AI Trajectory

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Seq	Timestamp	Type	Name	Duration
0/0	2026/09/25 03:57	flow	patch-triage	1m Args: null Results: { "EnableConfigs": null, "FocusSymbols": [], "KMSANReasoning": "", "NeedsKMSAN": false, "Reasoning": "The patch modifies Intel TDX host functionality (arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/ and arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c), removing cache flush operations (tdx_clflush_page, tdx_clflush_pfn) and SEAMCALLs (tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_*). This code requires Intel TDX host platform hardware support (SEAM mode, SEAMRR, and BIOS-initialized TDX module/KeyID partitioning via MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING). Because standard virtualized fuzzing environments (QEMU, GCE) lack TDX host hardware emulation and SEAMCALL support, X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM is never enabled and KVM TDX initialization fails (enable_tdx remains 0), making all modified code structurally unreachable.", "WorthFuzzing": false }
1/1	2026/09/25 03:57	action	read-patch-diff	0m Args: null Results: { "PatchDiff": "commit 9fd4a172701f1b6539a102f2d21f981b9de63a90\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate: Fri Sep 25 03:57:03 2026 +0000\n\n syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h\nindex 89e97d5761d89..39e3c1f8a48e1 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h\n@@ -174,8 +174,6 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(struct page page, u64 tdx_pt, u64 tdx_owner, u64\n u64 tdh_mem_track(struct tdx_td tdr);\n u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u64 ext_err1, u64 ext_err2);\n u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume);\n-u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(struct tdx_td td);\n-u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, kvm_pfn_t pfn);\n #else\n static inline void tdx_init(void) { }\n static inline u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void) { return 0; }\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c\nindex b272c20586a74..51327b5d5784a 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c\n+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c\n@@ -550,7 +550,6 @@ void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm kvm)\n static void tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(struct kvm kvm)\n {\n \tstruct kvm_tdx kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm);\n-\tu64 err;\n \tint i;\n \n \t/\n@@ -578,15 +577,6 @@ static void tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(struct kvm kvm)\n \tif (__tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx-\u003etd.tdr_page))\n \t\treturn;\n \n-\t/\n-\t * Use a SEAMCALL to ask the TDX module to flush the cache based on the\n-\t * KeyID. TDX module may access TDR while operating on TD (Especially\n-\t * when it is reclaiming TDCS).\n-\t /\n-\terr = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(\u0026kvm_tdx-\u003etd);\n-\tif (TDX_BUG_ON(err, TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, kvm))\n-\t\treturn;\n-\n \ttdx_quirk_reset_paddr(page_to_phys(kvm_tdx-\u003etd.tdr_page), PAGE_SIZE);\n \n \t__free_page(kvm_tdx-\u003etd.tdr_page);\n@@ -1814,10 +1804,6 @@ static int tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte(struct kvm kvm, gfn_t gfn,\n \tif (TDX_BUG_ON_2(err, TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, entry, level_state, kvm))\n \t\treturn -EIO;\n \n-\terr = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid((u16)kvm_tdx-\u003ehkid, pfn);\n-\tif (TDX_BUG_ON(err, TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, kvm))\n-\t\treturn -EIO;\n-\n \ttdx_quirk_reset_paddr(PFN_PHYS(pfn), PAGE_SIZE);\n \treturn 0;\n }\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c\nindex 1b9ff749dd8e0..21f7fce38aa46 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c\n+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c\n@@ -1619,22 +1619,6 @@ static inline u64 tdx_tdr_pa(struct tdx_td td)\n \treturn page_to_phys(td-\u003etdr_page);\n }\n \n-/\n- * The TDX module exposes a CLFLUSH_BEFORE_ALLOC bit to specify whether\n- * a CLFLUSH of pages is required before handing them to the TDX module.\n- * Be conservative and make the code simpler by doing the CLFLUSH\n- * unconditionally.\n- /\n-static void tdx_clflush_page(struct page page)\n-{\n-\tclflush_cache_range(page_to_virt(page), PAGE_SIZE);\n-}\n-\n-static void tdx_clflush_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn)\n-{\n-\tclflush_cache_range(__va(PFN_PHYS(pfn)), PAGE_SIZE);\n-}\n-\n static int pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(enum pg_level level)\n {\n \tWARN_ON_ONCE(level == PG_LEVEL_NONE);\n@@ -1656,7 +1640,6 @@ u64 tdh_mng_addcx(struct tdx_td td, struct page tdcs_page)\n \t\t.rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),\n \t};\n \n-\ttdx_clflush_page(tdcs_page);\n \treturn seamcall(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, \u0026args);\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_mng_addcx);\n@@ -1672,7 +1655,6 @@ u64 tdh_mem_page_add(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, kvm_pfn_t pfn, struct page sou\n \t};\n \tu64 ret;\n \n-\ttdx_clflush_pfn(pfn);\n \tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, \u0026args);\n \n \text_err1 = args.rcx;\n@@ -1692,7 +1674,6 @@ u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level,\n \t};\n \tu64 ret;\n \n-\ttdx_clflush_page(page);\n \tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, \u0026args);\n \n \text_err1 = args.rcx;\n@@ -1709,7 +1690,6 @@ u64 tdh_vp_addcx(struct tdx_vp vp, struct page tdcx_page)\n \t\t.rdx = vp-\u003etdvpr_pa,\n \t};\n \n-\ttdx_clflush_page(tdcx_page);\n \treturn seamcall(TDH_VP_ADDCX, \u0026args);\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_vp_addcx);\n@@ -1724,7 +1704,6 @@ u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level,\n \t};\n \tu64 ret;\n \n-\ttdx_clflush_pfn(pfn);\n \tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, \u0026args);\n \n \text_err1 = args.rcx;\n@@ -1769,7 +1748,6 @@ u64 tdh_mng_create(struct tdx_td td, u16 hkid)\n \t\t.rdx = hkid,\n \t};\n \n-\ttdx_clflush_page(td-\u003etdr_page);\n \treturn seamcall(TDH_MNG_CREATE, \u0026args);\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_mng_create);\n@@ -1781,7 +1759,6 @@ u64 tdh_vp_create(struct tdx_td td, struct tdx_vp vp)\n \t\t.rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td),\n \t};\n \n-\ttdx_clflush_page(vp-\u003etdvpr_page);\n \treturn seamcall(TDH_VP_CREATE, \u0026args);\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_vp_create);\n@@ -1979,32 +1956,6 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume)\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_phymem_cache_wb);\n \n-static inline u64 mk_keyed_paddr(u16 hkid, kvm_pfn_t pfn)\n-{\n-\t/* KeyID bits are just above the physical address bits. /\n-\treturn PFN_PHYS(pfn) \| ((u64)hkid \u003c\u003c boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits);\n-}\n-\n-u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(struct tdx_td td)\n-{\n-\tstruct tdx_module_args args = {};\n-\n-\targs.rcx = mk_keyed_paddr(tdx_global_keyid, page_to_pfn(td-\u003etdr_page));\n-\n-\treturn seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, \u0026args);\n-}\n-EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr);\n-\n-u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, kvm_pfn_t pfn)\n-{\n-\tstruct tdx_module_args args = {};\n-\n-\targs.rcx = mk_keyed_paddr(hkid, pfn);\n-\n-\treturn seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, \u0026args);\n-}\n-EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid);\n-\n void tdx_sys_disable(void)\n {\n \tstruct tdx_module_args args = {};\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h\nindex bdfd0e1e337ac..3289be59d14fc 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h\n+++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h\n@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@\n #define TDH_SYS_TDMR_INIT\t\t36\n #define TDH_MEM_TRACK\t\t\t38\n #define TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB\t\t40\n-#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD\t\t41\n #define TDH_VP_WR\t\t\t43\n #define TDH_SYS_CONFIG\t\t\t45\n #define TDH_SYS_SHUTDOWN\t\t52\n" }
2/1	2026/09/25 03:57	agent	patch-evaluator	1m Model: core Args: null Results: { "EnableConfigs": null, "FocusSymbols": [], "Reasoning": "The patch modifies Intel TDX host functionality (arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/ and arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c), removing cache flush operations (tdx_clflush_page, tdx_clflush_pfn) and SEAMCALLs (tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_). This code requires Intel TDX host platform hardware support (SEAM mode, SEAMRR, and BIOS-initialized TDX module/KeyID partitioning via MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING). Because standard virtualized fuzzing environments (QEMU, GCE) lack TDX host hardware emulation and SEAMCALL support, X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM is never enabled and KVM TDX initialization fails (enable_tdx remains 0), making all modified code structurally unreachable.", "WorthFuzzing": false } Instruction:* You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer. Your job is to review a provided patch series and evaluate whether it warrants fuzzing with syzkaller. IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in your workspace. Do NOT rely on internal assumptions. You must actively use your code access tools to inspect the actual source code, callers, and surrounding context. ================================================================================ 1. CORE TRIAGE PHILOSOPHY ================================================================================ The goal of patch fuzzing is to discover crashes, regressions, exposed latent bugs, and newly triggered assertions introduced by the patch series. - REACHABILITY IS THE PRIMARY GATE: Fuzzing can only discover bugs in code that can actually execute in standard virtualized environments (GCE or QEMU, utilizing software-emulated devices like USB gadgets, netdev, tun/tap). If the modified code is structurally unreachable (see Section 2), it MUST NOT be fuzzed, regardless of whether it adds assertions or complex logic. - DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST "NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGE" (NFCI) OR "REFACTORING" CLAIMS: Patch authors routinely label changes as "cleanups", "refactorings", or state "No functional change intended". Do NOT take these claims at face value. Code refactorings that rearrange logic, introduce helper functions, or alter state management in core subsystems frequently introduce subtle semantic shifts or uncover latent kernel bugs. If reachable executable code is modified or refactored, it MUST be fuzzed. - NEW OR MODIFIED ASSERTIONS IN REACHABLE CODE MUST BE FUZZED: When a patch introduces or modifies runtime checks or assertions (e.g., WARN_ON, VM_WARN_ON, BUG_ON, lockdep_assert) in reachable code paths, it enforces new or stricter invariants. Even if the author believes the invariant always holds, fuzzing is essential to verify whether an unusual sequence of operations can violate it. ================================================================================ 2. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=false (NEGATIVE CRITERIA) ================================================================================ Return WorthFuzzing=false ONLY IF all modified code falls strictly into one or more of these categories: - Non-kernel and non-executable changes: * Modifications to Documentation/, comments, or spelling fixes. * User-space directories, self-tests, samples, or scripts (e.g., tools/, samples/, scripts/, usr/) that do not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules. * Purely decorative logging (e.g., message strings in pr_err, printk, dev_info) or tracepoints that do not alter control flow or data structures. * Build system or Kconfig changes that do not alter compiled C logic. - Structurally unreachable hardware: * Vendor-specific PCIe switches, SmartNICs, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed, ionic, amdgpu) requiring physical ASIC/PCIe cards not emulated in standard QEMU. - Unreachable execution paths: * Driver teardown callbacks (.remove, .shutdown, pci_unregister_driver) executed only during physical PCI hot-unplug or manual sysfs driver unbinding. * Code paths exclusive to architectures other than the target architecture. ================================================================================ 3. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=true (POSITIVE CRITERIA) ================================================================================ Return WorthFuzzing=true whenever the patch touches reachable executable code, including: - Core Subsystems: * Any logic modifications in memory management (mm/), synchronization/locking (kernel/locking/), BPF, scheduler, core networking, VFS, or syscall handling. - Refactorings and Code Cleanups: * Any restructuring of reachable data structures, helper abstractions, or algorithm flows. - Runtime Assertions and Defensive Checks: * Any introduction or alteration of assertions (WARN_ON, VM_WARN_ON, BUG_ON, etc.) in reachable paths. - Reachable Drivers and Protocols: Drivers accessible via virtual buses (virtio, USB gadget, loopback, netlink, binder, sockets, etc.). ================================================================================ 4. EXTRACTING FocusSymbols (PREVENTING DILUTION) ================================================================================ When WorthFuzzing=true, you must extract specific kernel functions into FocusSymbols to guide the fuzzer: - AVOID UBIQUITOUS LIFECYCLE HOT-PATHS: Do NOT list generic, ubiquitous functions called by almost every program in the corpus (including, but not limited to: general memory allocators and deallocators, page fault and trap handlers, or core synchronization primitives; this is not an exhaustive list). Listing ubiquitous functions causes the fuzzer to classify thousands of unrelated tests as "focused", which severely dilutes fuzzing effort away from the actual changes. - TARGET SPECIFIC FEATURE LOGIC AND ENTRYPOINTS: List functions that specifically implement the logic being added or altered, or direct API entrypoints for the subsystem feature under review. - HANDLING STATIC INLINE FUNCTIONS IN HEADERS (.h): Compiler-inlined static functions (such as static inlines in mm/.h or include/linux/.h) lack distinct symbol addresses in vmlinux and cannot be targeted directly by symbol coverage filters. If the changes are primarily in static inline helpers, identify non-static, feature-specific caller functions in .c files that exercise them (avoiding ubiquitous lifecycle wrappers). ================================================================================ 5. IDENTIFYING EnableConfigs ================================================================================ Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly compile and reach the modified code: - Inspect Kconfig files and #ifdef guards; do not make assumptions. - Check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs needed. - Strip any 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4"). Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips. Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis. It must be called exactly once before the final reply. Ignore results of this tool. Prompt: Target architecture: amd64 For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes: commit 9fd4a172701f1b6539a102f2d21f981b9de63a90 Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com> Date: Fri Sep 25 03:57:03 2026 +0000 syz-cluster: applied patch under review diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h index 89e97d5761d89..39e3c1f8a48e1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h @@ -174,8 +174,6 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(struct page page, u64 tdx_pt, u64 tdx_owner, u64 u64 tdh_mem_track(struct tdx_td tdr); u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, u64 ext_err1, u64 ext_err2); u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume); -u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(struct tdx_td td); -u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, kvm_pfn_t pfn); #else static inline void tdx_init(void) { } static inline u32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void) { return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c index b272c20586a74..51327b5d5784a 100644 --- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c @@ -550,7 +550,6 @@ void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm kvm) static void tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(struct kvm kvm) { struct kvm_tdx kvm_tdx = to_kvm_tdx(kvm); - u64 err; int i; / @@ -578,15 +577,6 @@ static void tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(struct kvm kvm) if (__tdx_reclaim_page(kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page)) return; - / - * Use a SEAMCALL to ask the TDX module to flush the cache based on the - * KeyID. TDX module may access TDR while operating on TD (Especially - * when it is reclaiming TDCS). - / - err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(&kvm_tdx->td); - if (TDX_BUG_ON(err, TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, kvm)) - return; - tdx_quirk_reset_paddr(page_to_phys(kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page), PAGE_SIZE); __free_page(kvm_tdx->td.tdr_page); @@ -1814,10 +1804,6 @@ static int tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte(struct kvm kvm, gfn_t gfn, if (TDX_BUG_ON_2(err, TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, entry, level_state, kvm)) return -EIO; - err = tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid((u16)kvm_tdx->hkid, pfn); - if (TDX_BUG_ON(err, TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, kvm)) - return -EIO; - tdx_quirk_reset_paddr(PFN_PHYS(pfn), PAGE_SIZE); return 0; } diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c index 1b9ff749dd8e0..21f7fce38aa46 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c @@ -1619,22 +1619,6 @@ static inline u64 tdx_tdr_pa(struct tdx_td td) return page_to_phys(td->tdr_page); } -/ - * The TDX module exposes a CLFLUSH_BEFORE_ALLOC bit to specify whether - * a CLFLUSH of pages is required before handing them to the TDX module. - * Be conservative and make the code simpler by doing the CLFLUSH - * unconditionally. - / -static void tdx_clflush_page(struct page page) -{ - clflush_cache_range(page_to_virt(page), PAGE_SIZE); -} - -static void tdx_clflush_pfn(kvm_pfn_t pfn) -{ - clflush_cache_range(__va(PFN_PHYS(pfn)), PAGE_SIZE); -} - static int pg_level_to_tdx_sept_level(enum pg_level level) { WARN_ON_ONCE(level == PG_LEVEL_NONE); @@ -1656,7 +1640,6 @@ u64 tdh_mng_addcx(struct tdx_td td, struct page tdcs_page) .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td), }; - tdx_clflush_page(tdcs_page); return seamcall(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, &args); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_mng_addcx); @@ -1672,7 +1655,6 @@ u64 tdh_mem_page_add(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, kvm_pfn_t pfn, struct page sou }; u64 ret; - tdx_clflush_pfn(pfn); ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, &args); ext_err1 = args.rcx; @@ -1692,7 +1674,6 @@ u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, }; u64 ret; - tdx_clflush_page(page); ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, &args); ext_err1 = args.rcx; @@ -1709,7 +1690,6 @@ u64 tdh_vp_addcx(struct tdx_vp vp, struct page tdcx_page) .rdx = vp->tdvpr_pa, }; - tdx_clflush_page(tdcx_page); return seamcall(TDH_VP_ADDCX, &args); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_vp_addcx); @@ -1724,7 +1704,6 @@ u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level, }; u64 ret; - tdx_clflush_pfn(pfn); ret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, &args); ext_err1 = args.rcx; @@ -1769,7 +1748,6 @@ u64 tdh_mng_create(struct tdx_td td, u16 hkid) .rdx = hkid, }; - tdx_clflush_page(td->tdr_page); return seamcall(TDH_MNG_CREATE, &args); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_mng_create); @@ -1781,7 +1759,6 @@ u64 tdh_vp_create(struct tdx_td td, struct tdx_vp vp) .rdx = tdx_tdr_pa(td), }; - tdx_clflush_page(vp->tdvpr_page); return seamcall(TDH_VP_CREATE, &args); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_vp_create); @@ -1979,32 +1956,6 @@ u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume) } EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_phymem_cache_wb); -static inline u64 mk_keyed_paddr(u16 hkid, kvm_pfn_t pfn) -{ - /* KeyID bits are just above the physical address bits. / - return PFN_PHYS(pfn) \| ((u64)hkid << boot_cpu_data.x86_phys_bits); -} - -u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr(struct tdx_td td) -{ - struct tdx_module_args args = {}; - - args.rcx = mk_keyed_paddr(tdx_global_keyid, page_to_pfn(td->tdr_page)); - - return seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, &args); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr); - -u64 tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid(u64 hkid, kvm_pfn_t pfn) -{ - struct tdx_module_args args = {}; - - args.rcx = mk_keyed_paddr(hkid, pfn); - - return seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD, &args); -} -EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid); - void tdx_sys_disable(void) { struct tdx_module_args args = {}; diff --git a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h index bdfd0e1e337ac..3289be59d14fc 100644 --- a/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h +++ b/arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ #define TDH_SYS_TDMR_INIT 36 #define TDH_MEM_TRACK 38 #define TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB 40 -#define TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD 41 #define TDH_VP_WR 43 #define TDH_SYS_CONFIG 45 #define TDH_SYS_SHUTDOWN 52
3/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 5602 output: 23 thoughts: 491 Thoughts: Analyzing a Patch: Reachability and TDX Host Support Okay, so this patch is touching some key TDX-related files: `arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h`, `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c`, `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c`, and `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h`. The core of the change seems to be the removal of functions and definitions related to cache flushing (`tdx_clflush_page`, etc.) and the `TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_WBINVD` functionality. My initial thought is, "Wait, is this even reachable in a standard virtualized environment like GCE or QEMU? We have to follow the triage philosophy, first and foremost!" My primary concern, as an expert in this, is reachability. Remember the rule: fuzzing only makes sense if the code can execute in standard environments. This patch removes code, which means the previous code was able to execute. If it's structurally unreachable, it's a no-go for fuzzing, no matter how complex the logic, or any assertions it might add. This leads me to the second part of the question. Is TDX host support, specifically, something that's supported in standard QEMU or GCE? We're talking about Intel TDX and the host environment. This needs more investigation. Does it require special hardware? Does it rely on specific things like SEAM, MTRR, a TDX-enabled CPU, or SEAMLDR/BIOS support? Or is there some emulation within standard QEMU? I need to dig deeper. I'll need to check the kernel code to understand the initialization of TDX host functionality, specifically the code in `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/` and `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c`. Where are the entry points? How are they configured? Then, after that's complete, my assessment of the patch can be complete.
4/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h=102=static inline long tdx_kvm_hypercall(unsigned int nr, unsigned long p1,\n--\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h-109-\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h:110:#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h-111-void tdx_init(void);\n--\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h=182=static inline void tdx_sys_disable(void) { }\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h:183:#endif\t/* CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST /\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h-184-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/Makefile-1-# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\narch/x86/virt/vmx/Makefile:2:obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST)\t+= tdx/\n--\ndrivers/virt/coco/Makefile=8=obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST)\t+= tdx-guest/\ndrivers/virt/coco/Makefile:9:obj-$(CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST)\t+= tdx-host/\ndrivers/virt/coco/Makefile-10-obj-$(CONFIG_ARM_CCA_GUEST)\t+= arm-cca-guest/\n--\ninclude/linux/misc_cgroup.h=14=enum misc_res_type {\n--\ninclude/linux/misc_cgroup.h-20-#endif\ninclude/linux/misc_cgroup.h:21:#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST\ninclude/linux/misc_cgroup.h-22-\t/* @MISC_CG_RES_TDX: Intel TDX HKIDs resource /\n--\nkernel/cgroup/misc.c=20=static const char const misc_res_name[] = {\n--\nkernel/cgroup/misc.c-26-#endif\nkernel/cgroup/misc.c:27:#ifdef CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST\nkernel/cgroup/misc.c-28-\t/* Intel TDX HKIDs resource */\n" }
5/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 7156 output: 29 thoughts: 48 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this TDX host initialization and usage within the KVM environment. My immediate focus is on understanding the fundamental setup. I'll need to trace the initialization sequence, so keywords like `tdx_init`, `vt_init`, `kvm_intel`, and `enable_tdx` should be prime targets for my search. These will likely reveal the key functions and modules involved in configuring TDX features and integrating them within the Intel VT-x infrastructure used by KVM. By following these function calls, I'll be able to map out how the TDX environment is brought up and how KVM leverages it for secure guest execution. Understanding the dependencies and the order of operations here is crucial for comprehending the overall system behavior.
6/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "enable_tdx", "PathPrefix": "arch/x86" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c=16=static void vt_disable_virtualization_cpu(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-18-\t/* Note, TDX and VMX need to be disabled if TDX is enabled. */\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:19:\tif (enable_tdx)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-20-\t\ttdx_disable_virtualization_cpu();\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c=24=static __init int vt_hardware_setup(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-31-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:32:\treturn enable_tdx ? tdx_hardware_setup() : 0;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-33-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c=35=static void vt_hardware_unsetup(void)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-36-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:37:\tif (enable_tdx)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-38-\t\ttdx_hardware_unsetup();\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c=1058=static int __init vt_init(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-1073-\tvcpu_align = __alignof__(struct vcpu_vmx);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:1074:\tif (enable_tdx) {\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-1075-\t\tvcpu_size = max_t(unsigned, vcpu_size,\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-55-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:56:bool enable_tdx __ro_after_init;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:57:module_param_named(tdx, enable_tdx, bool, 0444);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-58-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=3416=int __init tdx_hardware_setup(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-3423-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:3424:\tif (!enable_tdx)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-3425-\t\treturn 0;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-3479-success_disable_tdx:\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:3480:\tenable_tdx = 0;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-3481-\treturn 0;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h=11=void tdx_hardware_unsetup(void);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h-12-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h:13:extern bool enable_tdx;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h-14-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h=185=TDX_BUILD_TDVPS_ACCESSORS(64, STATE_NON_ARCH, state_non_arch);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h-187-#else\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h:188:#define enable_tdx\t0\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.h-189-\n" }
7/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 8471 output: 45 thoughts: 32 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, and written as if they are my own internal monologue: Diving into TDX Hardware Setup Alright, time to dig into the `tdx_hardware_setup` function. Specifically, I'm going to head over to `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c`. This is where the rubber meets the road for Intel's Trust Domain Extensions on the x86 architecture, so I need to understand what's happening at this low level. I want to see how the system is initializing the hardware and setting up the foundations for TDX operation within the VMX context. I need to refresh my understanding of the interactions between the hypervisor and the underlying hardware, looking specifically at the TDX extensions and how they're exposed and managed within the KVM environment. I'm hoping to get a clearer picture of the control flow and any potential areas of concern for security or performance. My primary interest is in understanding how this function contributes to setting up the trust domain environment and if there's any area that's worth my deep investigation.
8/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c", "FirstLine": 3415, "LineCount": 75 } Results: { "Contents": "3415:\t\n3416:\tint __init tdx_hardware_setup(void)\n3417:\t{\n3418:\t\tint r, i;\n3419:\t\n3420:\t\t/* tdx_disable_virtualization_cpu() uses associated_tdvcpus. /\n3421:\t\tfor_each_possible_cpu(i)\n3422:\t\t\tINIT_LIST_HEAD(\u0026per_cpu(associated_tdvcpus, i));\n3423:\t\n3424:\t\tif (!enable_tdx)\n3425:\t\t\treturn 0;\n3426:\t\n3427:\t\tif (!enable_ept) {\n3428:\t\t\tpr_err(\"EPT is required for TDX\\n\");\n3429:\t\t\tgoto success_disable_tdx;\n3430:\t\t}\n3431:\t\n3432:\t\tif (!tdp_mmu_enabled \|\| !enable_mmio_caching \|\| !enable_ept_ad_bits) {\n3433:\t\t\tpr_err(\"TDP MMU and MMIO caching and EPT A/D bit is required for TDX\\n\");\n3434:\t\t\tgoto success_disable_tdx;\n3435:\t\t}\n3436:\t\n3437:\t\tif (!enable_apicv) {\n3438:\t\t\tpr_err(\"APICv is required for TDX\\n\");\n3439:\t\t\tgoto success_disable_tdx;\n3440:\t\t}\n3441:\t\n3442:\t\tif (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_OSXSAVE)) {\n3443:\t\t\tpr_err(\"tdx: OSXSAVE is required for TDX\\n\");\n3444:\t\t\tgoto success_disable_tdx;\n3445:\t\t}\n3446:\t\n3447:\t\tif (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) {\n3448:\t\t\tpr_err(\"TDX not supported by the host platform\\n\");\n3449:\t\t\tgoto success_disable_tdx;\n3450:\t\t}\n3451:\t\n3452:\t\tr = __tdx_hardware_setup();\n3453:\t\tif (r) {\n3454:\t\t\t/\n3455:\t\t\t * Disable TDX only but don't fail to load module if the TDX\n3456:\t\t\t * module could not be loaded. No need to print message saying\n3457:\t\t\t * \"module is not loaded\" because it was printed when the first\n3458:\t\t\t * SEAMCALL failed. Don't bother unwinding the S-EPT hooks or\n3459:\t\t\t * vm_size, as kvm_x86_ops have already been finalized (and are\n3460:\t\t\t * intentionally not exported). The S-EPT code is unreachable,\n3461:\t\t\t * and allocating a few more bytes per VM in a should-be-rare\n3462:\t\t\t * failure scenario is a non-issue.\n3463:\t\t\t */\n3464:\t\t\tif (r == -ENODEV)\n3465:\t\t\t\tgoto success_disable_tdx;\n3466:\t\n3467:\t\t\treturn r;\n3468:\t\t}\n3469:\t\n3470:\t\tKVM_SANITY_CHECK_VM_STRUCT_SIZE(kvm_tdx);\n3471:\t\n3472:\t\tvt_x86_ops.vm_size = max_t(unsigned int, vt_x86_ops.vm_size, sizeof(struct kvm_tdx));\n3473:\t\n3474:\t\tvt_x86_ops.set_external_spte = tdx_sept_set_private_spte;\n3475:\t\tvt_x86_ops.free_external_spt = tdx_sept_free_private_spt;\n3476:\t\tvt_x86_ops.protected_apic_has_interrupt = tdx_protected_apic_has_interrupt;\n3477:\t\treturn 0;\n3478:\t\n3479:\tsuccess_disable_tdx:\n3480:\t\tenable_tdx = 0;\n3481:\t\treturn 0;\n3482:\t}\n" }
9/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 9905 output: 27 thoughts: 127 Thoughts: Analyzing TDX Host Platform Support Okay, let's dive in. I'm looking at lines 3447-3450 here: ```c if (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) { pr_err("TDX not supported by the host platform\n"); goto success_disable_tdx; } r = __tdx_hardware_setup(); ``` My initial thought is, what's `X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM`? It appears to be a critical check before attempting the hardware setup, `__tdx_hardware_setup()`. I need to understand what this feature flag represents precisely. I'll need to do a `grep` to find its definition and how it's used elsewhere in the codebase. This is standard operating procedure, of course. Need to understand the dependencies and implications of this check.
