AI Trajectory

null

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PKEY",
    "PKEY_UV",
    "S390_UV_UAPI"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "uv_find_secret",
    "pkey_handler_verify_key",
    "pkey_handler_key_to_protkey"
  ],
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch addresses two issues:\n1. An out-of-bounds read in `find_secret_in_page()`. The loop previously used `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` instead of `list-\u003enum_secr_stored`. Since `list-\u003esecrets` is a fixed-size array of 85 elements, if `total_num_secrets` exceeds 85, the loop reads past the end of the `list` structure (which is exactly one page in size). This is a classic out-of-bounds read that is reliably detected by standard KASAN.\n2. A logic bug in `uv_find_secret()` where the loop condition `start_idx \u003c list-\u003enext_secret_idx` was always false because `start_idx` was assigned `list-\u003enext_secret_idx` immediately prior to the check. The fix correctly initializes and updates `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop.\n\nThe `list` structure passed to `uv_find_secret()` is fully zeroed before use (via `memset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list))` in `get_secret_metadata()`). There are no uninitialized memory reads, uninitialized stack/heap variables, or information leaks to user space introduced or fixed by this patch. Standard KASAN is perfectly suited to catch the out-of-bounds read, and a dedicated KMSAN session is not required.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false,
  "Reasoning": "The patch fixes a bug in `uv_find_secret` where `start_idx` was incorrectly updated and `find_secret_in_page` used the wrong limit. This is a functional change in the s390x ultravisor secret handling code, reachable from userspace via `/dev/pkey` ioctls.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

null

{
  "PatchDiff": "commit 567efac872e2c33ca89708442038fb617adac2fb\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate:   Wed Aug 12 18:12:14 2026 +0000\n\n    syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\nindex a284f98d97168..e70acad09cd5f 100644\n--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\n+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c\n@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n {\n \tu16 i;\n \n-\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c list-\u003etotal_num_secrets; i++) {\n+\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c list-\u003enum_secr_stored; i++) {\n \t\tif (memcmp(secret_id, list-\u003esecrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {\n \t\t\t*secret = list-\u003esecrets[i].hdr;\n \t\t\treturn 0;\n@@ -781,11 +781,14 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n \t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n \t\t   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n {\n-\tu16 start_idx = 0;\n+\tu16 start_idx;\n \tu16 list_rc;\n \tint ret;\n \n+\tlist-\u003enext_secret_idx = 0;\n+\n \tdo {\n+\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\n \t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\n \t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n \t\t\tif (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)\n@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n \t\tret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);\n \t\tif (ret == 0)\n \t\t\treturn ret;\n-\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\n \t} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA \u0026\u0026 start_idx \u003c list-\u003enext_secret_idx);\n \n \treturn -ENOENT;\n"
}

best-expensive

null

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PKEY",
    "PKEY_UV",
    "S390_UV_UAPI"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "uv_find_secret",
    "pkey_handler_verify_key",
    "pkey_handler_key_to_protkey"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch fixes a bug in `uv_find_secret` where `start_idx` was incorrectly updated and `find_secret_in_page` used the wrong limit. This is a functional change in the s390x ultravisor secret handling code, reachable from userspace via `/dev/pkey` ioctls.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and determine
if it makes functional changes to the kernel that should be fuzzed.

IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively
use your code access tools to examine the actual source code and confirm any assumptions.

Return WorthFuzzing=false if the patch only contains:
- Modifications to Documentation/, Kconfig files, or code comments.
- Purely decorative changes, such as logging (e.g., pr_err, printk) or tracepoints.
- Changes to numeric constants or macros that do not functionally alter execution flow.
- Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU,
  even when utilizing software-emulated hardware (e.g., usb gadget, mac80211_hwsim).
- Code in vendor-specific PCIe switch, SmartNIC, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed,
  ionic, amdgpu) that require physical PCIe hardware cards not emulated in standard QEMU.
- Driver .remove, .shutdown, or pci_unregister_driver teardown callbacks (e.g., igb_remove)
  that are executed only during PCI hot-unplug or sysfs driver unbind operations.

If it modifies reachable core kernel logic, drivers, or architectures, use your code search
tools to verify the code can be executed, then return WorthFuzzing=true.

When returning WorthFuzzing=true, you MUST ALSO:
1. Extract any specific kernel functions that should be heavily fuzzed into FocusSymbols.
   Avoid listing generic hot-path functions to prevent skewed test distributions.
   Prefer non-static, non-inlined API entrypoint functions over internal static helper functions
   (which are inlined by the compiler and do not have distinct symbol addresses).
2. Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly test this new/modified feature.
   Go and look into the Kconfig files and check for ifdefs around the code, do not make assumptions.
   Also check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs
   needed for Kbuild to compile the code statically into vmlinux. List them in the EnableConfigs
   output array, and DO NOT add a 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit 567efac872e2c33ca89708442038fb617adac2fb
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Wed Aug 12 18:12:14 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index a284f98d97168..e70acad09cd5f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 {
 	u16 i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < list->total_num_secrets; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_secr_stored; i++) {
 		if (memcmp(secret_id, list->secrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {
 			*secret = list->secrets[i].hdr;
 			return 0;
@@ -781,11 +781,14 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		   struct uv_secret_list *list,
 		   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)
 {
-	u16 start_idx = 0;
+	u16 start_idx;
 	u16 list_rc;
 	int ret;
 
+	list->next_secret_idx = 0;
+
 	do {
+		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 		uv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, &list_rc, NULL);
 		if (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED && list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {
 			if (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)
@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		ret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);
 		if (ret == 0)
 			return ret;
-		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 	} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA && start_idx < list->next_secret_idx);
 
 	return -ENOENT;

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 2375
							output: 19
							thoughts: 316
						

**Analyzing a Patch to s390 Architecture Code**

Okay, so I'm looking at this patch that's been applied to `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`. It looks like it's making a few changes to `find_secret_in_page` and `uv_find_secret`. Specifically, in `find_secret_in_page`, the loop condition has been altered; it now uses `list->num_secr_stored` instead of `list->total_num_secrets`, which is something to note. And within `uv_find_secret`, the initialization and update of `list->next_secret_idx` have been moved *inside* the loop. This could have performance implications, depending on the structure and use case.

Now, let's see how this function is actually *used*. I'll need to check the code in `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c` for calls to `uv_find_secret`. My immediate thought is, is this even *reachable* in a typical fuzzing environment like GCE or QEMU? S390 architecture, I seem to recall, is not always the target, and syzkaller's typical setups. Ah, wait, yes, syzkaller *does* support s390x. So we need to consider this. The prompt does say to skip any code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments. But wait, since s390x is supported, let's go back to looking at the use of `uv_find_secret` in the code, and how that could be reachable via syzkaller.

{
  "Expression": "uv_find_secret"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=613=static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-617-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:618:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-22-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:23: * One pre-allocated uv_secret_list for use with uv_find_secret()\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-99-\tmemset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:100:\trc = uv_find_secret(secret_id, uv_list, secret);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-101-\tmutex_unlock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 3758
							output: 19
							thoughts: 42
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, from an expert's perspective:

**Diving into the s390 Crypto Key Handling**

Right, `uv_find_secret`… that function name immediately rings a bell. It's used within the s390 architecture's cryptographic key handling, specifically in `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`. My initial thought is to refresh my memory on what `pkey_uv.c` actually *is*. Is this related to User Verification, Key storage and access or maybe some other hardware support for crypto? It's been a while since I last looked closely at the s390 key infrastructure. Let's see what that file contains.

{
  "Expression": "get_secret_metadata"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c=806=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-812- * @buf_size: Size of the buffer. The correct buffer size is reported as part of\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:813: * the result from `uv_get_secret_metadata`.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-814- *\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=83=static bool is_uv_keytype(enum pkey_key_type keytype)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-92-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:93:static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-94-\t\t\t       struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=106=static int retrieve_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-111-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:112:\trc = get_secret_metadata(secret_id, \u0026secret_meta_data);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-113-\tif (rc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=233=static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-247-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:248:\trc = get_secret_metadata(t-\u003esecret_id, \u0026secret_meta_data);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-249-\tif (rc)\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 4507
							output: 18
							thoughts: 66
						

Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this process:

**Diving into the `pkey_uv.c` Code**

Okay, let's get into this `pkey_uv.c` file. Right, it's a "protected key UV handler." I need to understand how it's interfacing with protected keys. My immediate thought is, "Can I even *reach* this thing?" I have to remember how `pkey` functionality is exposed. Is it accessible through `/dev/pkey`, or some related `ioctl` calls within the s390 architecture? I need to quickly determine the entry points and the conditions under which this `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c` code is invoked. I need to refresh my understanding of the larger `pkey` subsystem to gain some context.

{
  "Expression": "uv_verifykey"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=190=static int uv_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *_apqns __always_unused,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-232-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:233:static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-234-\t\t\tu16 *_card __always_unused,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=272=static struct pkey_handler uv_handler = {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-277-\t.key_to_protkey\t\t = uv_key2protkey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:278:\t.verify_key\t\t = uv_verifykey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-279-};\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 5043
							output: 17
							thoughts: 33
						

Okay, let's dive into this. I need to understand how the `pkey_handler` is being utilized within the s390 architecture's cryptographic key management. My immediate thought is to check out the relevant driver code, specifically something like `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c`. This seems the most likely place to find the implementation details. I'm hoping to quickly grasp how the `pkey_handler` structure is employed within that context. I'm aiming for a mental model of its role in the key management process. I'm thinking a deep dive into the code will reveal the necessary usage patterns.

