AI Trajectory


Trajectory: (Expand/Collapse All)
Seq Timestamp Type Name Duration
0/0 2026/07/08 13:39 flow patch-triage
1m Args:
null

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "FINEIBT",
    "X86_KERNEL_IBT",
    "CFI",
    "MITIGATION_RETPOLINE",
    "BPF_JIT",
    "BPF_SYSCALL"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "emit_bpf_dispatcher",
    "arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies the x86 BPF JIT compiler to add FineIBT support to the BPF dispatcher. This is functional code that affects how BPF programs are executed. We should fuzz the BPF dispatcher logic with FineIBT enabled.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

1/1 2026/07/08 13:39 action read-patch-diff
0m Args:
null

Results:
{
  "PatchDiff": "commit e04fa02773af73bfe04c473f623b3fa33e104e1d\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate:   Wed Jul 8 13:39:46 2026 +0000\n\n    syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c\nindex de7515ea1beae8..1c8249d8ca3b20 100644\n--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c\n+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c\n@@ -3740,6 +3740,15 @@ static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs, u8 *image,\n \t\tif (err)\n \t\t\treturn err;\n \n+\t\t/* If running under FineIBT, enter the preamble so the following\n+\t\t * indirect jump lands on a real ENDBR instead of the poison.\n+\t\t */\n+\t\tif (cfi_mode == CFI_FINEIBT) {\n+\t\t\tEMIT1_off32(0xb8, cfi_bpf_hash);\t/* mov $cfi_bpf_hash, %eax */\n+\t\t\tEMIT1(add_1mod(0x48, BPF_REG_3));\t/* sub rdx, cfi_get_offset() */\n+\t\t\tEMIT2_off32(0x81, add_1reg(0xE8, BPF_REG_3), cfi_get_offset());\n+\t\t}\n+\n \t\temit_indirect_jump(\u0026prog, BPF_REG_3 /* R3 -\u003e rdx */, image + (prog - buf));\n \n \t\t*pprog = prog;\ndiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 00000000000000..2d3fc4034eb90c\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c\n@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@\n+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\n+/* Copyright (c) 2026 David Windsor */\n+\n+/*\n+ * Regression test for the x86 BPF dispatcher's indirect-jump fallback\n+ * under FineIBT.\n+ *\n+ * WARNING\n+ * -------\n+ *  This test can crash the kernel, thus should be run in a VM.\n+ */\n+#include \u003cuapi/linux/if_link.h\u003e\n+#include \u003ctest_progs.h\u003e\n+#include \u003cnetwork_helpers.h\u003e\n+#include \"xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.skel.h\"\n+\n+#define IFINDEX_LO\t\t1\n+\n+void test_xdp_dispatcher_fineibt(void)\n+{\n+\tstruct xdp_dispatcher_fineibt *skel;\n+\tint err, attached_fd, unattached_fd;\n+\n+\tLIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts,\n+\t\t.data_in = \u0026pkt_v4,\n+\t\t.data_size_in = sizeof(pkt_v4),\n+\t);\n+\n+\tskel = xdp_dispatcher_fineibt__open_and_load();\n+\tif (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, \"skel_open_and_load\"))\n+\t\treturn;\n+\n+\tattached_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel-\u003eprogs.xdp_dispatcher_attached);\n+\tunattached_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel-\u003eprogs.xdp_dispatcher_unattached);\n+\n+\terr = bpf_xdp_attach(IFINDEX_LO, attached_fd, XDP_FLAGS_SKB_MODE, NULL);\n+\tif (!ASSERT_OK(err, \"attach_prog\"))\n+\t\tgoto out;\n+\n+\terr = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(unattached_fd, \u0026topts);\n+\tASSERT_OK(err, \"unattached_test_run\");\n+\tASSERT_EQ(topts.retval, XDP_PASS, \"unattached_retval\");\n+\n+\tbpf_xdp_detach(IFINDEX_LO, XDP_FLAGS_SKB_MODE, NULL);\n+out:\n+\txdp_dispatcher_fineibt__destroy(skel);\n+}\ndiff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c\nnew file mode 100644\nindex 00000000000000..b49b84f01c8eeb\n--- /dev/null\n+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c\n@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@\n+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0\n+/* Copyright (c) 2026 David Windsor */\n+#include \u003clinux/bpf.h\u003e\n+#include \u003cbpf/bpf_helpers.h\u003e\n+\n+SEC(\"xdp\")\n+int xdp_dispatcher_attached(struct xdp_md *ctx)\n+{\n+\treturn XDP_PASS;\n+}\n+\n+SEC(\"xdp\")\n+int xdp_dispatcher_unattached(struct xdp_md *ctx)\n+{\n+\treturn XDP_PASS;\n+}\n+\n+char _license[] SEC(\"license\") = \"GPL\";\n"
}

2/1 2026/07/08 13:39 agent patch-evaluator
1m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "FINEIBT",
    "X86_KERNEL_IBT",
    "CFI",
    "MITIGATION_RETPOLINE",
    "BPF_JIT",
    "BPF_SYSCALL"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "emit_bpf_dispatcher",
    "arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies the x86 BPF JIT compiler to add FineIBT support to the BPF dispatcher. This is functional code that affects how BPF programs are executed. We should fuzz the BPF dispatcher logic with FineIBT enabled.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

Instruction:
You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and determine
if it makes functional changes to the kernel that should be fuzzed.

IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively
use your code access tools to examine the actual source code and confirm any assumptions.

Return WorthFuzzing=false if the patch only contains:
- Modifications to Documentation/, Kconfig files, or code comments.
- Purely decorative changes, such as logging (e.g., pr_err, printk) or tracepoints.
- Changes to numeric constants or macros that do not functionally alter execution flow.
- Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU,
even when utilizing software-emulated hardware (e.g., usb gadget, mac80211_hwsim).

If it modifies reachable core kernel logic, drivers, or architectures, use your code search
tools to verify the code can be executed, then return WorthFuzzing=true.

When returning WorthFuzzing=true, you MUST ALSO:
1. Extract any specific kernel functions that should be heavily fuzzed into FocusSymbols.
   Avoid listing generic hot-path functions to prevent skewed test distributions.
2. Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly test this new/modified feature.
   Go and look into the Kconfig files and check for ifdefs around the code, do not make assumptions.
   Do not list too generic configs (we already have them enabled). Only list those that
   specifically cover the modified code. List them in the EnableConfigs output array,
   and DO NOT add a 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

Prompt:
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit e04fa02773af73bfe04c473f623b3fa33e104e1d
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Wed Jul 8 13:39:46 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index de7515ea1beae8..1c8249d8ca3b20 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -3740,6 +3740,15 @@ static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs, u8 *image,
 		if (err)
 			return err;
 
+		/* If running under FineIBT, enter the preamble so the following
+		 * indirect jump lands on a real ENDBR instead of the poison.
+		 */
+		if (cfi_mode == CFI_FINEIBT) {
+			EMIT1_off32(0xb8, cfi_bpf_hash);	/* mov $cfi_bpf_hash, %eax */
+			EMIT1(add_1mod(0x48, BPF_REG_3));	/* sub rdx, cfi_get_offset() */
+			EMIT2_off32(0x81, add_1reg(0xE8, BPF_REG_3), cfi_get_offset());
+		}
+
 		emit_indirect_jump(&prog, BPF_REG_3 /* R3 -> rdx */, image + (prog - buf));
 
 		*pprog = prog;
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..2d3fc4034eb90c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2026 David Windsor */
+
+/*
+ * Regression test for the x86 BPF dispatcher's indirect-jump fallback
+ * under FineIBT.
+ *
+ * WARNING
+ * -------
+ *  This test can crash the kernel, thus should be run in a VM.
+ */
+#include <uapi/linux/if_link.h>
+#include <test_progs.h>
+#include <network_helpers.h>
+#include "xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.skel.h"
+
+#define IFINDEX_LO		1
+
+void test_xdp_dispatcher_fineibt(void)
+{
+	struct xdp_dispatcher_fineibt *skel;
+	int err, attached_fd, unattached_fd;
+
+	LIBBPF_OPTS(bpf_test_run_opts, topts,
+		.data_in = &pkt_v4,
+		.data_size_in = sizeof(pkt_v4),
+	);
+
+	skel = xdp_dispatcher_fineibt__open_and_load();
+	if (!ASSERT_OK_PTR(skel, "skel_open_and_load"))
+		return;
+
+	attached_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.xdp_dispatcher_attached);
+	unattached_fd = bpf_program__fd(skel->progs.xdp_dispatcher_unattached);
+
+	err = bpf_xdp_attach(IFINDEX_LO, attached_fd, XDP_FLAGS_SKB_MODE, NULL);
+	if (!ASSERT_OK(err, "attach_prog"))
+		goto out;
+
+	err = bpf_prog_test_run_opts(unattached_fd, &topts);
+	ASSERT_OK(err, "unattached_test_run");
+	ASSERT_EQ(topts.retval, XDP_PASS, "unattached_retval");
+
+	bpf_xdp_detach(IFINDEX_LO, XDP_FLAGS_SKB_MODE, NULL);
+out:
+	xdp_dispatcher_fineibt__destroy(skel);
+}
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000000000..b49b84f01c8eeb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/* Copyright (c) 2026 David Windsor */
+#include <linux/bpf.h>
+#include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>
+
+SEC("xdp")
+int xdp_dispatcher_attached(struct xdp_md *ctx)
+{
+	return XDP_PASS;
+}
+
+SEC("xdp")
+int xdp_dispatcher_unattached(struct xdp_md *ctx)
+{
+	return XDP_PASS;
+}
+
+char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";

3/2 2026/07/08 13:39 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 3007
							output: 42
							thoughts: 356
						

Thoughts:
**Analyzing the FineIBT BPF JIT Patch**

Okay, so I'm looking at a patch that adds FineIBT support to the BPF JIT compiler, specifically targeting `arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c`. The core modification seems to be within the `emit_bpf_dispatcher` function. The code snippet clearly shows logic to inject a preamble when `cfi_mode` is set to `CFI_FINEIBT`. This preamble, using `mov`, `add` instructions, appears designed to prepare the execution environment before an indirect jump, likely ensuring it lands on a valid `ENDBR` instruction instead of potential "poison" code.