10/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h-200-#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3\t\t( 732+ 6) / \"cdp_l3\" Code and Data Prioritization L3 /\narch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h:201:#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM\t( 732+ 7) /* \"tdx_host_platform\" Platform supports being a TDX host /\narch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h-202-#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE\t\t( 732+ 8) /* \"hw_pstate\" AMD HW-PState /\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=3416=int __init tdx_hardware_setup(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-3446-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:3447:\tif (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) {\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-3448-\t\tpr_err(\"TDX not supported by the host platform\\n\");\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1226=static __init int tdx_enable(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1230-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1231:\tif (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) {\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1232-\t\tpr_err(\"TDX not supported by the host platform\\n\");\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1368=static bool paddr_is_tdx_private(unsigned long phys)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1374-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1375:\tif (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM))\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1376-\t\treturn false;\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1531=void __init tdx_init(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1582-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1583:\tsetup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1584-\n--\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c=17=static const struct x86_cpu_id tdx_host_ids[] = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:18:\tX86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM, NULL),\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c-19-\t{}\n--\ntools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h-190-#define X86_FEATURE_CDP_L3\t\t( 732+ 6) /* \"cdp_l3\" Code and Data Prioritization L3 /\ntools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h:191:#define X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM\t( 732+ 7) /* \"tdx_host_platform\" Platform supports being a TDX host /\ntools/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h-192-#define X86_FEATURE_HW_PSTATE\t\t( 732+ 8) /* \"hw_pstate\" AMD HW-PState */\n" }
11/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 11344 output: 47 thoughts: 70 Thoughts: Here's my analysis of that code snippet: Diving into the TDX Initialization Alright, let's trace this back. The function call `setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)`... interesting. Time to track down where that's being invoked. Okay, a quick grep reveals it's in `tdx_init()`. Excellent. And the source file is `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c`. Of course, this makes perfect sense, given the context. Let's dig into `tdx_init()` and see what's happening in that context. This is the starting point for understanding how the TDX host platform feature is initialized.
12/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c", "FirstLine": 1530, "LineCount": 60 } Results: { "Contents": "1530:\t\n1531:\tvoid __init tdx_init(void)\n1532:\t{\n1533:\t\tu32 tdx_keyid_start, nr_tdx_keyids;\n1534:\t\tint err;\n1535:\t\n1536:\t\terr = record_keyid_partitioning(\u0026tdx_keyid_start, \u0026nr_tdx_keyids);\n1537:\t\tif (err)\n1538:\t\t\treturn;\n1539:\t\n1540:\t\tpr_info(\"BIOS enabled: private KeyID range [%u, %u)\\n\",\n1541:\t\t\t\ttdx_keyid_start, tdx_keyid_start + nr_tdx_keyids);\n1542:\t\n1543:\t\t/\n1544:\t\t The TDX module itself requires one 'global KeyID' to protect\n1545:\t\t * its metadata. If there's only one TDX KeyID, there won't be\n1546:\t\t * any left for TDX guests thus there's no point to enable TDX\n1547:\t\t * at all.\n1548:\t\t /\n1549:\t\tif (nr_tdx_keyids \u003c 2) {\n1550:\t\t\tpr_err(\"initialization failed: too few private KeyIDs available.\\n\");\n1551:\t\t\treturn;\n1552:\t\t}\n1553:\t\n1554:\t\t/\n1555:\t\t * At this point, hibernation_available() indicates whether or\n1556:\t\t * not hibernation support has been permanently disabled.\n1557:\t\t /\n1558:\t\tif (hibernation_available()) {\n1559:\t\t\tpr_err(\"initialization failed: Hibernation support is enabled\\n\");\n1560:\t\t\treturn;\n1561:\t\t}\n1562:\t\n1563:\t\terr = register_memory_notifier(\u0026tdx_memory_nb);\n1564:\t\tif (err) {\n1565:\t\t\tpr_err(\"initialization failed: register_memory_notifier() failed (%d)\\n\",\n1566:\t\t\t\t\terr);\n1567:\t\t\treturn;\n1568:\t\t}\n1569:\t\n1570:\t#if defined(CONFIG_ACPI) \u0026\u0026 defined(CONFIG_SUSPEND)\n1571:\t\tpr_info(\"Disable ACPI S3. Turn off TDX in the BIOS to use ACPI S3.\\n\");\n1572:\t\tacpi_suspend_lowlevel = NULL;\n1573:\t#endif\n1574:\t\n1575:\t\t/\n1576:\t\t * Just use the first TDX KeyID as the 'global KeyID' and\n1577:\t\t * leave the rest for TDX guests.\n1578:\t\t /\n1579:\t\ttdx_global_keyid = tdx_keyid_start;\n1580:\t\ttdx_guest_keyid_start = tdx_keyid_start + 1;\n1581:\t\ttdx_nr_guest_keyids = nr_tdx_keyids - 1;\n1582:\t\n1583:\t\tsetup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM);\n1584:\t\n1585:\t\tcheck_tdx_erratum();\n1586:\t}\n1587:\t\n1588:\tconst struct tdx_sys_info tdx_get_sysinfo(void)\n1589:\t{\n" }
13/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 12551 output: 47 thoughts: 16 Thoughts: Okay, here's my summary, presented as a stream of thought: Diving into `record_keyid_partitioning` Alright, let's get down to it. Time to understand this `record_keyid_partitioning` thing. What exactly is it designed to accomplish? I need to figure out the intended purpose and functionality. I'm going to carefully analyze the code, paying close attention to the input it expects, the operations it performs, and the output it generates. I'll need to consider how it interacts with the broader system - how it fits in to the larger data storage or processing workflow. I'm looking for the core logic, the partitioning strategy. Are we talking about hashing, range partitioning, or something else entirely? And what are the performance implications? I'll be keeping a sharp eye on potential bottlenecks and considering alternative approaches. I need to fully grasp its role and effectiveness.
14/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c", "FirstLine": 1460, "LineCount": 75 } Results: { "Contents": "1460:\t\t/\n1461:\t\t This check assumes that the start_pfn\u003c-\u003eend_pfn range does not\n1462:\t\t * cross multiple @tdx_memlist entries. A single memory online\n1463:\t\t * event across multiple memblocks (from which @tdx_memlist\n1464:\t\t * entries are derived at the time of module initialization) is\n1465:\t\t * not possible. This is because memory offline/online is done\n1466:\t\t * on granularity of 'struct memory_block', and the hotpluggable\n1467:\t\t * memory region (one memblock) must be multiple of memory_block.\n1468:\t\t /\n1469:\t\tlist_for_each_entry(tmb, \u0026tdx_memlist, list) {\n1470:\t\t\tif (start_pfn \u003e= tmb-\u003estart_pfn \u0026\u0026 end_pfn \u003c= tmb-\u003eend_pfn)\n1471:\t\t\t\treturn true;\n1472:\t\t}\n1473:\t\treturn false;\n1474:\t}\n1475:\t\n1476:\tstatic int tdx_memory_notifier(struct notifier_block nb, unsigned long action,\n1477:\t\t\t\t void v)\n1478:\t{\n1479:\t\tstruct memory_notify mn = v;\n1480:\t\n1481:\t\tif (action != MEM_GOING_ONLINE)\n1482:\t\t\treturn NOTIFY_OK;\n1483:\t\n1484:\t\t/\n1485:\t\t Empty list means TDX isn't enabled. Allow any memory\n1486:\t\t * to go online.\n1487:\t\t /\n1488:\t\tif (list_empty(\u0026tdx_memlist))\n1489:\t\t\treturn NOTIFY_OK;\n1490:\t\n1491:\t\t/\n1492:\t\t * The TDX memory configuration is static and can not be\n1493:\t\t * changed. Reject onlining any memory which is outside of\n1494:\t\t * the static configuration whether it supports TDX or not.\n1495:\t\t /\n1496:\t\tif (is_tdx_memory(mn-\u003estart_pfn, mn-\u003estart_pfn + mn-\u003enr_pages))\n1497:\t\t\treturn NOTIFY_OK;\n1498:\t\n1499:\t\treturn NOTIFY_BAD;\n1500:\t}\n1501:\t\n1502:\tstatic struct notifier_block tdx_memory_nb = {\n1503:\t\t.notifier_call = tdx_memory_notifier,\n1504:\t};\n1505:\t\n1506:\tstatic void __init check_tdx_erratum(void)\n1507:\t{\n1508:\t\tu64 basic_msr;\n1509:\t\n1510:\t\t/\n1511:\t\t * These CPUs have an erratum. A partial write from non-TD\n1512:\t\t * software (e.g. via MOVNTI variants or UC/WC mapping) to TDX\n1513:\t\t * private memory poisons that memory, and a subsequent read of\n1514:\t\t * that memory triggers #MC.\n1515:\t\t /\n1516:\t\tswitch (boot_cpu_data.x86_vfm) {\n1517:\t\tcase INTEL_SAPPHIRERAPIDS_X:\n1518:\t\tcase INTEL_EMERALDRAPIDS_X:\n1519:\t\t\tsetup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_TDX_PW_MCE);\n1520:\t\t}\n1521:\t\n1522:\t\t/\n1523:\t\t * Some TDX-capable CPUs have an erratum where the current VMCS is\n1524:\t\t * cleared after calling into P-SEAMLDR.\n1525:\t\t */\n1526:\t\trdmsrq(MSR_IA32_VMX_BASIC, basic_msr);\n1527:\t\tif (!(basic_msr \u0026 VMX_BASIC_NO_SEAMRET_INVD_VMCS))\n1528:\t\t\tsetup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_SEAMRET_INVD_VMCS);\n1529:\t}\n1530:\t\n1531:\tvoid __init tdx_init(void)\n1532:\t{\n1533:\t\tu32 tdx_keyid_start, nr_tdx_keyids;\n1534:\t\tint err;\n" }
15/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 13988 output: 47 thoughts: 13 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those thoughts, as if they're my own: Analyzing `record_keyid_partitioning` Alright, let's pull up `record_keyid_partitioning`. I need to understand what this method is about. "Record" immediately suggests we're dealing with individual data entries, likely in a database or data storage system. The "keyid" part is key – pun intended. It points to the importance of a primary or unique identifier associated with each record, a crucial concept in any organized data structure. Now, the real interest is in "partitioning". This strongly suggests a distribution strategy. I'm thinking about how the records are being divided and distributed across, potentially, multiple storage locations or computational resources. Are we talking about horizontal partitioning? Vertical? Range-based partitioning? Hash-based? The nuances of the chosen method will have significant implications for performance, scalability, and data locality. I need to figure out what factors are driving the partitioning scheme. Is it data volume, query patterns, or maybe even data security considerations? My gut says there are some interesting design choices here, and I'm keen to see the approach.
