AI Trajectory

null

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE",
    "SECURITY_SELINUX"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "security_introspect_mem_foll_force",
    "selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force",
    "mem_release_with_private"
  ],
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch modifies the `/proc/pid/mem` open and read/write logic to track whether the ptrace access check was bypassed due to introspection (a process accessing its own memory). It introduces a new `struct mem_private` to hold the `mm_struct` pointer and a boolean `introspection` flag. This struct is allocated via `kmalloc_obj` (which does not zero memory), but both of its fields are explicitly initialized in `mem_open()`. The struct is only used internally within `fs/proc/base.c` and is never copied to userspace, so any uninitialized padding bytes do not pose an info-leak risk.\n\nAdditionally, the patch introduces a new LSM hook `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` and its SELinux implementation `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`. The SELinux implementation allocates a `struct av_decision avd` on the stack without initialization, but it is passed purely as an output parameter to `avc_has_perm_noaudit()`, which populates it. The contents of `avd` are not even read by the caller.\n\nSince all introduced memory is either fully initialized before use or used strictly as output parameters, and no kernel memory is copied to userspace in a way that could leak uninitialized bytes, there is no risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks. Standard KASAN and other bug detectors are sufficient to catch any potential memory safety issues (like use-after-free or memory leaks) introduced by these changes. A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not required.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false,
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies the access logic for `/proc/pid/mem` to allow a process to bypass `ptrace_access_check` when introspecting its own memory. It introduces a new `mem_private` struct to track the `mm_struct` and a boolean flag for introspection, and adds a new LSM hook `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` (implemented by SELinux) to control `FOLL_FORCE` usage during self-introspection. This behavior is active when `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` is configured. This is a functional change in core procfs and the security subsystem, reachable from userspace by opening and reading/writing `/proc/self/mem`.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

null

{
  "PatchDiff": "commit dd0dbc6661680310138f54036d082171deeebd12\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate:   Tue Aug 18 22:09:19 2026 +0000\n\n    syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c\nindex 780f812590527..3dfaef49bb70b 100644\n--- a/fs/proc/base.c\n+++ b/fs/proc/base.c\n@@ -848,15 +848,32 @@ static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)\n \treturn 0;\n }\n \n+/* private_data for proc_mem_operations */\n+struct mem_private {\n+\tstruct mm_struct *mm;\n+\t/* Was the ptrace access check bypassed due to introspection? */\n+\tbool introspection;\n+};\n+\n static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n {\n+\tstruct mem_private *priv __free(kfree) = kmalloc_obj(struct mem_private);\n+\n+\tif (!priv)\n+\t\treturn -ENOMEM;\n \tif (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file-\u003ef_op-\u003efop_flags \u0026 FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET)))\n \t\treturn -EINVAL;\n-\treturn __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);\n+\tpriv-\u003emm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);\n+\tif (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv-\u003emm))\n+\t\treturn priv-\u003emm ? PTR_ERR(priv-\u003emm) : -ESRCH;\n+\tpriv-\u003eintrospection = priv-\u003emm == current-\u003emm;\n+\tfile-\u003eprivate_data = no_free_ptr(priv);\n+\treturn 0;\n }\n \n static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)\n {\n+\tstruct mem_private *priv = file-\u003eprivate_data;\n \tstruct task_struct *task;\n \tbool ptrace_active = false;\n \n@@ -873,6 +890,8 @@ static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)\n \t\t}\n \t\treturn ptrace_active;\n \tdefault:\n+\t\tif (priv-\u003eintrospection)\n+\t\t\treturn security_introspect_mem_foll_force(file-\u003ef_cred) == 0;\n \t\treturn true;\n \t}\n }\n@@ -880,7 +899,8 @@ static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)\n static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,\n \t\t\tsize_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write)\n {\n-\tstruct mm_struct *mm = file-\u003eprivate_data;\n+\tstruct mem_private *priv = file-\u003eprivate_data;\n+\tstruct mm_struct *mm = priv-\u003emm;\n \tunsigned long addr = *ppos;\n \tssize_t copied;\n \tchar *page;\n@@ -970,12 +990,21 @@ static int mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n \treturn 0;\n }\n \n+static int mem_release_with_private(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n+{\n+\tstruct mem_private *priv = file-\u003eprivate_data;\n+\n+\tmmdrop(priv-\u003emm);\n+\tkfree(priv);\n+\treturn 0;\n+}\n+\n static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {\n \t.llseek\t\t= mem_lseek,\n \t.read\t\t= mem_read,\n \t.write\t\t= mem_write,\n \t.open\t\t= mem_open,\n-\t.release\t= mem_release,\n+\t.release\t= mem_release_with_private,\n \t.fop_flags\t= FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET,\n };\n \ndiff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h\nindex 65c9609ec2077..67452f71bedfb 100644\n--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h\n+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h\n@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transfer_file, const struct cred *from,\n LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_access_check, struct task_struct *child,\n \t unsigned int mode)\n LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_traceme, struct task_struct *parent)\n+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, introspect_mem_foll_force, const struct cred *subject)\n LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capget, const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,\n \t kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)\n LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capset, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,\ndiff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h\nindex 153e9043058f8..f8483be58bc8a 100644\n--- a/include/linux/security.h\n+++ b/include/linux/security.h\n@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,\n \t\t\t\t  const struct cred *to, const struct file *file);\n int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);\n int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);\n+int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject);\n int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,\n \t\t    kernel_cap_t *effective,\n \t\t    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,\n@@ -676,6 +677,11 @@ static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n \treturn cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);\n }\n \n+static inline int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)\n+{\n+\treturn 0;\n+}\n+\n static inline int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,\n \t\t\t\t   kernel_cap_t *effective,\n \t\t\t\t   kernel_cap_t *inheritable,\ndiff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c\nindex 71aea8fdf0142..d0f790a534eb0 100644\n--- a/security/security.c\n+++ b/security/security.c\n@@ -595,6 +595,21 @@ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n \treturn call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent);\n }\n \n+/**\n+ * security_introspect_mem_foll_force() - Check if introspective FOLL_FORCE is allowed\n+ * @subject: credentials of the process accessing its own memory\n+ *\n+ * Check if FOLL_FORCE is allowed for a process accessing its own memory, which\n+ * bypasses the security_ptrace_access_check() hook.\n+ * This is only used when the system is configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS.\n+ *\n+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.\n+ */\n+int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)\n+{\n+\treturn call_int_hook(introspect_mem_foll_force, subject);\n+}\n+\n /**\n  * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process\n  * @target: target process\ndiff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c\nindex 18dd28b2bb13d..905137c473217 100644\n--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c\n+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c\n@@ -2157,6 +2157,32 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n \t\t\t    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);\n }\n \n+/*\n+ * Decide whether it should be possible to read non-readable VMAs and write\n+ * non-writable VMAs via /proc/self/mem.\n+ * This only applies to systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, and only\n+ * triggers on accesses that are not visible to selinux_ptrace_access_check().\n+ *\n+ * This allows a process to overwrite read-only code in its own address space.\n+ *\n+ * Creating an audit record on denial doesn't make sense here, since we can't\n+ * tell whether FOLL_FORCE matters for the accessed VMAs.\n+ */\n+static int selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)\n+{\n+\tstruct av_decision avd;\n+\tint rc;\n+\tu32 sid = cred_sid(subject);\n+\n+\t/* Allow if the process is generally allowed to have executable anonymous memory. */\n+\trc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, 0, \u0026avd);\n+\n+\t/* Also allow if selinux_ptrace_access_check() would allow it. */\n+\tif (rc)\n+\t\trc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, \u0026avd);\n+\treturn rc;\n+}\n+\n static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,\n \t\t\t  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)\n {\n@@ -7558,6 +7584,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {\n \n \tLSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),\n \tLSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),\n+\tLSM_HOOK_INIT(introspect_mem_foll_force, selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force),\n \tLSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),\n \tLSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),\n \tLSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),\n"
}

best-expensive

null

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE",
    "SECURITY_SELINUX"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "security_introspect_mem_foll_force",
    "selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force",
    "mem_release_with_private"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies the access logic for `/proc/pid/mem` to allow a process to bypass `ptrace_access_check` when introspecting its own memory. It introduces a new `mem_private` struct to track the `mm_struct` and a boolean flag for introspection, and adds a new LSM hook `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` (implemented by SELinux) to control `FOLL_FORCE` usage during self-introspection. This behavior is active when `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` is configured. This is a functional change in core procfs and the security subsystem, reachable from userspace by opening and reading/writing `/proc/self/mem`.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and determine
if it makes functional changes to the kernel that should be fuzzed.

IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on your internal knowledge of the kernel. You must actively
use your code access tools to examine the actual source code and confirm any assumptions.

Return WorthFuzzing=false if the patch only contains:
- Modifications to Documentation/, Kconfig files, or code comments.
- Purely decorative changes, such as logging (e.g., pr_err, printk) or tracepoints.
- Changes to numeric constants or macros that do not functionally alter execution flow.
- Code paths that are impossible to reach in virtualized environments like GCE or QEMU,
  even when utilizing software-emulated hardware (e.g., usb gadget, mac80211_hwsim).
- Code in vendor-specific PCIe switch, SmartNIC, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed,
  ionic, amdgpu) that require physical PCIe hardware cards not emulated in standard QEMU.
- Driver .remove, .shutdown, or pci_unregister_driver teardown callbacks (e.g., igb_remove)
  that are executed only during PCI hot-unplug or sysfs driver unbind operations.

If it modifies reachable core kernel logic, drivers, or architectures, use your code search
tools to verify the code can be executed, then return WorthFuzzing=true.

When returning WorthFuzzing=true, you MUST ALSO:
1. Extract any specific kernel functions that should be heavily fuzzed into FocusSymbols.
   Avoid listing generic hot-path functions to prevent skewed test distributions.
   Prefer non-static, non-inlined API entrypoint functions over internal static helper functions
   (which are inlined by the compiler and do not have distinct symbol addresses).
2. Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly test this new/modified feature.
   Go and look into the Kconfig files and check for ifdefs around the code, do not make assumptions.
   Also check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs
   needed for Kbuild to compile the code statically into vmlinux. List them in the EnableConfigs
   output array, and DO NOT add a 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit dd0dbc6661680310138f54036d082171deeebd12
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Tue Aug 18 22:09:19 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 780f812590527..3dfaef49bb70b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -848,15 +848,32 @@ static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* private_data for proc_mem_operations */
+struct mem_private {
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
+	/* Was the ptrace access check bypassed due to introspection? */
+	bool introspection;
+};
+
 static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
+	struct mem_private *priv __free(kfree) = kmalloc_obj(struct mem_private);
+
+	if (!priv)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_op->fop_flags & FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET)))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	return __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv->mm))
+		return priv->mm ? PTR_ERR(priv->mm) : -ESRCH;
+	priv->introspection = priv->mm == current->mm;
+	file->private_data = no_free_ptr(priv);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
+	struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	bool ptrace_active = false;
 
@@ -873,6 +890,8 @@ static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
 		}
 		return ptrace_active;
 	default:
+		if (priv->introspection)
+			return security_introspect_mem_foll_force(file->f_cred) == 0;
 		return true;
 	}
 }
@@ -880,7 +899,8 @@ static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
 static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write)
 {
-	struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
+	struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = priv->mm;
 	unsigned long addr = *ppos;
 	ssize_t copied;
 	char *page;
@@ -970,12 +990,21 @@ static int mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int mem_release_with_private(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data;
+
+	mmdrop(priv->mm);
+	kfree(priv);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {
 	.llseek		= mem_lseek,
 	.read		= mem_read,
 	.write		= mem_write,
 	.open		= mem_open,
-	.release	= mem_release,
+	.release	= mem_release_with_private,
 	.fop_flags	= FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET,
 };
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 65c9609ec2077..67452f71bedfb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transfer_file, const struct cred *from,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_access_check, struct task_struct *child,
 	 unsigned int mode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_traceme, struct task_struct *parent)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, introspect_mem_foll_force, const struct cred *subject)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capget, const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capset, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 153e9043058f8..f8483be58bc8a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
 				  const struct cred *to, const struct file *file);
 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
+int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject);
 int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
@@ -676,6 +677,11 @@ static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 	return cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
 }
 
