AI Trajectory

Trajectory: (Expand/Collapse All)
Seq	Timestamp	Type	Name	Duration
0/0	2026/10/03 16:21	flow	finding-triage	0m Args: null Results: { "Introduced": false, "Reasoning": "The crash report indicates an RCU CPU stall warning (`rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:`) accompanied by a softlockup taint. The NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 executing an ioctl syscall under heavy memory allocation/quarantine stress (`tomoyo_realpath_from_path` -\u003e `__kmalloc_noprof` -\u003e `kasan_quarantine_reduce` -\u003e `__reset_page_owner` -\u003e `stack_trace_save` -\u003e `unwind_next_frame`), with an APIC timer interrupt attempting lock acquisition.\n\nThe patch under test modifies only `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c` to zeroize the stack-allocated `chacha_state` in `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt()` before returning. That function is exclusively used in WireGuard cookie verification and crypto kunit tests, none of which are present in the stack trace. The tested patch is entirely unrelated to the RCU stall, memory allocation, page owner tracking, or the GRED queueing discipline." }
1/1	2026/10/03 16:21	action	prepare-finding-overview	0m Args: null Results: { "DiffStat": "lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c \| 5 ++++-\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)", "HasCover": false, "PatchCount": 1, "PatchList": "The patch series contains 1 patch:\n[1] [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Fix missing state zeroization in xchacha decrypt" }
2/1	2026/10/03 16:21	agent	finding-triage-evaluator	0m Model: core Args: null Results: { "Introduced": false, "Reasoning": "The crash report indicates an RCU CPU stall warning (`rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:`) accompanied by a softlockup taint. The NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 executing an ioctl syscall under heavy memory allocation/quarantine stress (`tomoyo_realpath_from_path` -\u003e `__kmalloc_noprof` -\u003e `kasan_quarantine_reduce` -\u003e `__reset_page_owner` -\u003e `stack_trace_save` -\u003e `unwind_next_frame`), with an APIC timer interrupt attempting lock acquisition.\n\nThe patch under test modifies only `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c` to zeroize the stack-allocated `chacha_state` in `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt()` before returning. That function is exclusively used in WireGuard cookie verification and crypto kunit tests, none of which are present in the stack trace. The tested patch is entirely unrelated to the RCU stall, memory allocation, page owner tracking, or the GRED queueing discipline." } Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer specializing in crash triage and root-cause analysis. Your job is to review a kernel crash report (finding) and determine if it was introduced / caused by the patch series being tested, or if it is a pre-existing / unrelated bug. IMPORTANT: The entire patch series has ALREADY been applied and committed as a single squashed commit at HEAD (or on top of the base commit) in your workspace. Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively use your tools to examine the source code, inspect workspace diffs, and confirm any assumptions. Available Tools: - git-show: View the squashed patch series commit or historical commits. Call with Commit="HEAD" (default) and optional 'File' parameter to restrict the diff to a specific file or directory, or 'Stat=true' for a diffstat. - series-patches: Browse the original patch series. Call without arguments to list all patch titles, or PatchNum=<N> to view the full description and diff of a specific patch (or cover letter, if present). - read-file & codesearch-dir-index: Read exact source code files and directory contents in the workspace. - grepper: Regex search across files in the workspace (git grep). - git-blame: Inspect line authorship and find which commit last modified specific lines of code. Triage Procedure: 1. Analyze the Crash Report: - Identify the crash type (e.g. NULL dereference, KASAN use-after-free, out-of-bounds read/write, assertion failure, deadlock). - Carefully examine the stack trace(s) — both the faulting call stack and, if applicable (e.g., KASAN UAF), the allocation and free stacks. - Note the faulting function, file name, line numbers, and the specific variables or data structures involved. 2. Inspect Workspace Changes & Patch Series: - Check if any files or functions from the stack trace appear in the modified files overview or the patch series. - Use git-show with Commit="HEAD" and 'File' to inspect the exact diffs for relevant files in the squashed commit. - If needed, use series-patches with PatchNum=<N> to inspect the author's commit description and rationale for individual patches in the series. - Use read-file to inspect the actual source code at the faulting lines. 3. Determine Causality: - Set Introduced=true ONLY IF you are absolutely certain: * There is clear, unambiguous, and conclusive evidence that the crash was directly introduced or caused by the patch series. * The crash occurs directly in new or modified code introduced by the patch series, or the patch series altered data structures, locking, object lifetimes, or preconditions in a way that directly triggered the failure in existing code. - Set Introduced=false IF: * There is any doubt, ambiguity, or lack of conclusive proof that the patch series caused the bug. * The crash occurs in an unrelated subsystem or unmodified code path whose behavior is independent of the patch series. * The crash is a pre-existing kernel issue that was randomly triggered during fuzzing. 4. Formulate Output: - Set Introduced to true or false. - In Reasoning, provide a clear, step-by-step technical explanation detailing the crash type, the key stack frames, whether the affected code/structures were modified by the patch series, and the causal justification for your verdict. Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips. Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis. It must be called exactly once before the final reply. Ignore results of this tool. Prompt: Target architecture: amd64 The kernel crash report to triage is: GRED: Unable to relocate VQ 0x0 after dequeue, screwing up backlog GRED: Unable to relocate VQ 0x0 after dequeue, screwing up backlog GRED: Unable to relocate VQ 0x0 after dequeue, screwing up backlog rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: rcu: (detected by 1, t=10502 jiffies, g=55273, q=499 ncpus=2) rcu: All QSes seen, last rcu_preempt kthread activity 10496 (4294974404-4294963908), jiffies_till_next_fqs=1, root ->qsmask 0x0 rcu: rcu_preempt kthread timer wakeup didn't happen for 10495 jiffies! g55273 f0x2 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=R rcu: Possible timer handling issue on cpu=0 timer-softirq=15880 rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10496 jiffies! g55273 f0x2 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=R ->cpu=0 rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior. rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump: task:rcu_preempt state:R stack:27688 pid:17 tgid:17 ppid:2 task_flags:0x208040 flags:0x00080000 Call Trace: <TASK> __schedule+0x17db/0x58f0 schedule+0x164/0x2b0 schedule_timeout+0x152/0x2c0 rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x30c/0x11f0 rcu_gp_kthread+0x9e/0x2b0 kthread+0x38b/0x480 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 </TASK> rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran: Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0: NMI backtrace for cpu 0 CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13046 Comm: syz.4.2290 Tainted: G L syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014 RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x33e/0x2de0 Code: 0b 00 00 41 83 fe 31 48 89 74 24 20 0f 83 54 28 00 00 4c 89 74 24 38 4b 8d 04 b6 89 f1 81 e1 ff 1f 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 e0 ff ff <49> 23 54 c5 20 48 09 ca 49 89 54 c5 20 4d 89 44 c5 08 48 8b 54 24 RSP: 0018:ffffc90000007b08 EFLAGS: 00000046 RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000 RDX: ffffffffffffe000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000001879a0fc RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff84eb5f27 R09: 0000000000000001 R10: ffffc90000007d20 R11: fffff52000000fa6 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: ffff88811a0929b0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: ffff88811a091e00 FS: 00007f87d16536c0(0000) GS:ffff88818d6c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000 CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033 CR2: 00007f87d1631ff8 CR3: 00000001162f4000 CR4: 00000000000006f0 DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000 DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600 Call Trace: <IRQ> lock_acquire+0x115/0x350 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x40/0x60 debug_object_activate+0xb7/0x420 enqueue_hrtimer+0xa9/0x2c0 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x4ce/0xa10 hrtimer_interrupt+0x4cd/0xaa0 __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x102/0x430 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa1/0xc0 </IRQ> <TASK> asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20 RIP: 0010:unwind_next_frame+0x4f4/0x2550 Code: 89 c1 48 c1 f9 02 48 c1 e8 3f 48 01 c8 48 83 e0 fe 49 8d 1c 47 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 0f b6 04 08 <84> c0 75 27 48 63 03 48 01 d8 48 8d 4b 04 48 39 e8 4c 0f 46 f9 48 RSP: 0018:ffffc90007c775c0 EFLAGS: 00000a02 RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff909d2aa0 RCX: dffffc0000000000 RDX: ffffffff909d2a94 RSI: ffffffff9120b748 RDI: ffffffff8c6dad20 RBP: ffffffff82383197 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: ffffc90007c776b8 R11: ffffffff81b2c450 R12: ffffffff909d2aac R13: ffffffff909d2a94 R14: ffffc90007c77668 R15: ffffffff909d2a94 arch_stack_walk+0x11b/0x150 stack_trace_save+0xa9/0x100 save_stack+0x122/0x230 __reset_page_owner+0x71/0x1f0 __free_frozen_pages+0xc93/0xd90 __slab_free+0x274/0x2c0 qlist_free_all+0x99/0x100 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80 __kmalloc_noprof+0x307/0x720 tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0xef/0x640 tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x246/0x5f0 security_file_ioctl+0xc3/0x2a0 __se_sys_ioctl+0x47/0x170 do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f RIP: 0033:0x7f87d079e159 Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48 RSP: 002b:00007f87d1653028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010 RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f87d0a25fa0 RCX: 00007f87d079e159 RDX: 0000200000000200 RSI: 0000000000008914 RDI: 0000000000000004 RBP: 00007f87d083506b R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000 R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000 R13: 00007f87d0a26038 R14: 00007f87d0a25fa0 R15: 00007ffd5c2ebdb8 </TASK> Overview of modified files in the workspace: lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c \| 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) The patch series contains 1 patch: [1] [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Fix missing state zeroization in xchacha decrypt
3/2	2026/10/03 16:21	llm	finding-triage-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 5481 output: 26 thoughts: 71 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this crash report. Analyzing the Scene Right, first things first, let's get a handle on the landscape. I need to understand the context of the crash, starting with the patch series and the specific files that were touched. It looks like we're zeroing in on a critical section, `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c`. Okay, that rings a bell. ChaCha20-Poly1305, a fundamental part of our cryptographic machinery...interesting. Now, I'll use `series-patches` and `git-show` to visually dissect the changes applied to that file. We'll examine the specific lines that were added, removed, or modified. Understanding this diff will be key to understanding how things might have gone sideways. Knowing exactly what got changed in this critical module will likely give us the leverage we need to identify the root cause. This is where the real detective work begins.