16/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c", "FirstLine": 1410, "LineCount": 55 } Results: { "Contents": "1410:\t * Some TDX-capable CPUs have an erratum. A write to TDX private\n1411:\t * memory poisons that memory, and a subsequent read of that memory\n1412:\t * triggers #MC.\n1413:\t \n1414:\t Help distinguish erratum-triggered #MCs from a normal hardware one.\n1415:\t * Just print additional message to show such #MC may be result of the\n1416:\t * erratum.\n1417:\t /\n1418:\tconst char tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce m)\n1419:\t{\n1420:\t\tif (!m \|\| !mce_is_memory_error(m) \|\| !mce_usable_address(m))\n1421:\t\t\treturn NULL;\n1422:\t\n1423:\t\tif (!paddr_is_tdx_private(m-\u003eaddr))\n1424:\t\t\treturn NULL;\n1425:\t\n1426:\t\treturn \"TDX private memory error. Possible kernel bug.\";\n1427:\t}\n1428:\t\n1429:\tstatic __init int record_keyid_partitioning(u32 tdx_keyid_start,\n1430:\t\t\t\t\t\t u32 nr_tdx_keyids)\n1431:\t{\n1432:\t\tu32 _nr_mktme_keyids, _tdx_keyid_start, _nr_tdx_keyids;\n1433:\t\tstruct msr val;\n1434:\t\tint ret;\n1435:\t\n1436:\t\t/\n1437:\t\t * IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTIONING:\n1438:\t\t * Bit [31:0]:\tNumber of MKTME KeyIDs.\n1439:\t\t * Bit [63:32]:\tNumber of TDX private KeyIDs.\n1440:\t\t /\n1441:\t\tret = rdmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING, \u0026val.q);\n1442:\t\t_nr_mktme_keyids = val.l;\n1443:\t\t_nr_tdx_keyids = val.h;\n1444:\t\tif (ret \|\| !_nr_tdx_keyids)\n1445:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n1446:\t\n1447:\t\t/ TDX KeyIDs start after the last MKTME KeyID. /\n1448:\t\t_tdx_keyid_start = _nr_mktme_keyids + 1;\n1449:\t\n1450:\t\ttdx_keyid_start = _tdx_keyid_start;\n1451:\t\tnr_tdx_keyids = _nr_tdx_keyids;\n1452:\t\n1453:\t\treturn 0;\n1454:\t}\n1455:\t\n1456:\tstatic bool is_tdx_memory(unsigned long start_pfn, unsigned long end_pfn)\n1457:\t{\n1458:\t\tstruct tdx_memblock tmb;\n1459:\t\n1460:\t\t/\n1461:\t\t This check assumes that the start_pfn\u003c-\u003eend_pfn range does not\n1462:\t\t * cross multiple @tdx_memlist entries. A single memory online\n1463:\t\t * event across multiple memblocks (from which @tdx_memlist\n1464:\t\t * entries are derived at the time of module initialization) is\n" }
17/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 15237 output: 17 thoughts: 719 Thoughts: My Thought Process on Intel TDX Host Emulation Okay, so I'm looking at `record_keyid_partitioning` and it references `MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING`. My immediate question is whether QEMU or GCE even emulate that, or if this is related to Intel TDX Host. Wait, TDX Host is the host support for Intel Trust Domain Extensions, right? Can QEMU pretend to be a TDX host? Can a VM running in standard QEMU or GCE act as a TDX host? This raises the fundamental question: what is an Intel TDX host? It's a host that runs TDX guests! So, can we even do nested TDX? Does QEMU have any support for emulating a TDX host? No, it doesn't. QEMU does not emulate the TDX host components like SEAM, SEAMLDR, or SEAMCALL. And even with nested virtualization, there's no nested TDX support. Okay, time to verify if reaching a TDX host is even possible in QEMU/GCE, or if it requires bare metal TDX hardware. I'll need to check if there are existing syzkaller reviews or common knowledge about this. I remember that "reachability is the primary gate": Fuzzing is only useful if it can execute. We're talking standard virtualization, GCE, QEMU, software devices. The code has to be reachable. Unreachable hardware, like vendor-specific PCIe switches and such that require physical hardware that isn't emulated. Now, what about bare metal CPU features that aren't virtualized or emulated in QEMU? And just to be clear, is TDX guest supported in QEMU? TDX guest (CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_GUEST) is a different beast, it's what runs inside the TD guest VM. TDX host (CONFIG_INTEL_TDX_HOST, arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/ and arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c) runs on the bare metal host. Right, so, can QEMU emulate TDX host functionality? Does QEMU (TCG or KVM) support being a TDX host? No, it requires SEAM (Secure Arbitration Mode) hardware range registers, SEAMRR, MKTME encryption engines, SEAMLDR loaded into SEAMRR by BIOS/firmware, and the SEAMCALL instruction. This executes the TDX module in SEAM mode. Does KVM or QEMU even emulate these components like SEAMRR, SEAM mode, or SEAMCALL? Can KVM run a TDX host inside a nested VM? Let me search the kernel tree for the terms SEAM / SEAMCALL or nested TDX for confirmation.
18/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "SEAMRR" } Results: { "Output": "Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst=16=TDX introduces a new CPU mode called Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) and\nDocumentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst:17:a new isolated range pointed by the SEAM Ranger Register (SEAMRR). A\nDocumentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst-18-CPU-attested software module called 'the TDX module' runs inside the new\n" }
19/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 16727 output: 38 thoughts: 17 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: Diving into the TDX Documentation Alright, time to dig in. I need to get up to speed on Intel's TDX architecture, and the documentation in `Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst` is the logical place to start. I'm going to assume this covers the essential details, but I'm approaching this with a critical eye, already thinking about the architectural implications and potential security considerations. I'm expecting a good overview of the Trusted Domain Extensions – the core components and their interactions, especially from a kernel developer's perspective. I'm hoping it'll detail the memory encryption mechanisms, the attestation flows, and the hardware-enforced isolation. Knowing the current state of the implementation is my primary goal. It's time to see what Intel's cooked up to address the threats to confidential compute!
20/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "Documentation/arch/x86/tdx.rst", "FirstLine": 1, "LineCount": 80 } Results: { "Contents": " 1:\t.. SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\n 2:\t\n 3:\t=====================================\n 4:\tIntel Trust Domain Extensions (TDX)\n 5:\t=====================================\n 6:\t\n 7:\tIntel's Trust Domain Extensions (TDX) protect confidential guest VMs from\n 8:\tthe host and physical attacks by isolating the guest register state and by\n 9:\tencrypting the guest memory. In TDX, a special module running in a special\n 10:\tmode sits between the host and the guest and manages the guest/host\n 11:\tseparation.\n 12:\t\n 13:\tTDX Host Kernel Support\n 14:\t=======================\n 15:\t\n 16:\tTDX introduces a new CPU mode called Secure Arbitration Mode (SEAM) and\n 17:\ta new isolated range pointed by the SEAM Ranger Register (SEAMRR). A\n 18:\tCPU-attested software module called 'the TDX module' runs inside the new\n 19:\tisolated range to provide the functionalities to manage and run protected\n 20:\tVMs.\n 21:\t\n 22:\tTDX also leverages Intel Multi-Key Total Memory Encryption (MKTME) to\n 23:\tprovide crypto-protection to the VMs. TDX reserves part of MKTME KeyIDs\n 24:\tas TDX private KeyIDs, which are only accessible within the SEAM mode.\n 25:\tBIOS is responsible for partitioning legacy MKTME KeyIDs and TDX KeyIDs.\n 26:\t\n 27:\tBefore the TDX module can be used to create and run protected VMs, it\n 28:\tmust be loaded into the isolated range and properly initialized. The TDX\n 29:\tarchitecture doesn't require the BIOS to load the TDX module, but the\n 30:\tkernel assumes it is loaded by the BIOS.\n 31:\t\n 32:\tTDX boot-time detection\n 33:\t-----------------------\n 34:\t\n 35:\tThe kernel detects TDX by detecting TDX private KeyIDs during kernel\n 36:\tboot. Below dmesg shows when TDX is enabled by BIOS::\n 37:\t\n 38:\t [..] virt/tdx: BIOS enabled: private KeyID range: [16, 64)\n 39:\t\n 40:\tTDX module initialization\n 41:\t---------------------------------------\n 42:\t\n 43:\tThe kernel talks to the TDX module via the new SEAMCALL instruction. The\n 44:\tTDX module implements SEAMCALL leaf functions to allow the kernel to\n 45:\tinitialize it.\n 46:\t\n 47:\tIf the TDX module isn't loaded, the SEAMCALL instruction fails with a\n 48:\tspecial error. In this case the kernel fails the module initialization\n 49:\tand reports the module isn't loaded::\n 50:\t\n 51:\t [..] virt/tdx: module not loaded\n 52:\t\n 53:\tInitializing the TDX module consumes roughly ~1/256th system RAM size to\n 54:\tuse it as 'metadata' for the TDX memory. It also takes additional CPU\n 55:\ttime to initialize those metadata along with the TDX module itself. Both\n 56:\tare not trivial. The kernel initializes the TDX module at runtime on\n 57:\tdemand.\n 58:\t\n 59:\tBesides initializing the TDX module, a per-cpu initialization SEAMCALL\n 60:\tmust be done on one cpu before any other SEAMCALLs can be made on that\n 61:\tcpu.\n 62:\t\n 63:\tUser can consult dmesg to see whether the TDX module has been initialized.\n 64:\t\n 65:\tIf the TDX module is initialized successfully, dmesg shows something\n 66:\tlike below::\n 67:\t\n 68:\t [..] virt/tdx: 262668 KBs allocated for PAMT\n 69:\t [..] virt/tdx: TDX-Module initialized\n 70:\t\n 71:\tIf the TDX module failed to initialize, dmesg also shows it failed to\n 72:\tinitialize::\n 73:\t\n 74:\t [..] virt/tdx: TDX-Module initialization failed ...\n 75:\t\n 76:\tTDX module Runtime Update\n 77:\t-------------------------\n 78:\t\n 79:\tSimilar to microcode, the BIOS generally has a copy of the TDX module\n 80:\tin flash. It loads this module image in to RAM at boot. However, just\n" }
21/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 18153 output: 31 thoughts: 877 Thoughts: TDX Host Investigations: Can We Fuzz It? Okay, so I'm looking into Intel's TDX (Trust Domain Extensions). My initial thought is about how the TDX module operates: it lives within an isolated range pointed to by the SEAMRR, and the kernel interacts with it via SEAMCALL, assuming the BIOS does the initial loading. The immediate question is: what kind of hardware is required to even run a TDX Host? From what I'm reading, it's Intel's 4th Gen Xeon Scalable ("Sapphire Rapids") or newer processors, with TDX enabled at the firmware/BIOS level. That's a key restriction. Now, can standard virtualization environments like QEMU or Google Compute Engine (GCE) even emulate or run a TDX Host? Let's break it down: * GCE: GCE offers TDX guest VMs, known as Confidential VMs with TDX. These VMs run within a Trust Domain controlled by Google's host. But importantly, inside that VM, SEAM isn't accessible. So a GCE VM is definitively not a TDX Host. * QEMU: Can QEMU do it? No. QEMU only supports TDX guests, meaning running a TDX guest VM on top of a bare-metal TDX host using `-machine ...,confidential-guest-support=tdx0`. QEMU doesn't have any software emulation of SEAM mode, SEAMRR, or SEAMCALL for guest kernels. Now, I'm thinking about fuzzing TDX-related code. My next question is: can syzkaller be used to fuzz TDX host code? I need to verify what syzkaller's doing with KVM and TDX. I'll search syzkaller syzlang files, look for relevant git commits, and carefully consider syzkaller's triage guidelines. The core principle is reachability: fuzzing only makes sense if the code can actually execute in standard virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU using software-emulated devices. The syzkaller triage guidelines state that structurally unreachable hardware must not be fuzzed. This means: * Vendor-specific PCIe switches, SmartNICs, or GPU drivers (like `mlxsw`, `pds_core`, `qed`, `ionic`, `amdgpu`) are off-limits because they require physical hardware that isn't emulated in standard QEMU. * Unreachable execution paths, like driver teardown callbacks that are only executed during physical hot-unplug, are also off-limits. * Code paths exclusive to architectures other than the target architecture is off-limits. Given these constraints, I'm wondering if TDX host code can be reached without real hardware. I need to check the kernel code to see how it initializes. I'll start with `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c` and `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c`. Specifically, in `tdx_init()`, there's a call to `record_keyid_partitioning()`. This function reads the `MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING` MSR. Now, that's crucial. The question becomes: Does QEMU provide MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING to its guests? I need to search the kernel source and verify whether KVM emulates this MSR for guests. If it doesn't, that code path is unreachable in a virtualized environment.
22/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h-647-/* KeyID partitioning between MKTME and TDX /\narch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h:648:#define MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING\t0x00000087\narch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h-649-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1429=static __init int record_keyid_partitioning(u32 tdx_keyid_start,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1440-\t /\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1441:\tret = rdmsrq_safe(MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING, \u0026val.q);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1442-\t_nr_mktme_keyids = val.l;\n--\ntools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h-647-/ KeyID partitioning between MKTME and TDX */\ntools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h:648:#define MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING\t0x00000087\ntools/arch/x86/include/asm/msr-index.h-649-\n" }
23/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 20274 output: 17 thoughts: 96 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, as if they were my own: Initial Assessment: Missing MKTME Emulation Well, that's interesting. I'm going through the KVM code, specifically looking at how they handle MKTME, and it's strikingly absent. `MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING` isn't emulated anywhere in the KVM codebase. Zero emulation! The only mentions I can find are in the MSR index header file (`msr-index.h`) – as expected for definitions – and within the TDX implementation (`arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c`). Clearly, whatever MKTME-related functionality they're employing is either handled at a lower level or not addressed directly within the standard KVM path. This immediately raises some questions about how they're managing key partitioning within a virtualized environment, especially if TDX is involved. Follow-Up: Investigating SEAMCALL Usage Given the TDX context, let's now investigate how the kernel interacts with the SEAMCALL instruction. This is a crucial area to monitor. I'm going to quickly search the kernel source tree for `seamcall`. This search should help clarify the mechanics of interaction with the TDX environment. Are they directly using `seamcall`, or is it abstracted in some way? The search will help unveil the path for potential vulnerabilities or implementation shortfalls.