+static inline int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,
 				   kernel_cap_t *effective,
 				   kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 71aea8fdf0142..d0f790a534eb0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -595,6 +595,21 @@ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent);
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_introspect_mem_foll_force() - Check if introspective FOLL_FORCE is allowed
+ * @subject: credentials of the process accessing its own memory
+ *
+ * Check if FOLL_FORCE is allowed for a process accessing its own memory, which
+ * bypasses the security_ptrace_access_check() hook.
+ * This is only used when the system is configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(introspect_mem_foll_force, subject);
+}
+
 /**
  * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process
  * @target: target process
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 18dd28b2bb13d..905137c473217 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2157,6 +2157,32 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Decide whether it should be possible to read non-readable VMAs and write
+ * non-writable VMAs via /proc/self/mem.
+ * This only applies to systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, and only
+ * triggers on accesses that are not visible to selinux_ptrace_access_check().
+ *
+ * This allows a process to overwrite read-only code in its own address space.
+ *
+ * Creating an audit record on denial doesn't make sense here, since we can't
+ * tell whether FOLL_FORCE matters for the accessed VMAs.
+ */
+static int selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(subject);
+
+	/* Allow if the process is generally allowed to have executable anonymous memory. */
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, 0, &avd);
+
+	/* Also allow if selinux_ptrace_access_check() would allow it. */
+	if (rc)
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 			  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
@@ -7558,6 +7584,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(introspect_mem_foll_force, selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 4423
							output: 21
							thoughts: 685
						

**My Initial Assessment and Fuzzing Strategy for the `/proc/pid/mem` Patch**

Okay, so this patch is a definite functional change, right in the heart of the kernel, specifically impacting how `/proc/pid/mem` is accessed. It's adding an LSM hook, `security_introspect_mem_foll_force`, checking for `FOLL_FORCE`.  This is a potential attack surface, and clearly a good candidate for fuzzing.  I'm seeing new structures, `struct mem_private`, and modifications across several core functions like `mem_open`, `proc_mem_foll_force`, `mem_rw`, and `mem_release_with_private`. And it hooks the `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force` in SELinux too.

My initial focus is finding the best entry points for fuzzing. Let's see...

I need to nail down the specific functions. I noted:

*   `mem_open` – static, but potentially reachable through `proc_mem_operations.open`. Worth looking at.
*   `proc_mem_foll_force` – static, called from `mem_rw`.
*   `mem_rw` – static, called from `mem_read` and `mem_write`.
*   `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` – This is exported, which is good.  It's global! High priority.
*   `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force` – static, but hooked.

Hmm, okay, so `mem_open`, `proc_mem_foll_force`, and `mem_rw` are all *static*. I need to see *how* they're called, and what the VFS interaction looks like.  I need to double-check that `mem_read` and `mem_write` are actually used.

Alright, I remember that `mem_read` and `mem_write` are in `proc_mem_operations`.  And `mem_release_with_private` is there too.  Now, the real gem here is that `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` is *exported* – that's much better for fuzzing. I confirmed it's in `security/security.c`.

Okay, back to `fs/proc/base.c`. Confirmed – `mem_open`, `mem_rw`, and `mem_release_with_private` are all static.  This is important because statically defined functions are less likely to be good candidates for being called directly. We usually want to find entry points where the functions are exposed as APIs.

My focus should be on the non-static functions, and the VFS layer. So, `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` looks prime, but I still need to understand how the VFS calls are structured. This patch suggests the new function's a good place to start.

I'm also seeing a comment about `PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS`. This is a *critical* piece.  I need to check the kernel config options to see if this is a real configuration option. A conditional path is a big red flag that I want to investigate thoroughly with fuzzing. Let's do a grep!

{
  "Expression": "PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS"
}

{
  "Output": "fs/proc/base.c=121=enum proc_mem_force {\nfs/proc/base.c:122:\tPROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS,\nfs/proc/base.c-123-\tPROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE,\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=127=static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init =\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-129-\tIS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE :\nfs/proc/base.c:130:\tPROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS;\nfs/proc/base.c-131-\nfs/proc/base.c=132=static const struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] __initconst = {\nfs/proc/base.c:133:\t{ \"always\", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS },\nfs/proc/base.c-134-\t{ \"ptrace\", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE },\n--\nsecurity/security.c=593=int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n--\nsecurity/security.c-603- * bypasses the security_ptrace_access_check() hook.\nsecurity/security.c:604: * This is only used when the system is configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS.\nsecurity/security.c-605- *\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c=2154=static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2162- * non-writable VMAs via /proc/self/mem.\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c:2163: * This only applies to systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, and only\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2164- * triggers on accesses that are not visible to selinux_ptrace_access_check().\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 6367
							output: 19
							thoughts: 51
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, presented as my own mental process:

**Diving into Kernel Memory Access Control**

Right, so I see `PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS`. Okay, enum value. And that's likely connected to a kernel config option like `CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE` or something similar, dealing with how `procfs` handles memory access. Given I'm seeing this, I need to understand the implications of this particular constant. Let's dig into the `Kconfig` files – that's where the real story lives. Time to see what that `PROC_MEM_FORCE` family of options actually *does*. What dependencies does it have? What are the implications for security, debugging, and other aspects of the system? I need to understand this fully to assess its impact. The `Kconfig` files are my next stop.

{
  "Expression": "PROC_MEM_FORCE"
}

{
  "Output": "fs/proc/base.c=121=enum proc_mem_force {\nfs/proc/base.c:122:\tPROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS,\nfs/proc/base.c:123:\tPROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE,\nfs/proc/base.c:124:\tPROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER\nfs/proc/base.c-125-};\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=127=static enum proc_mem_force proc_mem_force_override __ro_after_init =\nfs/proc/base.c:128:\tIS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER :\nfs/proc/base.c:129:\tIS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE) ? PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE :\nfs/proc/base.c:130:\tPROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS;\nfs/proc/base.c-131-\nfs/proc/base.c=132=static const struct constant_table proc_mem_force_table[] __initconst = {\nfs/proc/base.c:133:\t{ \"always\", PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS },\nfs/proc/base.c:134:\t{ \"ptrace\", PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE },\nfs/proc/base.c:135:\t{ \"never\", PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER },\nfs/proc/base.c-136-\t{ }\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=874=static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-880-\tswitch (proc_mem_force_override) {\nfs/proc/base.c:881:\tcase PROC_MEM_FORCE_NEVER:\nfs/proc/base.c-882-\t\treturn false;\nfs/proc/base.c:883:\tcase PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE:\nfs/proc/base.c-884-\t\ttask = get_proc_task(file_inode(file));\n--\nsecurity/Kconfig=22=choice\nsecurity/Kconfig-23-\tprompt \"Allow /proc/pid/mem access override\"\nsecurity/Kconfig:24:\tdefault PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE\nsecurity/Kconfig-25-\thelp\n--\nsecurity/Kconfig=33=config PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE\n--\nsecurity/Kconfig-38-\nsecurity/Kconfig:39:config PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE\nsecurity/Kconfig-40-\tbool \"Require active ptrace() use for access override\"\n--\nsecurity/security.c=593=int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n--\nsecurity/security.c-603- * bypasses the security_ptrace_access_check() hook.\nsecurity/security.c:604: * This is only used when the system is configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS.\nsecurity/security.c-605- *\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c=2154=static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2162- * non-writable VMAs via /proc/self/mem.\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c:2163: * This only applies to systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, and only\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2164- * triggers on accesses that are not visible to selinux_ptrace_access_check().\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 7549
							output: 31
							thoughts: 46
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, assuming I'm the one having it:

**Configuration Confusion and Verification**

Hmm, let me see... the configuration option I'm working with is `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE`... or was it `PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS`? It's easy to get those mixed up sometimes. Best to be sure. Alright, I'll quickly double-check that definition in `security/Kconfig`. Can't trust my memory on these details, especially when dealing with such critical security-related settings. It's a fundamental step, always, to go back to the source when there's even a flicker of doubt about the exact name or meaning.

{
  "File": "security/Kconfig",
  "FirstLine": 20,
  "LineCount": 40
}

{
  "Contents": "  20:\t\t  If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.\n  21:\t\n  22:\tchoice\n  23:\t\tprompt \"Allow /proc/pid/mem access override\"\n  24:\t\tdefault PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE\n  25:\t\thelp\n  26:\t\t  Traditionally /proc/pid/mem allows users to override memory\n  27:\t\t  permissions for users like ptrace, assuming they have ptrace\n  28:\t\t  capability.\n  29:\t\n  30:\t\t  This allows people to limit that - either never override, or\n  31:\t\t  require actual active ptrace attachment (default).\n  32:\t\n  33:\tconfig PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE\n  34:\t\tbool \"Traditional /proc/pid/mem behavior\"\n  35:\t\thelp\n  36:\t\t  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping\n  37:\t\t  permissions if you have ptrace access rights.\n  38:\t\n  39:\tconfig PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE\n  40:\t\tbool \"Require active ptrace() use for access override\"\n  41:\t\thelp\n  42:\t\t  This allows /proc/pid/mem accesses to override memory mapping\n  43:\t\t  permissions for active ptracers like gdb.\n  44:\t\n  45:\tconfig PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE\n  46:\t\tbool \"Never\"\n  47:\t\thelp\n  48:\t\t  Never override memory mapping permissions\n  49:\t\n  50:\tendchoice\n  51:\t\n  52:\tconfig MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS\n  53:\t\tbool \"mseal system mappings\"\n  54:\t\tdepends on 64BIT\n  55:\t\tdepends on ARCH_SUPPORTS_MSEAL_SYSTEM_MAPPINGS\n  56:\t\tdepends on !CHECKPOINT_RESTORE\n  57:\t\thelp\n  58:\t\t  Apply mseal on system mappings.\n  59:\t\t  The system mappings includes vdso, vvar, vvar_vclock,\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 8305
							output: 17
							thoughts: 1098
						

**Fuzzing Target Identification: A Focused Review**

Okay, so I'm looking at this configuration: `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE`. Looking at the code in `fs/proc/base.c`, if `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` is set, neither `CONFIG_PROC_MEM_NO_FORCE` nor `CONFIG_PROC_MEM_FORCE_PTRACE` is enabled, and it defaults to `PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS`. Therefore, enabling `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` seems like the correct path for testing.

I need to remember SELinux is involved. So, `SECURITY_SELINUX` is also a critical configuration to enable. I'm seeing changes related to `mem_open`, `proc_mem_foll_force`, `mem_rw`, and `mem_release_with_private` in the code, specifically the fuzzing targets.

Now, let's zero in on the functions. `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` looks promising – it's an exported, non-static API entrypoint in `security/security.c`. Also, `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force` seems like another great target, found in `security/selinux/hooks.c`.

I need to confirm if anything else is viable. `mem_open` is static, but because it's assigned to a function pointer within `proc_mem_operations`, its address is taken. This means it has a distinct symbol and won't be fully inlined. Therefore, `mem_open` could also be considered for fuzzing. The same logic holds true for `mem_release_with_private`. However, `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` is the better choice because it's a global function.

Just to be absolutely sure, `mem_open` *is* static, and `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` *is* exported.

So, in summary, I'll need to enable `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` and `SECURITY_SELINUX`. `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` doesn't depend on any other configurations, according to the Kconfig file in `security/Kconfig`. `SECURITY_SELINUX` has a few dependencies, but that's already known.

Here are the specific functions I'm focusing on:

*   `security_introspect_mem_foll_force`
*   `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`
*   `mem_open`
*   `mem_release_with_private`

I should also make sure `mem_open` is unique, but it does have a distinct symbol because of the function pointer. This seems like a solid plan.