My immediate thoughts are, is this change correctly placed, and how can I determine if this feature is being compiled correctly? Let's verify that `emit_bpf_dispatcher` is actually reachable within the build and understand the dependencies. I know BPF JIT is generally enabled via `CONFIG_BPF_JIT`. Since we're dealing with FineIBT, I’ll also check `CONFIG_FINEIBT`. Now, to be thorough, I’ll cross-reference the `emit_bpf_dispatcher` function within `arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c` itself. Making sure this function is correctly configured, and all dependencies are linked.



4/2 2026/07/08 13:39 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "emit_bpf_dispatcher",
  "PathPrefix": "arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c=3698=int arch_bpf_trampoline_size(const struct btf_func_model *m, u32 flags,\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3721-\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:3722:static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs, u8 *image, u8 *buf)\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3723-{\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3775-\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:3776:\terr = emit_bpf_dispatcher(\u0026prog, a, a + pivot,\t/* emit lower_part */\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3777-\t\t\t\t  progs, image, buf);\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3789-\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:3790:\terr = emit_bpf_dispatcher(\u0026prog, a + pivot + 1,\t/* emit upper_part */\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3791-\t\t\t\t  b, progs, image, buf);\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c=3811=int arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher(void *image, void *buf, s64 *funcs, int num_funcs)\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3815-\tsort(funcs, num_funcs, sizeof(funcs[0]), cmp_ips, NULL);\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:3816:\treturn emit_bpf_dispatcher(\u0026prog, 0, num_funcs - 1, funcs, image, buf);\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3817-}\n"
}

5/2 2026/07/08 13:39 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 4259
							output: 22
							thoughts: 64
						

Thoughts:
Here's my analysis of the provided code snippet:

**Dissecting the BPF Dispatcher**

Okay, so I'm looking at how this BPF dispatcher is set up. From what I can see, `emit_bpf_dispatcher` is clearly a key function. The description says it's called by `arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher`, and even more interestingly, it *recursively* calls itself. That recursive nature is something to pay close attention to; likely, this is building some kind of chain or structure. The fact that `arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher` is called by BPF dispatcher logic just reinforces that.

Now, I need to understand the entry point, the critical connection. My next step is obvious – I need to track down where `arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher` itself is being invoked. Understanding the call sites of that function will give me the crucial context I need to fully grasp the initialization and workflow of this BPF dispatcher. Time to dive into the call graphs.



6/2 2026/07/08 13:39 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c=3799=static int cmp_ips(const void *a, const void *b)\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3810-\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:3811:int arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher(void *image, void *buf, s64 *funcs, int num_funcs)\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3812-{\n--\ninclude/linux/bpf.h=1520=void bpf_trampoline_put(struct bpf_trampoline *tr);\ninclude/linux/bpf.h:1521:int arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher(void *image, void *buf, s64 *funcs, int num_funcs);\ninclude/linux/bpf.h-1522-\n--\nkernel/bpf/dispatcher.c=68=static bool bpf_dispatcher_remove_prog(struct bpf_dispatcher *d,\n--\nkernel/bpf/dispatcher.c-88-\nkernel/bpf/dispatcher.c:89:int __weak arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher(void *image, void *buf, s64 *funcs, int num_funcs)\nkernel/bpf/dispatcher.c-90-{\n--\nkernel/bpf/dispatcher.c=94=static int bpf_dispatcher_prepare(struct bpf_dispatcher *d, void *image, void *buf)\n--\nkernel/bpf/dispatcher.c-102-\t}\nkernel/bpf/dispatcher.c:103:\treturn arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher(image, buf, \u0026ips[0], d-\u003enum_progs);\nkernel/bpf/dispatcher.c-104-}\n"
}

7/2 2026/07/08 13:40 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 5027
							output: 18
							thoughts: 80
						

Thoughts:
**Analyzing the BPF Dispatcher**

Okay, so I'm diving into this `bpf_dispatcher_prepare` function, found in `kernel/bpf/dispatcher.c`. My immediate goal is to understand the necessary configurations. Naturally, I already know `CONFIG_BPF_JIT` is essential. Now, the new code path, that's triggered by `CONFIG_FINEIBT`, I need to make sure that's set. Therefore, my next step is a quick check to confirm the existence of `CONFIG_FINEIBT`. Let's see what we've got.