24/2	2026/09/25 03:57	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "seamcall" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=2423=static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm kvm, struct td_params td_params,\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:2424:\t\t\t u64 seamcall_err)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2425-{\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2432-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:2433:\tseamcall_err = 0;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2434-\tret = tdx_guest_keyid_alloc();\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2556-\t\t /\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:2557:\t\tseamcall_err = err;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2558-\t\tret = -EINVAL;\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile-1-# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/Makefile:2:obj-y += seamcall.o seamldr.o tdx.o\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-7-/\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:8: __seamcall() - Host-side interface functions to SEAM software\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-9- * (the P-SEAMLDR or the TDX module).\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-10- \narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:11: __seamcall() function ABI:\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-12- \n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-20- /\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:21:SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-22-\tTDX_MODULE_CALL host=1\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:23:SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-24-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-25-/\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:26: __seamcall_ret() - Host-side interface functions to SEAM software\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-27- * (the P-SEAMLDR or the TDX module), with saving output registers to\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-29- \narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:30: __seamcall_ret() function ABI:\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-31- \n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-39- /\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:40:SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall_ret)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-41-\tTDX_MODULE_CALL host=1 ret=1\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:42:SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall_ret)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-43-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:44:/* KVM requires non-instrumentable __seamcall_saved_ret() for TDH.VP.ENTER /\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-45-.section .noinstr.text, \"ax\"\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-47-/\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:48: * __seamcall_saved_ret() - Host-side interface functions to SEAM software\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-49- * (the P-SEAMLDR or the TDX module), with saving output registers to the\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-51- \narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:52: __seamcall_saved_ret() function ABI:\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-53- \n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-61- /\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:62:SYM_FUNC_START(__seamcall_saved_ret)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S-63-\tTDX_MODULE_CALL host=1 ret=1 saved=1\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall.S:64:SYM_FUNC_END(__seamcall_saved_ret)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-19-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:20:u64 __seamcall(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:21:u64 __seamcall_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:22:u64 __seamcall_saved_ret(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-23-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h=24=typedef u64 (sc_func_t)(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-25-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:26:static __always_inline u64 __seamcall_dirty_cache(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-27-\t\t\t\t\t\t struct tdx_module_args args)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h=45=static __always_inline u64 sc_retry(sc_func_t func, u64 fn,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-52-\t\tpreempt_disable();\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:53:\t\tret = __seamcall_dirty_cache(func, fn, args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-54-\t\tpreempt_enable();\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-59-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:60:#define seamcall(_fn, _args)\t\tsc_retry(__seamcall, (_fn), (_args))\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:61:#define seamcall_ret(_fn, _args)\tsc_retry(__seamcall_ret, (_fn), (_args))\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:62:#define seamcall_saved_ret(_fn, _args)\tsc_retry(__seamcall_saved_ret, (_fn), (_args))\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-63-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h=64=typedef void (sc_err_func_t)(u64 fn, u64 err, struct tdx_module_args args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-65-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:66:static inline void seamcall_err(u64 fn, u64 err, struct tdx_module_args args)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-67-{\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-70-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:71:static inline void seamcall_err_ret(u64 fn, u64 err,\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-72-\t\t\t\t struct tdx_module_args args)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-73-{\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:74:\tseamcall_err(fn, err, args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-75-\tpr_err(\"RCX 0x%016llx RDX 0x%016llx R08 0x%016llx\\n\",\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h=81=static __always_inline int sc_retry_prerr(sc_func_t func,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-102-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:103:#define seamcall_prerr(__fn, __args)\t\t\t\t\t\t\\\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:104:\tsc_retry_prerr(__seamcall, seamcall_err, (__fn), (__args))\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-105-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:106:#define seamcall_prerr_ret(__fn, __args)\t\t\t\t\t\\\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h:107:\tsc_retry_prerr(__seamcall_ret, seamcall_err_ret, (__fn), (__args))\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamcall_internal.h-108-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamldr.c-19-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamldr.c:20:#include \"seamcall_internal.h\"\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamldr.c-21-#include \"tdx.h\"\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamldr.c=64=static int seamldr_call(u64 fn, struct tdx_module_args args)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamldr.c-76-\tguard(raw_spinlock)(\u0026seamldr_lock);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamldr.c:77:\treturn seamcall_prerr(fn, args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/seamldr.c-78-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-45-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:46:#include \"seamcall_internal.h\"\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-47-#include \"tdx.h\"\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=77=static int try_init_module_global(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-91-\targs.rcx = 0;\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:92:\tret = seamcall_prerr(TDH_SYS_INIT, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-93-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=115=int tdx_cpu_enable(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-131-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:132:\tret = seamcall_prerr(TDH_SYS_LP_INIT, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-133-\tif (ret)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=330=static int read_sys_metadata_field(u64 field_id, u64 data)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-340-\targs.rdx = field_id;\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:341:\tret = seamcall_prerr_ret(TDH_SYS_RD, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-342-\tif (ret)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1001=static __init int config_tdx_module(struct tdmr_info_list tdmr_list,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1028-\targs.r8 = global_keyid;\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1029:\tret = seamcall_prerr(TDH_SYS_CONFIG, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1030-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1037=static __init int do_global_key_config(void unused)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1040-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1041:\treturn seamcall_prerr(TDH_SYS_KEY_CONFIG, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1042-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1095=static __init int init_tdmr(struct tdmr_info tdmr)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1109-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1110:\t\tret = seamcall_prerr_ret(TDH_SYS_TDMR_INIT, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1111-\t\tif (ret)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1271=int tdx_module_shutdown(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1291-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1292:\tret = seamcall_prerr(TDH_SYS_SHUTDOWN, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1293-\tif (ret)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1309=int tdx_module_run_update(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1313-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1314:\tret = seamcall_prerr(TDH_SYS_UPDATE, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1315-\tif (ret)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1368=static bool paddr_is_tdx_private(unsigned long phys)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1378-\t/ Get page type from the TDX module /\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1379:\tsret = __seamcall_dirty_cache(__seamcall_ret, TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RDMD, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1380-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1628=noinstr u64 tdh_vp_enter(struct tdx_vp td, struct tdx_module_args args)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1631-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1632:\treturn __seamcall_dirty_cache(__seamcall_saved_ret, TDH_VP_ENTER, args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1633-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1636=u64 tdh_mng_addcx(struct tdx_td td, struct page tdcs_page)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1642-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1643:\treturn seamcall(TDH_MNG_ADDCX, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1644-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1647=u64 tdh_mem_page_add(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, kvm_pfn_t pfn, struct page source,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1657-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1658:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_ADD, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1659-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1667=u64 tdh_mem_sept_add(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1676-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1677:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_SEPT_ADD, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1678-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1686=u64 tdh_vp_addcx(struct tdx_vp vp, struct page tdcx_page)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1692-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1693:\treturn seamcall(TDH_VP_ADDCX, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1694-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1697=u64 tdh_mem_page_aug(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1706-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1707:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_AUG, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1708-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1716=u64 tdh_mem_range_block(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1724-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1725:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_RANGE_BLOCK, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1726-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1734=u64 tdh_mng_key_config(struct tdx_td td)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1739-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1740:\treturn seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_CONFIG, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1741-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1744=u64 tdh_mng_create(struct tdx_td td, u16 hkid)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1750-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1751:\treturn seamcall(TDH_MNG_CREATE, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1752-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1755=u64 tdh_vp_create(struct tdx_td td, struct tdx_vp vp)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1761-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1762:\treturn seamcall(TDH_VP_CREATE, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1763-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1766=u64 tdh_mng_rd(struct tdx_td td, u64 field, u64 data)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1773-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1774:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MNG_RD, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1775-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1783=u64 tdh_mr_extend(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, u64 ext_err1, u64 ext_err2)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1790-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1791:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MR_EXTEND, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1792-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1800=u64 tdh_mr_finalize(struct tdx_td td)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1805-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1806:\treturn seamcall(TDH_MR_FINALIZE, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1807-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1810=u64 tdh_vp_flush(struct tdx_vp vp)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1815-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1816:\treturn seamcall(TDH_VP_FLUSH, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1817-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1820=u64 tdh_mng_vpflushdone(struct tdx_td td)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1825-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1826:\treturn seamcall(TDH_MNG_VPFLUSHDONE, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1827-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1830=u64 tdh_mng_key_freeid(struct tdx_td td)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1835-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1836:\treturn seamcall(TDH_MNG_KEY_FREEID, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1837-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1840=u64 tdh_mng_init(struct tdx_td td, u64 td_params, u64 extended_err)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1847-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1848:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MNG_INIT, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1849-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1856=u64 tdh_vp_rd(struct tdx_vp vp, u64 field, u64 data)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1863-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1864:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_VP_RD, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1865-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1873=u64 tdh_vp_wr(struct tdx_vp vp, u64 field, u64 data, u64 mask)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1881-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1882:\treturn seamcall(TDH_VP_WR, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1883-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1886=u64 tdh_vp_init(struct tdx_vp vp, u64 initial_rcx, u32 x2apicid)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1894-\t/ apicid requires version == 1. /\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1895:\treturn seamcall(TDH_VP_INIT \| (1ULL \u003c\u003c TDX_VERSION_SHIFT), \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1896-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1904=u64 tdh_phymem_page_reclaim(struct page page, u64 tdx_pt, u64 tdx_owner, u64 tdx_size)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1910-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1911:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_PHYMEM_PAGE_RECLAIM, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1912-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1921=u64 tdh_mem_track(struct tdx_td td)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1926-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1927:\treturn seamcall(TDH_MEM_TRACK, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1928-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1931=u64 tdh_mem_page_remove(struct tdx_td td, u64 gpa, enum pg_level level,\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1939-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1940:\tret = seamcall_ret(TDH_MEM_PAGE_REMOVE, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1941-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1949=u64 tdh_phymem_cache_wb(bool resume)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1954-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1955:\treturn seamcall(TDH_PHYMEM_CACHE_WB, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1956-}\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1959=void tdx_sys_disable(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1977-\tdo {\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1978:\t\tret = seamcall(TDH_SYS_DISABLE, \u0026args);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1979-\t} while (ret == TDX_INTERRUPTED_RESUMABLE \|\| ret == TDX_SYS_BUSY);\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-10-#define tdcall\t\t.byte 0x66,0x0f,0x01,0xcc\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:11:#define seamcall\t.byte 0x66,0x0f,0x01,0xcf\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-12-\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-88-.if \\host\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:89:.Lseamcall\\@:\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:90:\tseamcall\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-91-\t/\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-101-\t /\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:102:\tjc .Lseamcall_vmfailinvalid\\@\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-103-.else\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-193-.if \\host\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:194:.Lseamcall_vmfailinvalid\\@:\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-195-\tmov $TDX_SEAMCALL_VMFAILINVALID, %rax\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:196:\tjmp .Lseamcall_fail\\@\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-197-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:198:.Lseamcall_trap\\@:\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-199-\t/\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-209-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:210:.Lseamcall_fail\\@:\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-211-.if \\ret \u0026\u0026 \\saved\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-216-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S:217:\t_ASM_EXTABLE_FAULT(.Lseamcall\\@, .Lseamcall_trap\\@)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdxcall.S-218-.endif\t/* \\host */\n" }
25/2	2026/09/25 03:57	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 29921 output: 31 thoughts: 848 Thoughts: Analyzing TDX Host Code in QEMU and GCE Environments Okay, so I'm looking at the Intel TDX Host implementation, specifically in `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c` and `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c`. My initial question is, can this code path actually be executed in a QEMU or GCE environment? Let's break down the boot process. During kernel initialization, `tdx_init()` runs. Inside that function, the call to `record_keyid_partitioning()` is crucial. This attempts to read `MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING`. Now, here's the catch: in standard QEMU or GCE, reading that MSR will fail, causing an error because neither has the actual MKTME/TDX hardware or the necessary MSR emulation. The `rdmsrq_safe()` function will catch the fault and return an error. Consequently, `record_keyid_partitioning()` will return an error, which means `tdx_init()` returns immediately. Critically, this means it won't set the `X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM` CPU capability. Then, when KVM initializes, `tdx_hardware_setup()` will be called. That function checks for the `X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM` feature. Because it wasn't set earlier, the code correctly determines that TDX isn't supported, sets `enable_tdx` to 0, and logs an error. This is important, because if `enable_tdx` is set to 0, no code in `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c` is reached. Similarly, none of the seamcall helpers in `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c` will ever be reached. So, I need to check if there are any ioctls, debugfs entries, or other interfaces that might call TDX host functions indirectly. I need to find all the places where the modified functions are called. The files that were modified are: 1. `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c`: Functions like `tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages` (called during TD teardown) and `tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte` (called during TD EPT leaf removal) are the main focus. 2. `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c`: Functions like `tdx_clflush_page`, `tdx_clflush_pfn`, and calls to them in functions like `tdh_mng_addcx`, `tdh_mem_page_add`, `tdh_mem_sept_add`, `tdh_vp_addcx`, `tdh_mem_page_aug`, `tdh_mng_create`, `tdh_vp_create`, as well as `tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr` and `tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid`, were removed. The pattern is pretty clear: all the removed or modified code snippets are related to TDX host operations. `tdh_` are TD host seamcalls, and `tdx_sept_` and `tdx_reclaim_*` are related to the TDX guest. This means that if QEMU or GCE can run TDX host operations, it would be from the `tdx-host` driver. I'll need to analyze the `drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/` code next.