{
  "Expression": "mem_open"
}

{
  "Output": "arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c=156=static int\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:157:spufs_mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-158-{\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c=303=static const struct file_operations spufs_mem_fops = {\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:304:\t.open\t\t\t= spufs_mem_open,\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-305-\t.release\t\t= spufs_mem_release,\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c=1920=int xe_pagemap_cache_create(struct xe_tile *tile)\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c-1936-\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c:1937:static struct drm_pagemap *xe_devmem_open(struct xe_device *xe, u32 region_instance)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c-1938-{\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c=1972=struct drm_pagemap *xe_drm_pagemap_from_fd(int fd, u32 region_instance)\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c-1998-\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c:1999:\tdpagemap = xe_devmem_open(to_xe_device(drm), region_instance);\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c-2000-\tdrm_dev_exit(idx);\n--\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c=531=void update_watermark_setting(struct ipu6_isys *isys)\n--\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c-540-\tu64 isys_pb_datarate_mbs = 0;\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c:541:\tu32 mem_open_threshold = 0;\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c-542-\tstruct ltr_did ltrdid;\n--\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c-619-\t\t\t     ISF_DMA_TOP_GDA_PROFERTY_PAGE_SIZE) ? 1 : 0;\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c:620:\t\tmem_open_threshold = isys-\u003epdata-\u003eipdata-\u003ememopen_threshold;\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c:621:\t\tmem_open_threshold = max_t(u32, mem_open_threshold, page_num);\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c:622:\t\tdev_dbg(dev, \"mem_open_threshold: %u\\n\", mem_open_threshold);\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c-623-\t\tset_iwake_register(isys, GDA_MEMOPEN_THRESHOLD_INDEX,\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c:624:\t\t\t\t   mem_open_threshold);\ndrivers/media/pci/intel/ipu6/ipu6-isys.c-625-\t} else {\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c=1658=static const struct file_operations flash_debugfs_fops = {\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c-1659-\t.owner   = THIS_MODULE,\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c:1660:\t.open    = mem_open,\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c-1661-\t.read    = flash_read,\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c=3245=static const struct file_operations sge_qinfo_debugfs_fops = {\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c-3252-\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c:3253:int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.c-3254-{\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.h=65=void add_debugfs_files(struct adapter *adap,\n--\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.h-67-\t\t       unsigned int nfiles);\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.h:68:int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file);\ndrivers/net/ethernet/chelsio/cxgb4/cxgb4_debugfs.h-69-\n--\ndrivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c=69=ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(qcom_rmtfs_mem);\ndrivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c-70-\ndrivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c:71:static int qcom_rmtfs_mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)\ndrivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c-72-{\n--\ndrivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c=152=static const struct file_operations qcom_rmtfs_mem_fops = {\ndrivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c-153-\t.owner = THIS_MODULE,\ndrivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c:154:\t.open = qcom_rmtfs_mem_open,\ndrivers/soc/qcom/rmtfs_mem.c-155-\t.read = qcom_rmtfs_mem_read,\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=804=static const struct file_operations proc_single_file_operations = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-811-/*\nfs/proc/base.c:812: * proc_mem_open() can return errno, NULL or mm_struct*.\nfs/proc/base.c-813- *\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-817- */\nfs/proc/base.c:818:struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode)\nfs/proc/base.c-819-{\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-839-\nfs/proc/base.c:840:static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)\nfs/proc/base.c-841-{\nfs/proc/base.c:842:\tstruct mm_struct *mm = proc_mem_open(inode, mode);\nfs/proc/base.c-843-\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=852=struct mem_private {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-857-\nfs/proc/base.c:858:static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\nfs/proc/base.c-859-{\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-865-\t\treturn -EINVAL;\nfs/proc/base.c:866:\tpriv-\u003emm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);\nfs/proc/base.c-867-\tif (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv-\u003emm))\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=1002=static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-1005-\t.write\t\t= mem_write,\nfs/proc/base.c:1006:\t.open\t\t= mem_open,\nfs/proc/base.c-1007-\t.release\t= mem_release_with_private,\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=1011=static int environ_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\nfs/proc/base.c-1012-{\nfs/proc/base.c:1013:\treturn __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ);\nfs/proc/base.c-1014-}\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=1086=static int auxv_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\nfs/proc/base.c-1087-{\nfs/proc/base.c:1088:\treturn __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);\nfs/proc/base.c-1089-}\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=2767=static int proc_pid_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-2769-\tfile-\u003eprivate_data = NULL;\nfs/proc/base.c:2770:\t__mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ_FSCREDS);\nfs/proc/base.c-2771-\treturn 0;\n--\nfs/proc/internal.h=394=struct proc_maps_private {\n--\nfs/proc/internal.h-404-\nfs/proc/internal.h:405:struct mm_struct *proc_mem_open(struct inode *inode, unsigned int mode);\nfs/proc/internal.h-406-\n--\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c=376=static int proc_maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,\n--\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c-384-\tpriv-\u003einode = inode;\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c:385:\tpriv-\u003elock_ctx.mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c-386-\tif (IS_ERR(priv-\u003elock_ctx.mm)) {\n--\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c=1619=static int smaps_rollup_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n--\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c-1632-\tpriv-\u003einode = inode;\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c:1633:\tpriv-\u003elock_ctx.mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c-1634-\tif (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv-\u003elock_ctx.mm)) {\n--\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c=2394=static int pagemap_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n--\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c-2397-\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c:2398:\tmm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);\nfs/proc/task_mmu.c-2399-\tif (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm))\n--\nfs/proc/task_nommu.c=252=static int maps_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,\n--\nfs/proc/task_nommu.c-261-\tpriv-\u003einode = inode;\nfs/proc/task_nommu.c:262:\tpriv-\u003elock_ctx.mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_READ);\nfs/proc/task_nommu.c-263-\tif (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv-\u003elock_ctx.mm)) {\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 13139
							output: 21
							thoughts: 58
						

Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed as my own:

**Investigating Memory Management in the Cheliso cxgb4 Driver**

Alright, so I'm digging into the Cheliso cxgb4 driver, specifically looking at its memory management routines. I spotted a `mem_open` function call within `cxgb4_debugfs.c`. Hmm, that's not exactly unique, is it? I've seen that name used in various contexts. It makes me want to look deeper.

It means the function name is likely not a particularly robust signifier of anything, therefore a different name or function has to be selected.

Okay, let's try a different tack. I'm wondering if there's a more specific and less generic name. Maybe a function with more specialized purpose. What about the `mem_release_with_private` function? That name sounds more promising. It implies a release mechanism associated with private data, which is often a key aspect of resource management in kernel modules. I need to see how that's being used. Is it coupled to the `mem_open`? What kind of private data is being managed here? And what's being released?

{
  "Expression": "mem_release_with_private"
}

{
  "Output": "fs/proc/base.c=985=static int mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-992-\nfs/proc/base.c:993:static int mem_release_with_private(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\nfs/proc/base.c-994-{\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=1002=static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-1006-\t.open\t\t= mem_open,\nfs/proc/base.c:1007:\t.release\t= mem_release_with_private,\nfs/proc/base.c-1008-\t.fop_flags\t= FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET,\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 13684
							output: 22
							thoughts: 159
						

**My Initial Assessment of Memory Management Fuzzing Targets**

Okay, so I'm looking at these memory-related functions and trying to identify the most promising candidates for fuzzing. `mem_release_with_private` stood out initially as something unique. I had it on a list with `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` and `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`. But, thinking about it a bit more, `mem_release_with_private` is just a simple memory release function. It's not particularly complex or interesting from a fuzzing perspective, it just frees memory. Probably not going to reveal anything new.

Now, my attention's turned to `proc_mem_foll_force`. While it's a static function, I see that `mem_rw`, which in turn is called by both `mem_read` and `mem_write`, calls `proc_mem_foll_force`. This is much more promising. The chain of calls suggests it's involved in more complex memory operations, something I can potentially exploit through fuzzing `mem_read` and `mem_write` - through the indirections. I should check if `proc_mem_foll_force` is unique, to confirm my hypothesis.

{
  "Expression": "proc_mem_foll_force"
}

{
  "Output": "fs/proc/base.c=858=static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-873-\nfs/proc/base.c:874:static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)\nfs/proc/base.c-875-{\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=899=static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-920-\tflags = write ? FOLL_WRITE : 0;\nfs/proc/base.c:921:\tif (proc_mem_foll_force(file, mm))\nfs/proc/base.c-922-\t\tflags |= FOLL_FORCE;\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 14360
							output: 24
							thoughts: 178
						

**My Analysis of the Memory Follow Force Function**

Okay, so I'm looking at this `proc_mem_foll_force` function, and my immediate thought is that it's a bit unusual. The fact that it's static and only called once strongly suggests that it's likely to be inlined by the compiler. If that's the case, then it won't even have its own dedicated symbol in the final executable, which is going to make it trickier to target, so I should probably focus my attention on the `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` and `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force` functions instead.

Before I go any further, I need to verify that my assumptions are sound, so let's double-check the relevant configuration options. Right, so we have `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` and `SECURITY_SELINUX`.

Wait a minute... I need to consider where these functions are actually defined. This patch adds `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` within `security/security.c` and `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force` in `security/selinux/hooks.c`, respectively. Now, the crucial question is whether any other LSM (Linux Security Module) is implementing this hook. I need to make sure this is an SELinux specific hook. Let's see...

{
  "Expression": "introspect_mem_foll_force"
}

{
  "Output": "fs/proc/base.c=874=static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-893-\t\tif (priv-\u003eintrospection)\nfs/proc/base.c:894:\t\t\treturn security_introspect_mem_foll_force(file-\u003ef_cred) == 0;\nfs/proc/base.c-895-\t\treturn true;\n--\ninclude/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h=38=LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_traceme, struct task_struct *parent)\ninclude/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h:39:LSM_HOOK(int, 0, introspect_mem_foll_force, const struct cred *subject)\ninclude/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h-40-LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capget, const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,\n--\ninclude/linux/security.h=340=int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);\ninclude/linux/security.h:341:int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject);\ninclude/linux/security.h-342-int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,\n--\ninclude/linux/security.h=675=static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n--\ninclude/linux/security.h-679-\ninclude/linux/security.h:680:static inline int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)\ninclude/linux/security.h-681-{\n--\nsecurity/security.c=593=int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n--\nsecurity/security.c-598-/**\nsecurity/security.c:599: * security_introspect_mem_foll_force() - Check if introspective FOLL_FORCE is allowed\nsecurity/security.c-600- * @subject: credentials of the process accessing its own memory\n--\nsecurity/security.c-607- */\nsecurity/security.c:608:int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)\nsecurity/security.c-609-{\nsecurity/security.c:610:\treturn call_int_hook(introspect_mem_foll_force, subject);\nsecurity/security.c-611-}\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c=2154=static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2170- */\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c:2171:static int selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2172-{\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c=7579=static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-7586-\tLSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c:7587:\tLSM_HOOK_INIT(introspect_mem_foll_force, selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force),\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-7588-\tLSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 15800
							output: 238
							thoughts: 754
						

**My Analysis of the `/proc/pid/mem` Introspection Patch**

Okay, so this patch is interesting. It looks like it's primarily an SELinux thing, at least in terms of the initial implementation. I need to confirm that `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` is the configuration option triggering this. Yes, confirmed, found it in `security/Kconfig`.

Now, let's break down the core logic. The patch is changing how `/proc/pid/mem` is accessed. Specifically, it allows a process to bypass the usual `ptrace_access_check` when it introspects its own memory. This bypass is granted only if the new `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` LSM hook allows it. And this whole thing is only active if `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` is configured. This sounds like a significant functional change within procfs and, critically, SELinux, affecting how memory introspection via `/proc/self/mem` works.

I've identified key symbols for fuzzing: `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` and `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`. And, to make it work, I need to enable `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` and `SECURITY_SELINUX`.

Hmm, I see `mem_release_with_private` is a non-inlined function assigned to a function pointer. Should I include it in the fuzzing scope? It's pretty straightforward: it just drops the `mm` and frees the `mem_private` struct.

```c
static int mem_release_with_private(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
{
	struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data;

	mmdrop(priv->mm);
	kfree(priv);
	return 0;
}
```

However, it's part of the new lifecycle management for `mem_private`. Fuzzing this might uncover use-after-free or memory leaks if there's an issue with how the `mem_private` is allocated or deallocated. I'll add it to the list.

Wait, what about `mem_open`? There are multiple implementations, it's easy to create issues with syzkaller if I just put `mem_open`. Since the relevant `mem_open` in `fs/proc/base.c` is static, I can't just provide the function name. If I provide the name, syzkaller might try to fuzz the wrong or all instances of `mem_open`, which is definitely not what I want. So I will avoid any ambiguous function names.

So, the definitive list for fuzzing is:
*   `security_introspect_mem_foll_force`
*   `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`
*   `mem_release_with_private`

Let's quickly double-check that `mem_release_with_private` is unique. Yes, it's the only one of its name.