{
  "Expression": "pkey_handler"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=25=static int key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-32-\t/* try the direct way */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:33:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(apqns, nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-34-\t\t\t\t\t key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-39-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:40:\t\trc = pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(apqns, nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-41-\t\t\t\t\t\t\t  key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=55=int pkey_key2protkey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-62-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:63:\t\tpkey_handler_request_modules();\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-64-\t\trc = key2protkey(NULL, 0, key, keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=92=static int pkey_ioctl_genseck(struct pkey_genseck __user *ugs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-104-\tkeybuflen = sizeof(kgs.seckey.seckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:105:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-106-\t\t\t\t  kgs.keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=116=static int pkey_ioctl_clr2seck(struct pkey_clr2seck __user *ucs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-128-\tkeybuflen = sizeof(kcs.seckey.seckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:129:\trc = pkey_handler_clr_to_key(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-130-\t\t\t\t     kcs.keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=142=static int pkey_ioctl_sec2protk(struct pkey_sec2protk __user *usp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-153-\tksp.protkey.len = sizeof(ksp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:154:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(\u0026apqn, 1,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-155-\t\t\t\t\t ksp.seckey.seckey,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=215=static int pkey_ioctl_findcard(struct pkey_findcard __user *ufc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-229-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:230:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kfc.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-231-\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(kfc.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-234-\tif (rc == -ENODEV)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:235:\t\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kfc.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-236-\t\t\t\t\t\tsizeof(kfc.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=253=static int pkey_ioctl_skey2pkey(struct pkey_skey2pkey __user *usp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-261-\tksp.protkey.len = sizeof(ksp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:262:\trc = pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-263-\t\t\t\t\t ksp.seckey.seckey,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=276=static int pkey_ioctl_verifykey(struct pkey_verifykey __user *uvk)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-286-\tkvk.domain = 0xFFFF;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:287:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(kvk.seckey.seckey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-288-\t\t\t\t     sizeof(kvk.seckey.seckey),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=305=static int pkey_ioctl_genprotk(struct pkey_genprotk __user *ugp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-313-\tkgp.protkey.len = sizeof(kgp.protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:314:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0, kgp.keytype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-315-\t\t\t\t  PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=326=static int pkey_ioctl_verifyprotk(struct pkey_verifyprotk __user *uvp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-355-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:356:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(tmpbuf, sizeof(*t),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-357-\t\t\t\t     NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, 0);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=390=static int pkey_ioctl_genseck2(struct pkey_genseck2 __user *ugs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-414-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:415:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(apqns, kgs.apqn_entries,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-416-\t\t\t\t  u, kgs.type, kgs.size, kgs.keygenflags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=442=static int pkey_ioctl_clr2seck2(struct pkey_clr2seck2 __user *ucs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-470-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:471:\trc = pkey_handler_clr_to_key(apqns, kcs.apqn_entries,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-472-\t\t\t\t     u, kcs.type, kcs.size, kcs.keygenflags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=503=static int pkey_ioctl_verifykey2(struct pkey_verifykey2 __user *uvk)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-514-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:515:\trc = pkey_handler_verify_key(kkey, kvk.keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-516-\t\t\t\t     \u0026kvk.cardnr, \u0026kvk.domain,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=558=static int pkey_ioctl_apqns4k(struct pkey_apqns4key __user *uak)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-578-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:579:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(kkey, kak.keylen, kak.flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-580-\t\t\t\t\tapqns, \u0026nr_apqns, 0);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=608=static int pkey_ioctl_apqns4kt(struct pkey_apqns4keytype __user *uat)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-622-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:623:\trc = pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(kat.type,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-624-\t\t\t\t\t    kat.cur_mkvp, kat.alt_mkvp,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c=34=static LIST_HEAD(handler_list);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-35-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:36:int pkey_handler_register(struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-37-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:38:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-39-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-78-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:79:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_register);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-80-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:81:int pkey_handler_unregister(struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-82-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-93-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:94:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_unregister);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-95-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-99-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:100:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keybased(const u8 *key, u32 keylen)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-101-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:102:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-103-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-117-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:118:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_get_keybased);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-119-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:120:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(enum pkey_key_type kt)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-121-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:122:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-123-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-137-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:138:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_get_keytypebased);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-139-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:140:void pkey_handler_put(const struct pkey_handler *handler)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-141-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:142:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-143-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-155-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:156:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_put);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-157-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:158:int pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-159-\t\t\t\tconst u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-162-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:163:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-164-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-165-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:166:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-167-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003ekey_to_protkey) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-171-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:172:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-173-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-175-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:176:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_key_to_protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-177-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-183- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:184:int pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-185-\t\t\t\t\t size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-189-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:190:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h, *htmp[10];\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-191-\tint i, n = 0, rc = -ENODEV;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-215-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:216:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-217-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:218:int pkey_handler_gen_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-219-\t\t\t u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-222-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:223:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-224-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-225-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:226:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-227-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003egen_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-231-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:232:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-233-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-235-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:236:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_gen_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-237-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:238:int pkey_handler_clr_to_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-239-\t\t\t    u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-244-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:245:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-246-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-247-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:248:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-249-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eclr_to_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-253-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:254:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-255-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-257-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:258:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_clr_to_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-259-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:260:int pkey_handler_verify_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-261-\t\t\t    u16 *card, u16 *dom,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-264-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:265:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-266-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-267-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:268:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-269-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003everify_key) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-272-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:273:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-274-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-276-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:277:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_verify_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-278-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:279:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, u32 flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-280-\t\t\t       struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-282-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:283:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-284-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-285-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:286:\th = pkey_handler_get_keybased(key, keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-287-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eapqns_for_key)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-289-\t\t\t\t      xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:290:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-291-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-293-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:294:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_apqns_for_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-295-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:296:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(enum pkey_key_type keysubtype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-297-\t\t\t\t   u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-300-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:301:\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-302-\tint rc = -ENODEV;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-303-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:304:\th = pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(keysubtype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-305-\tif (h \u0026\u0026 h-\u003eapqns_for_keytype) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-309-\t}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:310:\tpkey_handler_put(h);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-311-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-313-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:314:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-315-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:316:void pkey_handler_request_modules(void)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-317-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-318-#ifdef CONFIG_MODULES\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:319:\tstatic const char * const pkey_handler_modules[] = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-320-#if IS_MODULE(CONFIG_PKEY_CCA)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-334-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:335:\tfor (i = 0; i \u003c ARRAY_SIZE(pkey_handler_modules); i++) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:336:\t\tconst struct pkey_handler *h;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-337-\t\tbool found = false;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-341-\t\t\tif (h-\u003emodule \u0026\u0026\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:342:\t\t\t    !strcmp(h-\u003emodule-\u003ename, pkey_handler_modules[i])) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-343-\t\t\t\tfound = true;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-348-\t\tif (!found) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:349:\t\t\tpr_debug(\"request_module(%s)\\n\", pkey_handler_modules[i]);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:350:\t\t\trequest_module(pkey_handler_modules[i]);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-351-\t\t}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-354-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:355:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_request_modules);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-356-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h=145=extern const struct attribute_group *pkey_attr_groups[];\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-150-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:151:struct pkey_handler {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-152-\tstruct module *module;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-192-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:193:int pkey_handler_register(struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:194:int pkey_handler_unregister(struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-195-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-199-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:200:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keybased(const u8 *key, u32 keylen);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:201:const struct pkey_handler *pkey_handler_get_keytypebased(enum pkey_key_type kt);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:202:void pkey_handler_put(const struct pkey_handler *handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-203-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:204:int pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-205-\t\t\t\tconst u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-207-\t\t\t\tu32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:208:int pkey_handler_slowpath_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-209-\t\t\t\t\t size_t nr_apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-212-\t\t\t\t\t u32 *protkeytype, u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:213:int pkey_handler_gen_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-214-\t\t\t u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-216-\t\t\t u8 *keybuf, u32 *keybuflen, u32 *keyinfo, u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:217:int pkey_handler_clr_to_key(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-218-\t\t\t    u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-222-\t\t\t    u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:223:int pkey_handler_verify_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-224-\t\t\t    u16 *card, u16 *dom,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-226-\t\t\t    u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:227:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen, u32 flags,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-228-\t\t\t       struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t *nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-229-\t\t\t       u32 xflags);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:230:int pkey_handler_apqns_for_keytype(enum pkey_key_type ktype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-231-\t\t\t\t   u8 cur_mkvp[32], u8 alt_mkvp[32], u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-237- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h:238:void pkey_handler_request_modules(void);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.h-239-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=557=static int cca_slowpath_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-595-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:596:static struct pkey_handler cca_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-597-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=613=static int __init pkey_cca_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-615-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the cca stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:616:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026cca_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-617-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c=622=static void __exit pkey_cca_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-624-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c:625:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026cca_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_cca.c-626-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=504=static int ep11_slowpath_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-542-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:543:static struct pkey_handler ep11_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-544-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=560=static int __init pkey_ep11_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-562-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the ep11 stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:563:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026ep11_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-564-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c=569=static void __exit pkey_ep11_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-571-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c:572:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026ep11_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_ep11.c-573-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=435=static int pkey_pckmo_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-442-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:443:static struct pkey_handler pckmo_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-444-\t.module\t\t      = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=456=static int __init pkey_pckmo_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-469-\t/* register this module as pkey handler for all the pckmo stuff */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:470:\treturn pkey_handler_register(\u0026pckmo_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-471-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c=476=static void __exit pkey_pckmo_exit(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-478-\t/* unregister this module as pkey handler */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c:479:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026pckmo_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_pckmo.c-480-}\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-17-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:18: * Wrapper around pkey_handler_gen_key() which deals with the\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-19- * ENODEV return code and then tries to enforce a pkey handler\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-21- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:22:static int sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(u32 keytype, u32 keysubtype,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-23-\t\t\t\t    u32 keybitsize, u32 flags,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-27-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:28:\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-29-\t\t\t\t  keytype, keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-32-\tif (rc == -ENODEV) {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:33:\t\tpkey_handler_request_modules();\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:34:\t\trc = pkey_handler_gen_key(NULL, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-35-\t\t\t\t\t  keytype, keysubtype,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=49=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-67-\tprotkey.len = sizeof(protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:68:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-69-\t\t\t\t      protkey.protkey, \u0026protkey.len,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-81-\t\tprotkey.len = sizeof(protkey.protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:82:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-83-\t\t\t\t\t      protkey.protkey, \u0026protkey.len,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=106=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_aes_xts_attr_read(u32 keytype, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-131-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:132:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-133-\t\t\t\t      t-\u003eprotkey, \u0026protlen, \u0026prottype);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=148=static ssize_t pkey_protkey_hmac_attr_read(u32 keytype, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-173-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:174:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_PROTKEY, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-175-\t\t\t\t      t-\u003eprotkey, \u0026protlen, \u0026prottype);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=308=static ssize_t pkey_ccadata_aes_attr_read(u32 keytype, bool is_xts, char *buf,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-321-\tbuflen = sizeof(seckey-\u003eseckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:322:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-323-\t\t\t\t      seckey-\u003eseckey, \u0026buflen, NULL);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-329-\t\tbuflen = sizeof(seckey-\u003eseckey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:330:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(keytype, PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA, 0, 0,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-331-\t\t\t\t\t      seckey-\u003eseckey, \u0026buflen, NULL);\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=419=static ssize_t pkey_ccacipher_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-433-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:434:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(pkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-435-\t\t\t\t      PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER, keybits, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-442-\t\tbuf += CCACIPHERTOKENSIZE;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:443:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-444-\t\t\tpkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c=534=static ssize_t pkey_ep11_aes_attr_read(enum pkey_key_size keybits,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-548-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:549:\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(pkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-550-\t\t\t\t      PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES, keybits, 0,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-557-\t\tbuf += MAXEP11AESKEYBLOBSIZE;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c:558:\t\trc = sys_pkey_handler_gen_key(\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_sysfs.c-559-\t\t\tpkey_aes_bitsize_to_keytype(keybits),\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=233=static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-271-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:272:static struct pkey_handler uv_handler = {\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-273-\t.module\t\t\t = THIS_MODULE,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=284=static int __init pkey_uv_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-297-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:298:\trc = pkey_handler_register(\u0026uv_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-299-\tif (rc)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=308=static void __exit pkey_uv_exit(void)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-309-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:310:\tpkey_handler_unregister(\u0026uv_handler);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-311-\tmutex_lock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 16707
							output: 19
							thoughts: 241
						

**Reaching `uv_find_secret` from Userspace via `/dev/pkey` ioctls**

Okay, let me break this down. My initial thought process is tracing the path to `uv_find_secret`. It's called from `get_secret_metadata`, which is itself called from two places: `retrieve_secret` and `uv_verifykey`. I know that `uv_verifykey` is registered as `.verify_key` within `uv_handler`, which is initialized during `pkey_uv_init`. And `pkey_uv_init` is the module init function for `pkey_uv`.

So, `uv_verifykey` is ultimately called by `pkey_handler_verify_key`. That, in turn, is triggered by `pkey_ioctl_verifykey`, `pkey_ioctl_verifykey2`, and `pkey_ioctl_verifyprotk`. Aha! Those are ioctls on `/dev/pkey`. That's the link. **Yes, this is definitely reachable from userspace through those `/dev/pkey` ioctls.**

Now the critical question: can this be reached in QEMU? I know the s390x architecture gets attention from syzkaller. That's a good sign. And, looking at the code, I see that `uv_find_secret` is located in `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`. Therefore, the architecture that uses this is s390x.

Let's quickly check whether `CONFIG_PKEY_UV` is required in the configuration. That'll be a key part of determining the overall exposure to exploitation in the various build setups.

{
  "Expression": "config PKEY_UV"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig=137=config PKEY_PCKMO\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-157-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:158:config PKEY_UV\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-159-\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 17410
							output: 36
							thoughts: 33
						

Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:

**Investigating the Kconfig Options for PKEY_UV**

Right, so I need to track down the Kconfig definition for `PKEY_UV`. My instinct says it'll be in either the s390 crypto drivers or the generic crypto section. Given its likely function, the s390 path might be a better bet since it's probably related to hardware-specific key management. I'll start by checking `drivers/s390/crypto/Kconfig` first. If it's not there, I'll move on and immediately look in `drivers/crypto/Kconfig`. That's the logical progression. Finding the exact location and configuration dependencies for `PKEY_UV` is key for whatever I'm troubleshooting or configuring. Let's see what we find.

no matches

{
  "Expression": "config PKEY_UV",
  "PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/Kconfig"
}

{
  "error": "no matches"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 17681
							output: 34
							thoughts: 87
						

Here's my thought process, as it unfolded:

**Debugging Kconfig Configuration**

Okay, so I'm chasing down this `PKEY_PCKMO` configuration issue. It looks like the kernel build system is pointing me to `drivers/crypto/Kconfig`, which seems logical. Wait a minute… the output indicates `drivers/crypto/Kconfig=137=config PKEY_PCKMO`, confirming that location is relevant. But something feels off. Didn't I just try to look into `drivers/s390/crypto/Kconfig`? And that *didn't* exist, right? Okay, so I need to make sure I am looking in the right place, so now I need to double-check that location or just verify it's the correct Kconfig file. Let's revisit both those Kconfig locations. Gotta make sure I haven't mixed something up, given that the architecture-specific one seems absent. This feels like it might be a subtle but critical difference in how this feature is enabled/configured based on the architecture, which is important to keep in mind. I hope I can resolve this!

