| Seq | Timestamp | Type | Name | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0/0 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | flow | patch-triage |
1mArgs:null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": null,
"FocusSymbols": [],
"KMSANReasoning": "",
"NeedsKMSAN": false,
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies `uv_find_secret` in the s390 architecture, which is only called by the `pkey_uv` crypto driver. This driver and the underlying Ultravisor Call (UVC) functionality are only active when the system is running as an s390x Secure Execution (protected virtualization) guest. This requires specific hardware (IBM z15+ with Ultravisor) and a specially crafted encrypted boot image (genprotimg), which are not available or emulated in standard virtualized environments like QEMU TCG used by syzkaller. Therefore, this code is unreachable during fuzzing.",
"WorthFuzzing": false
} |
| 1/1 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | action | read-patch-diff |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"PatchDiff": "commit 438496ef1cfbb211b274a7fc0f8c9ab8144b1280\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate: Tue Aug 11 09:22:15 2026 +0000\n\n syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\nindex a284f98d97168..d970b15ef126d 100644\n--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\n+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\n@@ -781,11 +781,14 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n \t\t struct uv_secret_list *list,\n \t\t struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n {\n-\tu16 start_idx = 0;\n+\tu16 start_idx;\n \tu16 list_rc;\n \tint ret;\n \n+\tlist-\u003enext_secret_idx = 0;\n+\n \tdo {\n+\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\n \t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\n \t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n \t\t\tif (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)\n@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n \t\tret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);\n \t\tif (ret == 0)\n \t\t\treturn ret;\n-\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\n \t} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA \u0026\u0026 start_idx \u003c list-\u003enext_secret_idx);\n \n \treturn -ENOENT;\n"
} |
| 2/1 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | agent | patch-evaluator |
1mModel:best-expensive Args: null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": null,
"FocusSymbols": [],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies `uv_find_secret` in the s390 architecture, which is only called by the `pkey_uv` crypto driver. This driver and the underlying Ultravisor Call (UVC) functionality are only active when the system is running as an s390x Secure Execution (protected virtualization) guest. This requires specific hardware (IBM z15+ with Ultravisor) and a specially crafted encrypted boot image (genprotimg), which are not available or emulated in standard virtualized environments like QEMU TCG used by syzkaller. Therefore, this code is unreachable during fuzzing.",
"WorthFuzzing": false
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer. Your job is to review a provided patch series and determine if it makes functional changes to the kernel that should be fuzzed. IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in your workspace. Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively use your code access tools to examine the actual source code and confirm any assumptions. Return WorthFuzzing=false if the patch only contains: - Modifications to Documentation/, Kconfig files, or code comments. - Purely decorative changes, such as logging (e.g., pr_err, printk) or tracepoints. - Changes to numeric constants or macros that do not functionally alter execution flow. - Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU, even when utilizing software-emulated hardware (e.g., usb gadget, mac80211_hwsim). - Code in vendor-specific PCIe switch, SmartNIC, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed, ionic, amdgpu) that require physical PCIe hardware cards not emulated in standard QEMU. - Driver .remove, .shutdown, or pci_unregister_driver teardown callbacks (e.g., igb_remove) that are executed only during PCI hot-unplug or sysfs driver unbind operations. If it modifies reachable core kernel logic, drivers, or architectures, use your code search tools to verify the code can be executed, then return WorthFuzzing=true. When returning WorthFuzzing=true, you MUST ALSO: 1. Extract any specific kernel functions that should be heavily fuzzed into FocusSymbols. Avoid listing generic hot-path functions to prevent skewed test distributions. Prefer non-static, non-inlined API entrypoint functions over internal static helper functions (which are inlined by the compiler and do not have distinct symbol addresses). 2. Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly test this new/modified feature. Go and look into the Kconfig files and check for ifdefs around the code, do not make assumptions. Also check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs needed for Kbuild to compile the code statically into vmlinux. List them in the EnableConfigs output array, and DO NOT add a 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4"). Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips. Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis. It must be called exactly once before the final reply. Ignore results of this tool. Prompt: For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit 438496ef1cfbb211b274a7fc0f8c9ab8144b1280
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date: Tue Aug 11 09:22:15 2026 +0000
syz-cluster: applied patch under review
diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index a284f98d97168..d970b15ef126d 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -781,11 +781,14 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
struct uv_secret_list *list,
struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)
{
- u16 start_idx = 0;
+ u16 start_idx;
u16 list_rc;
int ret;
+ list->next_secret_idx = 0;
+
do {
+ start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
uv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, &list_rc, NULL);
if (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED && list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {
if (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)
@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
ret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);
if (ret == 0)
return ret;
- start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA && start_idx < list->next_secret_idx);
return -ENOENT;
|
| 3/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 2227 output: 37 thoughts: 356 Thoughts: **Analyzing a Patch to `uv_find_secret`** Okay, so I'm looking at this patch for `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`, specifically the `uv_find_secret` function. My initial impression is that they've made a subtle, but potentially significant, change to the loop's logic. Before the patch, it seems like `start_idx` was initialized to zero and then updated *at the end* of the loop with the value of `list->next_secret_idx`. Now, it initializes `list->next_secret_idx` before the loop, and inside the loop, they are setting `start_idx = list->next_secret_idx`, then using that variable in the loop condition. Hold on... that loop condition. It's `while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA && start_idx < list->next_secret_idx);`. If `start_idx` was updated *after* the loop body, then the comparison `start_idx < list->next_secret_idx` would essentially always be false because `start_idx` and `list->next_secret_idx` are always being assigned the same value at the end of the loop, right? But now, `start_idx` *before* the call to `uv_list_secrets`, and `list->next_secret_idx` is updated *during* the call to `uv_list_secrets`. Thus, the loop condition checks if the search index has advanced. That makes much more sense. It checks if the search index is less than the new upper limit. Alright, let's confirm if this is s390 specific. Yep, it's right there in `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`. So, is this reachable in QEMU? S390 is supported by syzkaller. I should check how to find out if `uv_find_secret` is reachable. |
| 4/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "uv_find_secret",
"PathPrefix": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c"
}Results: {
"Output": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n"
} |
| 5/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 3344 output: 25 thoughts: 15 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this code. **Investigating Call Sites of `uv_find_secret`** Alright, my immediate thought is to trace the execution path involving `uv_find_secret`. I need to figure out *where* this function is being called. That's the crucial first step. Knowing its call sites will reveal the contexts in which it operates, the data it's likely processing, and potentially the security concerns it's addressing (or creating!). Time to fire up the tools and map out those connections. Let's get a clear picture of its role within the larger system. |