Alright, time to synthesize the reasoning into a concise argument. The patch modifies access logic for `/proc/pid/mem`. Specifically, it allows a process to bypass `ptrace_access_check` when introspecting its own memory. This introduces a new `mem_private` struct to track `mm_struct` and a boolean flag for introspection. It also adds a new LSM hook, `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` (implemented by SELinux), which controls the `FOLL_FORCE` usage during self-introspection. This behavior is activated when `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` is enabled. This represents a functional change in core procfs and the security subsystem, and userspace interacts with this feature by opening and reading/writing `/proc/self/mem`.

Sounds solid. I think I've got a good grasp on this patch and am ready to move forward.

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE",
    "SECURITY_SELINUX"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "security_introspect_mem_foll_force",
    "selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force",
    "mem_release_with_private"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies the access logic for `/proc/pid/mem` to allow a process to bypass `ptrace_access_check` when introspecting its own memory. It introduces a new `mem_private` struct to track the `mm_struct` and a boolean flag for introspection, and adds a new LSM hook `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` (implemented by SELinux) to control `FOLL_FORCE` usage during self-introspection. This behavior is active when `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` is configured. This is a functional change in core procfs and the security subsystem, reachable from userspace by opening and reading/writing `/proc/self/mem`.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

{
  "EnableConfigs": [
    "PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE",
    "SECURITY_SELINUX"
  ],
  "FocusSymbols": [
    "security_introspect_mem_foll_force",
    "selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force",
    "mem_release_with_private"
  ],
  "Reasoning": "The patch modifies the access logic for `/proc/pid/mem` to allow a process to bypass `ptrace_access_check` when introspecting its own memory. It introduces a new `mem_private` struct to track the `mm_struct` and a boolean flag for introspection, and adds a new LSM hook `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` (implemented by SELinux) to control `FOLL_FORCE` usage during self-introspection. This behavior is active when `PROC_MEM_ALWAYS_FORCE` is configured. This is a functional change in core procfs and the security subsystem, reachable from userspace by opening and reading/writing `/proc/self/mem`.",
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

{
  "WorthFuzzing": true
}

null

best-expensive

null

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch modifies the `/proc/pid/mem` open and read/write logic to track whether the ptrace access check was bypassed due to introspection (a process accessing its own memory). It introduces a new `struct mem_private` to hold the `mm_struct` pointer and a boolean `introspection` flag. This struct is allocated via `kmalloc_obj` (which does not zero memory), but both of its fields are explicitly initialized in `mem_open()`. The struct is only used internally within `fs/proc/base.c` and is never copied to userspace, so any uninitialized padding bytes do not pose an info-leak risk.\n\nAdditionally, the patch introduces a new LSM hook `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` and its SELinux implementation `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`. The SELinux implementation allocates a `struct av_decision avd` on the stack without initialization, but it is passed purely as an output parameter to `avc_has_perm_noaudit()`, which populates it. The contents of `avd` are not even read by the caller.\n\nSince all introduced memory is either fully initialized before use or used strictly as output parameters, and no kernel memory is copied to userspace in a way that could leak uninitialized bytes, there is no risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks. Standard KASAN and other bug detectors are sufficient to catch any potential memory safety issues (like use-after-free or memory leaks) introduced by these changes. A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not required.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

You are an expert Linux kernel security engineer specializing in kernel memory
error detectors (KASAN and KMSAN). Your job is to review the provided patch series and
determine if the code changes justify spawning a dedicated KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer)
fuzzing session in addition to standard KASAN fuzzing.

CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KASAN AND KMSAN:
- Standard KASAN kernel builds (upstream-apparmor-kasan.config) already enable
  a comprehensive suite of debugging tools and sanitizers, including KASAN
  (out-of-bounds accesses, use-after-free, double free, invalid free), LOCKDEP
  (locking bugs and deadlocks), UB-sanitizers, and memory corruption checks.
- KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer) detects reads of UNINITIALIZED memory (stack, heap,
  or page allocations) and kernel-to-user memory info-leaks.

Rule: THERE IS NO SENSE IN RUNNING A KMSAN SESSION IF A BUG CAN BE CAUGHT BY KASAN,
LOCKDEP, OR OTHER STANDARD BUG DETECTORS.
A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session incurs significant resource costs. You must ONLY
set NeedsKMSAN=true if the code changes introduce or expose UNINITIALIZED MEMORY risks
that are detected ONLY by KMSAN.

Look holistically at the patch series and surrounding code. Even if no direct
uninitialized field accesses or new buffer allocations are added in the diff itself,
a patch may alter control flow, bounds checking, or data length calculations in ways
that change how the rest of the code operates on existing buffers (e.g. allowing
uninitialized stack/heap memory to be read, copied to user space, or used in control
flow). Do not hesitate to use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code,
called functions, and callers.

Set NeedsKMSAN=true ONLY IF the patch introduces or modifies:
1. Kernel structures sent to user space (via copy_to_user, put_user, netlink skb
   attributes, ioctl output arguments, socket options, or BPF buffers) where fields
   or structure padding might not be fully initialized/zeroed.
2. Conditional logic or branching that depends on potentially uninitialized variables
   or struct fields.
3. Allocation or initialization of complex data structures where uninitialized fields
   could be read later in reachable code paths.
4. Bounds checks, lengths, or logic in a way that allows surrounding code to access
   uninitialized bytes of existing buffers.

Set NeedsKMSAN=false IF:
- The code changes primarily risk out-of-bounds access, array overflows, NULL pointer
  dereferences, locking deadlocks, or use-after-free bugs (these are already caught
  by KASAN, LOCKDEP, or standard bug detectors).
- All stack/heap structures touched or introduced by the patch are fully zeroed
  or initialized (e.g. using = {0}, memset, kzalloc) before being read or copied.
- The patch does not introduce any risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks.

Use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code if necessary, then provide
detailed KMSANReasoning contrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability for this patch.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.


Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.

For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit dd0dbc6661680310138f54036d082171deeebd12
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date:   Tue Aug 18 22:09:19 2026 +0000

    syz-cluster: applied patch under review

diff --git a/fs/proc/base.c b/fs/proc/base.c
index 780f812590527..3dfaef49bb70b 100644
--- a/fs/proc/base.c
+++ b/fs/proc/base.c
@@ -848,15 +848,32 @@ static int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+/* private_data for proc_mem_operations */
+struct mem_private {
+	struct mm_struct *mm;
+	/* Was the ptrace access check bypassed due to introspection? */
+	bool introspection;
+};
+
 static int mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 {
+	struct mem_private *priv __free(kfree) = kmalloc_obj(struct mem_private);
+
+	if (!priv)
+		return -ENOMEM;
 	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!(file->f_op->fop_flags & FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET)))
 		return -EINVAL;
-	return __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+	priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH);
+	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(priv->mm))
+		return priv->mm ? PTR_ERR(priv->mm) : -ESRCH;
+	priv->introspection = priv->mm == current->mm;
+	file->private_data = no_free_ptr(priv);
+	return 0;
 }
 
 static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
 {
+	struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data;
 	struct task_struct *task;
 	bool ptrace_active = false;
 
@@ -873,6 +890,8 @@ static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
 		}
 		return ptrace_active;
 	default:
+		if (priv->introspection)
+			return security_introspect_mem_foll_force(file->f_cred) == 0;
 		return true;
 	}
 }
@@ -880,7 +899,8 @@ static bool proc_mem_foll_force(struct file *file, struct mm_struct *mm)
 static ssize_t mem_rw(struct file *file, char __user *buf,
 			size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int write)
 {
-	struct mm_struct *mm = file->private_data;
+	struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data;
+	struct mm_struct *mm = priv->mm;
 	unsigned long addr = *ppos;
 	ssize_t copied;
 	char *page;
@@ -970,12 +990,21 @@ static int mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int mem_release_with_private(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+	struct mem_private *priv = file->private_data;
+
+	mmdrop(priv->mm);
+	kfree(priv);
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {
 	.llseek		= mem_lseek,
 	.read		= mem_read,
 	.write		= mem_write,
 	.open		= mem_open,
-	.release	= mem_release,
+	.release	= mem_release_with_private,
 	.fop_flags	= FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET,
 };
 
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 65c9609ec2077..67452f71bedfb 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, binder_transfer_file, const struct cred *from,
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_access_check, struct task_struct *child,
 	 unsigned int mode)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, ptrace_traceme, struct task_struct *parent)
+LSM_HOOK(int, 0, introspect_mem_foll_force, const struct cred *subject)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capget, const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 	 kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 LSM_HOOK(int, 0, capset, struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 153e9043058f8..f8483be58bc8a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -338,6 +338,7 @@ int security_binder_transfer_file(const struct cred *from,
 				  const struct cred *to, const struct file *file);
 int security_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *child, unsigned int mode);
 int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent);
+int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject);
 int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,
 		    kernel_cap_t *effective,
 		    kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
@@ -676,6 +677,11 @@ static inline int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 	return cap_ptrace_traceme(parent);
 }
 
+static inline int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)
+{
+	return 0;
+}
+
 static inline int security_capget(const struct task_struct *target,
 				   kernel_cap_t *effective,
 				   kernel_cap_t *inheritable,
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 71aea8fdf0142..d0f790a534eb0 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -595,6 +595,21 @@ int security_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 	return call_int_hook(ptrace_traceme, parent);
 }
 
+/**
+ * security_introspect_mem_foll_force() - Check if introspective FOLL_FORCE is allowed
+ * @subject: credentials of the process accessing its own memory
+ *
+ * Check if FOLL_FORCE is allowed for a process accessing its own memory, which
+ * bypasses the security_ptrace_access_check() hook.
+ * This is only used when the system is configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS.
+ *
+ * Return: Returns 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+int security_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)
+{
+	return call_int_hook(introspect_mem_foll_force, subject);
+}
+
 /**
  * security_capget() - Get the capability sets for a process
  * @target: target process
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 18dd28b2bb13d..905137c473217 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2157,6 +2157,32 @@ static int selinux_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *parent)
 			    SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, NULL);
 }
 
+/*
+ * Decide whether it should be possible to read non-readable VMAs and write
+ * non-writable VMAs via /proc/self/mem.
+ * This only applies to systems configured with PROC_MEM_FORCE_ALWAYS, and only
+ * triggers on accesses that are not visible to selinux_ptrace_access_check().
+ *
+ * This allows a process to overwrite read-only code in its own address space.
+ *
+ * Creating an audit record on denial doesn't make sense here, since we can't
+ * tell whether FOLL_FORCE matters for the accessed VMAs.
+ */
+static int selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)
+{
+	struct av_decision avd;
+	int rc;
+	u32 sid = cred_sid(subject);
+
+	/* Allow if the process is generally allowed to have executable anonymous memory. */
+	rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, 0, &avd);
+
+	/* Also allow if selinux_ptrace_access_check() would allow it. */
+	if (rc)
+		rc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, &avd);
+	return rc;
+}
+
 static int selinux_capget(const struct task_struct *target, kernel_cap_t *effective,
 			  kernel_cap_t *inheritable, kernel_cap_t *permitted)
 {
@@ -7558,6 +7584,7 @@ static struct security_hook_list selinux_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, selinux_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, selinux_ptrace_traceme),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(introspect_mem_foll_force, selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capget, selinux_capget),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capset, selinux_capset),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(capable, selinux_capable),

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 4420
							output: 18
							thoughts: 232
						

**Analyzing the `/proc/pid/mem` Patch**

Okay, so this patch is digging into `fs/proc/base.c` and is clearly altering how `/proc/pid/mem` is handled. The core of it seems to be about introducing a new data structure, `struct mem_private`. This struct is going to hold a pointer to the `mm_struct` and a boolean flag called `introspection`. Interesting, I wonder what the purpose of that flag is. It looks like the allocation happens within `mem_open`, using `kmalloc_obj`. Now, `kmalloc_obj`... that's not standard, is it? I'm familiar with `kmalloc`, `kzalloc`... I *suspect* it's a macro or a wrapper, but I need to be sure. My initial thought is it's probably equivalent to `kmalloc(sizeof(struct mem_private), GFP_KERNEL)`, but the syntax is throwing me a bit. Wait, the code declares: `struct mem_private *priv __free(kfree) = kmalloc_obj(struct mem_private);` Ah, the `__free(kfree)` attribute is interesting, that helps me understand how the memory will be deallocated. Before I jump to conclusions, I need to check the codebase to see how `kmalloc_obj` is defined. I'm going to grep for it just to make sure. I'm betting it's a local macro of some sort.