4/2	2026/10/03 16:21	tool	series-patches	0m Error: missing argument "PatchNum" Args: null Results: { "error": "missing argument \"PatchNum\"" }
5/2	2026/10/03 16:21	tool	git-show	0m Args: { "Commit": "HEAD" } Results: { "Output": "commit bcf2711dfcd531fc0c8900e1f36af24231e4a795\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate: Sat Oct 3 16:20:52 2026 +0000\n\n syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\nindex ea42a28f4ff7d..03b14d272520b 100644\n--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\n+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\n@@ -199,10 +199,13 @@ bool xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 dst, const u8 src, const size_t src_len,\n \t\t\t const u8 key[at_least CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])\n {\n \tstruct chacha_state chacha_state;\n+\tbool ret;\n \n \txchacha_init(\u0026chacha_state, key, nonce);\n-\treturn __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,\n+\tret = __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,\n \t\t\t\t\t \u0026chacha_state);\n+\tchacha_zeroize_state(\u0026chacha_state);\n+\treturn ret;\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL(xchacha20poly1305_decrypt);\n \n" }
6/2	2026/10/03 16:21	llm	finding-triage-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 6242 output: 15 thoughts: 17 Thoughts: Here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience: Investigating Series Patches Okay, so I'm digging into this area... and I'm thinking, beyond the established queries, let's drill down specifically on the `series-patches` data. The focus should be on `PatchNum=1` initially. This feels like a good starting point for a deeper dive. It allows me to pinpoint a specific point in the patch series. From there, I can begin to observe trends and patterns more effectively. This allows for a deeper understanding of the relationships between the two entities in question.
7/2	2026/10/03 16:21	tool	series-patches	0m Args: { "PatchNum": 1 } Results: { "Output": "Patch [1] [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Fix missing state zeroization in xchacha decrypt:\n\nThe `__chacha20poly1305_decrypt` function does not zeroize the chacha\nstate, unlike its encrypt counterpart. The regular\n`chacha20poly1305_decrypt` function handles this by manually calling\nchacha_zeroize_state(). However, `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt` returns\nthe result directly without clearing the state.\n\nThis leaves the derived chacha20 subkey on the stack after the function\nreturns. Fix this by storing the return value, calling\nchacha_zeroize_state() and then returning the result, matching the\nlogic in `chacha20poly1305_decrypt`.\n\nFixes: ed20078b7e333 (\"crypto: chacha20poly1305 - import construction and selftest from Zinc\")\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Mohamad Raizudeen \u003craizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com\u003e\n---\n lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c \| 5 ++++-\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\nindex ea42a28f4ff7..03b14d272520 100644\n--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\n+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\n@@ -199,10 +199,13 @@ bool xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 dst, const u8 src, const size_t src_len,\n \t\t\t const u8 key[at_least CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])\n {\n \tstruct chacha_state chacha_state;\n+\tbool ret;\n \n \txchacha_init(\u0026chacha_state, key, nonce);\n-\treturn __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,\n+\tret = __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,\n \t\t\t\t\t \u0026chacha_state);\n+\tchacha_zeroize_state(\u0026chacha_state);\n+\treturn ret;\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL(xchacha20poly1305_decrypt);\n \n-- \n2.53.0" }
8/2	2026/10/03 16:21	llm	finding-triage-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 7045 output: 25 thoughts: 1347 Thoughts: Analyzing the Crash Report: A Deep Dive Okay, let's break this down. First, I see a classic RCU stall, specifically an `rcu_preempt` stall, which always grabs my attention. The report indicates stalls on CPUs/tasks. Looking closer, CPU 0 is the culprit and it's stuck deep inside the kernel: `tomoyo_realpath_from_path` which leads down a rabbit hole involving memory allocation (`__kmalloc_noprof`), KASAN quarantine (`kasan_quarantine_reduce`), and ultimately freeing pages. We have stack unwinding, timer interrupts, and lock-related issues are all piling up. Furthermore, the "GRED: Unable to relocate VQ" message is concerning, suggesting some potential network congestion or queue management issue. Now, my task is to correlate this crash with the patch I'm testing, which is focused on `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c`. Specifically, I'm working with a modification to `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt`. I see a standard state zeroization function added. This is a good practice (security-wise) and not inherently dangerous. It's clear, though, that the functions in the crash report (RCU, hrtimer, stack unwinder, page owner, kasan quarantine, tomoyo, ioctl, GRED) are nowhere near my crypto code. They are completely unrelated to `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c`. So my patch, on the surface, should have nothing to do with this crash. That's my initial hypothesis. But I know I can't leave it at that. I need to be thorough. Could there be a subtle, indirect link? I'm going to perform a thorough review, using grep, and check if, by any obscure path, `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt` is being called from Tomoyo or any part of the network stack. I'm going to rule out any possibility of cross-contamination between my patch and this crash. I need to be 100% sure this isn't my fault.