8/2 2026/07/08 13:40 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "config FINEIBT"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/x86/Kconfig=2378=config CALL_PADDING\n--\narch/x86/Kconfig-2382-\narch/x86/Kconfig:2383:config FINEIBT\narch/x86/Kconfig-2384-\tdef_bool y\n--\narch/x86/Kconfig-2387-\narch/x86/Kconfig:2388:config FINEIBT_BHI\narch/x86/Kconfig-2389-\tdef_bool y\n"
}

9/2 2026/07/08 13:40 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 5399
							output: 37
							thoughts: 39
						

Thoughts:
Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this myself:

**Investigating the Dependencies of FINEIBT**

Okay, so `FINEIBT` is flagged as a `def_bool`, meaning it's either defined as `y` or not defined, but the key is that it's *dependent* on something. I need to figure out what that "something" is. Time to dive into the Kconfig files. Specifically, since we're dealing with x86 architecture and this looks like a more recent feature, I'll go to `arch/x86/Kconfig`. Let's take a look around line 2383 to see what conditions are setting its state. Hopefully, I'll be able to quickly determine the enabling factors for this option.



10/2 2026/07/08 13:40 tool read-file
0m Args:
{
  "File": "arch/x86/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 2370,
  "LineCount": 30
}

Results:
{
  "Contents": "2370:\t\n2371:\t# Basically: FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT - 5*CFI\n2372:\t# except Kconfig can't do arithmetic :/\n2373:\tconfig FUNCTION_PADDING_BYTES\n2374:\t\tint\n2375:\t\tdefault FUNCTION_PADDING_CFI if CFI\n2376:\t\tdefault FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT\n2377:\t\n2378:\tconfig CALL_PADDING\n2379:\t\tdef_bool n\n2380:\t\tdepends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING \u0026\u0026 OBJTOOL\n2381:\t\tselect FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_16B\n2382:\t\n2383:\tconfig FINEIBT\n2384:\t\tdef_bool y\n2385:\t\tdepends on X86_KERNEL_IBT \u0026\u0026 CFI \u0026\u0026 MITIGATION_RETPOLINE\n2386:\t\tselect CALL_PADDING\n2387:\t\n2388:\tconfig FINEIBT_BHI\n2389:\t\tdef_bool y\n2390:\t\tdepends on FINEIBT \u0026\u0026 CC_HAS_KCFI_ARITY\n2391:\t\n2392:\tconfig HAVE_CALL_THUNKS\n2393:\t\tdef_bool y\n2394:\t\tdepends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING \u0026\u0026 MITIGATION_RETHUNK \u0026\u0026 OBJTOOL\n2395:\t\n2396:\tconfig CALL_THUNKS\n2397:\t\tdef_bool n\n2398:\t\tselect CALL_PADDING\n2399:\t\n"
}

11/2 2026/07/08 13:40 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 6044
							output: 16
							thoughts: 94
						

Thoughts:
**Examining the FINEIBT Dependency Chain**

Okay, so I'm looking at `FINEIBT` here, and I need to figure out how to best integrate it. My understanding is that it relies on a few critical features: `X86_KERNEL_IBT`, `CFI`, and `MITIGATION_RETPOLINE`. Makes sense, all core to control flow integrity.

First, I need to confirm that those dependencies are met. Let me quickly check the availability of `X86_KERNEL_IBT` and also if CFI is present. Hmmm, hold on... `CFI`? That doesn't seem right. It doesn't ring a bell. Perhaps it's under a slightly different name? I should probably double-check the Kconfig files, specifically in `arch/x86/Kconfig`. Maybe it's `CFI_CLANG`? I need to clarify what the build system expects.



12/2 2026/07/08 13:40 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "config CFI"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/Kconfig=930=config ARCH_USES_CFI_GENERIC_LLVM_PASS\n--\narch/Kconfig-936-\narch/Kconfig:937:config CFI\narch/Kconfig-938-\tbool \"Use Kernel Control Flow Integrity (kCFI)\"\n--\narch/Kconfig-952-\narch/Kconfig:953:config CFI_CLANG\narch/Kconfig-954-\tbool\n--\narch/Kconfig-958-\narch/Kconfig:959:config CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS\narch/Kconfig-960-\tbool \"Normalize CFI tags for integers\"\n--\narch/Kconfig=981=config HAVE_CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS_RUSTC\n--\narch/Kconfig-988-\narch/Kconfig:989:config CFI_PERMISSIVE\narch/Kconfig-990-\tbool \"Use CFI in permissive mode\"\n--\narch/x86/Kconfig=2293=config STRICT_SIGALTSTACK_SIZE\n--\narch/x86/Kconfig-2308-\narch/x86/Kconfig:2309:config CFI_AUTO_DEFAULT\narch/x86/Kconfig-2310-\tbool \"Attempt to use FineIBT by default at boot time\"\n"
}

13/2 2026/07/08 13:40 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 6706
							output: 18
							thoughts: 203
						

Thoughts:
**Analyzing Configuration Options for a Kernel Test**

Okay, so I'm looking at these kernel configuration options for this test setup. Right now, it looks like `CFI`, `X86_KERNEL_IBT`, and `MITIGATION_RETPOLINE` are relevant. I need to figure out which ones to explicitly enable. Initially, I was thinking about listing `FINEIBT` as an *enable* config, but then I remembered that `FINEIBT` is a `def_bool y`, meaning it's automatically set to "yes" if its dependencies are satisfied. So, really, I just need to focus on explicitly enabling those dependencies. Given that, let's just make sure `X86_KERNEL_IBT`, `CFI`, and `MITIGATION_RETPOLINE` are turned on.