{
  "Expression": "kmalloc_obj"
}

{
  "Output": "\nFull output is too long, showing 500 out of 15502 lines.\nUse more precise expression if possible.\n\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst=203=non-\\ ``NULL``, locklessly accessing the ``-\u003ea`` and ``-\u003eb`` fields.\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-208-       2 {\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst:209:       3   p = kmalloc_obj(*p);\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-210-       4   if (!p)\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst=225=their rights to reorder this code as follows:\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-230-       2 {\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst:231:       3   p = kmalloc_obj(*p);\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-232-       4   if (!p)\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst=261=shows an example of insertion:\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-266-       2 {\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst:267:       3   p = kmalloc_obj(*p);\nDocumentation/RCU/Design/Requirements/Requirements.rst-268-       4   if (!p)\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/listRCU.rst=267=The RCU version of audit_upd_rule() is as follows::\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/listRCU.rst-278-\t\t\tif (!audit_compare_rule(rule, \u0026e-\u003erule)) {\nDocumentation/RCU/listRCU.rst:279:\t\t\t\tne = kmalloc_obj(*entry, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/RCU/listRCU.rst-280-\t\t\t\tif (ne == NULL)\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst=441=uses of RCU may be found in listRCU.rst and NMI-RCU.rst.\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst-470-\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst:471:\t\tnew_fp = kmalloc_obj(*new_fp);\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst-472-\t\tspin_lock(\u0026foo_mutex);\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst=553=The foo_update_a() function might then be written as follows::\n--\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst-572-\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst:573:\t\tnew_fp = kmalloc_obj(*new_fp);\nDocumentation/RCU/whatisRCU.rst-574-\t\tspin_lock(\u0026foo_mutex);\n--\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst=39=kref_init as so::\n--\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst-42-\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst:43:     data = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst-44-     if (!data)\n--\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst=81=thread to process::\n--\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst-102-\tstruct task_struct *task;\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst:103:\tdata = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/core-api/kref.rst-104-\tif (!data)\n--\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst=383=to protect the cache and all the objects within it. Here's the code::\n--\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-444-\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst:445:            if ((obj = kmalloc_obj(*obj)) == NULL)\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-446-                    return -ENOMEM;\n--\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst=499=which are taken away, and the ``+`` are lines which are added.\n--\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-519-\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst:520:             if ((obj = kmalloc_obj(*obj)) == NULL)\nDocumentation/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-521-                     return -ENOMEM;\n--\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst=498=works perfectly::\n--\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst-500-  raw_spin_lock(\u0026lock);\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst:501:  p = kmalloc_obj(*p, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst-502-\n--\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst=507=preemption on PREEMPT_RT kernels::\n--\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst-509-  spin_lock(\u0026lock);\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst:510:  p = kmalloc_obj(*p, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/locking/locktypes.rst-511-\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst=938=The kernel provides the following general purpose memory allocators:\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst:939:kmalloc(), kzalloc(), kmalloc_objs(), kzalloc_objs(), vmalloc(), and\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-940-vzalloc().  Please refer to the API documentation for further information\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst=944=The preferred form for passing a size of a struct is the following:\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-947-\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst:948:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-949-\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst=958=The preferred form for allocating an array is the following:\n--\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-961-\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst:962:\tp = kmalloc_objs(*p, n, ...);\nDocumentation/process/coding-style.rst-963-\n--\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst=386=may help with alignment, wrap-around, or additional hardening. The\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst:387:kmalloc_obj()-family of macros provide this introspection, which can be\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-388-used for the common code patterns for single, array, and flexible object\n--\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst=398=become, respectively::\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-399-\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst:400:\tptr = kmalloc_obj(*ptr [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-401-\tptr = kzalloc_obj(*ptr [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst:402:\tptr = kmalloc_objs(*ptr, count [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-403-\tptr = kzalloc_objs(*ptr, count [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-404-\tptr = kmalloc_flex(*ptr, flex_member, count [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst:405:\t__auto_type ptr = kmalloc_obj(struct foo [, gfp] );\nDocumentation/process/deprecated.rst-406-\n--\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst=1734=callback::\n--\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst-1739-          ....\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst:1740:          data = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst-1741-          substream-\u003eruntime-\u003eprivate_data = data;\n--\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst=3302=destructor function is set in the ``private_free`` field::\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst-3303-\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst:3304:  struct mydata *p = kmalloc_obj(*p);\nDocumentation/sound/kernel-api/writing-an-alsa-driver.rst-3305-  hw-\u003eprivate_data = p;\n--\nDocumentation/spi/spi-summary.rst=242=And SOC-specific utility code might look something like::\n--\nDocumentation/spi/spi-summary.rst-251-\nDocumentation/spi/spi-summary.rst:252:\t\tpdata2 = kmalloc_obj(*pdata2);\nDocumentation/spi/spi-summary.rst-253-\t\t*pdata2 = pdata;\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst=403=e tutti gli oggetti che contiene. Ecco il codice::\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-464-\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst:465:            if ((obj = kmalloc_obj(*obj)) == NULL)\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-466-                    return -ENOMEM;\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst=519=sono quelle rimosse, mentre quelle ``+`` sono quelle aggiunte.\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-539-\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst:540:             if ((obj = kmalloc_obj(*obj)) == NULL)\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/kernel-hacking/locking.rst-541-                     return -ENOMEM;\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst=488=memoria. Su un kernel non-PREEMPT_RT il seguente codice funziona perfettamente::\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst-490-  raw_spin_lock(\u0026lock);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst:491:  p = kmalloc_obj(*p, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst-492-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst=497=PREEMPT_RT::\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst-499-  spin_lock(\u0026lock);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst:500:  p = kmalloc_obj(*p, GFP_ATOMIC);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/locking/locktypes.rst-501-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/process/coding-style.rst=942=Il modo preferito per passare la dimensione di una struttura è il seguente:\n--\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/process/coding-style.rst-945-\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/process/coding-style.rst:946:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/translations/it_IT/process/coding-style.rst-947-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/sp_SP/process/coding-style.rst=954=La forma preferida para pasar el tamaño de una estructura es la siguiente:\n--\nDocumentation/translations/sp_SP/process/coding-style.rst-957-\nDocumentation/translations/sp_SP/process/coding-style.rst:958:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/translations/sp_SP/process/coding-style.rst-959-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst=46=kref可以出现在数据结构体中的任何地方。\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst-54-\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst:55:     data = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst-56-     if (!data)\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst=62=Kref规则\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst-108-\tstruct task_struct *task;\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst:109:\tdata = kmalloc_obj(*data);\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/kref.rst-110-\tif (!data)\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/process/coding-style.rst=810=Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/memory-allocation.rst 。\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/process/coding-style.rst-815-\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/process/coding-style.rst:816:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/translations/zh_CN/process/coding-style.rst-817-\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_TW/process/coding-style.rst=824=Documentation/translations/zh_CN/core-api/memory-allocation.rst 。\n--\nDocumentation/translations/zh_TW/process/coding-style.rst-829-\nDocumentation/translations/zh_TW/process/coding-style.rst:830:\tp = kmalloc_obj(*p, ...);\nDocumentation/translations/zh_TW/process/coding-style.rst-831-\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c=857=marvel_agp_setup(alpha_agp_info *agp)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c-863-\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c:864:\taper = kmalloc_obj(*aper);\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c-865-\tif (aper == NULL) return -ENOMEM;\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c=1019=marvel_agp_info(void)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c-1061-\t */\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c:1062:\tagp = kmalloc_obj(*agp);\narch/alpha/kernel/core_marvel.c-1063-\tif (!agp)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c=590=titan_agp_setup(alpha_agp_info *agp)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c-596-\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c:597:\taper = kmalloc_obj(struct titan_agp_aperture);\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c-598-\tif (aper == NULL)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c=731=titan_agp_info(void)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c-762-\t */\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c:763:\tagp = kmalloc_obj(*agp);\narch/alpha/kernel/core_titan.c-764-\tif (!agp)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/module.c=29=process_reloc_for_got(Elf64_Rela *rela,\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/module.c-48-\narch/alpha/kernel/module.c:49:\tg = kmalloc_obj(*g);\narch/alpha/kernel/module.c-50-\tg-\u003enext = chains[r_sym].next;\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/pci.c=211=static void pdev_save_srm_config(struct pci_dev *dev)\n--\narch/alpha/kernel/pci.c-223-\narch/alpha/kernel/pci.c:224:\ttmp = kmalloc_obj(*tmp);\narch/alpha/kernel/pci.c-225-\tif (!tmp) {\n--\narch/arc/kernel/unwind.c=359=void *unwind_add_table(struct module *module, const void *table_start,\n--\narch/arc/kernel/unwind.c-368-\narch/arc/kernel/unwind.c:369:\ttable = kmalloc_obj(*table);\narch/arc/kernel/unwind.c-370-\tif (!table)\n--\narch/arm/common/locomo.c=274=static int locomo_suspend(struct platform_device *dev, pm_message_t state)\n--\narch/arm/common/locomo.c-279-\narch/arm/common/locomo.c:280:\tsave = kmalloc_obj(struct locomo_save_data);\narch/arm/common/locomo.c-281-\tif (!save)\n--\narch/arm/common/sa1111.c=964=static int sa1111_suspend_noirq(struct device *dev)\n--\narch/arm/common/sa1111.c-971-\narch/arm/common/sa1111.c:972:\tsave = kmalloc_obj(struct sa1111_save_data);\narch/arm/common/sa1111.c-973-\tif (!save)\n--\narch/arm/kernel/unwind.c=572=struct unwind_table *unwind_table_add(unsigned long start, unsigned long size,\n--\narch/arm/kernel/unwind.c-576-\tunsigned long flags;\narch/arm/kernel/unwind.c:577:\tstruct unwind_table *tab = kmalloc_obj(*tab);\narch/arm/kernel/unwind.c-578-\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-iommu.c=53=static struct powerdomain *_get_pwrdm(struct device *dev)\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-iommu.c-101-\narch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-iommu.c:102:\tentry = kmalloc_obj(*entry);\narch/arm/mach-omap2/omap-iommu.c-103-\tif (entry) {\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm34xx.c=406=static int __init pwrdms_setup(struct powerdomain *pwrdm, void *unused)\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm34xx.c-412-\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm34xx.c:413:\tpwrst = kmalloc_obj(struct power_state, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm34xx.c-414-\tif (!pwrst)\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm44xx.c=113=static int __init pwrdms_setup(struct powerdomain *pwrdm, void *unused)\n--\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm44xx.c-134-\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm44xx.c:135:\tpwrst = kmalloc_obj(struct power_state, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/arm/mach-omap2/pm44xx.c-136-\tif (!pwrst)\n--\narch/arm/mm/pgd.c-19-#ifdef CONFIG_ARM_LPAE\narch/arm/mm/pgd.c:20:#define _pgd_alloc(mm)\t\tkmalloc_objs(pgd_t, PTRS_PER_PGD, GFP_KERNEL | __GFP_ZERO)\narch/arm/mm/pgd.c-21-#define _pgd_free(mm, pgd)\tkfree(pgd)\n--\narch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c=764=static int coverage_start(const union decode_item *table)\narch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c-765-{\narch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c:766:\tcoverage.base = kmalloc_objs(struct coverage_entry,\narch/arm/probes/kprobes/test-core.c-767-\t\t\t\t     MAX_COVERAGE_ENTRIES);\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c=774=void kvm_host_pmu_init(struct arm_pmu *pmu)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c-786-\narch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c:787:\tentry = kmalloc_obj(*entry);\narch/arm64/kvm/pmu-emul.c-788-\tif (!entry)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c=102=static void *vgic_debug_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c-106-\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c:107:\titer = kmalloc_obj(*iter);\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c-108-\tif (!iter)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c=364=static void *vgic_its_debug_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c-377-\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c:378:\titer = kmalloc_obj(*iter);\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-debug.c-379-\tif (!iter)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c=743=void __init vgic_set_kvm_info(const struct gic_kvm_info *info)\n--\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c-745-\tBUG_ON(gic_kvm_info != NULL);\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c:746:\tgic_kvm_info = kmalloc_obj(*gic_kvm_info);\narch/arm64/kvm/vgic/vgic-init.c-747-\tif (gic_kvm_info)\n--\narch/m68k/emu/nfblock.c=97=static int __init nfhd_init_one(int id, u32 blocks, u32 bsize)\n--\narch/m68k/emu/nfblock.c-114-\narch/m68k/emu/nfblock.c:115:\tdev = kmalloc_obj(struct nfhd_device);\narch/m68k/emu/nfblock.c-116-\tif (!dev)\n--\narch/m68k/mm/kmap.c=108=static struct vm_struct *get_io_area(unsigned long size)\n--\narch/m68k/mm/kmap.c-112-\narch/m68k/mm/kmap.c:113:\tarea = kmalloc_obj(*area);\narch/m68k/mm/kmap.c-114-\tif (!area)\n--\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c=253=u32 au1xxx_dbdma_chan_alloc(u32 srcid, u32 destid,\n--\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c-312-\t\t\t */\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c:313:\t\t\tctp = kmalloc_obj(chan_tab_t, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c-314-\t\t\tchan_tab_ptr[i] = ctp;\n--\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c=391=u32 au1xxx_dbdma_ring_alloc(u32 chanid, int entries)\n--\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c-414-\t */\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c:415:\tdesc_base = (u32) kmalloc_objs(au1x_ddma_desc_t, entries,\narch/mips/alchemy/common/dbdma.c-416-\t\t\t\t       GFP_KERNEL | GFP_DMA);\n--\narch/mips/kernel/module.c=59=static int apply_r_mips_hi16(struct module *me, u32 *location, Elf_Addr v,\n--\narch/mips/kernel/module.c-74-\t */\narch/mips/kernel/module.c:75:\tn = kmalloc_obj(*n);\narch/mips/kernel/module.c-76-\tif (!n)\n--\narch/mips/kernel/vpe.c=311=static int apply_r_mips_hi16(struct module *me, uint32_t *location,\n--\narch/mips/kernel/vpe.c-320-\t */\narch/mips/kernel/vpe.c:321:\tn = kmalloc_obj(*n);\narch/mips/kernel/vpe.c-322-\tif (!n)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c=188=pat_query_module(ulong pcell_loc, ulong mod_index)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c-195-\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c:196:\tpa_pdc_cell = kmalloc_obj(*pa_pdc_cell);\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c-197-\tif (!pa_pdc_cell)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c=532=add_system_map_addresses(struct parisc_device *dev, int num_addrs, \n--\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c-538-\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c:539:\tdev-\u003eaddr = kmalloc_objs(*dev-\u003eaddr, num_addrs);\narch/parisc/kernel/inventory.c-540-\tif(!dev-\u003eaddr) {\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/processor.c=81=static int __init processor_probe(struct parisc_device *dev)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/processor.c-112-\narch/parisc/kernel/processor.c:113:\t\tpa_pdc_cell = kmalloc_obj(*pa_pdc_cell);\narch/parisc/kernel/processor.c-114-\t\tif (!pa_pdc_cell)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c=149=unwind_table_add(const char *name, unsigned long base_addr, \n--\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c-159-\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c:160:\ttable = kmalloc_obj(struct unwind_table, GFP_USER);\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c-161-\tif (table == NULL)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c=406=void unwind_frame_init_from_blocked_task(struct unwind_frame_info *info, struct task_struct *t)\n--\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c-410-\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c:411:\tr2 = kmalloc_obj(struct pt_regs, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/parisc/kernel/unwind.c-412-\tif (!r2)\n--\narch/powerpc/kernel/nvram_64.c=984=int __init nvram_scan_partitions(void)\n--\narch/powerpc/kernel/nvram_64.c-1032-\t\t}\narch/powerpc/kernel/nvram_64.c:1033:\t\ttmp_part = kmalloc_obj(*tmp_part);\narch/powerpc/kernel/nvram_64.c-1034-\t\terr = -ENOMEM;\n--\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c=731=int kvm_vcpu_ioctl_config_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,\n--\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c-774-\t\t    cfg-\u003earray / PAGE_SIZE;\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c:775:\tpages = kmalloc_objs(*pages, num_pages);\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c-776-\tif (!pages)\n--\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c=898=int kvmppc_e500_tlb_init(struct kvmppc_vcpu_e500 *vcpu_e500)\n--\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c-914-\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c:915:\tvcpu_e500-\u003egtlb_arch = kmalloc_objs(*vcpu_e500-\u003egtlb_arch,\narch/powerpc/kvm/e500_mmu.c-916-\t\t\t\t\t    KVM_E500_TLB0_SIZE + KVM_E500_TLB1_SIZE);\n--\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c=45=static int grow(rh_info_t * info, int max_blocks)\n--\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c-56-\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c:57:\tblock = kmalloc_objs(rh_block_t, max_blocks, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c-58-\tif (block == NULL)\n--\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c=253=rh_info_t *rh_create(unsigned int alignment)\n--\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c-260-\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c:261:\tinfo = kmalloc_obj(*info, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/powerpc/lib/rheap.c-262-\tif (info == NULL)\n--\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c=95=static int hash__init_new_context(struct mm_struct *mm)\n--\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c-98-\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c:99:\tmm-\u003econtext.hash_context = kmalloc_obj(struct hash_mm_context);\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c-100-\tif (!mm-\u003econtext.hash_context)\n--\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c-125-\t\tif (current-\u003emm-\u003econtext.hash_context-\u003espt) {\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c:126:\t\t\tmm-\u003econtext.hash_context-\u003espt = kmalloc_obj(struct subpage_prot_table);\narch/powerpc/mm/book3s64/mmu_context.c-127-\t\t\tif (!mm-\u003econtext.hash_context-\u003espt) {\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c=623=static int event_uniq_add(struct rb_root *root, const char *name, int nl,\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-650-\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c:651:\tdata = kmalloc_obj(*data);\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-652-\tif (!data)\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c=755=static int create_events_from_catalog(struct attribute ***events_,\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-908-\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c:909:\tevents = kmalloc_objs(*events, attr_max + 1);\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-910-\tif (!events) {\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-914-\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c:915:\tevent_descs = kmalloc_objs(*event_descs, event_idx + 1);\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-916-\tif (!event_descs) {\n--\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-920-\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c:921:\tevent_long_descs = kmalloc_objs(*event_long_descs, event_idx + 1);\narch/powerpc/perf/hv-24x7.c-922-\tif (!event_long_descs) {\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/44x/hsta_msi.c=122=static int hsta_msi_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/44x/hsta_msi.c-153-\narch/powerpc/platforms/44x/hsta_msi.c:154:\tppc4xx_hsta_msi.irq_map = kmalloc_objs(int, irq_count);\narch/powerpc/platforms/44x/hsta_msi.c-155-\tif (!ppc4xx_hsta_msi.irq_map) {\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c=44=static int spufs_attr_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file,\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-49-\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:50:\tattr = kmalloc_obj(*attr);\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-51-\tif (!attr)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c=628=void queue_hotplug_event(struct pseries_hp_errorlog *hp_errlog)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c-636-\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c:637:\twork = kmalloc_obj(struct pseries_hp_work, GFP_ATOMIC);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/dlpar.c-638-\tif (work) {\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hvcserver.c=119=int hvcs_get_partner_info(uint32_t unit_address, struct list_head *head,\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hvcserver.c-162-\t\t * hvcs_free_partner_info(). */\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hvcserver.c:163:\t\tnext_partner_info = kmalloc_obj(struct hvcs_partner_info,\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/hvcserver.c-164-\t\t\t\t\t\tGFP_ATOMIC);\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lparcfg.c=144=static void show_gpci_data(struct seq_file *m)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lparcfg.c-149-\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lparcfg.c:150:\tbuf = kmalloc_obj(*buf);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/lparcfg.c-151-\tif (buf == NULL)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c=435=static int pseries_msi_ops_prepare(struct irq_domain *domain, struct device *dev,\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c-443-\tstruct pseries_msi_device *pseries_dev __free(kfree)\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c:444:\t\t= kmalloc_obj(*pseries_dev);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/msi.c-445-\tif (!pseries_dev)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pci.c=120=static int pseries_pci_sriov_enable(struct pci_dev *pdev, u16 num_vfs)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pci.c-143-\tpdn = pci_get_pdn(pdev);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pci.c:144:\tpdn-\u003epe_num_map = kmalloc_objs(*pdn-\u003epe_num_map, num_vfs);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/pci.c-145-\tif (!pdn-\u003epe_num_map)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vas.c=1076=static int __init pseries_vas_init(void)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vas.c-1089-\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vas.c:1090:\thv_caps = kmalloc_obj(*hv_caps);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vas.c-1091-\tif (!hv_caps)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c=705=static int vio_cmo_bus_probe(struct vio_dev *viodev)\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c-747-\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c:748:\t\tdev_ent = kmalloc_obj(struct vio_cmo_dev_entry);\narch/powerpc/platforms/pseries/vio.c-749-\t\tif (!dev_ent)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_lbc.c=352=static int fsl_lbc_syscore_suspend(void *data)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_lbc.c-364-\narch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_lbc.c:365:\tctrl-\u003esaved_regs = kmalloc_obj(struct fsl_lbc_regs);\narch/powerpc/sysdev/fsl_lbc.c-366-\tif (!ctrl-\u003esaved_regs)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic.c=1549=void __init mpic_init(struct mpic *mpic)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic.c-1641-\t/* allocate memory to save mpic state */\narch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic.c:1642:\tmpic-\u003esave_data = kmalloc_objs(*mpic-\u003esave_data, mpic-\u003enum_sources);\narch/powerpc/sysdev/mpic.c-1643-\tBUG_ON(mpic-\u003esave_data == NULL);\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/of_rtc.c=23=void __init of_instantiate_rtc(void)\n--\narch/powerpc/sysdev/of_rtc.c-35-\narch/powerpc/sysdev/of_rtc.c:36:\t\t\tres = kmalloc_obj(*res);\narch/powerpc/sysdev/of_rtc.c-37-\t\t\tif (!res) {\n--\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c=654=static int add_relocation_to_accumulate(struct module *me, int type,\n--\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-665-\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c:666:\tentry = kmalloc_obj(*entry);\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-667-\n--\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-699-\tif (!found) {\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c:700:\t\trel_head = kmalloc_obj(*rel_head);\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-701-\n--\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c-711-\t\t\tbucket =\narch/riscv/kernel/module.c:712:\t\t\t\tkmalloc_obj(struct used_bucket);\n\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 15324
							output: 23
							thoughts: 1698
						