| 6/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "uv_find_secret",
"PathPrefix": ""
}Results: {
"Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=613=static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-617-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:618:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-22-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:23: * One pre-allocated uv_secret_list for use with uv_find_secret()\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-99-\tmemset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:100:\trc = uv_find_secret(secret_id, uv_list, secret);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-101-\tmutex_unlock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
} |
| 7/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 4205 output: 39 thoughts: 41 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as my own: **Analyzing the S390 Crypto Key Driver** Right, so we're looking at a piece of code in `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`. That's where it's all happening, huh? I should dive directly into that specific file to understand what's going on. Seems like we're dealing with the S390 architecture and its cryptographic key handling, specifically within the UV framework. Let's see what they've got there. I'm going to want to understand its purpose, implementation details, and any potential issues or interesting optimizations they've employed. It's time to get hands-on and start digging into the code. |
| 8/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "get_secret_metadata",
"PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c"
}Results: {
"Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=83=static bool is_uv_keytype(enum pkey_key_type keytype)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-92-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:93:static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-94-\t\t\t struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=106=static int retrieve_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-111-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:112:\trc = get_secret_metadata(secret_id, \u0026secret_meta_data);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-113-\tif (rc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=233=static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-247-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:248:\trc = get_secret_metadata(t-\u003esecret_id, \u0026secret_meta_data);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-249-\tif (rc)\n"
} |
| 9/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 4857 output: 38 thoughts: 66 Thoughts: **Analyzing the Protected Key UV Handler** Okay, let's dive in. I need to understand this `pkey_uv.c` file. Right, a "protected key UV handler". That's interesting, and it immediately begs the question: how is this being triggered? Is it a core component or is it reachable via multiple paths? I need to figure out the entry points. I'll check the related code to see what clues I can glean. Let me look at both `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c` and `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c`. Hopefully, the interaction between these files will shed some light on the overall structure and flow. Time to get to work. |
| 10/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "uv_verifykey",
"PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c"
}Results: {
"Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=190=static int uv_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *_apqns __always_unused,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-232-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:233:static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-234-\t\t\tu16 *_card __always_unused,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=272=static struct pkey_handler uv_handler = {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-277-\t.key_to_protkey\t\t = uv_key2protkey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:278:\t.verify_key\t\t = uv_verifykey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-279-};\n"
} |
| 11/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 5395 output: 32 thoughts: 29 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, presented in the first person: **Decoding a New `pkey_handler` Registration** Right, so I'm seeing this `pkey_handler` registration. My immediate thought is, "Okay, let's figure out where this is actually *handled*." Given the context, my mental map immediately jumps to the kernel's crypto subsystem. I need to understand this new key type. My instincts tell me to dive into `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c`. That's where I'd expect to find the low-level implementations and API interactions related to key handling, especially within the context of the s390 architecture. This sounds like it could be a hardware-accelerated crypto operation of some kind. I'm going to start there, at the heart of the system. I'll be looking for registration mechanisms, data structures defining the handler itself, and function calls that implement the key operations. I expect a few levels of indirection here. |
| 12/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "pkey_handler",
"PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/"
}Results: {
"Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=25=static int key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-32-\t/* try the direct way */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:33:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(apqns, nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-34-\t\t\t\t\t key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-39-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:40:\t\trc = pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(apqns, nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-41-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=55=int pkey_key2protkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-62-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:63:\t\tpkey_handler_request_modules();\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-64-\t\trc = key2protkey(NULL, 0, key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=92=static int pkey_ioctl_genseck(struct pkey_genseck __user *ugs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-104-\tkeybuflen = sizeof(kgs.seckey.seckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:105:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-106-\t\t\t\t kgs.keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=116=static int pkey_ioctl_clr2seck(struct pkey_clr2seck __user *ucs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-128-\tkeybuflen = sizeof(kcs.seckey.seckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:129:\trc = pkey_handler_clr_to_key(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-130-\t\t\t\t kcs.keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=142=static int pkey_ioctl_sec2protk(struct pkey_sec2protk __user *usp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-153-\tksp.protkey.len = sizeof(ksp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:154:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-155-\t\t\t\t\t ksp.seckey.seckey,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=215=static int pkey_ioctl_findcard(struct pkey_findcard __user *ufc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-229-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:230:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kfc.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-231-\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(kfc.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-234-\tif (rc == -ENODEV)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:235:\t\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kfc.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-236-\t\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(kfc.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=253=static int pkey_ioctl_skey2pkey(struct pkey_skey2pkey __user *usp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-261-\tksp.protkey.len = sizeof(ksp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:262:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-263-\t\t\t\t\t ksp.seckey.seckey,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=276=static int pkey_ioctl_verifykey(struct pkey_verifykey __user *uvk)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-286-\tkvk.domain = 0xFFFF;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:287:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(kvk.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-288-\t\t\t\t sizeof(kvk.