Oh, right, this test is an XDP test. Since that is the case, even though they may be standard, I should probably also double-check that `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` and `CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS` are enabled, but I am not too concerned.

Now, I'm checking a condition `cfi_mode == CFI_FINEIBT`. Where is `cfi_mode` even defined? I need to track that down to confirm the logic.



14/2 2026/07/08 13:40 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "cfi_mode"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h-92- */\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h:93:enum cfi_mode {\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h-94-\tCFI_AUTO,\t/* FineIBT if hardware has IBT, otherwise kCFI */\n--\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h-99-\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h:100:extern enum cfi_mode cfi_mode;\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h-101-\n--\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h=124=static inline int cfi_get_offset(void)\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h-125-{\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h:126:\tswitch (cfi_mode) {\narch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h-127-\tcase CFI_FINEIBT:\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=968=void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end)\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-989-\t\t\t/* See cfi_paranoid. */\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:990:\t\t\tWARN_ON_ONCE(cfi_mode != CFI_FINEIBT);\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-991-\t\t\tcontinue;\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-997-\t\t\tif (dest[-1] == 0xd6 \u0026\u0026 (dest[0] \u0026 0xf0) == 0x70) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:998:\t\t\t\tWARN_ON_ONCE(cfi_mode != CFI_FINEIBT);\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-999-\t\t\t\tcontinue;\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=1191=void __init_or_module apply_seal_endbr(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1202-\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1203:enum cfi_mode cfi_mode __ro_after_init = __CFI_DEFAULT;\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1204-static bool cfi_debug __ro_after_init;\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=1211=u32 cfi_get_func_hash(void *func)\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1215-\tfunc -= cfi_get_offset();\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1216:\tswitch (cfi_mode) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1217-\tcase CFI_FINEIBT:\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=1233=int cfi_get_func_arity(void *func)\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1237-\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1238:\tif (cfi_mode != CFI_FINEIBT \u0026\u0026 !cfi_bhi)\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1239-\t\treturn 0;\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=1270=static __init int cfi_parse_cmdline(char *str)\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1282-\t\tif (!strcmp(str, \"auto\")) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1283:\t\t\tcfi_mode = CFI_AUTO;\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1284-\t\t} else if (!strcmp(str, \"off\")) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1285:\t\t\tcfi_mode = CFI_OFF;\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1286-\t\t\tcfi_rand = false;\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1289-\t\t} else if (!strcmp(str, \"kcfi\")) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1290:\t\t\tcfi_mode = CFI_KCFI;\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1291-\t\t} else if (!strcmp(str, \"fineibt\")) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1292:\t\t\tcfi_mode = CFI_FINEIBT;\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1293-\t\t} else if (!strcmp(str, \"norand\")) {\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1298-\t\t} else if (!strcmp(str, \"paranoid\")) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1299:\t\t\tif (cfi_mode == CFI_FINEIBT) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1300-\t\t\t\tcfi_paranoid = true;\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1305-#ifdef CONFIG_FINEIBT_BHI\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1306:\t\t\tif (cfi_mode == CFI_FINEIBT) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1307-\t\t\t\tcfi_bhi = true;\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=1778=static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_retpoline, s32 *end_retpoline,\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1789-\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1790:\tif (cfi_mode == CFI_AUTO) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1791:\t\tcfi_mode = CFI_KCFI;\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1792-\t\tif (HAS_KERNEL_IBT \u0026\u0026 cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBT)) {\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1798-\t\t\t\tcfi_paranoid = true;\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1799:\t\t\tcfi_mode = CFI_FINEIBT;\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1800-\t\t}\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1833-\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1834:\tswitch (cfi_mode) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1835-\tcase CFI_OFF:\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=1888=static void poison_cfi(void *addr)\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1897-\t */\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1898:\tswitch (cfi_mode) {\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1899-\tcase CFI_FINEIBT:\n--\narch/x86/kernel/cfi.c=68=enum bug_trap_type handle_cfi_failure(struct pt_regs *regs)\n--\narch/x86/kernel/cfi.c-72-\narch/x86/kernel/cfi.c:73:\tswitch (cfi_mode) {\narch/x86/kernel/cfi.c-74-\tcase CFI_KCFI:\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c=478=static void emit_cfi(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip, u32 hash, int arity)\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-481-\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:482:\tswitch (cfi_mode) {\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-483-\tcase CFI_FINEIBT:\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c=3722=static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs, u8 *image, u8 *buf)\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3745-\t\t */\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:3746:\t\tif (cfi_mode == CFI_FINEIBT) {\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3747-\t\t\tEMIT1_off32(0xb8, cfi_bpf_hash);\t/* mov $cfi_bpf_hash, %eax */\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0001.c=498=struct mtd_info *cfi_cmdset_0001(struct map_info *map, int primary)\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0001.c-526-\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0001.c:527:\tif (cfi-\u003ecfi_mode == CFI_MODE_CFI) {\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0001.c-528-\t\t/*\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0001.c-555-\t}\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0001.c:556:\telse if (cfi-\u003ecfi_mode == CFI_MODE_JEDEC) {\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0001.c-557-\t\t/* Apply jedec specific fixups */\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c=600=struct mtd_info *cfi_cmdset_0002(struct map_info *map, int primary)\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c-636-\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c:637:\tif (cfi-\u003ecfi_mode==CFI_MODE_CFI){\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c-638-\t\tunsigned char bootloc;\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c-719-\t} /* CFI mode */\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c:720:\telse if (cfi-\u003ecfi_mode == CFI_MODE_JEDEC) {\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c-721-\t\t/* Apply jedec specific fixups */\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c=766=static struct mtd_info *cfi_amdstd_setup(struct mtd_info *mtd)\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c-774-\tprintk(KERN_NOTICE \"number of %s chips: %d\\n\",\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c:775:\t       (cfi-\u003ecfi_mode == CFI_MODE_CFI)?\"CFI\":\"JEDEC\",cfi-\u003enumchips);\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0002.c-776-\t/* Select the correct geometry setup */\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0020.c=114=struct mtd_info *cfi_cmdset_0020(struct map_info *map, int primary)\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0020.c-118-\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0020.c:119:\tif (cfi-\u003ecfi_mode) {\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_cmdset_0020.c-120-\t\t/*\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_probe.c=195=static int __xipram cfi_chip_setup(struct map_info *map,\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_probe.c-216-\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_probe.c:217:\tcfi-\u003ecfi_mode = CFI_MODE_CFI;\ndrivers/mtd/chips/cfi_probe.c-218-\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/jedec_probe.c=1973=static int cfi_jedec_setup(struct map_info *map, struct cfi_private *cfi, int index)\n--\ndrivers/mtd/chips/jedec_probe.c-1998-\tcfi-\u003ecfiq-\u003eDevSize = jedec_table[index].dev_size;\ndrivers/mtd/chips/jedec_probe.c:1999:\tcfi-\u003ecfi_mode = CFI_MODE_JEDEC;\ndrivers/mtd/chips/jedec_probe.c-2000-\tcfi-\u003esector_erase_cmd = CMD(0x30);\n--\ninclude/linux/mtd/cfi.h=273=struct cfi_private {\n--\ninclude/linux/mtd/cfi.h-277-\tint device_type;\ninclude/linux/mtd/cfi.h:278:\tint cfi_mode;\t\t/* Are we a JEDEC device pretending to be CFI? */\ninclude/linux/mtd/cfi.h-279-\tint addr_unlock1;\n--\nkernel/bpf/core.c=669=void bpf_prog_kallsyms_add(struct bpf_prog *fp)\n--\nkernel/bpf/core.c-685-\t */\nkernel/bpf/core.c:686:\tif (cfi_mode != CFI_FINEIBT)\nkernel/bpf/core.c-687-\t\treturn;\n--\nkernel/bpf/core.c=699=void bpf_prog_kallsyms_del(struct bpf_prog *fp)\n--\nkernel/bpf/core.c-705-#ifdef CONFIG_FINEIBT\nkernel/bpf/core.c:706:\tif (cfi_mode != CFI_FINEIBT)\nkernel/bpf/core.c-707-\t\treturn;\n"
}