**Analyzing the Patch: Memory Allocation and Security Implications**

Okay, so this patch is introducing `kmalloc_obj`, which seems to be a macro shorthand for allocating memory for an object using `kmalloc`. It looks like it's meant to replace `kmalloc(sizeof(struct foo), GFP_KERNEL)`.  My immediate question is whether this new macro zeroes the allocated memory.  Since plain `kmalloc` doesn't, I need to confirm that `kmalloc_obj` *doesn't* zero it either.  My quick check of the documentation confirms that assumption. This means any uninitialized memory within the object could potentially leak information if not handled carefully.

Now, let's look at how it's being used. The patch allocates a `struct mem_private`.  I see the allocation itself, `struct mem_private *priv __free(kfree) = kmalloc_obj(struct mem_private);`, and then the important thing is how that memory is *used*. The fields `mm` and `introspection` are explicitly initialized, which is good.

Let's examine the structure itself: `struct mm_struct *mm;` is an 8-byte pointer, and `bool introspection;` is 1 byte, so there are 7 bytes of padding. My concern here is uninitialized memory. Is there any risk of uninitialized memory being exposed?

I checked where `struct mem_private` is used. It's stored in `file->private_data`. It's accessed in `proc_mem_foll_force`, `mem_rw`, and `mem_release_with_private`.  Crucially, it is not *copied* to user space in any of these functions. Therefore, the uninitialized padding bytes are not a security issue since they are not being read or leaked to the user. The fields `mm` and `introspection` are being fully initialized, and that is sufficient.

Okay, let's broaden my view to other changes in this patch. I see new LSM hooks being introduced.  The addition of `introspect_mem_foll_force` hook is the critical new addition. I'm noting the new `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` and the `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force` functions.

My interest now turns to how these hooks are being implemented. The SELinux implementation uses `avc_has_perm_noaudit`. The code calls it with an `&avd` argument, indicating it's a pointer to an `av_decision` structure. I need to make sure that `avd` is properly initialized before being passed to `avc_has_perm_noaudit`, and look into the signatures and the implementation.