{
  "File": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 150,
  "LineCount": 20
}

{
  "Contents": " 150:\t\t  is especially used during self test of protected key ciphers like\n 151:\t\t  PAES but the CCA and EP11 handler provide alternate ways to\n 152:\t\t  generate protected keys from clear key values.\n 153:\t\n 154:\t\t  If you have selected the PKEY option then you should also enable\n 155:\t\t  this option unless you are sure you never need to derive protected\n 156:\t\t  keys from clear key values directly via PCKMO.\n 157:\t\n 158:\tconfig PKEY_UV\n 159:\t\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n 160:\t\tdepends on PKEY\n 161:\t\tdepends on S390_UV_UAPI\n 162:\t\thelp\n 163:\t\t  This is the PKEY Ultravisor support handler for deriving protected\n 164:\t\t  keys from secrets stored within the Ultravisor (UV).\n 165:\t\n 166:\t\t  This module works together with the UV device and supports the\n 167:\t\t  retrieval of protected keys from secrets stored within the\n 168:\t\t  UV firmware layer. This service is only available within\n 169:\t\t  a protected execution guest and thus this module will fail upon\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 18378
							output: 40
							thoughts: 222
						

**Secure Execution and Syzkaller on s390x**

Okay, so I see this message: "This service is only available within a protected execution guest," which immediately raises a question: does QEMU, the virtual machine I'm probably dealing with here, actually support secure execution? It sounds like a secure execution guest, or Secure Execution, is a prerequisite.

Good, it seems QEMU *does* support s390x Secure Execution, specifically using 'protvirt'. That's a point in the right direction. But hold on, the real question is whether syzkaller is *configured* to run s390x in this Secure Execution mode. I need to make sure syzkaller's setup is compatible.

Let's re-examine the prompt to see if there are any hints, it states that "Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU, even when utilizing software-emulated hardware". Since QEMU *can* support s390x Secure Execution, that code path is indeed possible to reach.

Okay, since QEMU *supports* s390x Secure Execution and the "Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments" line can be considered as the caveat, it *is* possible to reach. Let's see if there is any evidence of the ability to call `uv_find_secret` in `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`.

{
  "File": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c",
  "FirstLine": 770,
  "LineCount": 50
}

{
  "Contents": " 770:\t}\n 771:\t\n 772:\t/**\n 773:\t * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\n 774:\t * @secret_id: search pattern.\n 775:\t * @list: ephemeral buffer space\n 776:\t * @secret: output data, containing the secret's metadata.\n 777:\t *\n 778:\t * Context: might sleep.\n 779:\t */\n 780:\tint uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n 781:\t\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n 782:\t\t\t   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n 783:\t{\n 784:\t\tu16 start_idx;\n 785:\t\tu16 list_rc;\n 786:\t\tint ret;\n 787:\t\n 788:\t\tlist-\u003enext_secret_idx = 0;\n 789:\t\n 790:\t\tdo {\n 791:\t\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\n 792:\t\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\n 793:\t\t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n 794:\t\t\t\tif (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)\n 795:\t\t\t\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n 796:\t\t\t\telse\n 797:\t\t\t\t\treturn -EIO;\n 798:\t\t\t}\n 799:\t\t\tret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);\n 800:\t\t\tif (ret == 0)\n 801:\t\t\t\treturn ret;\n 802:\t\t} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA \u0026\u0026 start_idx \u003c list-\u003enext_secret_idx);\n 803:\t\n 804:\t\treturn -ENOENT;\n 805:\t}\n 806:\tEXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\n 807:\t\n 808:\t/**\n 809:\t * uv_retrieve_secret() - get the secret value for the secret index.\n 810:\t * @secret_idx: Secret index for which the secret should be retrieved.\n 811:\t * @buf: Buffer to store retrieved secret.\n 812:\t * @buf_size: Size of the buffer. The correct buffer size is reported as part of\n 813:\t * the result from `uv_get_secret_metadata`.\n 814:\t *\n 815:\t * Calls the Retrieve Secret UVC and translates the UV return code into an errno.\n 816:\t *\n 817:\t * Context: might sleep.\n 818:\t *\n 819:\t * Return:\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 19721
							output: 29
							thoughts: 137
						

**Analyzing the Patch: UV Secret Search Fix**

Okay, so this patch is all about tightening up the secret searching functionality within the `uv_find_secret` and `find_secret_in_page` functions. It looks like we're fixing a bug related to how `start_idx` is being handled, and there's a problem with `find_secret_in_page` using `list->total_num_secrets` when it should have been using `list->num_secr_stored`. A definite functional change, which is good – it means we're addressing a known issue.

The interesting bit is where this code resides – it's reachable through the `/dev/pkey` ioctls specifically on s390x systems. This ties it to the hardware key support, so we need to be extra careful to not break anything. The relevant configuration options needed for this functionality are `PKEY_UV`, `S390_UV_UAPI`, and `PKEY`. We're going to need to verify how `PKEY` is configured in our environment. I'll take a look at the `PKEY` configuration right away to assess the impact of this change.

{
  "Expression": "config PKEY",
  "PathPrefix": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig=67=config ZCRYPT\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-77-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:78:config PKEY\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-79-\ttristate \"Kernel API for protected key handling\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-104-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:105:config PKEY_CCA\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-106-\ttristate \"PKEY CCA support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-120-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:121:config PKEY_EP11\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-122-\ttristate \"PKEY EP11 support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-136-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:137:config PKEY_PCKMO\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-138-\ttristate \"PKEY PCKMO support handler\"\n--\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-157-\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig:158:config PKEY_UV\ndrivers/crypto/Kconfig-159-\ttristate \"PKEY UV support handler\"\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 20443
							output: 33
							thoughts: 39
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, from an expert's perspective:

**Dependencies and Key Considerations**

Alright, right off the bat, I know I'm dealing with `PKEY` and `PKEY_UV`. That's the core of the problem. But, hold on a second. I have a hunch... doesn't `PKEY` often have a tight link with `ZCRYPT`? I'd better double-check those dependencies before I move any further. I need to understand the full scope here, and that starts with knowing how `PKEY` relies on other modules or components. Let's dig into `PKEY`'s dependencies and confirm my initial thought. That dependency check is essential to building a reliable solution.

{
  "File": "drivers/crypto/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 78,
  "LineCount": 20
}

{
  "Contents": "  78:\tconfig PKEY\n  79:\t\ttristate \"Kernel API for protected key handling\"\n  80:\t\tdepends on S390\n  81:\t\thelp\n  82:\t\t  With this option enabled the pkey kernel modules provide an API\n  83:\t\t  for creation and handling of protected keys. Other parts of the\n  84:\t\t  kernel or userspace applications may use these functions.\n  85:\t\n  86:\t\t  The protected key support is distributed into:\n  87:\t\t  - A pkey base and API kernel module (pkey.ko) which offers the\n  88:\t\t    infrastructure for the pkey handler kernel modules, the ioctl\n  89:\t\t    and the sysfs API and the in-kernel API to the crypto cipher\n  90:\t\t    implementations using protected key.\n  91:\t\t  - A pkey pckmo kernel module (pkey-pckmo.ko) which is automatically\n  92:\t\t    loaded when pckmo support (that is generation of protected keys\n  93:\t\t    from clear key values) is available.\n  94:\t\t  - A pkey CCA kernel module (pkey-cca.ko) which is automatically\n  95:\t\t    loaded when a CEX crypto card is available.\n  96:\t\t  - A pkey EP11 kernel module (pkey-ep11.ko) which is automatically\n  97:\t\t    loaded when a CEX crypto card is available.\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 21038
							output: 24
							thoughts: 54
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of these dependencies, as if they were my own immediate thoughts as an expert:

**Dependency Deep Dive**

Alright, let's break this down. From what I see, `PKEY` *absolutely* leans on `S390` – that's the base requirement. Then, things get a bit more intricate with `PKEY_UV`. It's pulling in both `PKEY` and `S390_UV_UAPI`. It looks like some kind of User-Mode Variant. So, before I go any further, I should really dig into the details of `S390_UV_UAPI` to get the full picture. Understanding that one will be key to understanding the interplay of these other components. Time to investigate!

{
  "Expression": "config S390_UV_UAPI"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/char/Kconfig=75=config HMC_DRV\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/Kconfig-87-\ndrivers/s390/char/Kconfig:88:config S390_UV_UAPI\ndrivers/s390/char/Kconfig-89-\tdef_tristate m\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 21385
							output: 38
							thoughts: 35
						

**Examining the S390 UV UAPI Configuration Option**

Okay, so `S390_UV_UAPI` is defined within `drivers/s390/char/Kconfig`. Time to get into the details. I need to understand its dependencies, figure out what other configurations or features hinge on this one. What other options does this enable or disable? This is the starting point for a deeper dive.

{
  "File": "drivers/s390/char/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 88,
  "LineCount": 10
}

{
  "Contents": "  88:\tconfig S390_UV_UAPI\n  89:\t\tdef_tristate m\n  90:\t\tprompt \"Ultravisor userspace API\"\n  91:\t\tdepends on S390\n  92:\t\thelp\n  93:\t\t  Selecting exposes parts of the UV interface to userspace\n  94:\t\t  by providing a misc character device at /dev/uv.\n  95:\t\t  Using IOCTLs one can interact with the UV.\n  96:\t\t  The device is only available if the Ultravisor\n  97:\t\t  Facility (158) is present.\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 21709
							output: 38
							thoughts: 117
						

**My Analysis of the S390_UV_UAPI Configuration and Key Verification**

Okay, so I'm digging into this `S390_UV_UAPI` situation, and it looks like it's inherently tied to the `S390` architecture, which makes sense. To get this functionality enabled, I need to ensure that `PKEY`, `PKEY_UV`, and of course `S390_UV_UAPI` are all correctly configured. I should focus my attention on the following key functions: `uv_find_secret`, `uv_verifykey`, and `get_secret_metadata`.

Aha, hold on a second... is `uv_verifykey` *static* in `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`? That could have implications for its accessibility or how it's being used. I need to confirm that this is indeed the case. Let me double-check that `uv_verifykey` is, in fact, a static function. That's a crucial detail that will influence my further investigation.

{
  "Expression": "uv_verifykey",
  "PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=190=static int uv_key2protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *_apqns __always_unused,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-232-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:233:static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-234-\t\t\tu16 *_card __always_unused,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=272=static struct pkey_handler uv_handler = {\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-277-\t.key_to_protkey\t\t = uv_key2protkey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:278:\t.verify_key\t\t = uv_verifykey,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-279-};\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 22373
							output: 40
							thoughts: 70
						

Okay, let's break this down.

**Analyzing Key Verification in the s390 Crypto Driver**

Right, so I'm focusing on key verification within the s390 crypto driver. First observation: the `uv_verifykey` function is indeed static, confirming that its scope is limited to its compilation unit. Now, the next element to consider is that the `uv_find_secret` function is exported, indicating its visibility and potential use outside of its immediate defining module.

My primary interest lies in the ioctl-based verification methods used. So, I need to thoroughly examine `pkey_ioctl_verifykey`, `pkey_ioctl_verifykey2`, and `pkey_ioctl_verifyprotk`. These likely handle the core key verification logic through the ioctl interface, and they are located within the `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c` file. I'll need to dig into these functions to understand how they interact with `uv_verifykey` and `uv_find_secret` if at all, to determine the overall key verification architecture.

{
  "Expression": "pkey_ioctl_verifykey",
  "PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=253=static int pkey_ioctl_skey2pkey(struct pkey_skey2pkey __user *usp)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-275-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:276:static int pkey_ioctl_verifykey(struct pkey_verifykey __user *uvk)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-277-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=442=static int pkey_ioctl_clr2seck2(struct pkey_clr2seck2 __user *ucs)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-502-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:503:static int pkey_ioctl_verifykey2(struct pkey_verifykey2 __user *uvk)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-504-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c=703=static long pkey_unlocked_ioctl(struct file *filp, unsigned int cmd,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-727-\tcase PKEY_VERIFYKEY:\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:728:\t\trc = pkey_ioctl_verifykey((struct pkey_verifykey __user *)arg);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-729-\t\tbreak;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-745-\tcase PKEY_VERIFYKEY2:\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c:746:\t\trc = pkey_ioctl_verifykey2((struct pkey_verifykey2 __user *)arg);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_api.c-747-\t\tbreak;\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 23228
							output: 41
							thoughts: 101
						

**Analyzing the PKey Driver**

Okay, so I'm looking into this PKey driver, specifically to understand how key verification works. From what I see, `pkey_ioctl_verifykey` and `pkey_ioctl_verifykey2` are defined as static, so they're probably not the main entry points I need to focus on. My attention needs to shift to the non-static functions, namely `uv_find_secret` and `pkey_unlocked_ioctl`. Hold on, `pkey_unlocked_ioctl`... that's the ioctl handler for `/dev/pkey`, isn't it? Bingo. That's the key. Now, to trace the path, I need to see what's actually *doing* the verification. I'll check `pkey_handler_verify_key` in `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c`. That should be the verification function.