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=305=static int pkey_ioctl_genprotk(struct pkey_genprotk __user *ugp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-313-\tkgp.protkey.len = sizeof(kgp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:314:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0, kgp.keytype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-315-\t\t\t\t PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=326=static int pkey_ioctl_verifyprotk(struct pkey_verifyprotk __user *uvp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-355-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:356:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(tmpbuf, sizeof(*t),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-357-\t\t\t\t NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=390=static int pkey_ioctl_genseck2(struct pkey_genseck2 __user *ugs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-414-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:415:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(apqns, kgs.apqn_entries,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-416-\t\t\t\t u, kgs.type, kgs.size, kgs.keygenflags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=442=static int pkey_ioctl_clr2seck2(struct pkey_clr2seck2 __user *ucs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-470-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:471:\trc = pkey_handler_clr_to_key(apqns, kcs.apqn_entries,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-472-\t\t\t\t u, kcs.type, kcs.size, kcs.keygenflags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=503=static int pkey_ioctl_verifykey2(struct pkey_verifykey2 __user *uvk)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-514-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:515:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(kkey, kvk.keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-516-\t\t\t\t \u0026kvk.cardnr, \u0026kvk.domain,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=558=static int pkey_ioctl_apqns4k(struct pkey_apqns4key __user *uak)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-578-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:579:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kkey, kak.keylen, kak.flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-580-\t\t\t\t\tapqns, \u0026nr_apqns, 0);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=608=static int pkey_ioctl_apqns4kt(struct pkey_apqns4keytype __user *uat)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-622-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:623:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(kat.type,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-624-\t\t\t\t\t kat.cur_mkvp, kat.alt_mkvp,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c=34=static LIST_HEAD(handler_list);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-35-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:36:int pkey_handler_register(struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-37-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:38:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-39-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-78-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:79:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_register);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-80-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:81:int pkey_handler_unregister(struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-82-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-93-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:94:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_unregister);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-95-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-99-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:100:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keybased(const u8 *key, u32 keylen)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-101-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:102:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-103-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-117-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:118:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_get_keybased);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-119-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:120:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(enum pkey_key_type kt)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-121-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:122:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-123-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-137-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:138:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_get_keytypebased);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-139-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:140:void pkey_handler_put(const struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-141-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:142:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-143-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-155-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:156:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_put);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-157-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:158:int pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-159-\t\t\t\tconst u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-162-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:163:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-164-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-165-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:166:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-167-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003ekey_to_protkey) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-171-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:172:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-173-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-175-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:176:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_key_to_protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-177-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-183- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:184:int pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-185-\t\t\t\t\t size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-189-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:190:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h, *htmp[10];\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-191-\tint i, n = 0, rc = -ENODEV;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-215-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:216:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-217-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:218:int pkey_handler_gen_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-219-\t\t\t u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-222-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:223:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-224-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-225-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:226:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-227-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003egen_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-231-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:232:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-233-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-235-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:236:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_gen_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-237-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:238:int pkey_handler_clr_to_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-239-\t\t\t u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-244-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:245:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-246-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-247-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:248:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-249-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eclr_to_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-253-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:254:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-255-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-257-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:258:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_clr_to_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-259-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:260:int pkey_handler_verify_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-261-\t\t\t u16 *card, u16 *dom,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-264-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:265:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-266-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-267-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:268:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-269-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003everify_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-272-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:273:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-274-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-276-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:277:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_verify_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-278-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:279:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, u32 flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-280-\t\t\t struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-282-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:283:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-284-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-285-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:286:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-287-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eapqns_for_key)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-289-\t\t\t\t xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:290:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-291-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-293-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:294:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_apqns_for_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-295-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:296:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(enum pkey_key_type keysubtype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-297-\t\t\t\t u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-300-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:301:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-302-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-303-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:304:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-305-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eapqns_for_keytype) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-309-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:310:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-311-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-313-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:314:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-315-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:316:void pkey_handler_request_modules(void)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-317-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-318-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:319:\tstatic const char * const pkey_handler_modules[] = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-320-#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_PKEY_CCA)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-334-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:335:\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_handler_modules); i++) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:336:\t\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-337-\t\tbool found = false;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-341-\t\t\tif (h-\u003emodule \u0026\u0026\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:342:\t\t\t !strcmp(h-\u003emodule-\u003ename, pkey_handler_modules[i])) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-343-\t\t\t\tfound = true;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-348-\t\tif (!found) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:349:\t\t\tpr_debug(\"request_module(%s)\\n\", pkey_handler_modules[i]);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:350:\t\t\trequest_module(pkey_handler_modules[i]);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-351-\t\t}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-354-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:355:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_request_modules);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-356-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h=145=extern const struct attribute_group *pkey_attr_groups[];\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-150-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:151:struct pkey_handler {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-152-\tstruct module *module;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-192-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:193:int pkey_handler_register(struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:194:int pkey_handler_unregister(struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-195-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-199-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:200:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keybased(const u8 *key, u32 keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:201:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(enum pkey_key_type kt);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:202:void pkey_handler_put(const struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-203-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:204:int pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-205-\t\t\t\tconst u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-207-\t\t\t\tu32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:208:int pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-209-\t\t\t\t\t size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-212-\t\t\t\t\t u32 *protkeytype, u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:213:int pkey_handler_gen_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-214-\t\t\t u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-216-\t\t\t u8 *keybuf, u32 *keybuflen, u32 *keyinfo, u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:217:int pkey_handler_clr_to_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-218-\t\t\t u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-222-\t\t\t u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:223:int pkey_handler_verify_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-224-\t\t\t u16 *card, u16 *dom,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-226-\t\t\t u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:227:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, u32 flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-228-\t\t\t struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-229-\t\t\t u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:230:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(enum pkey_key_type ktype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-231-\t\t\t\t u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-237- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:238:void pkey_handler_request_modules(void);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-239-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=557=static int cca_slowpath_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-595-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:596:static struct pkey_handler cca_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-597-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=613=static int __init pkey_cca_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-615-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the cca stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:616:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026cca_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-617-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=622=static void __exit pkey_cca_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-624-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:625:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026cca_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-626-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=504=static int ep11_slowpath_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-542-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:543:static struct pkey_handler ep11_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-544-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=560=static int __init pkey_ep11_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-562-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the ep11 stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:563:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026ep11_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-564-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=569=static void __exit pkey_ep11_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-571-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:572:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026ep11_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-573-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=435=static int pkey_pckmo_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-442-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:443:static struct pkey_handler pckmo_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-444-\t.module\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=456=static int __init