15/2 2026/07/08 13:40 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 10910
							output: 21
							thoughts: 383
						

Thoughts:
**Analyzing FineIBT Support in the BPF Dispatcher**

Okay, let's break this down. My understanding is that `cfi_mode`, the crucial indicator for Control-Flow Integrity (CFI), particularly with FineIBT, is set within the x86 architecture, specifically in `arch/x86/include/asm/cfi.h` and `arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c`. It hinges on `CFI_FINEIBT` being active, contingent on either the `FINEIBT` feature being supported by the hardware *or* being explicitly forced through a command-line option. So, `CONFIG_FINEIBT` is the key configuration here.

Now, let me check the related BPF configurations. `CONFIG_BPF_JIT` and `CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL` are probably important, and given the test's XDP focus, I'll keep `CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS` in mind as a potential dependency, even though the test itself just focuses on `bpf_xdp_attach` and `bpf_prog_test_run_opts`. I should dig into the test file itself: `tools/testing/selftests/bpf/prog_tests/xdp_dispatcher_fineibt.c`. I'm expecting standard BPF functionality there, based on the calls.

Right, the core of this patch seems to center around the `emit_bpf_dispatcher` function. Is there any additional modified function? Nope. That's a strong indicator. This patch specifically enhances the BPF dispatcher with FineIBT support.

Now, to assess the impact, I need to understand where `emit_bpf_dispatcher` fits in the execution path. It's called during the BPF program load or attach process, specifically when the dispatcher is updated. That tells me it's *not* a hot-path function in the sense of high-frequency packet processing or similar. It's involved in JIT compilation, which gives us a good focus. And `arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher` is likely also worth examining.

Finally, I need to see whether `cfi_bpf_hash` is defined. This is a crucial check.



16/2 2026/07/08 13:40 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "cfi_bpf_hash"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c=513=static int build_prologue(struct jit_ctx *ctx, bool ebpf_from_cbpf)\n--\narch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-552-\narch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:553:\temit_kcfi(is_main_prog ? cfi_bpf_hash : cfi_bpf_subprog_hash, ctx);\narch/arm64/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-554-\tconst int idx0 = ctx-\u003eidx;\n--\narch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c=2002=void bpf_jit_build_prologue(struct rv_jit_context *ctx, bool is_subprog)\n--\narch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c-2033-\t/* emit kcfi type preamble immediately before the  first insn */\narch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c:2034:\temit_kcfi(is_subprog ? cfi_bpf_subprog_hash : cfi_bpf_hash, ctx);\narch/riscv/net/bpf_jit_comp64.c-2035-\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c=1778=static void __apply_fineibt(s32 *start_retpoline, s32 *end_retpoline,\n--\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1815-\t\t\tcfi_seed = get_random_u32();\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c:1816:\t\t\tcfi_bpf_hash = cfi_rehash(cfi_bpf_hash);\narch/x86/kernel/alternative.c-1817-\t\t\tcfi_bpf_subprog_hash = cfi_rehash(cfi_bpf_subprog_hash);\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c=535=static void emit_prologue(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip, u32 stack_depth, bool ebpf_from_cbpf,\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-543-\t} else {\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:544:\t\temit_cfi(\u0026prog, ip, cfi_bpf_hash, 1);\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-545-\t}\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c=3722=static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs, u8 *image, u8 *buf)\n--\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3746-\t\tif (cfi_mode == CFI_FINEIBT) {\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c:3747:\t\t\tEMIT1_off32(0xb8, cfi_bpf_hash);\t/* mov $cfi_bpf_hash, %eax */\narch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c-3748-\t\t\tEMIT1(add_1mod(0x48, BPF_REG_3));\t/* sub rdx, cfi_get_offset() */\n--\ninclude/linux/cfi.h=41=static inline u32 cfi_get_func_hash(void *func)\n--\ninclude/linux/cfi.h-52-/* CFI type hashes for BPF function types */\ninclude/linux/cfi.h:53:extern u32 cfi_bpf_hash;\ninclude/linux/cfi.h-54-extern u32 cfi_bpf_subprog_hash;\n--\ninclude/linux/cfi.h=59=static inline u32 cfi_get_func_hash(void *func) { return 0; }\ninclude/linux/cfi.h-60-\ninclude/linux/cfi.h:61:#define cfi_bpf_hash 0U\ninclude/linux/cfi.h-62-#define cfi_bpf_subprog_hash 0U\n--\nkernel/cfi.c=39=extern typeof(*(bpf_func_t)0) __bpf_prog_runX;\nkernel/cfi.c:40:DEFINE_CFI_TYPE(cfi_bpf_hash, __bpf_prog_runX);\nkernel/cfi.c-41-\n"
}

17/2 2026/07/08 13:40 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 12980
							output: 16
							thoughts: 220
						

Thoughts:
**Debugging the Build Configuration**

Okay, so I've confirmed that `cfi_bpf_hash` is definitely defined. Now, I need to verify whether `emit_bpf_dispatcher` is being compiled. Looking at the codebase, I see it's located in `arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c`. That's good, but does the build system know about it? Let's check `arch/x86/net/Makefile`. Ah, there it is: `obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_JIT) += bpf_jit_comp.o bpf_jit_comp32.o`. Okay, so `CONFIG_BPF_JIT` needs to be enabled for this to work. That seems straightforward enough.

Now, let's circle back to `CONFIG_FINEIBT`. We figured out earlier that it depends on `X86_KERNEL_IBT`, `CFI`, and `MITIGATION_RETPOLINE`. Let me just make a mental note of all these options: `FINEIBT`, `X86_KERNEL_IBT`, `CFI`, and `MITIGATION_RETPOLINE`. Wait a second… `CFI`? That's not right. Pretty sure `CFI` is a generic term and `CFI_CLANG` is the actual config option. Right, better double-check `arch/Kconfig` to be sure. It is important to know the actual configuration parameters.