{
  "Expression": "pkey_handler_verify_key",
  "PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c=258=EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_clr_to_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-259-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:260:int pkey_handler_verify_key(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-261-\t\t\t    u16 *card, u16 *dom,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-276-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:277:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_verify_key);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-278-\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 23785
							output: 44
							thoughts: 30
						

Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as an expert's internal monologue:

**Investigating a Key Handling Workflow**

Alright, so `pkey_handler_verify_key` is actually exported, which is a key observation. Now that I know *that*, let's see how that fits into the broader picture. My next move is to zero in on `pkey_handler_key_to_protkey`. Understanding how the key representation translates to a protected key is crucial for figuring out the security implications here. I need to trace the data flow and understand if this translation introduces any vulnerabilities or weaknesses in the overall key management process. This is where the devil is in the details. I suspect that the potential security flaw, may lie here.

{
  "Expression": "pkey_handler_key_to_protkey",
  "PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c=156=EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_put);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-157-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:158:int pkey_handler_key_to_protkey(const struct pkey_apqn *apqns, size_t nr_apqns,\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-159-\t\t\t\tconst u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-175-}\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c:176:EXPORT_SYMBOL(pkey_handler_key_to_protkey);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_base.c-177-\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 24243
							output: 153
							thoughts: 400
						

**My Analysis of the Secret Handling Patch**

Okay, so `pkey_handler_key_to_protkey` is also exported, that's good to note. The core of this patch seems to be centered around `uv_find_secret`, which is the function that got modified, along with the static function `find_secret_in_page`. So, `uv_find_secret` is definitely the primary symbol to focus on, but I'll keep `pkey_handler_verify_key` and `pkey_handler_key_to_protkey` in mind as potentially related. I've confirmed that these are the only functions touched by this patch, which reinforces my initial hunch.

Here's my summary of the situation: this is worth fuzzing. The patch fixes a bug in `uv_find_secret` – a critical one, actually, where `start_idx` was being updated incorrectly, and `find_secret_in_page` was using the wrong limit. This is a functional change in the s390x ultravisor secret handling code, and it's reachable from userspace through the `/dev/pkey` ioctls.

The primary focus symbols I should keep in mind are `uv_find_secret`, as well as `pkey_handler_verify_key` and `pkey_handler_key_to_protkey`.

The relevant configurations to enable for this fuzzing are `PKEY`, `PKEY_UV`, and `S390_UV_UAPI`. Let me double-check... yep, `PKEY_UV` is tristate. So that's correct.

Let's quickly check the dependencies: `PKEY` depends on `S390`, `PKEY_UV` depends on `PKEY` and `S390_UV_UAPI`, and `S390_UV_UAPI` depends on `S390`. These three configurations seem sufficient to enable the relevant functionality, so that checks out. Alright, this looks like a good path to take.

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PKEY",
    "PKEY_UV",
    "S390_UV_UAPI"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "uv_find_secret",
    "pkey_handler_verify_key",
    "pkey_handler_key_to_protkey"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch fixes a bug in `uv_find_secret` where `start_idx` was incorrectly updated and `find_secret_in_page` used the wrong limit. This is a functional change in the s390x ultravisor secret handling code, reachable from userspace via `/dev/pkey` ioctls.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PKEY",
    "PKEY_UV",
    "S390_UV_UAPI"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "uv_find_secret",
    "pkey_handler_verify_key",
    "pkey_handler_key_to_protkey"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch fixes a bug in `uv_find_secret` where `start_idx` was incorrectly updated and `find_secret_in_page` used the wrong limit. This is a functional change in the s390x ultravisor secret handling code, reachable from userspace via `/dev/pkey` ioctls.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

{
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

null

best-expensive

null

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch addresses two issues:\n1. An out-of-bounds read in `find_secret_in_page()`. The loop previously used `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` instead of `list-\u003enum_secr_stored`. Since `list-\u003esecrets` is a fixed-size array of 85 elements, if `total_num_secrets` exceeds 85, the loop reads past the end of the `list` structure (which is exactly one page in size). This is a classic out-of-bounds read that is reliably detected by standard KASAN.\n2. A logic bug in `uv_find_secret()` where the loop condition `start_idx \u003c list-\u003enext_secret_idx` was always false because `start_idx` was assigned `list-\u003enext_secret_idx` immediately prior to the check. The fix correctly initializes and updates `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop.\n\nThe `list` structure passed to `uv_find_secret()` is fully zeroed before use (via `memset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list))` in `get_secret_metadata()`). There are no uninitialized memory reads, uninitialized stack/heap variables, or information leaks to user space introduced or fixed by this patch. Standard KASAN is perfectly suited to catch the out-of-bounds read, and a dedicated KMSAN session is not required.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

You are an expert Linux kernel security engineer specializing in kernel memory
error detectors (KASAN and KMSAN). Your job is to review the provided patch series and
determine if the code changes justify spawning a dedicated KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer)
fuzzing session in addition to standard KASAN fuzzing.

CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KASAN AND KMSAN:
- Standard KASAN kernel builds (upstream-apparmor-kasan.config) already enable
  a comprehensive suite of debugging tools and sanitizers, including KASAN
  (out-of-bounds accesses, use-after-free, double free, invalid free), LOCKDEP
  (locking bugs and deadlocks), UB-sanitizers, and memory corruption checks.
- KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer) detects reads of UNINITIALIZED memory (stack, heap,
  or page allocations) and kernel-to-user memory info-leaks.

Rule: THERE IS NO SENSE IN RUNNING A KMSAN SESSION IF A BUG CAN BE CAUGHT BY KASAN,
LOCKDEP, OR OTHER STANDARD BUG DETECTORS.
A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session incurs significant resource costs. You must ONLY
set NeedsKMSAN=true if the code changes introduce or expose UNINITIALIZED MEMORY risks
that are detected ONLY by KMSAN.

Look holistically at the patch series and surrounding code. Even if no direct
uninitialized field accesses or new buffer allocations are added in the diff itself,
a patch may alter control flow, bounds checking, or data length calculations in ways
that change how the rest of the code operates on existing buffers (e.g. allowing
uninitialized stack/heap memory to be read, copied to user space, or used in control
flow). Do not hesitate to use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code,
called functions, and callers.

Set NeedsKMSAN=true ONLY IF the patch introduces or modifies:
1. Kernel structures sent to user space (via copy_to_user, put_user, netlink skb
   attributes, ioctl output arguments, socket options, or BPF buffers) where fields
   or structure padding might not be fully initialized/zeroed.
2. Conditional logic or branching that depends on potentially uninitialized variables
   or struct fields.
3. Allocation or initialization of complex data structures where uninitialized fields
   could be read later in reachable code paths.
4. Bounds checks, lengths, or logic in a way that allows surrounding code to access
   uninitialized bytes of existing buffers.

Set NeedsKMSAN=false IF:
- The code changes primarily risk out-of-bounds access, array overflows, NULL pointer
  dereferences, locking deadlocks, or use-after-free bugs (these are already caught
  by KASAN, LOCKDEP, or standard bug detectors).
- All stack/heap structures touched or introduced by the patch are fully zeroed
  or initialized (e.g. using = {0}, memset, kzalloc) before being read or copied.
- The patch does not introduce any risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks.

Use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code if necessary, then provide
detailed KMSANReasoning contrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability for this patch.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit 567efac872e2c33ca89708442038fb617adac2fb
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Wed Aug 12 18:12:14 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
index a284f98d97168..e70acad09cd5f 100644
--- a/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
+++ b/arch/s390/kernel/uv.c
@@ -760,7 +760,7 @@ static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 {
 	u16 i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < list->total_num_secrets; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_secr_stored; i++) {
 		if (memcmp(secret_id, list->secrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {
 			*secret = list->secrets[i].hdr;
 			return 0;
@@ -781,11 +781,14 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		   struct uv_secret_list *list,
 		   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)
 {
-	u16 start_idx = 0;
+	u16 start_idx;
 	u16 list_rc;
 	int ret;
 
+	list->next_secret_idx = 0;
+
 	do {
+		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 		uv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, &list_rc, NULL);
 		if (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED && list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {
 			if (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)
@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		ret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);
 		if (ret == 0)
 			return ret;
-		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 	} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA && start_idx < list->next_secret_idx);
 
 	return -ENOENT;

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 2372
							output: 37
							thoughts: 237
						

**Analyzing a Patch to `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`**

Okay, so I'm looking at this patch for `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c`, and it appears to be focused on some modifications related to secret handling within that architecture. Specifically, I see changes within the `find_secret_in_page` and `uv_find_secret` functions.

First, the loop bound in `find_secret_in_page` has been adjusted. It used to iterate up to `list->total_num_secrets`, but now it seems to stop at `list->num_secr_stored`. That's interesting; I'll need to understand the relationship between those two fields within the `struct uv_secret_list` structure to grasp the significance of this change. Is this about optimization, or is there a functional reason? Perhaps `num_secr_stored` represents the valid entries, while `total_num_secrets` is a buffer size?

Then, in `uv_find_secret`, I note a change in how `list->next_secret_idx` and `start_idx` are handled. Previously, `start_idx` was initialized to 0 and adjusted after the loop. Now, the patch sets `list->next_secret_idx` to 0 *before* the loop, and within the loop, `start_idx` is set to `list->next_secret_idx`. This suggests a potential optimization or a shift in how the search resumes across calls, rather than starting from the beginning each time. Let me see... I suspect the code is using `next_secret_idx` to keep track of the current search position, so it can be resumed later.

To fully understand this, I need to get into the details of the relevant structures and functions. Specifically, `list` is a `struct uv_secret_list *`, and I see that `uv_list_secrets` is called with this `list`, along with `start_idx`, a return code `&list_rc`, and `NULL`. This function seems to be intimately involved. The `find_secret_in_page` function then appears to be searching the `list->secrets` for a specific `secret_id`. This is my clue about the way the data structures are designed and function with each other.

Okay, time to crack open `arch/s390/kernel/uv.c` and take a closer look at `uv_list_secrets`. Let's see how these pieces fit together and what the implications of these changes really are.

{
  "Expression": "uv_list_secrets",
  "PathPrefix": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/kernel/uv.c=780=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-791-\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:792:\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-793-\t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 3372
							output: 25
							thoughts: 14
						

Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those thoughts, as if they're my own:

**Investigating `uv_list_secrets`**

Right, let's get down to brass tacks. The first order of business here is to understand precisely what `uv_list_secrets` *is*. I need the definitive definition. I'm assuming it's part of the broader Ultraviolet framework, so I'll need to check the relevant documentation or source code if that's available. The name itself suggests it's a function or method related to listing secrets – could be credentials, API keys, private data, anything sensitive, really. My immediate questions are: What's the context? What secrets are we talking about? Where are these secrets stored? Does this function support any filtering or search criteria? Is it a read-only operation, or does it also have the capacity to modify the secrets in some manner? I need a clear understanding of its purpose, inputs, outputs, and any potential side effects before I can assess its implications. Ultimately, a proper understanding of it's definition is crucial for determining how it fits into the greater system and its security implications.

{
  "Expression": "uv_list_secrets",
  "PathPrefix": ""
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=473=static inline int uv_cmd_nodata(u64 handle, u16 cmd, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-489-/**\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:490: * uv_list_secrets() - Do a List Secrets UVC.\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-491- *\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-511- */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:512:static inline int uv_list_secrets(struct uv_secret_list *buf, u16 start_idx,\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-513-\t\t\t\t  u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=780=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-791-\t\tstart_idx = list-\u003enext_secret_idx;\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:792:\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, \u0026list_rc, NULL);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-793-\t\tif (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026 list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=307=static int uvio_get_list(void *zpage, struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-316-\tdo {\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:317:\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, list-\u003enext_secret_idx, \u0026uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rc,\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-318-\t\t\t\t\u0026uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rrc);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 4215
							output: 42
							thoughts: 29
						

Here's my take on the thought process, as if it were my own:

**Diving into the S390 UV Architecture**

Okay, time to get my hands dirty. I'm focusing on the `uv_list_secrets` function, and my immediate target is the `arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h` header file. I know this is where the low-level details of the UV (Universal Virtualization) architecture on S390 are going to be defined. I'm expecting to find the data structures, function prototypes, and potentially some inline assembly related to how secrets are managed within that specific environment. I need to understand how the system's security features are implemented in this particular context. This file is probably the key to uncovering the mechanics of secret handling at a fundamental level. I'm hoping it's well-documented... but I'm prepared for a deep dive!