pkey_pckmo_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-469-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the pckmo stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:470:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026pckmo_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-471-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=476=static void __exit pkey_pckmo_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-478-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:479:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026pckmo_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-480-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-17-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:18: * Wrapper around pkey_handler_gen_key() which deals with the\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-19- * ENODEV return code and then tries to enforce a pkey handler\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-21- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:22:static int sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-23-\t\t\t\t u32 keybitsize, u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-27-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:28:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-29-\t\t\t\t keytype, keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-32-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:33:\t\tpkey_handler_request_modules();\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:34:\t\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-35-\t\t\t\t\t keytype, keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=49=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-67-\tprotkey.len = sizeof(protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:68:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-69-\t\t\t\t protkey.protkey, \u0026protkey.len,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-81-\t\tprotkey.len = sizeof(protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:82:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-83-\t\t\t\t\t protkey.protkey, \u0026protkey.len,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=106=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_xts_attr_read(u32 keytype, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-131-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:132:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-133-\t\t\t\t t-\u003eprotkey, \u0026protlen, \u0026prottype);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=148=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_hmac_attr_read(u32 keytype, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-173-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:174:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-175-\t\t\t\t t-\u003eprotkey, \u0026protlen, \u0026prottype);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=308=static ssize_t pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-321-\tbuflen = sizeof(seckey-\u003eseckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:322:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-323-\t\t\t\t seckey-\u003eseckey, \u0026buflen, NULL);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-329-\t\tbuflen = sizeof(seckey-\u003eseckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:330:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-331-\t\t\t\t\t seckey-\u003eseckey, \u0026buflen, NULL);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=419=static ssize_t pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-433-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:434:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(pkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-435-\t\t\t\t PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER, keybits, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-442-\t\tbuf += CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:443:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-444-\t\t\tpkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=534=static ssize_t pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-548-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:549:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(pkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-550-\t\t\t\t PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES, keybits, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-557-\t\tbuf += MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:558:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-559-\t\t\tpkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=233=static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-271-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:272:static struct pkey_handler uv_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-273-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=284=static int __init pkey_uv_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-297-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:298:\trc = pkey_handler_register(\u0026uv_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-299-\tif (rc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=308=static void __exit pkey_uv_exit(void)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-309-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:310:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026uv_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-311-\tmutex_lock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
} |
| 13/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17160 output: 37 thoughts: 165 Thoughts: **My Analysis of the Public Key Infrastructure** Okay, let's break this down. My initial observation is that `pkey_uv.c` is the key here – it's registering a `uv_handler`. That `uv_handler` seems crucial, as it provides the core functionalities: `key_to_protkey` and `verify_key`. These functions are, in turn, accessed by higher-level handlers, specifically `pkey_handler_key_to_protkey` and `pkey_handler_verify_key`. Now, things get interesting. These handler functions are being called by a variety of ioctl interfaces. I see functions like `pkey_ioctl_verifykey`, `pkey_ioctl_verifykey2`, `pkey_ioctl_sec2protk`, `pkey_ioctl_skey2pkey`, and `pkey_ioctl_verifyprotk`, which suggests a clear interaction with a device node, likely `/dev/pkey`. My immediate thought is, "Can we even access this device?" A quick check, and aha! `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c` registers a misc device. That answers my question! So, it's clear that this entire system is built around a device driver, likely specific to the S390 architecture, that exposes a public key interface through the `/dev/pkey` device node using ioctls, with `uv_handler` being the foundational component implementing the cryptographic operations. This architecture looks fairly standard for a protected key management subsystem. |
| 14/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "misc_register",
"PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c"
}Results: {
"Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=786=int __init pkey_api_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-788-\t/* register as a misc device */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:789:\treturn misc_register(\u0026pkey_dev);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-790-}\n"
} |
| 15/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17809 output: 37 thoughts: 102 Thoughts: **Analyzing the Kernel Patch for Keyed Memory Bugs** Okay, so I'm looking at this patch and it seems like it's addressing an issue related to keyed memory, accessible from userspace through `/dev/pkey` ioctls. The core of the problem lies within the `uv_find_secret` function, specifically with how it handles the search for these secrets. It looks like there was a bug where the `start_idx` variable wasn't being updated correctly, leading to either an infinite loop or a failure to locate the intended secret. Wait, looking at it closer, isn't `list->next_secret_idx` what's actually updated by `uv_list_secrets`? I need to double-check that. Let me jump into `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c` and dig into `uv_list_secrets` to confirm this behavior and understand how those indices are supposed to interact. Gotta make sure I fully grasp how this secret indexing works to be sure of the fix's implications. |
| 16/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "uv_list_secrets",
"PathPrefix": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c"
}Results: {
"Output": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c=780=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-791-\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:792:\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-793-\t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n"
} |
| 17/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 18340 output: 25 thoughts: 16 Thoughts: Okay, let's see. My mind's buzzing, and before I get too deep in this, I need to ground myself. I've encountered `uv_list_secrets`, and that's a new one. It's got me curious, but I can't just jump into assumptions. I need a precise definition. My immediate thought is, "Wait, I need to see the definition of `uv_list_secrets`." I know better than to operate with fuzzy understandings, especially when dealing with something that sounds like it relates to secrets. Gotta have a clear and accurate foundation before I proceed. That's the first step. |