9/2	2026/10/03 16:21	tool	grepper	0m Args: { "Expression": "xchacha20poly1305_decrypt" } Results: { "Output": "drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c=198=void wg_cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie src,\n--\ndrivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c-215-\t}\ndrivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c:216:\tret = xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(\ndrivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c-217-\t\tcookie, src-\u003eencrypted_cookie, sizeof(src-\u003eencrypted_cookie),\n--\ninclude/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h=28=void xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(u8 dst, const u8 src, const size_t src_len,\n--\ninclude/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h-32-\ninclude/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h:33:bool __must_check xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(\ninclude/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h-34-\tu8 dst, const u8 src, const size_t src_len,\n--\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c=194=EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha20poly1305_decrypt);\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c-195-\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c:196:bool xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 dst, const u8 src, const size_t src_len,\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c-197-\t\t\t const u8 ad, const size_t ad_len,\n--\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c-209-}\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c:210:EXPORT_SYMBOL(xchacha20poly1305_decrypt);\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c-211-\n--\nlib/crypto/tests/chacha20poly1305_kunit.c=8885=static void test_chacha20poly1305(struct kunit *test)\n--\nlib/crypto/tests/chacha20poly1305_kunit.c-8998-\t\tmemset(computed_output, 0, MAXIMUM_TEST_BUFFER_LEN);\nlib/crypto/tests/chacha20poly1305_kunit.c:8999:\t\tret = xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(computed_output,\nlib/crypto/tests/chacha20poly1305_kunit.c-9000-\t\t\t\t\txchacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].input,\n" }
10/2	2026/10/03 16:21	llm	finding-triage-evaluator	0m Model: gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 9574 output: 251 thoughts: 93 Thoughts: Okay, here's my understanding, tailored for an expert audience, and framed as my own thought process: Deduction on the Crash Report Alright, let's dissect this crash report. My initial hunch pointing at `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt` is a dead end. That's solely tied to WireGuard cookies and kunit tests—nothing relevant to this situation. It's a completely different part of the system. We can safely dismiss any involvement there. Instead, the core issue is an RCU CPU stall warning. This is where things get interesting. It sounds like CPU 0 is getting bogged down. The culprit appears to be excessive time spent unwinding the page owner/kasan quarantine stack. This is specifically during memory allocation under heavy system load. That's our target. So, the next step is clear. Let's call `set-results` and mark this as a "false positive" or that the issue was not "Introduced" during the change. I need to document this meticulously. The root cause is a heavy allocation load interfering with a resource, which is not an application-level bug.
11/2	2026/10/03 16:21	tool	set-results	0m Args: { "Introduced": false, "Reasoning": "The crash report indicates an RCU CPU stall warning (`rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:`) accompanied by a softlockup taint. The NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 executing an ioctl syscall under heavy memory allocation/quarantine stress (`tomoyo_realpath_from_path` -\u003e `__kmalloc_noprof` -\u003e `kasan_quarantine_reduce` -\u003e `__reset_page_owner` -\u003e `stack_trace_save` -\u003e `unwind_next_frame`), with an APIC timer interrupt attempting lock acquisition.\n\nThe patch under test modifies only `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c` to zeroize the stack-allocated `chacha_state` in `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt()` before returning. That function is exclusively used in WireGuard cookie verification and crypto kunit tests, none of which are present in the stack trace. The tested patch is entirely unrelated to the RCU stall, memory allocation, page owner tracking, or the GRED queueing discipline." } Results: { "Introduced": false, "Reasoning": "The crash report indicates an RCU CPU stall warning (`rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:`) accompanied by a softlockup taint. The NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 executing an ioctl syscall under heavy memory allocation/quarantine stress (`tomoyo_realpath_from_path` -\u003e `__kmalloc_noprof` -\u003e `kasan_quarantine_reduce` -\u003e `__reset_page_owner` -\u003e `stack_trace_save` -\u003e `unwind_next_frame`), with an APIC timer interrupt attempting lock acquisition.\n\nThe patch under test modifies only `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c` to zeroize the stack-allocated `chacha_state` in `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt()` before returning. That function is exclusively used in WireGuard cookie verification and crypto kunit tests, none of which are present in the stack trace. The tested patch is entirely unrelated to the RCU stall, memory allocation, page owner tracking, or the GRED queueing discipline." }