{
  "File": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h",
  "FirstLine": 490,
  "LineCount": 50
}

{
  "Contents": " 490:\t * uv_list_secrets() - Do a List Secrets UVC.\n 491:\t *\n 492:\t * @buf: Buffer to write list into; size of one page.\n 493:\t * @start_idx: The smallest index that should be included in the list.\n 494:\t *\t\tFor the fist invocation use 0.\n 495:\t * @rc: Pointer to store the return code or NULL.\n 496:\t * @rrc: Pointer to store the return reason code or NULL.\n 497:\t *\n 498:\t * This function calls the List Secrets UVC. The result is written into `buf`,\n 499:\t * that needs to be at least one page of writable memory.\n 500:\t * `buf` consists of:\n 501:\t * * %struct uv_secret_list_hdr\n 502:\t * * %struct uv_secret_list_item (multiple)\n 503:\t *\n 504:\t * For `start_idx` use _0_ for the first call. If there are more secrets available\n 505:\t * but could not fit into the page then `rc` is `UVC_RC_MORE_DATA`.\n 506:\t * In this case use `uv_secret_list_hdr.next_secret_idx` for `start_idx`.\n 507:\t *\n 508:\t * Context: might sleep.\n 509:\t *\n 510:\t * Return: The UVC condition code.\n 511:\t */\n 512:\tstatic inline int uv_list_secrets(struct uv_secret_list *buf, u16 start_idx,\n 513:\t\t\t\t\t  u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n 514:\t{\n 515:\t\tstruct uv_cb_list_secrets uvcb = {\n 516:\t\t\t.header.len = sizeof(uvcb),\n 517:\t\t\t.header.cmd = UVC_CMD_LIST_SECRETS,\n 518:\t\t\t.start_idx = start_idx,\n 519:\t\t\t.list_addr = (u64)buf,\n 520:\t\t};\n 521:\t\tint cc = uv_call_sched(0, (u64)\u0026uvcb);\n 522:\t\n 523:\t\tif (rc)\n 524:\t\t\t*rc = uvcb.header.rc;\n 525:\t\tif (rrc)\n 526:\t\t\t*rrc = uvcb.header.rrc;\n 527:\t\n 528:\t\treturn cc;\n 529:\t}\n 530:\t\n 531:\tstruct uv_info {\n 532:\t\tunsigned long inst_calls_list[4];\n 533:\t\tunsigned long uv_base_stor_len;\n 534:\t\tunsigned long guest_base_stor_len;\n 535:\t\tunsigned long guest_virt_base_stor_len;\n 536:\t\tunsigned long guest_virt_var_stor_len;\n 537:\t\tunsigned long guest_cpu_stor_len;\n 538:\t\tunsigned long max_sec_stor_addr;\n 539:\t\tunsigned int max_num_sec_conf;\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 5329
							output: 27
							thoughts: 66
						

**Analyzing the Secrets Listing Function**

Okay, so I'm looking at this `uv_list_secrets` function, and it seems pretty straightforward on the surface. It's essentially calling a hypervisor call, a UVC, to fetch a list of secrets. The UVC, of course, is the low-level interface that does the heavy lifting. The results of that call are then written into this `buf`. Now, this `buf` seems interesting, it's allocated as a page of memory, which makes sense for potential size considerations. And it's also type `struct uv_secret_list`. My immediate instinct is to take a closer look at that structure. I need to understand the format of that data. I wonder what fields are included, how the list is organized, and what considerations were made for the various sizes and secret properties. Time to dive into the definition of `struct uv_secret_list`.

{
  "Expression": "struct uv_secret_list ",
  "PathPrefix": ""
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=411=struct uv_secret_list_item {\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-423- */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:424:struct uv_secret_list {\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-425-\tu16 num_secr_stored;\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=473=static inline int uv_cmd_nodata(u64 handle, u16 cmd, u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-511- */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:512:static inline int uv_list_secrets(struct uv_secret_list *buf, u16 start_idx,\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-513-\t\t\t\t  u16 *rc, u16 *rrc)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=618=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:619:\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-620-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret);\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:758:\t\t\t       const struct uv_secret_list *list,\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-759-\t\t\t       struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=780=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:781:\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-782-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=307=static int uvio_get_list(void *zpage, struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-310-\tu8 __user *user_buf = (u8 __user *)uv_ioctl-\u003eargument_addr;\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:311:\tstruct uv_secret_list *list = zpage;\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-312-\tu16 num_secrets_stored = 0;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:25:static struct uv_secret_list *uv_list;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-26-static DEFINE_MUTEX(uv_list_mutex);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 6493
							output: 42
							thoughts: 29
						

Here's my take on those thoughts, summarized as if they were my own:

**Diving into the S390 UV Secret List**

Alright, let's get down to it. I need to take a look at the `struct uv_secret_list`. It's defined within `arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h`. Given my background with s390 architecture and the UV (UltraViolet) platform, I'm expecting this structure to hold details relevant to secure memory access or confidential data management within that specific environment. I anticipate this will be a critical structure for any code dealing with sensitive information or perhaps involved in establishing secure execution contexts. I'm keen to see if it utilizes any unique s390-specific memory protection mechanisms. Time to check it out.

{
  "File": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h",
  "FirstLine": 411,
  "LineCount": 20
}

{
  "Contents": " 411:\tstruct uv_secret_list_item {\n 412:\t\tstruct uv_secret_list_item_hdr hdr;\n 413:\t\tu64 reserverd08;\n 414:\t\tu8 id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN];\n 415:\t} __packed __aligned(8);\n 416:\t\n 417:\t/**\n 418:\t * uv_secret_list - UV secret-metadata list.\n 419:\t * @num_secr_stored: Number of secrets stored in this list.\n 420:\t * @total_num_secrets: Number of secrets stored in the UV for this guest.\n 421:\t * @next_secret_idx: positive number if there are more secrets available or zero.\n 422:\t * @secrets: Up to 85 UV-secret metadata entries.\n 423:\t */\n 424:\tstruct uv_secret_list {\n 425:\t\tu16 num_secr_stored;\n 426:\t\tu16 total_num_secrets;\n 427:\t\tu16 next_secret_idx;\n 428:\t\tu16 reserved_06;\n 429:\t\tu64 reserved_08;\n 430:\t\tstruct uv_secret_list_item secrets[85];\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 7088
							output: 25
							thoughts: 1373
						

**Analyzing the Bug Fixes**

Okay, so looking at this code, the first thing that jumps out is the issue in `find_secret_in_page`. The original code was using `total_num_secrets` instead of `num_secr_stored` in the loop condition. Now, `total_num_secrets` represents the total secrets, which could be more than the 85-element array `list->secrets` can actually hold for the current page. If `total_num_secrets` exceeds 85, this immediately triggers an out-of-bounds read when iterating through `list->secrets`. KASAN would definitely catch that, which is good.

Next, I'm focusing on the change in `uv_find_secret`. The original loop condition was fundamentally flawed. It was taking `start_idx` and setting it to `list->next_secret_idx` immediately before comparing them in the loop condition. That makes the condition `start_idx < list->next_secret_idx` effectively `x < x`, which is always false, right? So the loop was guaranteed to execute only once. That's a classic logic error, very easily missed. The fix initializes `list->next_secret_idx` to `0` and then uses the incremented value in the loop condition, so the loop executes correctly.

The critical thing I'm assessing is if this is related to KMSAN's domain of uninitialized reads. Neither of these fixes *directly* deals with uninitialized memory. The first is an out-of-bounds read – KASAN does that. The second is a logic error that breaks the loop - that has to be fixed. It’s an interesting bug, but it does not seem KMSAN specific. I'll need to check where `uv_find_secret` is called to rule out uninitialized memory issues.

{
  "Expression": "uv_find_secret",
  "PathPrefix": ""
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=613=static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-617-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:618:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-22-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:23: * One pre-allocated uv_secret_list for use with uv_find_secret()\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-99-\tmemset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:100:\trc = uv_find_secret(secret_id, uv_list, secret);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-101-\tmutex_unlock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 9576
							output: 31
							thoughts: 378
						

**Analyzing a Potential Out-of-Bounds Read in `s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`**

Okay, so I'm looking at `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`, and I see that `uv_list` gets pre-allocated and zeroed before the `uv_find_secret` function is called. This means the structure is fully initialized right from the start. That's good, predictable behavior. Now, the potential issue arises within `find_secret_in_page`, specifically when it reads from `list->secrets[i]`. If this `i` index exceeds the allocated boundaries, it looks like we could have an out-of-bounds read, and that's never good.

I'm thinking, this `list` variable, it's probably allocated as a page, probably a single page. If we go past index 85, we're likely going to read past the end of the `list->secrets` array. I need to be sure though. Let me check the size of `struct uv_secret_list`... Ah, yes, it's defined like this:
```c
struct uv_secret_list {
	u16 num_secr_stored;
	u16 total_num_secrets;
	u16 next_secret_idx;
	u16 reserved_06;
	u64 reserved_08;
	struct uv_secret_list_item secrets[85];
};
```
Okay, so it has that array of `secrets[85]`. And then `struct uv_secret_list_item` is defined as:
```c
struct uv_secret_list_item {
	struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr hdr;
	u64 reserverd08;
	u8 id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN];
} __packed __aligned(8);
```
So I guess I need to check the exact size of `struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr` and `UV_SECRET_ID_LEN` to nail down the size and calculate the bounds. I'm going to have to dig into those definitions to understand the memory layout precisely. We have the potential for a buffer overflow here.

{
  "Expression": "struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr ",
  "PathPrefix": ""
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=373=enum uv_secret_types {\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-398- */\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:399:struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr {\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-400-\tu16 index;\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=411=struct uv_secret_list_item {\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:412:\tstruct uv_secret_list_item_hdr hdr;\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-413-\tu64 reserverd08;\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=618=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:620:\t\t   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret);\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-621-int uv_retrieve_secret(u16 secret_idx, u8 *buf, size_t buf_size);\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-758-\t\t\t       const struct uv_secret_list *list,\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:759:\t\t\t       struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-760-{\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=780=int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:782:\t\t   struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-783-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:94:\t\t\t       struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr *secret)\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-95-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=106=static int retrieve_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-108-{\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:109:\tstruct uv_secret_list_item_hdr secret_meta_data;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-110-\tint rc;\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=233=static int uv_verifykey(const u8 *key, u32 keylen,\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-239-\tstruct uvsecrettoken *t = (struct uvsecrettoken *)key;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:240:\tstruct uv_secret_list_item_hdr secret_meta_data;\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-241-\tu32 pkeysize, pkeytype, bitsize;\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 11476
							output: 42
							thoughts: 16
						

Here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience:

**Diving into `uv_secret_list_item_hdr`**

Alright, let's dissect this `struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr`. I'm immediately curious about its structure – what's the underlying purpose of this header within libuv's secret list implementation? Is it a single node, or a more complex metadata structure for a linked list? My immediate questions revolve around memory management: are we dealing with embedded data, or pointers to external blocks? Are there implications for atomicity and thread safety here, particularly if this data structure is accessed concurrently? Is there an inherent ordering to the secret items, or is this just an unordered collection? Are there potential performance considerations? What are the implications for locking, particularly in multi-threaded environments where secrets might be accessed or updated? I want to understand the design tradeoffs they made.

{
  "File": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h",
  "FirstLine": 399,
  "LineCount": 10
}

{
  "Contents": " 399:\tstruct uv_secret_list_item_hdr {\n 400:\t\tu16 index;\n 401:\t\tu16 type;\n 402:\t\tu32 length;\n 403:\t} __packed __aligned(8);\n 404:\t\n 405:\t#define UV_SECRET_ID_LEN 32\n 406:\t/**\n 407:\t * uv_secret_list_item - UV secret entry.\n 408:\t * @hdr: The metadata of this secret.\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 11880
							output: 38
							thoughts: 349
						

**Analyzing a Potential Out-of-Bounds Read in `uv_secret_list`**

Okay, let's break this down. My initial assessment is focused on memory layout. I'm seeing that `struct uv_secret_list_item_hdr` is a modest 8 bytes, which is good. Then `struct uv_secret_list_item` balloons to 48 bytes (8 for the header, 8 for something else, and a 32-byte ID, presumably). Now, the crucial part: `struct uv_secret_list` itself. The calculation looks like this: 2 + 2 + 2 + 2 + 8 + (85 * 48) = 4096 bytes total. Hmm, that's exactly one page. That's a red flag in itself.

Now, that brings me to the potential bug in `find_secret_in_page`:

```c
	for (i = 0; i < list->total_num_secrets; i++) {
		if (memcmp(secret_id, list->secrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {
			*secret = list->secrets[i].hdr;
			return 0;
		}
	}
```

The loop iterates up to `total_num_secrets`. If `total_num_secrets` exceeds 85, then `list->secrets[i]` goes out-of-bounds, since we only have space for 85 `uv_secret_list_item`s, potentially writing at a memory address that's outside of the allocated page. This is a classic out-of-bounds read, and KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer) should nail it because it's reading past the page boundary.

The next question is, how is the memory for the `list` allocated? Is it `kmalloc`? `get_free_page`? That's essential to understand the implications of the overflow. Going back to the driver code, I see that the `uv_list` is pre-allocated. Let's dig deeper to see exactly how and where.

{
  "Expression": "uv_list =",
  "PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=284=static int __init pkey_uv_init(void)\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-293-\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:294:\tuv_list = kmalloc_obj(*uv_list);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-295-\tif (!uv_list)\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 12865
							output: 42
							thoughts: 52
						

Okay, let's see...

