a random variable\n-\t * that should be in L1.\n-\t */\n-\tif (unlikely(static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK))) {\n-\t\tasm volatile(\n-\t\t\t\"fnclex\\n\\t\"\n-\t\t\t\"emms\\n\\t\"\n-\t\t\t\"fildl %[addr]\"\t/* set F?P to defined value */\n-\t\t\t: : [addr] \"m\" (*fpstate));\n-\t}\n-\n \tif (use_xsave()) {\n \t\t/*\n \t\t * Dynamically enabled features are enabled in XCR0, but\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h\nindex 975de070c9c9..3b4d178edc31 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h\n@@ -2,6 +2,9 @@\n #ifndef __X86_KERNEL_FPU_INTERNAL_H\n #define __X86_KERNEL_FPU_INTERNAL_H\n \n+#include \u003casm/cpufeature.h\u003e\n+#include \u003casm/fpu/types.h\u003e\n+\n extern struct fpstate init_fpstate;\n \n /* CPU feature check wrappers */\n@@ -15,6 +18,22 @@ static __always_inline __pure bool use_fxsr(void)\n \treturn cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_FXSR);\n }\n \n+/*\n+ * AMD CPUs without XSaveErPtr may leave FDP/FIP/FOP unchanged on restore\n+ * when no x87 exception is pending. Using an x87 load to overwrite them\n+ * leaks the kernel instruction and operand addresses through FNSTENV.\n+ *\n+ * FNINIT clears the pointers without recording any new ones. Only do this\n+ * when the x87 state is about to be replaced; a partial XRSTOR must leave\n+ * unrequested components alone.\n+ */\n+static inline void fpregs_restore_prepare(u64 mask)\n+{\n+\tif (unlikely(static_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK)) \u0026\u0026\n+\t (mask \u0026 XFEATURE_MASK_FP))\n+\t\tasm volatile(\"fninit\");\n+}\n+\n #ifdef CONFIG_X86_DEBUG_FPU\n # define WARN_ON_FPU(x) WARN_ON_ONCE(x)\n #else\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h\nindex 098f367bb8a7..fe825c9a00c7 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h\n@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@\n \n #include \u003casm/fpu/types.h\u003e\n \n+#include \"internal.h\"\n+\n extern unsigned int mxcsr_feature_mask;\n \n static inline void ldmxcsr(u32 mxcsr)\n@@ -63,6 +65,8 @@ static inline int fxsave_to_user_sigframe(struct fxregs_state __user *fx)\n \n static inline void fxrstor(struct fxregs_state *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \tif (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))\n \t\tkernel_insn(fxrstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n \telse\n@@ -71,6 +75,8 @@ static inline void fxrstor(struct fxregs_state *fx)\n \n static inline int fxrstor_safe(struct fxregs_state *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \tif (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))\n \t\treturn kernel_insn_err(fxrstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n \telse\n@@ -79,6 +85,8 @@ static inline int fxrstor_safe(struct fxregs_state *fx)\n \n static inline int fxrstor_from_user_sigframe(struct fxregs_state __user *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \tif (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_32))\n \t\treturn user_insn(fxrstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n \telse\n@@ -87,16 +95,22 @@ static inline int fxrstor_from_user_sigframe(struct fxregs_state __user *fx)\n \n static inline void frstor(struct fregs_state *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \tkernel_insn(frstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n }\n \n static inline int frstor_safe(struct fregs_state *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \treturn kernel_insn_err(frstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n }\n \n static inline int frstor_from_user_sigframe(struct fregs_state __user *fx)\n {\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(XFEATURE_MASK_FP);\n+\n \treturn user_insn(frstor %[fx], \"=m\" (*fx), [fx] \"m\" (*fx));\n }\n \ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h\nindex 38a2862f09d3..ac378d839534 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h\n@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@\n #include \u003casm/fpu/xcr.h\u003e\n #include \u003casm/msr.h\u003e\n \n+#include \"internal.h\"\n+\n #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64\n DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, xfd_state);\n #endif\n@@ -240,6 +242,7 @@ static inline void os_xrstor(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 mask)\n \tu32 hmask = mask \u003e\u003e 32;\n \n \txfd_validate_state(fpstate, mask, true);\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(mask);\n \tXSTATE_XRESTORE(\u0026fpstate-\u003eregs.xsave, lmask, hmask);\n }\n \n@@ -334,6 +337,7 @@ static inline int xrstor_from_user_sigframe(struct xregs_state __user *buf, u64\n \tint err;\n \n \txfd_validate_state(x86_task_fpu(current)-\u003efpstate, mask, true);\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(mask);\n \n \tstac();\n \tXSTATE_OP(XRSTOR, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);\n@@ -355,6 +359,7 @@ static inline int os_xrstor_safe(struct fpstate *fpstate, u64 mask)\n \n \t/* Ensure that XFD is up to date */\n \txfd_update_state(fpstate);\n+\tfpregs_restore_prepare(mask);\n \n \tif (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVES))\n \t\tXSTATE_OP(XRSTORS, xstate, lmask, hmask, err);\n-- \n2.53.0"
} |
| 9/2 | 2026/10/07 02:39 | llm | finding-triage-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17529 output: 261 thoughts: 579 Thoughts: **Triage Assessment: XFS Hang Not Related to FPU Patch**
Okay, so the crash report is in, and my initial scan indicates a hung task timeout, specifically within the XFS filesystem. The tasks are getting blocked in `xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata`, `xfs_attr_set`, `vfs_utimes`, and `xfs_create`, all of which point to lock contention and journal log reservation issues within XFS. I'm seeing waits in `xfs_ilock` and `xlog_grant_head_wait`, classic XFS issues.
The patch I was reviewing deals with the x86 FPU restore path – `fxrstor/xrstor` – and specifically addresses a potential kernel address leak on certain AMD CPUs. It uses `asm volatile("fninit")` within `fpregs_restore_prepare()` when `X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK` is true, a very targeted workaround. Absolutely nothing about this FPU logic relates to the XFS code I'm seeing in the backtrace.
Therefore, the likelihood of this patch series causing the crash is extremely low. The crash appears to be the expected outcome of syzkaller fuzzing XFS ioctls and syscalls, specifically related to metadata scrubbing, attribute setting, and file creation. These types of hangs are a known issue in XFS when subjected to fuzzing. It's a lock contention problem, and potentially journal log reservation exhaustion, unrelated to the FPU.
I've confirmed the lack of any connection between the FPU save/restore routines and the XFS transaction/locking subsystem. The patch series is definitely not the cause.
I'm confident in my assessment. Triage is complete. I'll call `set-results` now.
|
| 10/2 | 2026/10/07 02:39 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"Introduced": false,
"Reasoning": "The crash report indicates hung tasks (`task blocked for more than 143 seconds`) in the XFS filesystem layer. Multiple tasks are blocked on XFS locks and log grant head space reservations (`xfs_ilock`, `xlog_grant_head_wait`, `down_write` in `vfs_utimes`) during concurrent XFS operations (`xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata`, `vfs_setxattr`, `vfs_mkdir`).\n\nThe patch series being tested modifies only the x86 FPU subsystem (`arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h`) to address kernel address leaks via `fninit` on AMD CPUs with `X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK`. It does not touch filesystem code, locking primitives, or any code paths in the stack trace. The hung task in XFS is unrelated to the tested patch series."
}Results: {
"Introduced": false,
"Reasoning": "The crash report indicates hung tasks (`task blocked for more than 143 seconds`) in the XFS filesystem layer. Multiple tasks are blocked on XFS locks and log grant head space reservations (`xfs_ilock`, `xlog_grant_head_wait`, `down_write` in `vfs_utimes`) during concurrent XFS operations (`xfs_ioc_scrubv_metadata`, `vfs_setxattr`, `vfs_mkdir`).\n\nThe patch series being tested modifies only the x86 FPU subsystem (`arch/x86/kernel/fpu/core.c`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/internal.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/legacy.h`, `arch/x86/kernel/fpu/xstate.h`) to address kernel address leaks via `fninit` on AMD CPUs with `X86_BUG_FXSAVE_LEAK`. It does not touch filesystem code, locking primitives, or any code paths in the stack trace. The hung task in XFS is unrelated to the tested patch series."
} |
| Total Calls | Total Tokens | Avg Tokens | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|
| Total Calls | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|