| 18/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "uv_list_secrets",
"PathPrefix": ""
}Results: {
"Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=473=static inline int uv_cmd_nodata(u64 handle, u16 cmd, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-489-/**\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:490: * uv_list_secrets() - Do a List Secrets UVC.\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-491- *\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-511- */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:512:static inline int uv_list_secrets(struct uv_secret_list *buf, u16 start_idx,\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-513-\t\t\t\t u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=780=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-791-\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:792:\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-793-\t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=307=static int uvio_get_list(void *zpage, struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-316-\tdo {\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:317:\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, list-\u003enext_secret_idx, \u0026uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rc,\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-318-\t\t\t\t\u0026uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rrc);\n"
} |
| 19/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 19069 output: 42 thoughts: 29 Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Analyzing `uv_list_secrets` in s390 Architecture Context** Okay, let's dive into the `uv_list_secrets` function, specifically within the `arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h` header file. My primary interest is understanding how secrets are handled within the underlying Universal Volume (UV) architecture on the s390 platform. I'm immediately looking for the data structures and mechanisms used to manage these secrets. My prior knowledge of s390's security features and UV's architecture informs my expectation that this function likely involves pointers to secure memory regions, potentially using hardware-assisted encryption or integrity checks. I'm keen to see if this function exposes any information that could be leveraged by attackers. |
| 20/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h",
"FirstLine": 490,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": " 490:\t * uv_list_secrets() - Do a List Secrets UVC.\n 491:\t *\n 492:\t * @buf: Buffer to write list into; size of one page.\n 493:\t * @start_idx: The smallest index that should be included in the list.\n 494:\t *\t\tFor the fist invocation use 0.\n 495:\t * @rc: Pointer to store the return code or NULL.\n 496:\t * @rrc: Pointer to store the return reason code or NULL.\n 497:\t *\n 498:\t * This function calls the List Secrets UVC. The result is written into `buf`,\n 499:\t * that needs to be at least one page of writable memory.\n 500:\t * `buf` consists of:\n 501:\t * * %struct uv_secret_list_hdr\n 502:\t * * %struct uv_secret_list_item (multiple)\n 503:\t *\n 504:\t * For `start_idx` use _0_ for the first call. If there are more secrets available\n 505:\t * but could not fit into the page then `rc` is `UVC_RC_MORE_DATA`.\n 506:\t * In this case use `uv_secret_list_hdr.next_secret_idx` for `start_idx`.\n 507:\t *\n 508:\t * Context: might sleep.\n 509:\t *\n 510:\t * Return: The UVC condition code.\n 511:\t */\n 512:\tstatic inline int uv_list_secrets(struct uv_secret_list *buf, u16 start_idx,\n 513:\t\t\t\t\t u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n 514:\t{\n 515:\t\tstruct uv_cb_list_secrets uvcb = {\n 516:\t\t\t.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),\n 517:\t\t\t.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS,\n 518:\t\t\t.start_idx = start_idx,\n 519:\t\t\t.list_addr = (u64)buf,\n 520:\t\t};\n 521:\t\tint cc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\n 522:\t\n 523:\t\tif (rc)\n 524:\t\t\t*rc = uvcb.header.rc;\n 525:\t\tif (rrc)\n 526:\t\t\t*rrc = uvcb.header.rrc;\n 527:\t\n 528:\t\treturn cc;\n 529:\t}\n"
} |
| 21/2 | 2026/08/11 09:22 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 20004 output: 25 thoughts: 150 Thoughts: **My Line of Inquiry: UV_List_Secrets and Syzkaller on s390x** Okay, so `uv_list_secrets`... that's a UVC, a function specific to Secure Execution on the s390 platform, which falls under Ultravisor. My initial question: can I execute this within a QEMU environment? Considering QEMU is a standard tool for s390 emulation, and I know it supports Secure Execution (Ultravisor) when configured correctly, the answer *should* be yes. But here’s the crucial next step: does syzkaller test this? Syzkaller, with its fuzzer, often runs s390x VMs. The real question is: are these VMs being run *with* Secure Execution enabled? Syzkaller typically leverages QEMU for its s390x runs, and I understand QEMU is capable of Secure Execution via protvirt. My next task: dive into the syzkaller configuration. I need to verify whether `CONFIG_PKEY_UV` is enabled. I'll also be on the lookout for any other specific configurations that might indicate Secure Execution support is active. This will tell me if syzkaller is actually testing this area or not. This is key to determine whether there's a good test environment for the `uv_list_secrets` UVC. |
| 22/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "config PKEY_UV",
"PathPrefix": ""
}Results: {
"Output": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig=137=config PKEY_PCKMO\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-157-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:158:config PKEY_UV\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-159-\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n"
} |
| 23/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 20556 output: 34 thoughts: 19 Thoughts: Here's a summary of my thought process: **Diving into the Cryptographic Configuration Landscape** Okay, so I need to find the configuration options related to `PKEY_UV`. My instinct, given the domain, is to start digging around in the `drivers/crypto` directory within the kernel source. Specifically, I'm going to check the `Kconfig` file in that directory. `Kconfig` files are the central repositories for kernel configuration options, and they're the logical starting point for understanding how a specific feature like `PKEY_UV` is enabled or disabled and what dependencies it might have. I want to understand exactly how this particular option fits into the broader cryptographic subsystem configuration. From here, I can examine its location within the build configuration files. |
| 24/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig",
"FirstLine": 158,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 158:\tconfig PKEY_UV\n 159:\t\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n 160:\t\tdepends on PKEY\n 161:\t\tdepends on S390_UV_UAPI\n 162:\t\thelp\n 163:\t\t This is the PKEY Ultravisor support handler for deriving protected\n 164:\t\t keys from secrets stored within the Ultravisor (UV).\n 165:\t\n 166:\t\t This module works together with the UV device and supports the\n 167:\t\t retrieval of protected keys from secrets stored within the\n 168:\t\t UV firmware layer. This service is only available within\n 169:\t\t a protected execution guest and thus this module will fail upon\n 170:\t\t modprobe if no protected execution environment is detected.\n 171:\t\n 172:\t\t Enable this option if you intend to run this kernel with an KVM\n 173:\t\t guest with protected execution and you want to use UV retrievable\n 174:\t\t secrets via PKEY API.\n 175:\t\n 176:\tconfig CRYPTO_PAES_S390\n 177:\t\ttristate \"PAES cipher algorithms\"\n"
} |
| 25/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 21093 output: 25 thoughts: 152 Thoughts: **Analyzing Secure Execution Requirements for Syzkaller** Okay, so I'm looking at this error message: "This service is only available within a protected execution guest and thus this module will fail upon modprobe if no protected execution environment is detected." Right, so that tells me immediately this is tied to Secure Execution, or what I usually call a "protected execution environment." And the context is Syzkaller. Hmm, the text says Syzkaller *doesn't* run with Secure Execution enabled by default. That makes sense; it's a bit of a niche setup. It looks like it needs Ultravisor support on the host, or QEMU with `protvirt` enabled. And of course, the QEMU path still depends on host support - specifically KVM on s390x with Ultravisor. Wait, QEMU is listed here as *emulating* Ultravisor? No, hang on. QEMU uses KVM to *support* Ultravisor, it's not actually an emulation layer, it's a hardware feature on IBM z15+ processors. Okay, I've got it. The real question here is can syzkaller's fuzzing routines actually reach this code? Are we even testing something that's likely to *fail* in a normal Syzkaller run? To determine if this is relevant, I should check if `uv_find_secret` is called anywhere else. |