**Deconstructing this Memory Allocation**

Hmm, `kmalloc_obj(*uv_list)`... that syntax throws a flag. `kmalloc_obj` is definitely not a standard kernel allocator. My first instinct is that it's a macro or a custom wrapper defined somewhere specific to this codebase. It's often that these types of constructs are used to handle object-specific memory management and potentially provide additional context or debugging information. But let's verify that.

My next move is to fall back to the tried-and-true standard kernel allocation: `kmalloc(sizeof(*uv_list), GFP_KERNEL)`.  It's much more likely this is what they *meant* and the code is using the right size and allocation flags. Time to check the actual code or relevant header files to confirm this assumption and get a better understanding of how memory allocation is handled within this specific context. That's the only way to be completely sure.

{
  "File": "drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c",
  "FirstLine": 284,
  "LineCount": 20
}

{
  "Contents": " 284:\tstatic int __init pkey_uv_init(void)\n 285:\t{\n 286:\t\tint rc;\n 287:\t\n 288:\t\tif (!is_prot_virt_guest())\n 289:\t\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n 290:\t\n 291:\t\tif (!test_bit_inv(BIT_UVC_CMD_RETR_SECRET, uv_info.inst_calls_list))\n 292:\t\t\treturn -ENODEV;\n 293:\t\n 294:\t\tuv_list = kmalloc_obj(*uv_list);\n 295:\t\tif (!uv_list)\n 296:\t\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n 297:\t\n 298:\t\trc = pkey_handler_register(\u0026uv_handler);\n 299:\t\tif (rc)\n 300:\t\t\tkfree(uv_list);\n 301:\t\n 302:\t\treturn rc;\n 303:\t}\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 13441
							output: 24
							thoughts: 44
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, summarized as you requested:

**Navigating Unfamiliar Code**

Right, let me see... I'm looking at this `kmalloc_obj` thing and it's not immediately jumping out at me as standard kernel code. My first instinct, given the context, is that it's likely a macro specific to the s390 architecture, or maybe defined in some local, project-specific header file. Okay, hold on. Just confirming my initial impression... Yep, `kmalloc_obj` isn't a standard, universally defined kernel function or macro. So, time to track down its definition. Let's find out where this thing is actually declared! I need to understand what it's doing.

{
  "Expression": "kmalloc_obj",
  "PathPrefix": ""
}

{
  "Output": "\nFull output is too long, showing 500 out of 15497 lines.\nUse more precise expression if possible.\n\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst=203=non-\\ ``NULL``, locklessly accessing the ``-\u003ea`` and ``-\u003eb`` fields.\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-208-       2 {\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst:209:       3   p = kmalloc_obj(*p);\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-210-       4   if (!p)\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst=225=their rights to reorder this code as follows:\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-230-       2 {\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst:231:       3   p = kmalloc_obj(*p);\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-232-       4   if (!p)\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst=261=shows an example of insertion:\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-266-       2 {\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst:267:       3   p = kmalloc_obj(*p);\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-268-       4   if (!p)\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/listRCU.rst=267=The RCU version of audit_upd_rule() is as follows::\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/listRCU.rst-278-\t\t\tif (!audit_compare_rule(rule, \u0026e-\u003erule)) {\nDocumentation/RCU/listRCU.rst:279:\t\t\t\tne = kmalloc_obj(*entry, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/RCU/listRCU.rst-280-\t\t\t\tif (ne == NULL)\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst=441=uses of RCU may be found in listRCU.rst and NMI-RCU.rst.\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst-470-\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst:471:\t\tnew_fp = kmalloc_obj(*new_fp);\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst-472-\t\tspin_lock(\u0026foo_mutex);\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst=553=The foo_update_a() function might then be written as follows::\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst-572-\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst:573:\t\tnew_fp = kmalloc_obj(*new_fp);\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst-574-\t\tspin_lock(\u0026foo_mutex);\n--\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst=39=kref_init as so::\n--\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst-42-\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst:43:     data = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst-44-     if (!data)\n--\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst=81=thread to process::\n--\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst-102-\tstruct task_struct *task;\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst:103:\tdata = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst-104-\tif (!data)\n--\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst=383=to protect the cache and all the objects within it. Here's the code::\n--\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-444-\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst:445:            if ((obj = kmalloc_obj(*obj)) == NULL)\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-446-                    return -ENOMEM;\n--\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst=499=which are taken away, and the ``+`` are lines which are added.\n--\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-519-\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst:520:             if ((obj = kmalloc_obj(*obj)) == NULL)\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-521-                     return -ENOMEM;\n--\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst=498=works perfectly::\n--\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst-500-  raw_spin_lock(\u0026lock);\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst:501:  p = kmalloc_obj(*p, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst-502-\n--\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst=507=preemption on PREEMPT_RT kernels::\n--\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst-509-  spin_lock(\u0026lock);\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst:510:  p = kmalloc_obj(*p, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst-511-\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst=938=The kernel provides the following general purpose memory allocators:\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst:939:kmalloc(), kzalloc(), kmalloc_objs(), kzalloc_objs(), vmalloc(), and\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-940-vzalloc().  Please refer to the API documentation for further information\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst=944=The preferred form for passing a size of a struct is the following:\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-947-\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst:948:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-949-\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst=958=The preferred form for allocating an array is the following:\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-961-\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst:962:\tp = kmalloc_objs(*p, n, ...);\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-963-\n--\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst=386=may help with alignment, wrap-around, or additional hardening. The\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst:387:kmalloc_obj()-family of macros provide this introspection, which can be\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-388-used for the common code patterns for single, array, and flexible object\n--\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst=398=become, respectively::\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-399-\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst:400:\tptr = kmalloc_obj(*ptr [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-401-\tptr = kzalloc_obj(*ptr [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst:402:\tptr = kmalloc_objs(*ptr, count [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-403-\tptr = kzalloc_objs(*ptr, count [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-404-\tptr = kmalloc_flex(*ptr, flex_member, count [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst:405:\t__auto_type ptr = kmalloc_obj(struct foo [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-406-\n--\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst=1734=callback::\n--\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst-1739-          ....\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst:1740:          data = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst-1741-          substream-\u003eruntime-\u003eprivate_data = data;\n--\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst=3302=destructor function is set in the ``private_free`` field::\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst-3303-\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst:3304:  struct mydata *p = kmalloc_obj(*p);\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst-3305-  hw-\u003eprivate_data = p;\n--\nDocumentation/spi/spi-summary.rst=242=And SOC-specific utility code might look something like::\n--\nDocumentation/spi/spi-summary.rst-251-\nDocumentation/spi/spi-summary.rst:252:\t\tpdata2 = kmalloc_obj(*pdata2);\nDocumentation/spi/spi-summary.rst-253-\t\t*pdata2 = pdata;\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst=403=e tutti gli oggetti che contiene. Ecco il codice::\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-464-\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst:465:            if ((obj = kmalloc_obj(*obj)) == NULL)\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-466-                    return -ENOMEM;\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst=519=sono quelle rimosse, mentre quelle ``+`` sono quelle aggiunte.\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-539-\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst:540:             if ((obj = kmalloc_obj(*obj)) == NULL)\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-541-                     return -ENOMEM;\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst=488=memoria. Su un kernel non-PREEMPT_RT il seguente codice funziona perfettamente::\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst-490-  raw_spin_lock(\u0026lock);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst:491:  p = kmalloc_obj(*p, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst-492-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst=497=PREEMPT_RT::\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst-499-  spin_lock(\u0026lock);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst:500:  p = kmalloc_obj(*p, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst-501-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/process/coding-style.rst=942=Il modo preferito per passare la dimensione di una struttura è il seguente:\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/process/coding-style.rst-945-\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/process/coding-style.rst:946:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/process/coding-style.rst-947-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/sp_SP/process/coding-style.rst=954=La forma preferida para pasar el tamaño de una estructura es la siguiente:\n--\nDocumentation/translations/sp_SP/process/coding-style.rst-957-\nDocumentation/translations/sp_SP/process/coding-style.rst:958:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/translations/sp_SP/process/coding-style.rst-959-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst=46=kref可以出现在数据结构体中的任何地方。\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst-54-\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst:55:     data = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst-56-     if (!data)\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst=62=Kref规则\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst-108-\tstruct task_struct *task;\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst:109:\tdata = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst-110-\tif (!data)\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/process/coding-style.rst=810=Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/memory-allocation.rst 。\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/process/coding-style.rst-815-\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/process/coding-style.rst:816:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/process/coding-style.rst-817-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_TW/process/coding-style.rst=824=Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/memory-allocation.rst 。\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_TW/process/coding-style.rst-829-\nDocumentation/translations/zh_TW/process/coding-style.rst:830:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/translations/zh_TW/process/coding-style.rst-831-\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c=857=marvel_agp_setup(alpha_agp_info *agp)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c-863-\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c:864:\taper = kmalloc_obj(*aper);\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c-865-\tif (aper == NULL) return -ENOMEM;\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c=1019=marvel_agp_info(void)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c-1061-\t */\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c:1062:\tagp = kmalloc_obj(*agp);\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c-1063-\tif (!agp)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c=590=titan_agp_setup(alpha_agp_info *agp)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c-596-\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c:597:\taper = kmalloc_obj(struct titan_agp_aperture);\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c-598-\tif (aper == NULL)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c=731=titan_agp_info(void)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c-762-\t */\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c:763:\tagp = kmalloc_obj(*agp);\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c-764-\tif (!agp)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/module.c=29=process_reloc_for_got(Elf64_Rela *rela,\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/module.c-48-\narch/alpha/kernel/module.c:49:\tg = kmalloc_obj(*g);\narch/alpha/kernel/module.c-50-\tg-\u003enext = chains[r_sym].next;\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/pci.c=211=static void pdev_save_srm_config(struct pci_dev *dev)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/pci.c-223-\narch/alpha/kernel/pci.c:224:\ttmp = kmalloc_obj(*tmp);\narch/alpha/kernel/pci.c-225-\tif (!tmp) {\n--\narch/arc/kernel/unwind.c=359=void *unwind_add_table(struct module *module, const void *table_start,\n--\narch/arc/kernel/unwind.c-368-\narch/arc/kernel/unwind.c:369:\ttable = kmalloc_obj(*table);\narch/arc/kernel/unwind.c-370-\tif (!table)\n--\narch/arm/common/locomo.c=274=static int locomo_suspend(struct platform_device *dev, pm_message_t state)\n--\narch/arm/common/locomo.c-279-\narch/arm/common/locomo.c:280:\tsave = kmalloc_obj(struct locomo_save_data);\narch/arm/common/locomo.c-281-\tif (!save)\n--\narch/arm/common/sa1111.c=964=static int sa1111_suspend_noirq(struct device *dev)\n--\narch/arm/common/sa1111.c-971-\narch/arm/common/sa1111.c:972:\tsave = kmalloc_obj(struct sa1111_save_data);\narch/arm/common/sa1111.c-973-\tif (!save)\n--\narch/arm/kernel/unwind.c=572=struct