{
  "Expression": "avc_has_perm_noaudit"
}

{
  "Output": "security/selinux/avc.c=954=int avc_ss_reset(u32 seqno)\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-982- *\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c:983: * Slow-path helper function for avc_has_perm_noaudit, when the avc_node lookup\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-984- * fails.  Don't inline this, since it's the slow-path and just results in a\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c=1019=int avc_has_extended_perms(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1105- *\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c:1106: * This is the \"we have no node\" part of avc_has_perm_noaudit(), which is\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1107- * unlikely and needs extra stack space for the new node that we generate, so\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c=1110=static noinline int avc_perm_nonode(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1125-/**\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c:1126: * avc_has_perm_noaudit - Check permissions but perform no auditing.\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1127- * @ssid: source security identifier\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1144- */\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c:1145:inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1146-\t\t\t\tu16 tclass, u32 requested,\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c=1189=int avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1194-\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c:1195:\trc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0,\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1196-\t\t\t\t  \u0026avd);\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c=1641=static int cred_has_capability(const struct cred *cred,\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-1665-\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c:1666:\trc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, sclass, av, 0, \u0026avd);\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-1667-\tif (!(opts \u0026 CAP_OPT_NOAUDIT)) {\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c=2171=static int selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force(const struct cred *subject)\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2177-\t/* Allow if the process is generally allowed to have executable anonymous memory. */\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c:2178:\trc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__EXECMEM, 0, \u0026avd);\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2179-\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2181-\tif (rc)\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c:2182:\t\trc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, sid, SECCLASS_PROCESS, PROCESS__PTRACE, 0, \u0026avd);\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-2183-\treturn rc;\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c=3269=static int selinux_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int requested)\n--\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-3305-\t\t/* Cache miss. */\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c:3306:\t\trc = avc_has_perm_noaudit(sid, isec-\u003esid, isec-\u003esclass,\nsecurity/selinux/hooks.c-3307-\t\t\t\t\t  perms, 0, avdp);\n--\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h=101=int slow_avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested, u32 audited,\n--\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h-110- * @avd: access vector decisions\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h:111: * @result: result from avc_has_perm_noaudit\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h-112- * @a:  auxiliary audit data\n--\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h-116- * avc_has_perm() after a permission check, but can also be\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h:117: * called directly by callers who use avc_has_perm_noaudit()\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h-118- * in order to separate the permission check from the auditing.\n--\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h=123=static inline int avc_audit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,\n--\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h-136-#define AVC_EXTENDED_PERMS 2 /* update extended permissions */\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h:137:int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass, u32 requested,\nsecurity/selinux/include/avc.h-138-\t\t\t unsigned int flags, struct av_decision *avd);\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 19168
							output: 25
							thoughts: 44
						

Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, framed from a hypothetical expert's perspective:

**Investigating `avc_has_perm_noaudit`'s Interaction with `avd`**

Right, let's dive into the guts of the SELinux access vector cache (AVC) implementation. I need to quickly ascertain how `avc_has_perm_noaudit` in `security/selinux/avc.c` actually *uses* the `avd` structure. Is this function just updating it, effectively writing information? Or is it actually reading data from the `avd` to perform some kind of check or decision-making process? Understanding this interaction is crucial for tracing data flows and performance implications within the AVC. The implications of this are important from a security perspective too! Understanding where the data goes, and where it comes from is paramount to finding any potential vulnerabilities. This should be a fairly straightforward scan, but precision is key.

{
  "Expression": "inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit"
}

{
  "Output": "security/selinux/avc.c=1110=static noinline int avc_perm_nonode(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,\n--\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1144- */\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c:1145:inline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,\nsecurity/selinux/avc.c-1146-\t\t\t\tu16 tclass, u32 requested,\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 19588
							output: 39
							thoughts: 24
						

Here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, tailored for an expert audience:

**Diving into AVC.c**

Okay, time to dig in. I'm thinking I should start by looking at `security/selinux/avc.c`, specifically around line 1145. I've got a hunch about something related to access vector cache (AVC) handling, maybe a race condition or a potential performance bottleneck. This particular section has historically been prone to subtle issues, and the symptoms I'm chasing are leading me in this direction. I need to refresh my memory on the data structures and control flow around the AVC cache lookup and invalidation. Time to analyze the code. I'll focus on what's going on there. Hopefully, this will lead me to the root cause.

{
  "File": "security/selinux/avc.c",
  "FirstLine": 1140,
  "LineCount": 50
}

{
  "Contents": "1140:\t * other errors.  This function is typically called by avc_has_perm(),\n1141:\t * but may also be called directly to separate permission checking from\n1142:\t * auditing, e.g. in cases where a lock must be held for the check but\n1143:\t * should be released for the auditing.\n1144:\t */\n1145:\tinline int avc_has_perm_noaudit(u32 ssid, u32 tsid,\n1146:\t\t\t\t\tu16 tclass, u32 requested,\n1147:\t\t\t\t\tunsigned int flags,\n1148:\t\t\t\t\tstruct av_decision *avd)\n1149:\t{\n1150:\t\tu32 denied;\n1151:\t\tstruct avc_node *node;\n1152:\t\n1153:\t\tif (WARN_ON(!requested))\n1154:\t\t\treturn -EACCES;\n1155:\t\n1156:\t\trcu_read_lock();\n1157:\t\tnode = avc_lookup(ssid, tsid, tclass);\n1158:\t\tif (unlikely(!node)) {\n1159:\t\t\trcu_read_unlock();\n1160:\t\t\treturn avc_perm_nonode(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested,\n1161:\t\t\t\t\t       flags, avd);\n1162:\t\t}\n1163:\t\tdenied = requested \u0026 ~node-\u003eae.avd.allowed;\n1164:\t\tmemcpy(avd, \u0026node-\u003eae.avd, sizeof(*avd));\n1165:\t\trcu_read_unlock();\n1166:\t\n1167:\t\tif (unlikely(denied))\n1168:\t\t\treturn avc_denied(ssid, tsid, tclass, requested, 0, 0, 0,\n1169:\t\t\t\t\t  flags, avd);\n1170:\t\treturn 0;\n1171:\t}\n1172:\t\n1173:\t/**\n1174:\t * avc_has_perm - Check permissions and perform any appropriate auditing.\n1175:\t * @ssid: source security identifier\n1176:\t * @tsid: target security identifier\n1177:\t * @tclass: target security class\n1178:\t * @requested: requested permissions, interpreted based on @tclass\n1179:\t * @auditdata: auxiliary audit data\n1180:\t *\n1181:\t * Check the AVC to determine whether the @requested permissions are granted\n1182:\t * for the SID pair (@ssid, @tsid), interpreting the permissions\n1183:\t * based on @tclass, and call the security server on a cache miss to obtain\n1184:\t * a new decision and add it to the cache.  Audit the granting or denial of\n1185:\t * permissions in accordance with the policy.  Return %0 if all @requested\n1186:\t * permissions are granted, -%EACCES if any permissions are denied, or\n1187:\t * another -errno upon other errors.\n1188:\t */\n1189:\tint avc_has_perm(u32 ssid, u32 tsid, u16 tclass,\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 20657
							output: 17
							thoughts: 1476
						

**Analysis of Potential Uninitialized Memory Use in SELinux/Proc Filesystem Code**

Okay, let's break this down. First, the initial concern was about potential uninitialized memory in `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`. My quick scan showed `avc_has_perm_noaudit` populating an `av_decision` struct, which is an output parameter, so that's perfectly fine. We're good there.

Now, that `kmalloc_obj` macro, that's what caught my attention. It's not a standard kernel macro but appears to be a recent addition to replace `kmalloc(sizeof(...))`. Right, so it *allocates* but doesn't *zero* memory, which means there could be some issues. If we use it on a struct that is passed to userspace, or its fields are used in conditional statements, we need to be careful.

Specifically, the code uses `kmalloc_obj(struct mem_private)`. Let's look at `struct mem_private`... It contains a `struct mm_struct *mm` and a `bool introspection`. Okay, if we check the code for `mem_open`, they're both initialized: `priv->mm = proc_mem_open(inode, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)` and `priv->introspection = priv->mm == current->mm`. However, there is padding. `struct mem_private` is 16 bytes on 64-bit, with 8 bytes for `mm`, 1 byte for `introspection`, and 7 bytes of padding. The padding is never read. And the struct isn't copied to userspace. Also, it isn't used in any conditional logic except the field `priv->introspection`.

But what if `proc_mem_open` returns an error? Okay, right, in that case, the function bails out before `priv->introspection` is initialized, but the struct is freed. So, no memory is accessed.

Let's trace its use. The `mem_release_with_private` looks safe; it dereferences the members and then `kfree`s the struct. I need to make sure everything using `file->private_data` is accounted for.

Checking other uses of `file->private_data`, in `proc_mem_foll_force`, the `introspection` field is properly initialized. Also, `mem_rw` is safe, as its struct uses the initialized fields.

Are there any other functions in `fs/proc/base.c` that use the `proc_mem_operations` structure? I quickly looked at the `proc_mem_operations` to check all the other file operations. Okay, so `mem_lseek` doesn't use `file->private_data`. `mem_read` and `mem_write` calls `mem_rw`, which uses `file->private_data`, as we have seen, so they're safe.

I also checked other related things like `environ_read`, but it uses a different operation structure. The `mem_release` is still there, for other things, but uses a different `private_data`. Now, I'm comfortable that I've accounted for every place that uses the `file->private_data`, and there is no uninitialized memory usage. Good, we're solid.