{
  "Introduced": false,
  "Reasoning": "The crash report indicates an RCU CPU stall warning (`rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:`) accompanied by a softlockup taint. The NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 executing an ioctl syscall under heavy memory allocation/quarantine stress (`tomoyo_realpath_from_path` -\u003e `__kmalloc_noprof` -\u003e `kasan_quarantine_reduce` -\u003e `__reset_page_owner` -\u003e `stack_trace_save` -\u003e `unwind_next_frame`), with an APIC timer interrupt attempting lock acquisition.\n\nThe patch under test modifies only `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c` to zeroize the stack-allocated `chacha_state` in `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt()` before returning. That function is exclusively used in WireGuard cookie verification and crypto kunit tests, none of which are present in the stack trace. The tested patch is entirely unrelated to the RCU stall, memory allocation, page owner tracking, or the GRED queueing discipline."
}

{
  "DiffStat": "lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 5 ++++-\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)",
  "HasCover": false,
  "PatchCount": 1,
  "PatchList": "The patch series contains 1 patch:\n[1] [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Fix missing state zeroization in xchacha decrypt"
}

{
  "Introduced": false,
  "Reasoning": "The crash report indicates an RCU CPU stall warning (`rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:`) accompanied by a softlockup taint. The NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 executing an ioctl syscall under heavy memory allocation/quarantine stress (`tomoyo_realpath_from_path` -\u003e `__kmalloc_noprof` -\u003e `kasan_quarantine_reduce` -\u003e `__reset_page_owner` -\u003e `stack_trace_save` -\u003e `unwind_next_frame`), with an APIC timer interrupt attempting lock acquisition.\n\nThe patch under test modifies only `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c` to zeroize the stack-allocated `chacha_state` in `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt()` before returning. That function is exclusively used in WireGuard cookie verification and crypto kunit tests, none of which are present in the stack trace. The tested patch is entirely unrelated to the RCU stall, memory allocation, page owner tracking, or the GRED queueing discipline."
}

You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer specializing
in crash triage and root-cause analysis.
Your job is to review a kernel crash report (finding) and determine if it was introduced / caused
by the patch series being tested, or if it is a pre-existing / unrelated bug.

IMPORTANT: The entire patch series has ALREADY been applied and committed as a single squashed commit
at HEAD (or on top of the base commit) in your workspace.
Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively use your tools to examine
the source code, inspect workspace diffs, and confirm any assumptions.

Available Tools:
- git-show: View the squashed patch series commit or historical commits. Call with Commit="HEAD" (default)
and optional 'File' parameter to restrict the diff to a specific file or directory, or 'Stat=true' for a diffstat.
- series-patches: Browse the original patch series. Call without arguments to list all patch titles,
or PatchNum=<N> to view the full description and diff of a specific patch (or cover letter, if present).
- read-file & codesearch-dir-index: Read exact source code files and directory contents in the workspace.
- grepper: Regex search across files in the workspace (git grep).
- git-blame: Inspect line authorship and find which commit last modified specific lines of code.

Triage Procedure:
1. Analyze the Crash Report:
- Identify the crash type (e.g. NULL dereference, KASAN use-after-free, out-of-bounds read/write,
assertion failure, deadlock).
- Carefully examine the stack trace(s) — both the faulting call stack and, if applicable (e.g., KASAN UAF),
the allocation and free stacks.
- Note the faulting function, file name, line numbers, and the specific variables or data structures involved.

2. Inspect Workspace Changes & Patch Series:
- Check if any files or functions from the stack trace appear in the modified files overview or the patch series.
- Use git-show with Commit="HEAD" and 'File' to inspect the exact diffs for relevant files
in the squashed commit.
- If needed, use series-patches with PatchNum=<N> to inspect the author's commit description
and rationale for individual patches in the series.
- Use read-file to inspect the actual source code at the faulting lines.

3. Determine Causality:
- Set Introduced=true ONLY IF you are absolutely certain:
* There is clear, unambiguous, and conclusive evidence that the crash was directly introduced
or caused by the patch series.
* The crash occurs directly in new or modified code introduced by the patch series, or the patch series
altered data structures, locking, object lifetimes, or preconditions in a way that directly
triggered the failure in existing code.
- Set Introduced=false IF:
* There is any doubt, ambiguity, or lack of conclusive proof that the patch series caused the bug.
* The crash occurs in an unrelated subsystem or unmodified code path whose behavior is independent
of the patch series.
* The crash is a pre-existing kernel issue that was randomly triggered during fuzzing.

4. Formulate Output:
- Set Introduced to true or false.
- In Reasoning, provide a clear, step-by-step technical explanation detailing the crash type,
the key stack frames, whether the affected code/structures were modified by the patch series,
and the causal justification for your verdict.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.

Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

Target architecture: amd64

The kernel crash report to triage is:

GRED: Unable to relocate VQ 0x0 after dequeue, screwing up backlog
GRED: Unable to relocate VQ 0x0 after dequeue, screwing up backlog
GRED: Unable to relocate VQ 0x0 after dequeue, screwing up backlog
rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:
rcu: 	(detected by 1, t=10502 jiffies, g=55273, q=499 ncpus=2)
rcu: All QSes seen, last rcu_preempt kthread activity 10496 (4294974404-4294963908), jiffies_till_next_fqs=1, root ->qsmask 0x0
rcu: rcu_preempt kthread timer wakeup didn't happen for 10495 jiffies! g55273 f0x2 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=R
rcu: 	Possible timer handling issue on cpu=0 timer-softirq=15880
rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 10496 jiffies! g55273 f0x2 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=R ->cpu=0
rcu: 	Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior.
rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump:
task:rcu_preempt     state:R stack:27688 pid:17    tgid:17    ppid:2      task_flags:0x208040 flags:0x00080000
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 __schedule+0x17db/0x58f0
 schedule+0x164/0x2b0
 schedule_timeout+0x152/0x2c0
 rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x30c/0x11f0
 rcu_gp_kthread+0x9e/0x2b0
 kthread+0x38b/0x480
 ret_from_fork+0x514/0xb70
 ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
 </TASK>
rcu: Stack dump where RCU GP kthread last ran:
Sending NMI from CPU 1 to CPUs 0:
NMI backtrace for cpu 0
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 13046 Comm: syz.4.2290 Tainted: G             L      syzkaller #0 PREEMPT(full) 
Tainted: [L]=SOFTLOCKUP
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:__lock_acquire+0x33e/0x2de0
Code: 0b 00 00 41 83 fe 31 48 89 74 24 20 0f 83 54 28 00 00 4c 89 74 24 38 4b 8d 04 b6 89 f1 81 e1 ff 1f 00 00 48 c7 c2 00 e0 ff ff <49> 23 54 c5 20 48 09 ca 49 89 54 c5 20 4d 89 44 c5 08 48 8b 54 24
RSP: 0018:ffffc90000007b08 EFLAGS: 00000046
RAX: 0000000000000014 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 0000000000000000
RDX: ffffffffffffe000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 000000001879a0fc
RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: ffffffff84eb5f27 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: ffffc90000007d20 R11: fffff52000000fa6 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: ffff88811a0929b0 R14: 0000000000000004 R15: ffff88811a091e00
FS:  00007f87d16536c0(0000) GS:ffff88818d6c7000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
CR2: 00007f87d1631ff8 CR3: 00000001162f4000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000ffff0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000600
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 lock_acquire+0x115/0x350
 _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x40/0x60
 debug_object_activate+0xb7/0x420
 enqueue_hrtimer+0xa9/0x2c0
 __hrtimer_run_queues+0x4ce/0xa10
 hrtimer_interrupt+0x4cd/0xaa0
 __sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x102/0x430
 sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0xa1/0xc0
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 asm_sysvec_apic_timer_interrupt+0x1a/0x20
RIP: 0010:unwind_next_frame+0x4f4/0x2550
Code: 89 c1 48 c1 f9 02 48 c1 e8 3f 48 01 c8 48 83 e0 fe 49 8d 1c 47 48 89 d8 48 c1 e8 03 48 b9 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 0f b6 04 08 <84> c0 75 27 48 63 03 48 01 d8 48 8d 4b 04 48 39 e8 4c 0f 46 f9 48
RSP: 0018:ffffc90007c775c0 EFLAGS: 00000a02
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffffffff909d2aa0 RCX: dffffc0000000000
RDX: ffffffff909d2a94 RSI: ffffffff9120b748 RDI: ffffffff8c6dad20
RBP: ffffffff82383197 R08: 0000000000000007 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: ffffc90007c776b8 R11: ffffffff81b2c450 R12: ffffffff909d2aac
R13: ffffffff909d2a94 R14: ffffc90007c77668 R15: ffffffff909d2a94
 arch_stack_walk+0x11b/0x150
 stack_trace_save+0xa9/0x100
 save_stack+0x122/0x230
 __reset_page_owner+0x71/0x1f0
 __free_frozen_pages+0xc93/0xd90
 __slab_free+0x274/0x2c0
 qlist_free_all+0x99/0x100
 kasan_quarantine_reduce+0x148/0x160
 __kasan_slab_alloc+0x22/0x80
 __kmalloc_noprof+0x307/0x720
 tomoyo_realpath_from_path+0xef/0x640
 tomoyo_path_number_perm+0x246/0x5f0
 security_file_ioctl+0xc3/0x2a0
 __se_sys_ioctl+0x47/0x170
 do_syscall_64+0x166/0x520
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f87d079e159
Code: ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 44 00 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 e8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007f87d1653028 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007f87d0a25fa0 RCX: 00007f87d079e159
RDX: 0000200000000200 RSI: 0000000000008914 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007f87d083506b R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 00007f87d0a26038 R14: 00007f87d0a25fa0 R15: 00007ffd5c2ebdb8
 </TASK>



Overview of modified files in the workspace:
lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 5 ++++-
 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)



The patch series contains 1 patch:
[1] [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Fix missing state zeroization in xchacha decrypt

							input: 5481
							output: 26
							thoughts: 71

Okay, let's dive into this crash report.