unwind_table *unwind_table_add(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,\n--\narch/arm/kernel/unwind.c-576-\tunsigned long flags;\narch/arm/kernel/unwind.c:577:\tstruct unwind_table *tab = kmalloc_obj(*tab);\narch/arm/kernel/unwind.c-578-\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-iommu.c=53=static struct powerdomain *_get_pwrdm(struct device *dev)\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-iommu.c-101-\narch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-iommu.c:102:\tentry = kmalloc_obj(*entry);\narch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-iommu.c-103-\tif (entry) {\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm34xx.c=406=static int __init pwrdms_setup(struct powerdomain *pwrdm, void *unused)\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm34xx.c-412-\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm34xx.c:413:\tpwrst = kmalloc_obj(struct power_state, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm34xx.c-414-\tif (!pwrst)\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm44xx.c=113=static int __init pwrdms_setup(struct powerdomain *pwrdm, void *unused)\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm44xx.c-134-\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm44xx.c:135:\tpwrst = kmalloc_obj(struct power_state, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm44xx.c-136-\tif (!pwrst)\n--\narch/arm/mm/pgd.c-19-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE\narch/arm/mm/pgd.c:20:#define _pgd_alloc(mm)\t\tkmalloc_objs(pgd_t, PTRS_PER_PGD, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO)\narch/arm/mm/pgd.c-21-#define _pgd_free(mm, pgd)\tkfree(pgd)\n--\narch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c=764=static int coverage_start(const union decode_item *table)\narch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c-765-{\narch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c:766:\tcoverage.base = kmalloc_objs(struct coverage_entry,\narch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c-767-\t\t\t\t     MAX_COVERAGE_ENTRIES);\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c=774=void kvm_host_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *pmu)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c-786-\narch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c:787:\tentry = kmalloc_obj(*entry);\narch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c-788-\tif (!entry)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c=102=static void *vgic_debug_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c-106-\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c:107:\titer = kmalloc_obj(*iter);\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c-108-\tif (!iter)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c=364=static void *vgic_its_debug_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c-377-\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c:378:\titer = kmalloc_obj(*iter);\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c-379-\tif (!iter)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c=743=void __init vgic_set_kvm_info(const struct gic_kvm_info *info)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c-745-\tBUG_ON(gic_kvm_info != NULL);\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:746:\tgic_kvm_info = kmalloc_obj(*gic_kvm_info);\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c-747-\tif (gic_kvm_info)\n--\narch/m68k/emu/nfblock.c=97=static int __init nfhd_init_one(int id, u32 blocks, u32 bsize)\n--\narch/m68k/emu/nfblock.c-114-\narch/m68k/emu/nfblock.c:115:\tdev = kmalloc_obj(struct nfhd_device);\narch/m68k/emu/nfblock.c-116-\tif (!dev)\n--\narch/m68k/mm/kmap.c=108=static struct vm_struct *get_io_area(unsigned long size)\n--\narch/m68k/mm/kmap.c-112-\narch/m68k/mm/kmap.c:113:\tarea = kmalloc_obj(*area);\narch/m68k/mm/kmap.c-114-\tif (!area)\n--\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c=253=u32 au1xxx_dbdma_chan_alloc(u32 srcid, u32 destid,\n--\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c-312-\t\t\t */\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c:313:\t\t\tctp = kmalloc_obj(chan_tab_t, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c-314-\t\t\tchan_tab_ptr[i] = ctp;\n--\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c=391=u32 au1xxx_dbdma_ring_alloc(u32 chanid, int entries)\n--\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c-414-\t */\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c:415:\tdesc_base = (u32) kmalloc_objs(au1x_ddma_desc_t, entries,\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c-416-\t\t\t\t       GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);\n--\narch/mips/kernel/module.c=59=static int apply_r_mips_hi16(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v,\n--\narch/mips/kernel/module.c-74-\t */\narch/mips/kernel/module.c:75:\tn = kmalloc_obj(*n);\narch/mips/kernel/module.c-76-\tif (!n)\n--\narch/mips/kernel/vpe.c=311=static int apply_r_mips_hi16(struct module *me, uint32_t *location,\n--\narch/mips/kernel/vpe.c-320-\t */\narch/mips/kernel/vpe.c:321:\tn = kmalloc_obj(*n);\narch/mips/kernel/vpe.c-322-\tif (!n)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c=188=pat_query_module(ulong pcell_loc, ulong mod_index)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c-195-\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c:196:\tpa_pdc_cell = kmalloc_obj(*pa_pdc_cell);\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c-197-\tif (!pa_pdc_cell)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c=532=add_system_map_addresses(struct parisc_device *dev, int num_addrs, \n--\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c-538-\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c:539:\tdev-\u003eaddr = kmalloc_objs(*dev-\u003eaddr, num_addrs);\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c-540-\tif(!dev-\u003eaddr) {\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/processor.c=81=static int __init processor_probe(struct parisc_device *dev)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/processor.c-112-\narch/parisc/kernel/processor.c:113:\t\tpa_pdc_cell = kmalloc_obj(*pa_pdc_cell);\narch/parisc/kernel/processor.c-114-\t\tif (!pa_pdc_cell)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c=149=unwind_table_add(const char *name, unsigned long base_addr, \n--\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c-159-\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c:160:\ttable = kmalloc_obj(struct unwind_table, GFP_USER);\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c-161-\tif (table == NULL)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c=406=void unwind_frame_init_from_blocked_task(struct unwind_frame_info *info, struct task_struct *t)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c-410-\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c:411:\tr2 = kmalloc_obj(struct pt_regs, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c-412-\tif (!r2)\n--\narch/powerpc/kernel/nvram_64.c=984=int __init nvram_scan_partitions(void)\n--\narch/powerpc/kernel/nvram_64.c-1032-\t\t}\narch/powerpc/kernel/nvram_64.c:1033:\t\ttmp_part = kmalloc_obj(*tmp_part);\narch/powerpc/kernel/nvram_64.c-1034-\t\terr = -ENOMEM;\n--\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c=731=int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_config_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,\n--\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c-774-\t\t    cfg-\u003earray / PAGE_SIZE;\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c:775:\tpages = kmalloc_objs(*pages, num_pages);\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c-776-\tif (!pages)\n--\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c=898=int kvmppc_e500_tlb_init(struct kvmppc_vcpu_e500 *vcpu_e500)\n--\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c-914-\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c:915:\tvcpu_e500-\u003egtlb_arch = kmalloc_objs(*vcpu_e500-\u003egtlb_arch,\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c-916-\t\t\t\t\t    KVM_E500_TLB0_SIZE + KVM_E500_TLB1_SIZE);\n--\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c=45=static int grow(rh_info_t * info, int max_blocks)\n--\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c-56-\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c:57:\tblock = kmalloc_objs(rh_block_t, max_blocks, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c-58-\tif (block == NULL)\n--\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c=253=rh_info_t *rh_create(unsigned int alignment)\n--\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c-260-\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c:261:\tinfo = kmalloc_obj(*info, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c-262-\tif (info == NULL)\n--\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c=95=static int hash__init_new_context(struct mm_struct *mm)\n--\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c-98-\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c:99:\tmm-\u003econtext.hash_context = kmalloc_obj(struct hash_mm_context);\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c-100-\tif (!mm-\u003econtext.hash_context)\n--\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c-125-\t\tif (current-\u003emm-\u003econtext.hash_context-\u003espt) {\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c:126:\t\t\tmm-\u003econtext.hash_context-\u003espt = kmalloc_obj(struct subpage_prot_table);\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c-127-\t\t\tif (!mm-\u003econtext.hash_context-\u003espt) {\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c=623=static int event_uniq_add(struct rb_root *root, const char *name, int nl,\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-650-\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c:651:\tdata = kmalloc_obj(*data);\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-652-\tif (!data)\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c=755=static int create_events_from_catalog(struct attribute ***events_,\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-908-\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c:909:\tevents = kmalloc_objs(*events, attr_max + 1);\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-910-\tif (!events) {\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-914-\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c:915:\tevent_descs = kmalloc_objs(*event_descs, event_idx + 1);\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-916-\tif (!event_descs) {\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-920-\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c:921:\tevent_long_descs = kmalloc_objs(*event_long_descs, event_idx + 1);\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-922-\tif (!event_long_descs) {\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/44x/hsta_msi.c=122=static int hsta_msi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/44x/hsta_msi.c-153-\narch/powerpc/platforms/44x/hsta_msi.c:154:\tppc4xx_hsta_msi.irq_map = kmalloc_objs(int, irq_count);\narch/powerpc/platforms/44x/hsta_msi.c-155-\tif (!ppc4xx_hsta_msi.irq_map) {\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c=44=static int spufs_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-49-\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:50:\tattr = kmalloc_obj(*attr);\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-51-\tif (!attr)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c=628=void queue_hotplug_event(struct pseries_hp_errorlog *hp_errlog)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c-636-\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c:637:\twork = kmalloc_obj(struct pseries_hp_work, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c-638-\tif (work) {\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hvcserver.c=119=int hvcs_get_partner_info(uint32_t unit_address, struct list_head *head,\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hvcserver.c-162-\t\t * hvcs_free_partner_info(). */\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hvcserver.c:163:\t\tnext_partner_info = kmalloc_obj(struct hvcs_partner_info,\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hvcserver.c-164-\t\t\t\t\t\tGFP_ATOMIC);\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lparcfg.c=144=static void show_gpci_data(struct seq_file *m)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lparcfg.c-149-\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lparcfg.c:150:\tbuf = kmalloc_obj(*buf);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lparcfg.c-151-\tif (buf == NULL)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c=435=static int pseries_msi_ops_prepare(struct irq_domain *domain, struct device *dev,\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c-443-\tstruct pseries_msi_device *pseries_dev __free(kfree)\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c:444:\t\t= kmalloc_obj(*pseries_dev);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c-445-\tif (!pseries_dev)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pci.c=120=static int pseries_pci_sriov_enable(struct pci_dev *pdev, u16 num_vfs)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pci.c-143-\tpdn = pci_get_pdn(pdev);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pci.c:144:\tpdn-\u003epe_num_map = kmalloc_objs(*pdn-\u003epe_num_map, num_vfs);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pci.c-145-\tif (!pdn-\u003epe_num_map)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vas.c=1076=static int __init pseries_vas_init(void)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vas.c-1089-\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vas.c:1090:\thv_caps = kmalloc_obj(*hv_caps);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vas.c-1091-\tif (!hv_caps)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c=705=static int vio_cmo_bus_probe(struct vio_dev *viodev)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c-747-\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c:748:\t\tdev_ent = kmalloc_obj(struct vio_cmo_dev_entry);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c-749-\t\tif (!dev_ent)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_lbc.c=352=static int fsl_lbc_syscore_suspend(void *data)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_lbc.c-364-\narch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_lbc.c:365:\tctrl-\u003esaved_regs = kmalloc_obj(struct fsl_lbc_regs);\narch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_lbc.c-366-\tif (!ctrl-\u003esaved_regs)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic.c=1549=void __init mpic_init(struct mpic *mpic)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic.c-1641-\t/* allocate memory to save mpic state */\narch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic.c:1642:\tmpic-\u003esave_data = kmalloc_objs(*mpic-\u003esave_data, mpic-\u003enum_sources);\narch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic.c-1643-\tBUG_ON(mpic-\u003esave_data == NULL);\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/of_rtc.c=23=void __init of_instantiate_rtc(void)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/of_rtc.c-35-\narch/powerpc/sysdev/of_rtc.c:36:\t\t\tres = kmalloc_obj(*res);\narch/powerpc/sysdev/of_rtc.c-37-\t\t\tif (!res) {\n--\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c=654=static int add_relocation_to_accumulate(struct module *me, int type,\n--\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-665-\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c:666:\tentry = kmalloc_obj(*entry);\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-667-\n--\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-699-\tif (!found) {\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c:700:\t\trel_head = kmalloc_obj(*rel_head);\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-701-\n--\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-711-\t\t\tbucket =\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c:712:\t\t\t\tkmalloc_obj(struct used_bucket);\n\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 24010
							output: 41
							thoughts: 366
						