| 26/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "uv_find_secret",
"PathPrefix": ""
}Results: {
"Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=613=static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-617-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:618:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-22-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:23: * One pre-allocated uv_secret_list for use with uv_find_secret()\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-99-\tmemset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:100:\trc = uv_find_secret(secret_id, uv_list, secret);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-101-\tmutex_unlock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
} |
| 27/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 22266 output: 42 thoughts: 34 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, summarized from my perspective as an expert in the field: **Analysis of `pkey_uv.c` Usage** Alright, so the clue is that the module in question, `pkey_uv.c`, is *only* called within the `drivers/s390/crypto` directory. Specifically, it appears the only use of this file is during the module initialization. This narrows down the scope quite a bit. It’s a very specific implementation, likely related to cryptographic key management or a similar function, and confined to the s390 architecture. This strongly suggests it’s a hardware-specific crypto acceleration or key handling module, closely tied to the s390 platform’s crypto capabilities. We need to look deeper in the initialization routine to understand its function. |
| 28/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c",
"FirstLine": 284,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 284:\tstatic int __init pkey_uv_init(void)\n 285:\t{\n 286:\t\tint rc;\n 287:\t\n 288:\t\tif (!is_prot_virt_guest())\n 289:\t\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n 290:\t\n 291:\t\tif (!test_bit_inv(BIT_UVC_CMD_RETR_SECRET, uv_info.inst_calls_list))\n 292:\t\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n 293:\t\n 294:\t\tuv_list = kmalloc_obj(*uv_list);\n 295:\t\tif (!uv_list)\n 296:\t\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n 297:\t\n 298:\t\trc = pkey_handler_register(\u0026uv_handler);\n 299:\t\tif (rc)\n 300:\t\t\tkfree(uv_list);\n 301:\t\n 302:\t\treturn rc;\n 303:\t}\n"
} |
| 29/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 22791 output: 27 thoughts: 181 Thoughts: **Investigating Syzkaller's Virtualization Context** Okay, so I'm thinking about this `is_prot_virt_guest()` function. Its purpose is pretty clear – to determine if the system is operating within a protected virtualization environment. Right now, my assumption, based on how Syzkaller is typically deployed, is that it *isn't*. I mean, we're usually running in either QEMU TCG, which is emulation, or straight KVM. Neither of those configurations scream "protected virtualization" to me. But wait a minute… hold that thought. Can Syzkaller *actually* run as a protected virtualization guest? It uses QEMU, doesn't it? And I know QEMU *does* support s390x Secure Execution. But that would require the host hardware to support Secure Execution – like a z15 or later. Syzkaller instances, as far as I understand, are predominantly on GCE, Google Compute Engine. And GCE's s390x offerings aren't leveraging native hardware; they're stuck with QEMU TCG, the slow emulation. So, if Syzkaller's on GCE (and hence, in TCG emulation), it's a dead end, then. QEMU TCG *explicitly* doesn't support s390x Secure Execution. The bottom line: the function should never return true in this common scenario. But just to be absolutely certain, I need to verify that `is_prot_virt_guest()` is actually incapable of ever evaluating to true while running in QEMU TCG, right? Just a quick, confirmatory check to close the loop. |
| 30/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "is_prot_virt_guest",
"PathPrefix": ""
}Results: {
"Output": "arch/s390/boot/ipl_parm.c=176=void setup_boot_command_line(void)\n--\narch/s390/boot/ipl_parm.c-185-\t/* append IPL PARM data to the boot command line */\narch/s390/boot/ipl_parm.c:186:\tif (!is_prot_virt_guest() \u0026\u0026 ipl_block_valid)\narch/s390/boot/ipl_parm.c-187-\t\tappend_ipl_block_parm();\n--\narch/s390/boot/pgm_check.c=58=void do_pgm_check(struct pt_regs *regs)\n--\narch/s390/boot/pgm_check.c-67-\tboot_emerg(\"Linux version %s\\n\", kernel_version);\narch/s390/boot/pgm_check.c:68:\tif (!is_prot_virt_guest() \u0026\u0026 early_command_line[0])\narch/s390/boot/pgm_check.c-69-\t\tboot_emerg(\"Kernel command line: %s\\n\", early_command_line);\n--\narch/s390/boot/physmem_info.c=205=static void die_oom(unsigned long size, unsigned long align, unsigned long min, unsigned long max)\n--\narch/s390/boot/physmem_info.c-212-\tboot_emerg(\"Linux version %s\\n\", kernel_version);\narch/s390/boot/physmem_info.c:213:\tif (!is_prot_virt_guest() \u0026\u0026 early_command_line[0])\narch/s390/boot/physmem_info.c-214-\t\tboot_emerg(\"Kernel command line: %s\\n\", early_command_line);\n--\narch/s390/boot/uv.c=65=static int is_prot_virt_host_capable(void)\n--\narch/s390/boot/uv.c-70-\t/* disable if protected guest virtualization is enabled */\narch/s390/boot/uv.c:71:\tif (is_prot_virt_guest())\narch/s390/boot/uv.c-72-\t\treturn 0;\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=564=extern int prot_virt_guest;\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-565-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:566:static inline int is_prot_virt_guest(void)\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-567-{\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=571=static inline int share(unsigned long addr, u16 cmd)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-578-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:579:\tif (!is_prot_virt_guest())\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-580-\t\treturn -EOPNOTSUPP;\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=664=static struct attribute_group uv_keys_attr_group = {\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-667-\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:668:static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_guest(struct kobject *kobj,\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-669-\t\t\t\t struct kobj_attribute *attr, char *buf)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=680=static struct kobj_attribute uv_prot_virt_guest =\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:681:\t__ATTR(prot_virt_guest, 0444, uv_is_prot_virt_guest, NULL);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-682-\n--\narch/s390/mm/init.c=140=bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)\narch/s390/mm/init.c-141-{\narch/s390/mm/init.c:142:\treturn is_prot_virt_guest();\narch/s390/mm/init.c-143-}\n--\narch/s390/mm/init.c=146=static void __init pv_init(void)\narch/s390/mm/init.c-147-{\narch/s390/mm/init.c:148:\tif (!is_prot_virt_guest())\narch/s390/mm/init.c-149-\t\treturn;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c=259=bool ap_is_se_guest(void)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c-260-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c:261:\treturn is_prot_virt_guest() \u0026\u0026 ap_sb_available();\ndrivers/s390/crypto/ap_bus.c-262-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=284=static int __init pkey_uv_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-287-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:288:\tif (!is_prot_virt_guest())\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-289-\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n"
} |
| 31/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 24807 output: 42 thoughts: 30 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's how I'd approach this task, as if these were my internal thoughts: **Checking the s390 Architecture for Virtual Guest Information** Right, so we're looking to determine if we're running in a virtual guest environment on s390. My immediate thought is to check `is_prot_virt_guest`. That's the typical place to look for platform-specific virtual machine detection, especially on s390. I'll need to confirm the exact definition, and the source file mentioned is a solid starting point – `arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h`. This likely holds the macro definition or function implementation that will give me the answer. Time to crack open that header and verify. I expect to find some low-level hardware or hypervisor detection mechanisms in there. I'll need to understand the logic being used to properly interpret the results and integrate it with the rest of my research. |
| 32/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h",
"FirstLine": 564,
"LineCount": 10
}Results: {
"Contents": " 564:\textern int prot_virt_guest;\n 565:\t\n 566:\tstatic inline int is_prot_virt_guest(void)\n 567:\t{\n 568:\t\treturn prot_virt_guest;\n 569:\t}\n 570:\t\n 571:\tstatic inline int share(unsigned long addr, u16 cmd)\n 572:\t{\n 573:\t\tstruct uv_cb_share uvcb = {\n"
} |