**Analyzing the Scene**

Right, first things first, let's get a handle on the landscape. I need to understand the context of the crash, starting with the patch series and the specific files that were touched. It looks like we're zeroing in on a critical section, `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c`.  Okay, that rings a bell. ChaCha20-Poly1305, a fundamental part of our cryptographic machinery...interesting. Now, I'll use `series-patches` and `git-show` to visually dissect the changes applied to that file. We'll examine the specific lines that were added, removed, or modified. Understanding this diff will be key to understanding *how* things might have gone sideways. Knowing exactly what got changed in this critical module will likely give us the leverage we need to identify the root cause. This is where the real detective work begins.

missing argument "PatchNum"

{
  "error": "missing argument \"PatchNum\""
}

{
  "Commit": "HEAD"
}

{
  "Output": "commit bcf2711dfcd531fc0c8900e1f36af24231e4a795\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate:   Sat Oct 3 16:20:52 2026 +0000\n\n    syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\nindex ea42a28f4ff7d..03b14d272520b 100644\n--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\n+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\n@@ -199,10 +199,13 @@ bool xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,\n \t\t\t       const u8 key[at_least CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])\n {\n \tstruct chacha_state chacha_state;\n+\tbool ret;\n \n \txchacha_init(\u0026chacha_state, key, nonce);\n-\treturn __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,\n+\tret = __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,\n \t\t\t\t\t  \u0026chacha_state);\n+\tchacha_zeroize_state(\u0026chacha_state);\n+\treturn ret;\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL(xchacha20poly1305_decrypt);\n \n"
}

							input: 6242
							output: 15
							thoughts: 17

Here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience:

**Investigating Series Patches**

Okay, so I'm digging into this area... and I'm thinking, beyond the established queries, let's drill down specifically on the `series-patches` data. The focus should be on `PatchNum=1` initially. This feels like a good starting point for a deeper dive. It allows me to pinpoint a specific point in the patch series. From there, I can begin to observe trends and patterns more effectively. This allows for a deeper understanding of the relationships between the two entities in question.

{
  "Output": "Patch [1] [PATCH] crypto: chacha20poly1305 - Fix missing state zeroization in xchacha decrypt:\n\nThe `__chacha20poly1305_decrypt` function does not zeroize the chacha\nstate, unlike its encrypt counterpart. The regular\n`chacha20poly1305_decrypt` function handles this by manually calling\nchacha_zeroize_state(). However, `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt` returns\nthe result directly without clearing the state.\n\nThis leaves the derived chacha20 subkey on the stack after the function\nreturns. Fix this by storing the return value, calling\nchacha_zeroize_state() and then returning the result, matching the\nlogic in `chacha20poly1305_decrypt`.\n\nFixes: ed20078b7e333 (\"crypto: chacha20poly1305 - import construction and selftest from Zinc\")\nCc: stable@vger.kernel.org\nSigned-off-by: Mohamad Raizudeen \u003craizudeen.kerneldev@gmail.com\u003e\n---\n lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c | 5 ++++-\n 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)\n\ndiff --git a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\nindex ea42a28f4ff7..03b14d272520 100644\n--- a/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\n+++ b/lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c\n@@ -199,10 +199,13 @@ bool xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,\n \t\t\t       const u8 key[at_least CHACHA20POLY1305_KEY_SIZE])\n {\n \tstruct chacha_state chacha_state;\n+\tbool ret;\n \n \txchacha_init(\u0026chacha_state, key, nonce);\n-\treturn __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,\n+\tret = __chacha20poly1305_decrypt(dst, src, src_len, ad, ad_len,\n \t\t\t\t\t  \u0026chacha_state);\n+\tchacha_zeroize_state(\u0026chacha_state);\n+\treturn ret;\n }\n EXPORT_SYMBOL(xchacha20poly1305_decrypt);\n \n-- \n2.53.0"
}

							input: 7045
							output: 25
							thoughts: 1347

**Analyzing the Crash Report: A Deep Dive**

Okay, let's break this down. First, I see a classic RCU stall, specifically an `rcu_preempt` stall, which always grabs my attention. The report indicates stalls on CPUs/tasks. Looking closer, CPU 0 is the culprit and it's stuck deep inside the kernel: `tomoyo_realpath_from_path` which leads down a rabbit hole involving memory allocation (`__kmalloc_noprof`), KASAN quarantine (`kasan_quarantine_reduce`), and ultimately freeing pages. We have stack unwinding, timer interrupts, and lock-related issues are all piling up. Furthermore, the "GRED: Unable to relocate VQ" message is concerning, suggesting some potential network congestion or queue management issue.

Now, my task is to correlate this crash with the patch I'm testing, which is focused on `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c`. Specifically, I'm working with a modification to `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt`. I see a standard state zeroization function added. This is a good practice (security-wise) and not inherently dangerous.

It's clear, though, that the functions in the crash report (RCU, hrtimer, stack unwinder, page owner, kasan quarantine, tomoyo, ioctl, GRED) are nowhere near my crypto code. They are completely unrelated to `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c`. So my patch, on the surface, should have *nothing* to do with this crash. That's my initial hypothesis.