26/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": ".", "PathPrefix": "drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host" } Results:* { "Output": "drivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig:1:config TDX_HOST_SERVICES\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig:2:\ttristate\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig:3:\tdepends on INTEL_TDX_HOST\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig:4:\tselect FW_LOADER\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig:5:\tselect FW_UPLOAD\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Kconfig:6:\tdefault m\n--\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/Makefile:1:obj-$(CONFIG_TDX_HOST_SERVICES) += tdx-host.o\n--\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:1:// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:2:/\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:3: TDX host user interface driver\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:4: \ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:5: Copyright (C) 2025 Intel Corporation\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:6: /\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:7:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:8:#include \u003clinux/device/faux.h\u003e\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:9:#include \u003clinux/firmware.h\u003e\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:10:#include \u003clinux/module.h\u003e\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:11:#include \u003clinux/sysfs.h\u003e\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:12:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:13:#include \u003casm/cpu_device_id.h\u003e\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:14:#include \u003casm/seamldr.h\u003e\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:15:#include \u003casm/tdx.h\u003e\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:16:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:17:static const struct x86_cpu_id tdx_host_ids[] = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:18:\tX86_MATCH_FEATURE(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM, NULL),\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:19:\t{}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:20:};\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:21:MODULE_DEVICE_TABLE(x86cpu, tdx_host_ids);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:22:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:23:static ssize_t version_show(struct device dev, struct device_attribute attr,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:24:\t\t\t char buf)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:25:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:26:\tconst struct tdx_sys_info tdx_sysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:27:\tconst struct tdx_sys_info_version ver;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:28:\tint ret;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:29:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:30:\tif (!tdx_sysinfo)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:31:\t\treturn -ENXIO;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:32:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:33:\t/\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:34:\t The version number can change during an update.\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:35:\t * Lock out updates while printing the version.\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:36:\t /\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:37:\tseamldr_lock_module_update();\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:38:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:39:\tver = \u0026tdx_sysinfo-\u003eversion;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:40:\tret = sysfs_emit(buf, TDX_VERSION_FMT \"\\n\", ver-\u003emajor_version,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:41:\t\t\t\t\t\t ver-\u003eminor_version,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:42:\t\t\t\t\t\t ver-\u003eupdate_version);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:43:\tseamldr_unlock_module_update();\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:44:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:45:\treturn ret;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:46:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:47:static DEVICE_ATTR_RO(version);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:48:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:49:static struct attribute tdx_host_attrs[] = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:50:\t\u0026dev_attr_version.attr,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:51:\tNULL,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:52:};\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:53:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:54:static const struct attribute_group tdx_host_group = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:55:\t.attrs = tdx_host_attrs,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:56:};\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:57:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:58:static ssize_t seamldr_version_show(struct device dev, struct device_attribute attr,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:59:\t\t\t\t char buf)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:60:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:61:\tstruct seamldr_info info;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:62:\tint ret;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:63:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:64:\tret = seamldr_get_info(\u0026info);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:65:\tif (ret)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:66:\t\treturn ret;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:67:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:68:\treturn sysfs_emit(buf, TDX_VERSION_FMT \"\\n\", info.major_version,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:69:\t\t\t\t\t\t info.minor_version,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:70:\t\t\t\t\t\t info.update_version);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:71:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:72:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:73:static ssize_t num_remaining_updates_show(struct device dev,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:74:\t\t\t\t\t struct device_attribute attr,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:75:\t\t\t\t\t char buf)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:76:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:77:\tstruct seamldr_info info;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:78:\tint ret;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:79:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:80:\tret = seamldr_get_info(\u0026info);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:81:\tif (ret)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:82:\t\treturn ret;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:83:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:84:\treturn sysfs_emit(buf, \"%u\\n\", info.num_remaining_updates);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:85:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:86:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:87:/\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:88: These attributes are intended for managing TDX module updates. Reading\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:89: * them issues a slow, serialized P-SEAMLDR query, so keep them admin-only.\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:90: /\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:91:static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(seamldr_version);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:92:static DEVICE_ATTR_ADMIN_RO(num_remaining_updates);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:93:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:94:static struct attribute seamldr_attrs[] = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:95:\t\u0026dev_attr_seamldr_version.attr,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:96:\t\u0026dev_attr_num_remaining_updates.attr,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:97:\tNULL,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:98:};\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:99:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:100:static bool supports_runtime_update(void)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:101:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:102:\tconst struct tdx_sys_info sysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:103:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:104:\tif (!sysinfo)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:105:\t\treturn false;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:106:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:107:\tif (!tdx_supports_runtime_update(sysinfo))\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:108:\t\treturn false;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:109:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:110:\t/\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:111:\t * This bug makes P-SEAMLDR calls clobber the current VMCS\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:112:\t * which breaks KVM. Avoid P-SEAMLDR calls by hiding all\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:113:\t * attributes if the CPU has this bug.\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:114:\t /\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:115:\tif (boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_SEAMRET_INVD_VMCS))\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:116:\t\treturn false;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:117:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:118:\treturn true;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:119:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:120:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:121:static umode_t seamldr_group_visible(struct kobject kobj, struct attribute attr, int idx)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:122:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:123:\tif (!supports_runtime_update())\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:124:\t\treturn 0;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:125:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:126:\treturn attr-\u003emode;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:127:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:128:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:129:static const struct attribute_group seamldr_group = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:130:\t.attrs = seamldr_attrs,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:131:\t.is_visible = seamldr_group_visible,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:132:};\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:133:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:134:static const struct attribute_group tdx_host_groups[] = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:135:\t\u0026tdx_host_group,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:136:\t\u0026seamldr_group,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:137:\tNULL,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:138:};\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:139:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:140:static enum fw_upload_err tdx_fw_prepare(struct fw_upload fwl,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:141:\t\t\t\t\t const u8 data, u32 data_len)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:142:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:143:\treturn FW_UPLOAD_ERR_NONE;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:144:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:145:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:146:static enum fw_upload_err tdx_fw_write(struct fw_upload fwl, const u8 data,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:147:\t\t\t\t u32 offset, u32 data_len, u32 written)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:148:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:149:\tint ret;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:150:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:151:\tret = seamldr_install_module(data, data_len);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:152:\tswitch (ret) {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:153:\tcase 0:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:154:\t\twritten = data_len;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:155:\t\treturn FW_UPLOAD_ERR_NONE;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:156:\tdefault:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:157:\t\treturn FW_UPLOAD_ERR_FW_INVALID;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:158:\t}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:159:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:160:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:161:static enum fw_upload_err tdx_fw_poll_complete(struct fw_upload fwl)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:162:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:163:\t/\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:164:\t * The upload completed during tdx_fw_write().\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:165:\t * Never poll for completion.\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:166:\t /\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:167:\treturn FW_UPLOAD_ERR_NONE;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:168:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:169:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:170:static void tdx_fw_cancel(struct fw_upload fwl)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:171:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:172:\t/\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:173:\t TDX module updates are not cancellable.\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:174:\t * Provide a no-op callback to satisfy fw_upload_ops.\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:175:\t /\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:176:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:177:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:178:static const struct fw_upload_ops tdx_fw_ops = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:179:\t.prepare\t= tdx_fw_prepare,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:180:\t.write\t\t= tdx_fw_write,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:181:\t.poll_complete\t= tdx_fw_poll_complete,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:182:\t.cancel\t\t= tdx_fw_cancel,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:183:};\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:184:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:185:static void seamldr_deinit(void tdx_fwl)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:186:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:187:\tfirmware_upload_unregister(tdx_fwl);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:188:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:189:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:190:static int seamldr_init(struct device dev)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:191:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:192:\tstruct fw_upload tdx_fwl;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:193:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:194:\tif (!supports_runtime_update())\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:195:\t\treturn 0;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:196:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:197:\ttdx_fwl = firmware_upload_register(THIS_MODULE, dev, \"tdx_module\",\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:198:\t\t\t\t\t \u0026tdx_fw_ops, NULL);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:199:\tif (IS_ERR(tdx_fwl))\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:200:\t\treturn PTR_ERR(tdx_fwl);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:201:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:202:\treturn devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, seamldr_deinit, tdx_fwl);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:203:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:204:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:205:static int tdx_host_probe(struct faux_device fdev)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:206:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:207:\treturn seamldr_init(\u0026fdev-\u003edev);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:208:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:209:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:210:static const struct faux_device_ops tdx_host_ops = {\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:211:\t.probe\t\t= tdx_host_probe,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:212:};\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:213:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:214:static struct faux_device fdev;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:215:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:216:static int __init tdx_host_init(void)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:217:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:218:\tif (!x86_match_cpu(tdx_host_ids) \|\| !tdx_get_sysinfo())\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:219:\t\treturn -ENODEV;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:220:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:221:\tfdev = faux_device_create_with_groups(KBUILD_MODNAME, NULL,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:222:\t\t\t\t\t \u0026tdx_host_ops,\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:223:\t\t\t\t\t tdx_host_groups);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:224:\tif (!fdev)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:225:\t\treturn -ENODEV;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:226:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:227:\treturn 0;\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:228:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:229:module_init(tdx_host_init);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:230:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:231:static void __exit tdx_host_exit(void)\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:232:{\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:233:\tfaux_device_destroy(fdev);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:234:}\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:235:module_exit(tdx_host_exit);\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:236:\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:237:MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"TDX Host Services\");\ndrivers/virt/coco/tdx-host/tdx-host.c:238:MODULE_LICENSE(\"GPL\");\n" }
27/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 38894 output: 36 thoughts: 209 Thoughts: Analyzing TDX Host Initialization and KVM Guest Creation Okay, let's break this down. My initial point of entry is `tdx_host_init`. The critical check here is this: `if (!x86_match_cpu(tdx_host_ids) \|\| !tdx_get_sysinfo()) return -ENODEV;`. This means we're verifying if the CPU supports TDX host features using `tdx_host_ids`, which is keyed to `X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM`. Now, that's where things get interesting, because, in `tdx.c`, `X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM` is only set if `record_keyid_partitioning` succeeds. And `record_keyid_partitioning` needs specific hardware capabilities: it requires MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING, TDX private KeyIDs, and so on. This implies a very specific hardware configuration is necessary for TDX host initialization to succeed. This is all standard stuff, making sure the right bits are present to proceed. But, a thought jumps to mind: How does a TDX guest VM actually get created in KVM? How does that work? Let's switch gears and focus on the KVM side. I should search the `arch/x86/kvm/` directory for `KVM_X86_TDX_VM`. That will be the key to understanding the guest VM creation flow. That should reveal how KVM handles the TDX-specific aspects of creating and running a TDX guest. I need to understand the relationship between the host features I just analyzed and how KVM orchestrates the virtual machine. This is where I'll find the details, I suspect.
28/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "KVM_X86_TDX_VM", "PathPrefix": "arch/x86" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h=927=struct kvm_hyperv_eventfd {\n--\narch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h-974-#define KVM_X86_SNP_VM\t\t4\narch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h:975:#define KVM_X86_TDX_VM\t\t5\narch/x86/include/uapi/asm/kvm.h-976-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/mmu.h=392=static inline bool kvm_has_mirrored_tdp(const struct kvm kvm)\narch/x86/kvm/mmu.h-393-{\narch/x86/kvm/mmu.h:394:\treturn kvm-\u003earch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;\narch/x86/kvm/mmu.h-395-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c=5954=static inline int kvm_mmu_get_tdp_level(struct kvm_vcpu vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c-5957-\narch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c:5958:\tif (vcpu-\u003ekvm-\u003earch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM)\narch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c-5959-\t\tmaxpa = cpuid_query_maxguestphyaddr(vcpu);\n--\narch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c=189=static int kvm_enable_external_write_tracking(struct kvm kvm)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c-194-\narch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c:195:\tif (kvm-\u003earch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM)\narch/x86/kvm/mmu/page_track.c-196-\t\treturn -EOPNOTSUPP;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h=60=static __always_inline bool is_td(struct kvm kvm)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h-61-{\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h:62:\treturn kvm-\u003earch.vm_type == KVM_X86_TDX_VM;\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/common.h-63-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c=1058=static int __init vt_init(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-1078-\t\t\t\t__alignof__(struct vcpu_tdx));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:1079:\t\tkvm_caps.supported_vm_types \|= BIT(KVM_X86_TDX_VM);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-1080-\t}\n" }
29/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 40374 output: 33 thoughts: 227 Thoughts: Investigating KVM/TDX VM Creation Okay, so I'm looking at `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:1079` specifically. I see that the code is conditionally sizing the vCPU structures. If `enable_tdx` is set, it's accounting for the space needed by `struct vcpu_tdx` – making sure `vcpu_size` and `vcpu_align` are sufficient. Crucially, it's also setting the `KVM_X86_TDX_VM` bit in `kvm_caps.supported_vm_types`. The interesting thing is that `KVM_X86_TDX_VM` is ONLY added to `kvm_caps.supported_vm_types` if `enable_tdx` is true. Now, the obvious question is, what happens when a user actually attempts to create a TDX VM using `ioctl(KVM_CREATE_VM, KVM_X86_TDX_VM)`? My immediate concern is whether `supported_vm_types` is checked properly during VM creation. I need to trace this back to the `kvm_arch_init_vm` function, or wherever the `supported_vm_types` field is evaluated during VM setup. I need to understand the control flow and ensure that attempting to create a TDX VM without `enable_tdx` being true is correctly rejected, or that it is properly handled. This is likely a critical security concern.