| 33/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 25228 output: 26 thoughts: 11 Thoughts: Here's my thought process, summarized as you requested: **Tracking Down a Variable** Okay, so I'm trying to figure out where this `prot_virt_guest` variable is actually defined and assigned a value. I need to understand its scope and usage within the codebase. It's not immediately obvious, and I have a feeling it's critical to understanding the underlying behavior I'm trying to analyze. Time to get my search-fu working. I need to pinpoint its origin quickly to proceed. |
| 34/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "prot_virt_guest =",
"PathPrefix": ""
}Results: {
"Output": "arch/s390/boot/uv.c=15=void uv_query_info(void)\n--\narch/s390/boot/uv.c-54-\t test_bit_inv(BIT_UVC_CMD_REMOVE_SHARED_ACCESS, (unsigned long *)uvcb.inst_calls_list))\narch/s390/boot/uv.c:55:\t\tprot_virt_guest = 1;\narch/s390/boot/uv.c-56-}\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=674=static ssize_t uv_is_prot_virt_host(struct kobject *kobj,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-679-\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:680:static struct kobj_attribute uv_prot_virt_guest =\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-681-\t__ATTR(prot_virt_guest, 0444, uv_is_prot_virt_guest, NULL);\n"
} |
| 35/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 25647 output: 38 thoughts: 338 Thoughts: **Analyzing the Ultravisor Facility and its Implications for Vulnerability Research** Okay, so I'm digging into this code and trying to figure out where `uv_find_secret` gets called. My initial thought is, it's triggered if `uv_query_info` works and UVC commands are accessible within `arch/s390/boot/uv.c`. But that hinges on the hypervisor actually supporting and enabling the Ultravisor facility for the guest. Then, there's the Syzkaller setup. It runs on GCE, and GCE doesn't have native s390x hardware; it's using QEMU in TCG mode instead. The problem is, QEMU TCG *doesn't* support the Ultravisor facility, which means no Secure Execution. So, `prot_virt_guest` is definitely going to be zero in this case. If `prot_virt_guest` is zero, then `pkey_uv_init` will return `-ENODEV`. And if `pkey_uv_init` returns `-ENODEV`, the critical `uv_handler` isn't registered. That's a major red flag because if `uv_handler` isn't registered, `uv_find_secret` never gets called through this path. But wait, is `uv_find_secret` called from somewhere else? I need to check. I saw mentions of `arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h`, `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`, and `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`. Let's start with `arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h`. Nope, that's just a declaration. Ok, so where else? I'm going to look at `drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c`. That seems like the most logical place to look next. |
| 36/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | grepper |
0mError:no matches Args: {
"Expression": "uv_find_secret",
"PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c"
}Results: {
"error": "no matches"
} |
| 37/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 26458 output: 25 thoughts: 703 Thoughts: **Unreachable Code in Syzkaller Environment** Okay, so I've traced the call path of `uv_find_secret`. It's only called from `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`. That file, `pkey_uv.c`, is initialized only if `is_prot_virt_guest()` is true. Now, syzkaller runs s390x under QEMU TCG, and in that setup, `is_prot_virt_guest()` is definitely false. So, based on that, the code's unreachable. But wait... does syzkaller use KVM sometimes? I know there's an s390x instance on GCE, which runs QEMU TCG. But even if there were KVM instances, Secure Execution (protvirt) needs specific setup: a QEMU command line with `protvirt`, and a host with Ultravisor. Syzkaller is not doing that. It boots a standard vmlinux and doesn't use the special bootloader `genprotimg` needed for a secure image. Hold on, could `uv_query_info` succeed in QEMU TCG? Nope. QEMU TCG doesn't implement the Ultravisor Call (UVC) instruction, or if it does, it doesn't do the Secure Execution stuff. So, it's definitely unreachable in QEMU. Let me double-check this for syzkaller, considering the prompt I'm working with: "Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU, even when utilizing software-emulated hardware". That's a "WorthFuzzing=false" scenario. Okay, let's nail this down. `pkey_uv.c` is the key. If `is_prot_virt_guest()` is false, `pkey_uv_init` returns `-ENODEV`. The module fails to load, or if built-in, the initcall fails. Therefore, `uv_handler` is never registered, and `uv_find_secret` is never called. The modified code is unreachable in standard QEMU/syzkaller environments. The prompt says that unreachable code paths in virtualized environments, even using software-emulated hardware, result in WorthFuzzing=false. This requires s390x Secure Execution (Ultravisor), which is a hardware feature, not emulated by QEMU TCG. Also, it requires a specially crafted encrypted boot image (`genprotimg`), even on KVM. So, this is impossible to reach in syzkaller. Just to be absolutely sure, is `uv_find_secret` exported and potentially callable from elsewhere? It's `EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret)`. But I checked all the callers in the kernel tree using `git grep uv_find_secret` and the only caller is `pkey_uv.c`. So I'm confident. Okay, let me just run a quick check to ensure there are no missed callers of `uv_find_secret`. After a quick double-check I am confident this code path is unreachable. |
| 38/2 | 2026/08/11 09:23 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "uv_find_secret",
"PathPrefix": ""
}Results: {
"Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=613=static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-617-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:618:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-22-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:23: * One pre-allocated uv_secret_list for use with uv_find_secret()\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-99-\tmemset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:100:\trc = uv_find_secret(secret_id, uv_list, secret);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-101-\tmutex_unlock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
} |
| 39/2 | 2026/08/11 09:24 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.1-pro-preview Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 28554 output: 159 thoughts: 100 Thoughts: **Unreachable Code Path Confirmed** Okay, let me think this through. The code in question is only ever called by `pkey_uv.c`. Further investigation reveals that `pkey_uv.c` itself only becomes active under the condition `is_prot_virt_guest()` evaluates to true. My understanding is that this function specifically deals with Secure Execution (Ultravisor) capabilities on s390x. Therefore, this code path is definitely *not* something we'll be able to hit during fuzing with syzkaller. Standard virtualized environments like QEMU TCG are simply not equipped to trigger this particular condition. We'd need something very specific, like a bespoke secure boot image with s390x Secure Execution enabled. I'm going to flag this as unfuzzable. Let's set WorthFuzzing=false for this case. My reasoning is that it fundamentally depends on a platform feature that's unavailable in our standard testing setup. No point wasting cycles on something that's unreachable. |
| 40/2 | 2026/08/11 09:24 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"EnableConfigs": [],
"FocusSymbols": [],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies `uv_find_secret` in the s390 architecture, which is only called by the `pkey_uv` crypto driver. This driver and the underlying Ultravisor Call (UVC) functionality are only active when the system is running as an s390x Secure Execution (protected virtualization) guest. This requires specific hardware (IBM z15+ with Ultravisor) and a specially crafted encrypted boot image (genprotimg), which are not available or emulated in standard virtualized environments like QEMU TCG used by syzkaller. Therefore, this code is unreachable during fuzzing.",
"WorthFuzzing": false
}Results: {
"EnableConfigs": null,
"FocusSymbols": [],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies `uv_find_secret` in the s390 architecture, which is only called by the `pkey_uv` crypto driver. This driver and the underlying Ultravisor Call (UVC) functionality are only active when the system is running as an s390x Secure Execution (protected virtualization) guest. This requires specific hardware (IBM z15+ with Ultravisor) and a specially crafted encrypted boot image (genprotimg), which are not available or emulated in standard virtualized environments like QEMU TCG used by syzkaller. Therefore, this code is unreachable during fuzzing.",
"WorthFuzzing": false
} |
| 41/1 | 2026/08/11 09:24 | action | If |
0mArgs:{
"WorthFuzzing": false
}Results: null |
| Total Calls | Total Tokens | Avg Tokens | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|
| Total Calls | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|