But I know I can't leave it at that. I need to be thorough. Could there be a subtle, indirect link? I'm going to perform a thorough review, using grep, and check if, by any obscure path, `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt` is being called from Tomoyo or any part of the network stack. I'm going to rule out *any* possibility of cross-contamination between my patch and this crash. I need to be 100% sure this isn't my fault.

{
  "Expression": "xchacha20poly1305_decrypt"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c=198=void wg_cookie_message_consume(struct message_handshake_cookie *src,\n--\ndrivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c-215-\t}\ndrivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c:216:\tret = xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(\ndrivers/net/wireguard/cookie.c-217-\t\tcookie, src-\u003eencrypted_cookie, sizeof(src-\u003eencrypted_cookie),\n--\ninclude/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h=28=void xchacha20poly1305_encrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,\n--\ninclude/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h-32-\ninclude/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h:33:bool __must_check xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(\ninclude/crypto/chacha20poly1305.h-34-\tu8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,\n--\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c=194=EXPORT_SYMBOL(chacha20poly1305_decrypt);\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c-195-\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c:196:bool xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(u8 *dst, const u8 *src, const size_t src_len,\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c-197-\t\t\t       const u8 *ad, const size_t ad_len,\n--\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c-209-}\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c:210:EXPORT_SYMBOL(xchacha20poly1305_decrypt);\nlib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c-211-\n--\nlib/crypto/tests/chacha20poly1305_kunit.c=8885=static void test_chacha20poly1305(struct kunit *test)\n--\nlib/crypto/tests/chacha20poly1305_kunit.c-8998-\t\tmemset(computed_output, 0, MAXIMUM_TEST_BUFFER_LEN);\nlib/crypto/tests/chacha20poly1305_kunit.c:8999:\t\tret = xchacha20poly1305_decrypt(computed_output,\nlib/crypto/tests/chacha20poly1305_kunit.c-9000-\t\t\t\t\txchacha20poly1305_dec_vectors[i].input,\n"
}

							input: 9574
							output: 251
							thoughts: 93

Okay, here's my understanding, tailored for an expert audience, and framed as my own thought process:

**Deduction on the Crash Report**

Alright, let's dissect this crash report. My initial hunch pointing at `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt` is a dead end. That's solely tied to WireGuard cookies and kunit tests—nothing relevant to this situation. It's a completely different part of the system. We can safely dismiss any involvement there.

Instead, the core issue is an RCU CPU stall warning. This is where things get interesting. It sounds like CPU 0 is getting bogged down. The culprit appears to be excessive time spent unwinding the page owner/kasan quarantine stack. This is specifically during memory allocation under heavy system load. That's our target.

So, the next step is clear. Let's call `set-results` and mark this as a "false positive" or that the issue was not "Introduced" during the change. I need to document this meticulously. The root cause is a heavy allocation load interfering with a resource, which is not an application-level bug.

{
  "Introduced": false,
  "Reasoning": "The crash report indicates an RCU CPU stall warning (`rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:`) accompanied by a softlockup taint. The NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 executing an ioctl syscall under heavy memory allocation/quarantine stress (`tomoyo_realpath_from_path` -\u003e `__kmalloc_noprof` -\u003e `kasan_quarantine_reduce` -\u003e `__reset_page_owner` -\u003e `stack_trace_save` -\u003e `unwind_next_frame`), with an APIC timer interrupt attempting lock acquisition.\n\nThe patch under test modifies only `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c` to zeroize the stack-allocated `chacha_state` in `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt()` before returning. That function is exclusively used in WireGuard cookie verification and crypto kunit tests, none of which are present in the stack trace. The tested patch is entirely unrelated to the RCU stall, memory allocation, page owner tracking, or the GRED queueing discipline."
}

{
  "Introduced": false,
  "Reasoning": "The crash report indicates an RCU CPU stall warning (`rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks:`) accompanied by a softlockup taint. The NMI backtrace shows CPU 0 executing an ioctl syscall under heavy memory allocation/quarantine stress (`tomoyo_realpath_from_path` -\u003e `__kmalloc_noprof` -\u003e `kasan_quarantine_reduce` -\u003e `__reset_page_owner` -\u003e `stack_trace_save` -\u003e `unwind_next_frame`), with an APIC timer interrupt attempting lock acquisition.\n\nThe patch under test modifies only `lib/crypto/chacha20poly1305.c` to zeroize the stack-allocated `chacha_state` in `xchacha20poly1305_decrypt()` before returning. That function is exclusively used in WireGuard cookie verification and crypto kunit tests, none of which are present in the stack trace. The tested patch is entirely unrelated to the RCU stall, memory allocation, page owner tracking, or the GRED queueing discipline."
}

LLM Calls Summary:
Total Calls	Total Tokens	Avg Tokens	Total Duration (Seconds)	Avg Duration (Seconds)

Tool Calls Summary:
Total Calls	Total Duration (Seconds)	Avg Duration (Seconds)