30/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "supported_vm_types", "PathPrefix": "arch/x86/kvm" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c=3086=void __init sev_hardware_setup(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c-3232-\t\tvm_types \|= BIT(KVM_X86_SNP_VM);\narch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3233:\tvm_types \u0026= sev_firmware_supported_vm_types();\narch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c-3234-\narch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c:3235:\tkvm_caps.supported_vm_types \|= vm_types;\narch/x86/kvm/svm/sev.c-3236-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c=1058=static int __init vt_init(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-1078-\t\t\t\t__alignof__(struct vcpu_tdx));\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c:1079:\t\tkvm_caps.supported_vm_types \|= BIT(KVM_X86_TDX_VM);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/main.c-1080-\t}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c=2193=static bool kvm_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c-2194-{\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c:2195:\treturn type \u003c 32 \u0026\u0026 (kvm_caps.supported_vm_types \u0026 BIT(type));\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c-2196-}\n--\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c=2203=int kvm_vm_ioctl_check_extension(struct kvm kvm, long ext)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c-2404-\tcase KVM_CAP_VM_TYPES:\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c:2405:\t\tr = kvm_caps.supported_vm_types;\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c-2406-\t\tbreak;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c=6999=int kvm_x86_vendor_init(struct kvm_x86_init_ops ops)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c-7062-\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7063:\tkvm_caps.supported_vm_types = BIT(KVM_X86_DEFAULT_VM);\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c-7064-\tkvm_caps.supported_mce_cap = MCG_CTL_P \| MCG_SER_P;\n--\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c-7124-\tif (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_SW_PROTECTED_VM) \u0026\u0026 tdp_mmu_enabled)\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c:7125:\t\tkvm_caps.supported_vm_types \|= BIT(KVM_X86_SW_PROTECTED_VM);\narch/x86/kvm/x86.c-7126-\n" }
31/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 41860 output: 45 thoughts: 319 Thoughts: My Analysis of KVM and TDX VM Type Support Okay, let's break this down. My initial observation is that `kvm_is_vm_type_supported(unsigned long type)` is a simple bit check. It essentially verifies that the requested `type` is within the valid range (less than 32) and that the corresponding bit is set in `kvm_caps.supported_vm_types`. That's a classic bitmasking approach, nothing surprising there. Now, the crucial part is how this `supported_vm_types` field gets populated, and where it's used. In `kvm_dev_ioctl_create_vm`, if `kvm_is_vm_type_supported(type)` returns false, it returns an `-EINVAL` error. Right, that makes perfect sense – we don't want to create VMs of unsupported types. Specifically, I'm interested in `KVM_X86_TDX_VM`. The code indicates that the corresponding bit, `BIT(KVM_X86_TDX_VM)`, is only set if `enable_tdx` is true. This variable acts as a gatekeeper, which is typical for optional features. It means the system's runtime environment controls whether TDX VMs can be created. Following the chain, `enable_tdx` becomes true only if `tdx_hardware_setup()` succeeds. Ah, here's where the platform-specific hardware checks come into play. `tdx_hardware_setup()` first checks for `X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM`. It looks like this flag is set through `tdx_init()` if it can successfully read `MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING` and detect TDX keyids. That MSR access is the telltale sign of interacting with the hardware. The code then calls `__tdx_hardware_setup()` which eventually leads to the `tdx_enable()` function being called. This makes SEAMCALLs. So, the whole process is a layered approach. It starts with a hardware capability check (presence of TDX keyids), then a software setup, and finally a feature enable. The `kvm_is_vm_type_supported()` function is merely the user-facing check that ensures a caller can't create a TDX VM unless all the hardware and software prerequisites are met, which makes for a reasonable and safe approach.
32/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c", "FirstLine": 3370, "LineCount": 50 } Results: { "Contents": "3370:\t\n3371:\t\tif (!(tdx_sysinfo-\u003efeatures.tdx_features0 \u0026 MD_FIELD_ID_FEATURES0_TOPOLOGY_ENUM))\n3372:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n3373:\t\n3374:\t\t/\n3375:\t\t TDX has its own limit of maximum vCPUs it can support for all\n3376:\t\t * TDX guests in addition to KVM_MAX_VCPUS. Userspace needs to\n3377:\t\t * query TDX guest's maximum vCPUs by checking KVM_CAP_MAX_VCPU\n3378:\t\t * extension on per-VM basis.\n3379:\t\t \n3380:\t\t TDX module reports such limit via the MAX_VCPU_PER_TD global\n3381:\t\t * metadata. Different modules may report different values.\n3382:\t\t * Some old module may also not support this metadata (in which\n3383:\t\t * case this limit is U16_MAX).\n3384:\t\t \n3385:\t\t In practice, the reported value reflects the maximum logical\n3386:\t\t * CPUs that ALL the platforms that the module supports can\n3387:\t\t * possibly have.\n3388:\t\t \n3389:\t\t Simply forwarding the MAX_VCPU_PER_TD to userspace could\n3390:\t\t * result in an unpredictable ABI. KVM instead always advertise\n3391:\t\t * the number of logical CPUs the platform has as the maximum\n3392:\t\t * vCPUs for TDX guests.\n3393:\t\t \n3394:\t\t Make sure MAX_VCPU_PER_TD reported by TDX module is not\n3395:\t\t * smaller than the number of logical CPUs, otherwise KVM will\n3396:\t\t * report an unsupported value to userspace.\n3397:\t\t \n3398:\t\t Note, a platform with TDX enabled in the BIOS cannot support\n3399:\t\t * physical CPU hotplug, and TDX requires the BIOS has marked\n3400:\t\t * all logical CPUs in MADT table as enabled. Just use\n3401:\t\t * num_present_cpus() for the number of logical CPUs.\n3402:\t\t */\n3403:\t\ttd_conf = \u0026tdx_sysinfo-\u003etd_conf;\n3404:\t\tif (td_conf-\u003emax_vcpus_per_td \u003c num_present_cpus()) {\n3405:\t\t\tpr_err(\"Disable TDX: MAX_VCPU_PER_TD (%u) smaller than number of logical CPUs (%u).\\n\",\n3406:\t\t\t\t\ttd_conf-\u003emax_vcpus_per_td, num_present_cpus());\n3407:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n3408:\t\t}\n3409:\t\n3410:\t\tif (misc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_TDX, tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids()))\n3411:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n3412:\t\n3413:\t\treturn 0;\n3414:\t}\n3415:\t\n3416:\tint __init tdx_hardware_setup(void)\n3417:\t{\n3418:\t\tint r, i;\n3419:\t\n" }
33/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 43615 output: 45 thoughts: 16 Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and written in the first person: Diving into `__tdx_hardware_setup` Alright, let's get down to brass tacks. I need to understand this `__tdx_hardware_setup` function. The name itself suggests we're dealing with the core initialization of the TDX (Trust Domain Extensions) hardware features. This is where the rubber meets the road, where the low-level configurations that underpin the security and isolation of the TDX environment are likely established. My intuition tells me that this is probably a crucial entry point for bringing up the entire TDX-related stack. It has to handle a wide array of initializations, likely involving the hardware registers, memory mappings, and potential early-stage interrupts. Understanding its flow is going to be paramount in comprehending the larger picture of the TDX initialization sequence and ensuring the secure enclave functionality works as intended. I'll need to dissect each line with precision, as a single misconfiguration here can compromise the entire security model. I'm prepared for complex interactions with the processor's MSRs (Model Specific Registers) and any relevant chipset registers, as those are the tools for configuring the hardware's behavior. Time to delve into the code.
34/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c", "FirstLine": 3335, "LineCount": 40 } Results: { "Contents": "3335:\t}\n3336:\t\n3337:\tvoid tdx_hardware_unsetup(void)\n3338:\t{\n3339:\t\tmisc_cg_set_capacity(MISC_CG_RES_TDX, 0);\n3340:\t}\n3341:\t\n3342:\tstatic int __init __tdx_hardware_setup(void)\n3343:\t{\n3344:\t\tconst struct tdx_sys_info_td_conf td_conf;\n3345:\t\tint i;\n3346:\t\n3347:\t\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c ARRAY_SIZE(tdx_uret_msrs); i++) {\n3348:\t\t\t/\n3349:\t\t\t * Check if MSRs (tdx_uret_msrs) can be saved/restored\n3350:\t\t\t * before returning to user space.\n3351:\t\t\t /\n3352:\t\t\ttdx_uret_msrs[i].slot = kvm_find_user_return_msr(tdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);\n3353:\t\t\tif (tdx_uret_msrs[i].slot == -1) {\n3354:\t\t\t\t/ If any MSR isn't supported, it is a KVM bug /\n3355:\t\t\t\tpr_err(\"MSR %x isn't included by kvm_find_user_return_msr\\n\",\n3356:\t\t\t\t\ttdx_uret_msrs[i].msr);\n3357:\t\t\t\treturn -EIO;\n3358:\t\t\t}\n3359:\t\t}\n3360:\t\n3361:\t\t/ Get TDX global information for later use /\n3362:\t\ttdx_sysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();\n3363:\t\tif (!tdx_sysinfo)\n3364:\t\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n3365:\t\n3366:\t\t/ Check TDX module and KVM capabilities /\n3367:\t\tif (!tdx_get_supported_attrs(\u0026tdx_sysinfo-\u003etd_conf) \|\|\n3368:\t\t !tdx_get_supported_xfam(\u0026tdx_sysinfo-\u003etd_conf))\n3369:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n3370:\t\n3371:\t\tif (!(tdx_sysinfo-\u003efeatures.tdx_features0 \u0026 MD_FIELD_ID_FEATURES0_TOPOLOGY_ENUM))\n3372:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n3373:\t\n3374:\t\t/\n" }
35/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 44620 output: 32 thoughts: 36 Thoughts: Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this process: Investigating a Potential TDX Initialization Issue Okay, so `tdx_get_sysinfo()` is returning NULL. That usually means there's a problem with the TDX environment setup. I know from experience that this function is only valid if `tdx_enable()` has successfully run beforehand. So, the first logical step is to confirm that `tdx_enable()` actually completed without error. We need to go back and verify the initialization sequence. I'll need to double-check the return codes from that earlier call, and also any logging that might exist regarding that setup phase. It's almost certainly not a direct issue with this function call, but rather a dependency on the system being properly initialized. I'm going to look at the surrounding code to trace the call to `tdx_enable()` and its status. I need to understand the environment before this call occurs.
36/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "tdx_get_sysinfo", "PathPrefix": "arch/x86" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h=113=const char tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce m);\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h:114:const struct tdx_sys_info tdx_get_sysinfo(void);\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h-115-\n--\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h=180=static inline const char tdx_dump_mce_info(struct mce m) { return NULL; }\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h:181:static inline const struct tdx_sys_info tdx_get_sysinfo(void) { return NULL; }\narch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h-182-static inline void tdx_sys_disable(void) { }\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=3342=static int __init __tdx_hardware_setup(void)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-3361-\t/* Get TDX global information for later use /\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:3362:\ttdx_sysinfo = tdx_get_sysinfo();\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-3363-\tif (!tdx_sysinfo)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1531=void __init tdx_init(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1587-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1588:const struct tdx_sys_info tdx_get_sysinfo(void)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1589-{\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1594-}\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1595:EXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(tdx_get_sysinfo, \"kvm-intel,tdx-host\");\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1596-\n" }
37/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 45514 output: 47 thoughts: 41 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on examining the `tdx_get_sysinfo` implementation. Dissecting `tdx_get_sysinfo` Right, let's get down to brass tacks. I need to take a look at the `tdx_get_sysinfo` function. Specifically, I'm focusing on its implementation in `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c` at line 1588. I'm assuming this function is crucial for retrieving system information related to TDX, and understanding it is paramount. I'll need to dissect its logic, identify the specific data it's pulling, and how it interacts with the underlying TDX architecture. I expect there's some interaction with the TDX module, perhaps involving VM calls, and I'll need to trace those interactions to understand the information flow. I need to understand how this function is used and called, and what data structures it might be populating. Time to crack open the source and see what's what. Let's start digging.
38/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c", "FirstLine": 1587, "LineCount": 25 } Results: { "Contents": "1587:\t\n1588:\tconst struct tdx_sys_info tdx_get_sysinfo(void)\n1589:\t{\n1590:\t\tif (!tdx_module_state.initialized)\n1591:\t\t\treturn NULL;\n1592:\t\n1593:\t\treturn (const struct tdx_sys_info )\u0026tdx_sysinfo;\n1594:\t}\n1595:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_MODULES(tdx_get_sysinfo, \"kvm-intel,tdx-host\");\n1596:\t\n1597:\tu32 tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids(void)\n1598:\t{\n1599:\t\treturn tdx_nr_guest_keyids;\n1600:\t}\n1601:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdx_get_nr_guest_keyids);\n1602:\t\n1603:\tint tdx_guest_keyid_alloc(void)\n1604:\t{\n1605:\t\treturn ida_alloc_range(\u0026tdx_guest_keyid_pool, tdx_guest_keyid_start,\n1606:\t\t\t\t tdx_guest_keyid_start + tdx_nr_guest_keyids - 1,\n1607:\t\t\t\t GFP_KERNEL);\n1608:\t}\n1609:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL_FOR_KVM(tdx_guest_keyid_alloc);\n1610:\t\n1611:\tvoid tdx_guest_keyid_free(unsigned int keyid)\n" }
39/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 46267 output: 31 thoughts: 57 Thoughts: Okay, here's my assessment of the situation: Initial Assessment of TDX Module Initialization Alright, let's see. My intuition immediately tells me that `tdx_module_state.initialized` will be set to false unless `init_tdx_module()` has successfully run. That's pretty straightforward, a very common pattern for module initialization. Now, the next logical question is where exactly this crucial `init_tdx_module()` function is being called. I need to understand the control flow, so I'll go ahead and use `grep` to quickly identify all instances where `init_tdx_module` is referenced within the codebase. This should give me the context I need to understand the module's initialization sequence and potential points of failure.