**Analyzing Kernel Memory Allocation and Initialization**

Okay, so I'm looking at this new `kmalloc_obj` macro in the kernel – seems like it's meant to clean up code by replacing the more verbose `kmalloc(sizeof(*ptr), ...)`. My initial thought was, hmm, it's `kmalloc_obj(*uv_list)`, or maybe… no, wait, it's definitely `kmalloc_obj(*ptr)`. I need to remember that. Ah, right, so `uv_list = kmalloc_obj(*uv_list);` is really just a shorthand for something like `uv_list = kmalloc(sizeof(*uv_list), GFP_KERNEL);`.

Now, the important thing here is that `kmalloc` *doesn't* zero the allocated memory. That's `kzalloc`'s job. This is going to be important in just a bit.

Okay, let's look at `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`. Specifically, at the `get_secret_metadata` function. Here, I see that `uv_list` is zeroed *before* calling `uv_find_secret` with `memset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));`. This means that `uv_list` is fully initialized before we even get to that function!

Hmm, that all seems correct. Now, I have to wonder about the implications for `uvio_get_list` in `drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c`. That's the next place I need to investigate.

{
  "File": "drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c",
  "FirstLine": 307,
  "LineCount": 40
}

{
  "Contents": " 307:\tstatic int uvio_get_list(void *zpage, struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n 308:\t{\n 309:\t\tconst size_t data_off = offsetof(struct uv_secret_list, secrets);\n 310:\t\tu8 __user *user_buf = (u8 __user *)uv_ioctl-\u003eargument_addr;\n 311:\t\tstruct uv_secret_list *list = zpage;\n 312:\t\tu16 num_secrets_stored = 0;\n 313:\t\tsize_t user_off = data_off;\n 314:\t\tsize_t copy_len;\n 315:\t\n 316:\t\tdo {\n 317:\t\t\tuv_list_secrets(list, list-\u003enext_secret_idx, \u0026uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rc,\n 318:\t\t\t\t\t\u0026uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rrc);\n 319:\t\t\tif (uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED \u0026\u0026\n 320:\t\t\t    uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA)\n 321:\t\t\t\tbreak;\n 322:\t\n 323:\t\t\tcopy_len = sizeof(list-\u003esecrets[0]) * list-\u003enum_secr_stored;\n 324:\t\t\tif (copy_to_user(user_buf + user_off, list-\u003esecrets, copy_len))\n 325:\t\t\t\treturn -EFAULT;\n 326:\t\n 327:\t\t\tuser_off += copy_len;\n 328:\t\t\tnum_secrets_stored += list-\u003enum_secr_stored;\n 329:\t\t} while (uv_ioctl-\u003euv_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA \u0026\u0026\n 330:\t\t\t user_off + sizeof(*list) \u003c= uv_ioctl-\u003eargument_len);\n 331:\t\n 332:\t\tlist-\u003enum_secr_stored = num_secrets_stored;\n 333:\t\tif (copy_to_user(user_buf, list, data_off))\n 334:\t\t\treturn -EFAULT;\n 335:\t\treturn 0;\n 336:\t}\n 337:\t\n 338:\t/**\n 339:\t * uvio_list_secrets() - Perform a List Secret UVC\n 340:\t *\n 341:\t * @uv_ioctl: ioctl control block\n 342:\t *\n 343:\t * uvio_list_secrets() performs the List Secret Ultravisor Call. It verifies\n 344:\t * that the given userspace argument address is valid and its size is sane.\n 345:\t * Every other check is made by the Ultravisor (UV) and won't result in a\n 346:\t * negative return value. It builds the request, performs the UV-call, and\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 25495
							output: 39
							thoughts: 52
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, considering my expertise:

**Checking the Memory Allocation and Usage in `uvio_get_list`**

Right, so I'm looking at the `uvio_get_list` function. I see that `zpage` is being passed in as a `list`. Now, `zpage`, from what I recall of the codebase, is a chunk of memory, a page specifically. My immediate question is: Is this memory guaranteed to be initialized, or is it potentially uninitialized, holding garbage data? This is crucial for avoiding unexpected behavior down the line, potentially security issues, or simply data corruption if the code relies on a zeroed page. I really need to confirm whether `zpage` is properly cleared. The best thing to do is track down where `uvio_get_list` is called from. That call site will give more context on how the `zpage` is managed and allocated, hopefully answering this all important question on initial state.

{
  "Expression": "uvio_get_list",
  "PathPrefix": "drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c"
}

{
  "Output": "drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=269=static int uvio_add_secret(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-306- */\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:307:static int uvio_get_list(void *zpage, struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-308-{\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c=365=static int uvio_list_secrets(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n--\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-377-\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c:378:\trc = uvio_get_list(zpage, uv_ioctl);\ndrivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c-379-\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 26053
							output: 41
							thoughts: 12
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, assuming I'm an expert in this field:

**Diving into the `uvio_list_secrets` Command**

Alright, `uvio_list_secrets`. Let's break this down. My initial reaction is, "Right, I know this one." That command is likely part of the `uvio` utility, whatever system it might be part of. The 'list' part is pretty self-explanatory – we're enumerating something. And 'secrets'… well, that could mean a range of things, depending on the context.

My expertise immediately kicks in to help me categorize my thinking:

*   **Potential Context:** I need to immediately consider the system this is part of. Is it a cloud environment? A development framework? Is it related to containerization or Kubernetes? Understanding the environment informs the *type* of secrets we're talking about (API keys, passwords, certificates, etc.) and where they are stored, because the `uvio` functionality dictates how we interact with those items.
*   **Security Implications:** Listing secrets is inherently sensitive. I'm immediately thinking about permissions and access controls. I'd expect this command to require authentication and authorization. It's crucial this tool is configured to only reveal secrets to the right users and processes.
*   **Data Format & Output:** What will the output look like? Will it be a simple list of names, or more detailed information (descriptions, associated applications, usage data, etc.)? I'll probably be looking for formatting options like JSON, YAML, or a structured table for easy parsing and automation. What flags are supported to tailor this output?
*   **Error Handling:** What happens if I don't have the proper permissions? Or if there's an error retrieving the secrets? Good logging and error messages will be key to understanding the tool's behavior and troubleshooting any issues.
*   **Use Cases:** What are the typical reasons for listing secrets? Debugging an application? Auditing security configurations? Automating secret rotation? The use case will inform how I approach this command.
*   **Assumed Knowledge:** It's likely I already understand how to manage secrets within this ecosystem. If it's a dedicated secrets manager, I likely know the key concepts of the technology.

So, overall, my mind is immediately formulating questions and hypotheses. I'm ready to dig into the documentation, or try the command directly to see what information it reveals. It all comes down to the context I know and how much control I have over it.

{
  "File": "drivers/s390/char/uvdevice.c",
  "FirstLine": 365,
  "LineCount": 20
}

{
  "Contents": " 365:\tstatic int uvio_list_secrets(struct uvio_ioctl_cb *uv_ioctl)\n 366:\t{\n 367:\t\tvoid *zpage;\n 368:\t\tint rc;\n 369:\t\n 370:\t\tif (uv_ioctl-\u003eargument_len == 0 ||\n 371:\t\t    uv_ioctl-\u003eargument_len % UVIO_LIST_SECRETS_LEN != 0)\n 372:\t\t\treturn -EINVAL;\n 373:\t\n 374:\t\tzpage = (void *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);\n 375:\t\tif (!zpage)\n 376:\t\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n 377:\t\n 378:\t\trc = uvio_get_list(zpage, uv_ioctl);\n 379:\t\n 380:\t\tfree_page((unsigned long)zpage);\n 381:\t\treturn rc;\n 382:\t}\n 383:\t\n 384:\t/**\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 26932
							output: 25
							thoughts: 1623
						

**Analysis of the Code and Vulnerabilities**

Okay, let's break this down. First, I see `zpage` is explicitly zeroed with `get_zeroed_page`. Good, that eliminates a whole class of potential problems right off the bat. Then I started to think, "What about `uv_list_secrets`? Could it be writing uninitialized data somewhere?" But, `uv_list_secrets` is a hypervisor call, so the hypervisor is responsible for ensuring it writes initialized data. Even if it doesn't, that's not a kernel-space bug.

But, when I examine `uv_list_secrets` called in `uvio_get_list`, I see that it uses `list->next_secret_idx` as `start_idx`. In the first iteration, `list->next_secret_idx` is zero, because the page `zpage` is zeroed, and it is zero-initialized. After the call to `uv_list_secrets`, it updates `list->next_secret_idx` if there's more data. Then `copy_to_user` copies `list->secrets` to user space. It copies exactly `list->num_secr_stored` items. The zeroing of the page means anything *not* written will be zero. Since the hypervisor is *supposed* to write those elements, any unwritten elements are zero. So I am confident, at this point, that there's no uninitialized memory leak to user space here.

Now, let's re-examine the patch itself.

```c
 	u16 i;
 
-	for (i = 0; i < list->total_num_secrets; i++) {
+	for (i = 0; i < list->num_secr_stored; i++) {
 		if (memcmp(secret_id, list->secrets[i].id, UV_SECRET_ID_LEN) == 0) {
 			*secret = list->secrets[i].hdr;
 			return 0;
```

Ah, this fixes an out-of-bounds read vulnerability. The original code was using `list->total_num_secrets` to iterate through `list->secrets`. The `list->secrets` array has a fixed size of 85 elements. If `total_num_secrets` exceeds 85, this loop would be reading past the end of the array, and therefore the end of the `list` structure, causing an out-of-bounds read. This is a clear case for KASAN to catch.

The second part:

```c
-	u16 start_idx = 0;
+	u16 start_idx;
 	u16 list_rc;
 	int ret;
 
+	list->next_secret_idx = 0;
+
 	do {
+		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 		uv_list_secrets(list, start_idx, &list_rc, NULL);
 		if (list_rc != UVC_RC_EXECUTED && list_rc != UVC_RC_MORE_DATA) {
 			if (list_rc == UVC_RC_INV_CMD)
@@ -796,7 +799,6 @@ int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],
 		ret = find_secret_in_page(secret_id, list, secret);
 		if (ret == 0)
 			return ret;
-		start_idx = list->next_secret_idx;
 	} while (list_rc == UVC_RC_MORE_DATA && start_idx < list->next_secret_idx);
```

Okay, the original code had a logic bug. `start_idx` was initialized to 0 and `uv_list_secrets` was called. Then, `start_idx` was assigned the value of `list->next_secret_idx`. Then the `while` loop condition checked if `start_idx < list->next_secret_idx`. But since `start_idx` was just assigned the value of `list->next_secret_idx`, this condition would *always* be false in the first iteration. So the loop would terminate after only the first iteration, even if there was more data (`UVC_RC_MORE_DATA`). The fix ensures the loop continues to iterate.

Is there any uninitialized memory read here? Let's check. In the original code, `list->next_secret_idx` is read at the end of

{
  "Expression": "uv_find_secret",
  "PathPrefix": ""
}

{
  "Output": "arch/s390/include/asm/uv.h=613=static inline int uv_remove_shared(unsigned long addr)\n--\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-617-\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h:618:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/include/asm/uv.h-619-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c=757=static int find_secret_in_page(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-772-/**\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:773: * uv_find_secret() - search secret metadata for a given secret id.\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-774- * @secret_id: search pattern.\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-779- */\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:780:int uv_find_secret(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-781-\t\t   struct uv_secret_list *list,\n--\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-805-}\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c:806:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(uv_find_secret);\narch/s390/kernel/uv.c-807-\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=20=MODULE_DESCRIPTION(\"s390 protected key UV handler\");\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-22-/*\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:23: * One pre-allocated uv_secret_list for use with uv_find_secret()\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-24- */\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c=93=static int get_secret_metadata(const u8 secret_id[UV_SECRET_ID_LEN],\n--\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-99-\tmemset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list));\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c:100:\trc = uv_find_secret(secret_id, uv_list, secret);\ndrivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c-101-\tmutex_unlock(\u0026uv_list_mutex);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 30297
							output: 328
							thoughts: 379
						

**My Assessment of the Security Fix**

Okay, let's break this down. From what I can see, this patch is straightforward. The vulnerability lies within `drivers/s390/crypto/pkey_uv.c`, specifically in how the `uv_find_secret` function interacts with the `uv_list` structure. I'm noting that the code is only called from `get_secret_metadata`. Most importantly, the `uv_list` is explicitly zeroed out before being used. That's key.

So, the first change in the `find_secret_in_page` function addresses an out-of-bounds read. The original loop incorrectly used `list->total_num_secrets` to iterate, which could exceed the bounds of the `list->secrets` array (limited to 85 elements). This means a KASAN (Kernel Address Sanitizer) triggered, which is great because it means that problem is easy to detect.

The second change in `uv_find_secret` fixes a logic bug. The initial loop condition used `start_idx < list->next_secret_idx`. However, `start_idx` was assigned `list->next_secret_idx` immediately before the check, so the loop was never executed. The corrected version correctly initializes and updates `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop.

Because the structure passed to `uv_find_secret` is initialized to zero before use, there aren't any uninitialized memory reads or information leaks, and so `NeedsKMSAN` is false.

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch addresses two issues:\n1. An out-of-bounds read in `find_secret_in_page()`. The loop previously used `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` instead of `list-\u003enum_secr_stored`. Since `list-\u003esecrets` is a fixed-size array of 85 elements, if `total_num_secrets` exceeds 85, the loop reads past the end of the `list` structure (which is exactly one page in size). This is a classic out-of-bounds read that is reliably detected by standard KASAN.\n2. A logic bug in `uv_find_secret()` where the loop condition `start_idx \u003c list-\u003enext_secret_idx` was always false because `start_idx` was assigned `list-\u003enext_secret_idx` immediately prior to the check. The fix correctly initializes and updates `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop.\n\nThe `list` structure passed to `uv_find_secret()` is fully zeroed before use (via `memset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list))` in `get_secret_metadata()`). There are no uninitialized memory reads, uninitialized stack/heap variables, or information leaks to user space introduced or fixed by this patch. Standard KASAN is perfectly suited to catch the out-of-bounds read, and a dedicated KMSAN session is not required.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch addresses two issues:\n1. An out-of-bounds read in `find_secret_in_page()`. The loop previously used `list-\u003etotal_num_secrets` instead of `list-\u003enum_secr_stored`. Since `list-\u003esecrets` is a fixed-size array of 85 elements, if `total_num_secrets` exceeds 85, the loop reads past the end of the `list` structure (which is exactly one page in size). This is a classic out-of-bounds read that is reliably detected by standard KASAN.\n2. A logic bug in `uv_find_secret()` where the loop condition `start_idx \u003c list-\u003enext_secret_idx` was always false because `start_idx` was assigned `list-\u003enext_secret_idx` immediately prior to the check. The fix correctly initializes and updates `start_idx` at the beginning of the loop.\n\nThe `list` structure passed to `uv_find_secret()` is fully zeroed before use (via `memset(uv_list, 0, sizeof(*uv_list))` in `get_secret_metadata()`). There are no uninitialized memory reads, uninitialized stack/heap variables, or information leaks to user space introduced or fixed by this patch. Standard KASAN is perfectly suited to catch the out-of-bounds read, and a dedicated KMSAN session is not required.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}