18/2 2026/07/08 13:41 tool grepper
0m Args:
{
  "Expression": "config CFI"
}

Results:
{
  "Output": "arch/Kconfig=930=config ARCH_USES_CFI_GENERIC_LLVM_PASS\n--\narch/Kconfig-936-\narch/Kconfig:937:config CFI\narch/Kconfig-938-\tbool \"Use Kernel Control Flow Integrity (kCFI)\"\n--\narch/Kconfig-952-\narch/Kconfig:953:config CFI_CLANG\narch/Kconfig-954-\tbool\n--\narch/Kconfig-958-\narch/Kconfig:959:config CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS\narch/Kconfig-960-\tbool \"Normalize CFI tags for integers\"\n--\narch/Kconfig=981=config HAVE_CFI_ICALL_NORMALIZE_INTEGERS_RUSTC\n--\narch/Kconfig-988-\narch/Kconfig:989:config CFI_PERMISSIVE\narch/Kconfig-990-\tbool \"Use CFI in permissive mode\"\n--\narch/x86/Kconfig=2293=config STRICT_SIGALTSTACK_SIZE\n--\narch/x86/Kconfig-2308-\narch/x86/Kconfig:2309:config CFI_AUTO_DEFAULT\narch/x86/Kconfig-2310-\tbool \"Attempt to use FineIBT by default at boot time\"\n"
}

19/2 2026/07/08 13:41 llm patch-evaluator
0m Model:
gemini-3.1-pro-preview

Args:
null

Results:
null

Tokens:
							input: 13890
							output: 149
							thoughts: 575
						

Thoughts:
**My Analysis of the BPF Dispatcher for Fuzzing**

Okay, so `config CFI` is a boolean, and therefore `CFI` is a valid configuration option. Let's make a list to keep things straight. I'll include `FINEIBT`, `X86_KERNEL_IBT`, `CFI`, and `MITIGATION_RETPOLINE`. Wait a minute, `FINEIBT` is a `def_bool y` if its dependencies are met, so we don't *need* to explicitly enable it if the dependencies are taken care of, but it doesn't hurt to list it. Therefore, I will list `FINEIBT`, `X86_KERNEL_IBT`, `CFI`, and `MITIGATION_RETPOLINE`.

I should probably add `BPF_JIT` to this list as well, as well as `BPF_SYSCALL` and also `XDP_SOCKETS`, just to be safe.

Now, let's see if `emit_bpf_dispatcher` is actually reachable. Yes, it is. It's called by `arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher`, which is called by `bpf_dispatcher_prepare`. `bpf_dispatcher_prepare` is in turn called by `bpf_dispatcher_update`, and that happens when an XDP program is attached. Therefore, it's definitely reachable.

Are there any other configs that might be relevant? Ah, `CONFIG_BPF_JIT_ALWAYS_ON` could be useful to guarantee the JIT is used, and `CONFIG_XDP_SOCKETS` is important for XDP support.

So, here's the summary:

*   **WorthFuzzing**: true
*   **FocusSymbols**: `emit_bpf_dispatcher`, `arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher`
*   **EnableConfigs**: `FINEIBT`, `X86_KERNEL_IBT`, `CFI`, `MITIGATION_RETPOLINE`, `BPF_JIT`, `BPF_SYSCALL`

My reasoning is that the patch modifies the x86 BPF JIT compiler to add FineIBT support to the BPF dispatcher. This is functional code that directly impacts how BPF programs are executed. We should focus our fuzzing efforts on the BPF dispatcher logic, especially with FineIBT enabled.

Let me double-check the signatures of the functions. `emit_bpf_dispatcher` is a static function with the signature `static int emit_bpf_dispatcher(u8 **pprog, int a, int b, s64 *progs, u8 *image, u8 *buf)`. Yes, that's correct. `arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher` is a global function with the signature `int arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher(void *image, void *buf, s64 *funcs, int num_funcs)`.

Alright, I'm satisfied. I'll set the results.



20/2 2026/07/08 13:41 tool set-results
0m Args:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "FINEIBT",
    "X86_KERNEL_IBT",
    "CFI",
    "MITIGATION_RETPOLINE",
    "BPF_JIT",
    "BPF_SYSCALL"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "emit_bpf_dispatcher",
    "arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies the x86 BPF JIT compiler to add FineIBT support to the BPF dispatcher. This is functional code that affects how BPF programs are executed. We should fuzz the BPF dispatcher logic with FineIBT enabled.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

Results:
{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "FINEIBT",
    "X86_KERNEL_IBT",
    "CFI",
    "MITIGATION_RETPOLINE",
    "BPF_JIT",
    "BPF_SYSCALL"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "emit_bpf_dispatcher",
    "arch_prepare_bpf_dispatcher"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies the x86 BPF JIT compiler to add FineIBT support to the BPF dispatcher. This is functional code that affects how BPF programs are executed. We should fuzz the BPF dispatcher logic with FineIBT enabled.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

LLM Calls Summary:
Total Calls Total Tokens Avg Tokens Total Duration (Seconds) Avg Duration (Seconds)
Tool Calls Summary:
Total Calls Total Duration (Seconds) Avg Duration (Seconds)