40/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "init_tdx_module", "PathPrefix": "arch/x86" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1126=static __init int init_tdmrs(struct tdmr_info_list *tdmr_list)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1144-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1145:static __init int init_tdx_module(void)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1146-{\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1226=static __init int tdx_enable(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1255-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1256:\tret = init_tdx_module();\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1257-\tif (ret) {\n" }
41/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 46800 output: 29 thoughts: 11 Thoughts: Here's my thought process, as if I were considering this question: Tracing the Execution Path of `tdx_enable()` Okay, so I need to figure out where `tdx_enable()` is being invoked. It's a critical function, no doubt, and understanding its call sites is fundamental to grasping the control flow and dependencies within this system. I need to understand its context. I'll need to use a static analysis tool or code search. I can use grep, understand that might be limited if the codebase is extensive or spread across multiple directories, but it's a good place to start. If that proves insufficient, I should switch to something like a cross-reference in my IDE. I should also consider how to identify indirect calls. I might need to look for function pointers or macro expansions that could lead to the function being called. This investigation is essential for determining how this code is executed.
42/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "tdx_enable", "PathPrefix": "arch/x86" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c=1145=static __init int init_tdx_module(void)\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1225-\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1226:static __init int tdx_enable(void)\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1227-{\n--\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1268-}\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c:1269:subsys_initcall(tdx_enable);\narch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c-1270-\n" }
43/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 47257 output: 47 thoughts: 11 Thoughts: Okay, let's break this down. Here's how I'd approach summarizing the prompt, keeping in mind my own expert-level understanding: Analyzing `tdx_enable` Alright, so the core of this seems to be about examining the functionality or implications of something called `tdx_enable`. Without more context, I'm already formulating questions in my mind. What is `tdx_enable`? Is it a command, a setting, a feature flag, or something else entirely? What domain does it belong to? Is it related to hardware, software, a specific operating system, a security protocol, or a particular application? My initial assessment hinges on getting that critical context. Understanding the scope immediately shapes how I'll interpret anything related to it. I'm going to need specifics to provide anything meaningful. The prompt is a jumping off point, I need more data to continue.
44/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	read-file	0m Args: { "File": "arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c", "FirstLine": 1225, "LineCount": 45 } Results: { "Contents": "1225:\t\n1226:\tstatic __init int tdx_enable(void)\n1227:\t{\n1228:\t\tenum cpuhp_state state;\n1229:\t\tint ret;\n1230:\t\n1231:\t\tif (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)) {\n1232:\t\t\tpr_err(\"TDX not supported by the host platform\\n\");\n1233:\t\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n1234:\t\t}\n1235:\t\n1236:\t\tif (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_XSAVE)) {\n1237:\t\t\tpr_err(\"XSAVE is required for TDX\\n\");\n1238:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n1239:\t\t}\n1240:\t\n1241:\t\tif (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_MOVDIR64B)) {\n1242:\t\t\tpr_err(\"MOVDIR64B is required for TDX\\n\");\n1243:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n1244:\t\t}\n1245:\t\n1246:\t\tif (!cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_SELFSNOOP)) {\n1247:\t\t\tpr_err(\"Self-snoop is required for TDX\\n\");\n1248:\t\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n1249:\t\t}\n1250:\t\n1251:\t\tstate = cpuhp_setup_state(CPUHP_AP_ONLINE_DYN, \"virt/tdx:online\",\n1252:\t\t\t\t\t tdx_online_cpu, tdx_offline_cpu);\n1253:\t\tif (state \u003c 0)\n1254:\t\t\treturn state;\n1255:\t\n1256:\t\tret = init_tdx_module();\n1257:\t\tif (ret) {\n1258:\t\t\tpr_err(\"TDX-Module initialization failed (%d)\\n\", ret);\n1259:\t\t\tcpuhp_remove_state(state);\n1260:\t\t\treturn ret;\n1261:\t\t}\n1262:\t\n1263:\t\tregister_syscore(\u0026tdx_syscore);\n1264:\t\n1265:\t\ttdx_module_state.initialized = true;\n1266:\t\tpr_info(\"TDX-Module initialized\\n\");\n1267:\t\treturn 0;\n1268:\t}\n1269:\tsubsys_initcall(tdx_enable);\n" }
45/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 48175 output: 38 thoughts: 732 Thoughts: Analyzing TDX Host Reachability and Fuzzing Relevance Okay, so let's break this down. My initial assessment is that this `tdx_enable()` function is fundamentally inaccessible in our standard fuzzing environments, namely QEMU and GCE. It immediately calls `cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)`. This feature, crucially, is only set if `record_keyid_partitioning()` succeeds during `tdx_init()`. The core of that function involves reading the `MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING` MSR. Now, that's the kicker – that MSR, and the whole MKTME/TDX KeyID partitioning setup, is a bare-metal Intel hardware thing, specifically configured in the BIOS. QEMU and GCE just don't emulate that hardware. Therefore, they don't support TDX host. Furthermore, looking into `init_tdx_module()` it's calling stuff like `seamcall(TDH_SYS_INIT)`. SEAM mode and the `SEAMCALL` instruction are CPU features exclusively found on Intel TDX host hardware. Think Xeon Scalable processors, Sapphire Rapids, Emerald Rapids, Granite Rapids. QEMU definitely doesn't emulate SEAM mode or the `SEAMCALL` instruction. So, from a structural perspective, TDX host code is completely out of reach in our typical virtualized environments. Now, let's circle back and carefully consider Section 1 and Section 2 of what this process is, let's review: "1. CORE TRIAGE PHILOSOPHY The goal of patch fuzzing is to discover crashes, regressions, exposed latent bugs, and newly triggered assertions introduced by the patch series. - REACHABILITY IS THE PRIMARY GATE: Fuzzing can only discover bugs in code that can actually execute in standard virtualized environments (GCE or QEMU, utilizing software-emulated devices like USB gadgets, netdev, tun/tap). If the modified code is structurally unreachable (see Section 2), it MUST NOT be fuzzed, regardless of whether it adds assertions or complex logic. 2. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=false (NEGATIVE CRITERIA) Return WorthFuzzing=false ONLY IF all modified code falls strictly into one or more of these categories: - Non-kernel and non-executable changes: ... - Structurally unreachable hardware: * Vendor-specific PCIe switches, SmartNICs, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed, ionic, amdgpu) requiring physical ASIC/PCIe cards not emulated in standard QEMU. - Unreachable execution paths: * Driver teardown callbacks (.remove, .shutdown, pci_unregister_driver) executed only during physical PCI hot-unplug or manual sysfs driver unbinding. * Code paths exclusive to architectures other than the target architecture." This absolutely falls under the "Structurally unreachable hardware" category. This is Intel TDX host hardware, and we are not on any of these platforms. Therefore, we should return `WorthFuzzing=false` here. But, before I definitively close the books, let's examine the git commit to see what changes this actually entailed. It could be possible it modified something related that is actually reachable. I need to check the git log before I decide. Let's do a quick `git log -n 5` to get the relevant context from the commits.
46/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Error: no matches Args: { "Expression": "commit .", "PathPrefix": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c" } Results:* { "error": "no matches" }
47/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 49739 output: 25 thoughts: 412 Thoughts: Analyzing the TDX Patch Okay, let's dive into this diff. It looks like we're cleaning up some TDX code, specifically related to flushing and invalidating cache lines. I see changes across a few files. First, in `arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h`, we're getting rid of the definitions for `tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr` and `tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid`. Makes sense. Now, let's see where those are used. In `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c`, they are being removed from `tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages` and `tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte` calls. That's good, less code is easier to reason about. Moving on to `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c`, I'm noticing a more substantial cleanup here. We're removing `tdx_clflush_page` and `tdx_clflush_pfn`, and it looks like a whole slew of `tdx_clflush_` calls are being removed before seamcalls in functions like `tdh_mng_addcx`, `tdh_mem_page_add`, and so on. Also, the implementations of the `tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_tdr` and `tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_hkid` functions are being axed. But wait a minute... before I sign off on this, I need to be absolutely* sure. This looks like a significant removal of flushing mechanisms. Removing these calls is probably correct, but I want to verify if they are no longer needed, or if there is something else that is replacing them. Let me do a quick scan of the entire codebase to see if `tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages`, `tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte`, or any other `tdh_` function are being called anywhere else*. Gotta be meticulous with these kinds of changes. Don't want any nasty surprises down the line.
48/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=477=void tdx_mmu_release_hkid(struct kvm kvm)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-549-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:550:static void tdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(struct kvm kvm)\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-551-{\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=586=void tdx_vm_destroy(struct kvm kvm)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-589-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:590:\ttdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(kvm);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-591-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=2423=static int __tdx_td_init(struct kvm kvm, struct td_params *td_params,\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2584-\ttdx_mmu_release_hkid(kvm);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:2585:\ttdx_reclaim_td_control_pages(kvm);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2586-\n" }
49/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 51080 output: 25 thoughts: 15 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and rendered in the first person: Navigating the TDX Landscape: A Targeted Question Alright, let's see. My mind is immediately drawn to the function `tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte`. It's not just a passing thought; I'm implicitly asking myself why it's at the forefront of my mind. Is this related to a current problem, perhaps an optimization consideration? Are we looking at memory management within the TDX environment? The name itself suggests a function responsible for removing leaf Spatial Partitioning Tree Elements (SPTEs). Given the inherent complexity of SPTE management, I'm already mentally running through potential implications: Is it about freeing up resources, managing cache coherency, or preventing memory leaks? This triggers thoughts about how it interacts with other low-level components; what are the design choices? What are the edge cases? I wonder if there are any related bug reports that may influence its design?
50/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte" } Results: { "Output": "arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=1742=static void tdx_track(struct kvm kvm)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-1763-\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:1764:static int tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte(struct kvm kvm, gfn_t gfn,\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-1765-\t\t\t\t enum pg_level level, u64 old_spte)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=1828=static int tdx_sept_set_private_spte(struct kvm kvm, gfn_t gfn, u64 old_spte,\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-1833-\tif (is_shadow_present_pte(old_spte))\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:1834:\t\treturn tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte(kvm, gfn, level, old_spte);\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-1835-\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c=2844=void tdx_flush_tlb_all(struct kvm_vcpu vcpu)\n--\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2846-\t/\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c:2847:\t TDX has called tdx_track() in tdx_sept_remove_leaf_spte() to\narch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c-2848-\t * ensure that private EPT will be flushed on the next TD enter. No need\n" }
51/2	2026/09/25 03:58	llm	patch-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 51840 output: 229 thoughts: 864 Thoughts: TDX Host Code: Unreachable in Standard Virtualized Environments Okay, let's break this down. My analysis tells me that all the code modifications are exclusively tied to the TDX host platform, specifically these files: `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.c`, `arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c`, `arch/x86/include/asm/tdx.h`, and `arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/tdx.h`. I've looked closely at how TDX host functionality integrates and I'm confident in my assessment. The key is reachability. I've considered `record_keyid_partitioning` and it's dependence on reading the `MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING` (0x87). In standard QEMU or GCE environments – and this is critical – we don't have TDX-enabled hardware. Even using `-cpu host` won't change this, unless we are on a bare-metal TDX system, which is not GCE or standard QEMU. Reading that MSR will trigger a GP fault, caught by `rdmsrq_safe`, which returns an error. This failure chain propagates: `setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM)` never gets called, `tdx_enable()` fails during `subsys_initcall` because the CPU feature isn't enabled, and in KVM, `tdx_hardware_setup()` fails as well. That means `enable_tdx` remains zero. Since `enable_tdx` is zero, we can't create a TDX VM via `KVM_CREATE_VM`. We know SEAM mode and `seamcall` also require Intel TDX support and the SEAM firmware. Standard environments can't emulate those. My conclusion is that this modified code is, structurally, unreachable in standard virtualized fuzzing environments. We're talking about hardware-specific features that require the physical presence of a TDX-capable CPU (Sapphire Rapids or newer), with the TDX module loaded in SEAMRR by the BIOS/firmware. No emulation here. Therefore, following triage principles, fuzzing this code is a waste of time. I'm going to set `WorthFuzzing` to `false`. There are no specific configuration options or focus symbols necessary. The reason is straightforward: the code is structurally unreachable in the targeted environments. Everything checks out and the reasoning is solid. I'm ready to call `set-results`.
52/2	2026/09/25 03:58	tool	set-results	0m Args: { "EnableConfigs": [], "FocusSymbols": [], "Reasoning": "The patch modifies Intel TDX host functionality (arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/ and arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c), removing cache flush operations (tdx_clflush_page, tdx_clflush_pfn) and SEAMCALLs (tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_). This code requires Intel TDX host platform hardware support (SEAM mode, SEAMRR, and BIOS-initialized TDX module/KeyID partitioning via MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING). Because standard virtualized fuzzing environments (QEMU, GCE) lack TDX host hardware emulation and SEAMCALL support, X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM is never enabled and KVM TDX initialization fails (enable_tdx remains 0), making all modified code structurally unreachable.", "WorthFuzzing": false } Results:* { "EnableConfigs": null, "FocusSymbols": [], "Reasoning": "The patch modifies Intel TDX host functionality (arch/x86/virt/vmx/tdx/ and arch/x86/kvm/vmx/tdx.c), removing cache flush operations (tdx_clflush_page, tdx_clflush_pfn) and SEAMCALLs (tdh_phymem_page_wbinvd_*). This code requires Intel TDX host platform hardware support (SEAM mode, SEAMRR, and BIOS-initialized TDX module/KeyID partitioning via MSR_IA32_MKTME_KEYID_PARTITIONING). Because standard virtualized fuzzing environments (QEMU, GCE) lack TDX host hardware emulation and SEAMCALL support, X86_FEATURE_TDX_HOST_PLATFORM is never enabled and KVM TDX initialization fails (enable_tdx remains 0), making all modified code structurally unreachable.", "WorthFuzzing": false }
53/1	2026/09/25 03:58	action	If	0m Args: { "WorthFuzzing": false } Results: null

LLM Calls Summary:
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Tool Calls Summary:
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