{
  "Expression": "mem_release"
}

{
  "Output": "\nFull output is too long, showing 500 out of 1388 lines.\nUse more precise expression if possible.\n\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c=170=static int\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:171:spufs_mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-172-{\n--\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c=303=static const struct file_operations spufs_mem_fops = {\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-304-\t.open\t\t\t= spufs_mem_open,\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c:305:\t.release\t\t= spufs_mem_release,\narch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c-306-\t.read\t\t\t= spufs_mem_read,\n--\ndrivers/accel/habanalabs/common/command_buffer.c=160=struct hl_cb_mmap_mem_alloc_args {\n--\ndrivers/accel/habanalabs/common/command_buffer.c-167-\ndrivers/accel/habanalabs/common/command_buffer.c:168:static void hl_cb_mmap_mem_release(struct hl_mmap_mem_buf *buf)\ndrivers/accel/habanalabs/common/command_buffer.c-169-{\n--\ndrivers/accel/habanalabs/common/command_buffer.c=258=static struct hl_mmap_mem_buf_behavior cb_behavior = {\n--\ndrivers/accel/habanalabs/common/command_buffer.c-261-\t.alloc = hl_cb_mmap_mem_alloc,\ndrivers/accel/habanalabs/common/command_buffer.c:262:\t.release = hl_cb_mmap_mem_release,\ndrivers/accel/habanalabs/common/command_buffer.c-263-\t.mmap = hl_cb_mmap,\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c=369=static int fifo_init(struct xillyfifo *fifo,\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-432-\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c:433:static void fifo_mem_release(struct xillyfifo *fifo)\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-434-{\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c=467=static void endpoint_dealloc(struct xillyusb_endpoint *ep)\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-470-\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c:471:\tfifo_mem_release(\u0026ep-\u003efifo);\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-472-\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c=1236=static int xillyusb_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-1396-\tsafely_assign_in_fifo(chan, NULL);\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c:1397:\tfifo_mem_release(in_fifo);\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-1398-\tkfree(in_fifo);\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c=1706=static int xillyusb_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *filp)\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-1734-\t\tsafely_assign_in_fifo(chan, NULL);\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c:1735:\t\tfifo_mem_release(in_fifo);\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-1736-\t\tkfree(in_fifo);\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c=2001=static int xillyusb_discovery(struct usb_interface *interface)\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-2121-\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c:2122:\tfifo_mem_release(\u0026idt_fifo);\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-2123-\tkfree(chan);\n--\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-2140-\tsafely_assign_in_fifo(chan, NULL);\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c:2141:\tfifo_mem_release(\u0026idt_fifo);\ndrivers/char/xillybus/xillyusb.c-2142-\n--\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c=652=static int alloc_hpa(struct cxl_region *cxlr, resource_size_t size)\n--\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c-697-\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c:698:static void cxl_region_iomem_release(struct cxl_region *cxlr)\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c-699-{\n--\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c=716=static int free_hpa(struct cxl_region *cxlr)\n--\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c-729-\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c:730:\tcxl_region_iomem_release(cxlr);\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c-731-\tp-\u003estate = CXL_CONFIG_IDLE;\n--\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c=2562=static void unregister_region(struct cxl_region *cxlr)\n--\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c-2580-\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c:2581:\tcxl_region_iomem_release(cxlr);\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c-2582-\tput_device(\u0026cxlr-\u003edev);\n--\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c=3675=static int __construct_region(struct cxl_region *cxlr,\n--\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c-3726-\t\t * Platform-firmware may not have split resources like \"System\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c:3727:\t\t * RAM\" on CXL window boundaries see cxl_region_iomem_release()\ndrivers/cxl/core/region.c-3728-\t\t */\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c=159=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(drm_gem_shmem_create);\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-161-/**\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:162: * __drm_gem_shmem_release_sgt_locked - Unpin and DMA unmap pages, and release the\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-163- * cached scatter/gather table for an shmem GEM object.\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c=183=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(__drm_gem_shmem_free_sgt_locked);\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-185-/**\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:186: * drm_gem_shmem_release - Release resources associated with a shmem GEM object.\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-187- * @shmem: shmem GEM object\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-191- */\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:192:void drm_gem_shmem_release(struct drm_gem_shmem_object *shmem)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-193-{\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-215-}\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:216:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(drm_gem_shmem_release);\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-217-\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c=225=void drm_gem_shmem_free(struct drm_gem_shmem_object *shmem)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-226-{\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c:227:\tdrm_gem_shmem_release(shmem);\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_gem_shmem_helper.c-228-\tkfree(shmem);\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c=128=static void drm_pagemap_zdd_destroy(struct kref *ref)\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c-136-\t\tcomplete_all(\u0026devmem-\u003edetached);\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c:137:\t\tif (devmem-\u003eops-\u003edevmem_release)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c:138:\t\t\tdevmem-\u003eops-\u003edevmem_release(devmem);\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c-139-\t}\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c=616=int drm_pagemap_migrate_to_devmem(struct drm_pagemap_devmem *devmem_allocation,\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c-841-err_out:\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c:842:\tdevmem_allocation-\u003eops-\u003edevmem_release(devmem_allocation);\ndrivers/gpu/drm/drm_pagemap.c-843-\treturn err;\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gem.c=466=void etnaviv_gem_describe_objects(struct etnaviv_drm_private *priv,\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gem.c-487-\ndrivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gem.c:488:static void etnaviv_gem_shmem_release(struct etnaviv_gem_object *etnaviv_obj)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gem.c-489-{\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gem.c=494=static const struct etnaviv_gem_ops etnaviv_gem_shmem_ops = {\ndrivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gem.c-495-\t.get_pages = etnaviv_gem_shmem_get_pages,\ndrivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gem.c:496:\t.release = etnaviv_gem_shmem_release,\ndrivers/gpu/drm/etnaviv/etnaviv_gem.c-497-\t.vmap = etnaviv_gem_vmap_impl,\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c=471=shmem_pread(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj,\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c-479-\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c:480:static void shmem_release(struct drm_i915_gem_object *obj)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c-481-{\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c=488=const struct drm_i915_gem_object_ops i915_gem_shmem_ops = {\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c-499-\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c:500:\t.release = shmem_release,\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gem/i915_gem_shmem.c-501-};\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_region_lmem.c=116=static int\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_region_lmem.c:117:region_lmem_release(struct intel_memory_region *mem)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_region_lmem.c-118-{\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_region_lmem.c=149=static const struct intel_memory_region_ops intel_region_lmem_ops = {\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_region_lmem.c-150-\t.init = region_lmem_init,\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_region_lmem.c:151:\t.release = region_lmem_release,\ndrivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_region_lmem.c-152-\t.init_object = __i915_gem_ttm_object_init,\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c=1544=vc4_dsi_init_phy_clocks(struct vc4_dsi *dsi)\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c-1606-\ndrivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c:1607:static void vc4_dsi_dma_mem_release(void *ptr)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c-1608-{\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c=1631=static int vc4_dsi_bind(struct device *dev, struct device *master, void *data)\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c-1678-\ndrivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c:1679:\t\tret = devm_add_action_or_reset(dev, vc4_dsi_dma_mem_release, dsi);\ndrivers/gpu/drm/vc4/vc4_dsi.c-1680-\t\tif (ret)\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c=756=static struct xe_bo *to_xe_bo(struct drm_pagemap_devmem *devmem_allocation)\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c-760-\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c:761:static void xe_svm_devmem_release(struct drm_pagemap_devmem *devmem_allocation)\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c-762-{\n--\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c=806=static const struct drm_pagemap_devmem_ops dpagemap_devmem_ops = {\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c:807:\t.devmem_release = xe_svm_devmem_release,\ndrivers/gpu/drm/xe/xe_svm.c-808-\t.populate_devmem_pfn = xe_svm_populate_devmem_pfn,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-49-\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:50:static void __ib_umem_release(struct ib_device *dev, struct ib_umem *umem, int dirty)\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-51-{\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c=162=static struct ib_umem *__ib_umem_get_va(struct ib_device *device,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-246-\t\t\tret = pinned;\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:247:\t\t\tgoto umem_release;\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-248-\t\t}\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-257-\t\t\tunpin_user_pages_dirty_lock(page_list, pinned, 0);\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:258:\t\t\tgoto umem_release;\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-259-\t\t}\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-264-\tif (ret)\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:265:\t\tgoto umem_release;\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-266-\tgoto out;\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-267-\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:268:umem_release:\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:269:\t__ib_umem_release(device, umem, 0);\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-270-\tatomic64_sub(ib_umem_num_pages(umem), \u0026mm-\u003epinned_vm);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c=376=ib_umem_get_desc_check(struct ib_device *device,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-385-\tif (umem-\u003elength \u003c min_size) {\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:386:\t\tib_umem_release(umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-387-\t\treturn ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c=612=EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_get_cq_buf_or_va);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-614-/**\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:615: * ib_umem_release - release pinned memory\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-616- * @umem: umem struct to release\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-617- */\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:618:void ib_umem_release(struct ib_umem *umem)\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-619-{\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-626-\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:627:\t__ib_umem_release(umem-\u003eibdev, umem, 1);\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-628-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-632-}\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c:633:EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_release);\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem.c-634-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c=214=ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_and_lock(struct ib_device *device,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c-242-\tdma_resv_unlock(umem_dmabuf-\u003eattach-\u003edmabuf-\u003eresv);\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c:243:\tib_umem_release(\u0026umem_dmabuf-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c-244-\treturn ERR_PTR(err);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c=263=EXPORT_SYMBOL(ib_umem_dmabuf_get_pinned_with_dma_device);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c-287- * If successful, then the revoke callback may be called at any time and will\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c:288: * also be called automatically upon ib_umem_release (serialized). The revoke\ndrivers/infiniband/core/umem_dmabuf.c-289- * callback will be called one time at most.\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=1001=static void bnxt_re_qp_free_umem(struct bnxt_re_qp *qp)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-1002-{\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:1003:\tib_umem_release(qp-\u003erumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:1004:\tib_umem_release(qp-\u003esumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-1005-}\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=1197=static int bnxt_re_init_user_qp(struct bnxt_re_dev *rdev, struct bnxt_re_pd *pd,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-1255-rqfail:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:1256:\tib_umem_release(qp-\u003erumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-1257-\tqp-\u003erumem = NULL;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-1259-fail:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:1260:\tib_umem_release(qp-\u003esumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-1261-\tqp-\u003esumem = NULL;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=2143=int bnxt_re_destroy_srq(struct ib_srq *ib_srq, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-2159-\t\tfree_page((unsigned long)srq-\u003euctx_srq_page);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:2160:\tib_umem_release(srq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-2161-\tatomic_dec(\u0026rdev-\u003estats.res.srq_count);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=2199=int bnxt_re_create_srq(struct ib_srq *ib_srq,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-2288-fail:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:2289:\tib_umem_release(srq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-2290-exit:\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=3461=int bnxt_re_destroy_cq(struct ib_cq *ib_cq, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-3487-\tkfree(cq-\u003ecql);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:3488:\tib_umem_release(cq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-3489-\treturn ib_respond_empty_udata(udata);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=3492=int bnxt_re_create_user_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, const struct ib_cq_init_attr *attr,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-3580-free_umem:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:3581:\tib_umem_release(cq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-3582-\treturn rc;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=3637=static void bnxt_re_resize_cq_complete(struct bnxt_re_cq *cq)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-3644-\tif (cq-\u003eresize_umem) {\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:3645:\t\tib_umem_release(cq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-3646-\t\tcq-\u003eumem = cq-\u003eresize_umem;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=3652=int bnxt_re_resize_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, unsigned int cqe,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-3723-\tif (cq-\u003eresize_umem) {\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:3724:\t\tib_umem_release(cq-\u003eresize_umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-3725-\t\tcq-\u003eresize_umem = NULL;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=4446=int bnxt_re_dereg_mr(struct ib_mr *ib_mr, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-4468-\t}\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:4469:\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eib_umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-4470-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=4688=struct ib_mr *bnxt_re_reg_user_mr(struct ib_pd *ib_pd, u64 start, u64 length,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-4711-\tif (IS_ERR(ib_mr))\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:4712:\t\tib_umem_release(umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-4713-\treturn ib_mr;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c=4716=struct ib_mr *bnxt_re_reg_user_mr_dmabuf(struct ib_pd *ib_pd, u64 start,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-4739-\tif (IS_ERR(ib_mr))\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c:4740:\t\tib_umem_release(umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/bnxt_re/ib_verbs.c-4741-\treturn ib_mr;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c=491=struct ib_mr *c4iw_reg_user_mr(struct ib_pd *pd, u64 start, u64 length,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c-541-\tif (err)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c:542:\t\tgoto err_umem_release;\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c-543-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c-590-\t\t\t      mhp-\u003eattr.pbl_size \u003c\u003c 3);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c:591:err_umem_release:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c:592:\tib_umem_release(mhp-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c-593-err_free_skb:\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c=704=int c4iw_dereg_mr(struct ib_mr *ib_mr, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c-725-\t\tkfree((void *) (unsigned long) mhp-\u003ekva);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c:726:\tib_umem_release(mhp-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/cxgb4/mem.c-727-\tpr_debug(\"mmid 0x%x ptr %p\\n\", mmid, mhp);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c=1055=int efa_destroy_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1073-\t\tefa_free_mapped(dev, cq-\u003ecpu_addr, cq-\u003edma_addr, cq-\u003esize, DMA_FROM_DEVICE);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c:1074:\tib_umem_release(cq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1075-\treturn 0;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c=1113=int efa_create_user_cq(struct ib_cq *ibcq, const struct ib_cq_init_attr *attr,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1265-err_release_umem:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c:1266:\tib_umem_release(cq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1267-err_out:\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c=1710=struct ib_mr *efa_reg_user_mr_dmabuf(struct ib_pd *ibpd, u64 start,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1748-err_release:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c:1749:\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1750-err_free:\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c=1757=struct ib_mr *efa_reg_mr(struct ib_pd *ibpd, u64 start, u64 length,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1792-err_release:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c:1793:\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1794-err_free:\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c=1834=int efa_dereg_mr(struct ib_mr *ibmr, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1847-\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c:1848:\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/efa/efa_verbs.c-1849-\tkfree(mr);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c=831=static int get_mtt_entries(struct erdma_dev *dev, struct erdma_mem *mem,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c-862-\tif (mem-\u003eumem) {\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c:863:\t\tib_umem_release(mem-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c-864-\t\tmem-\u003eumem = NULL;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c=870=static void put_mtt_entries(struct erdma_dev *dev, struct erdma_mem *mem)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c-875-\tif (mem-\u003eumem) {\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c:876:\t\tib_umem_release(mem-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c-877-\t\tmem-\u003eumem = NULL;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c=926=erdma_unmap_user_dbrecords(struct erdma_ucontext *ctx,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c-934-\t\tlist_del(\u0026(*dbr_page)-\u003elist);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c:935:\t\tib_umem_release((*dbr_page)-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/erdma/erdma_verbs.c-936-\t\tkfree(*dbr_page);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_db.c=55=void hns_roce_db_unmap_user(struct hns_roce_ucontext *context,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_db.c-62-\t\tlist_del(\u0026db-\u003eu.user_page-\u003elist);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_db.c:63:\t\tib_umem_release(db-\u003eu.user_page-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_db.c-64-\t\tkfree(db-\u003eu.user_page);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_mr.c=572=static void mtr_free_bufs(struct hns_roce_dev *hr_dev, struct hns_roce_mtr *mtr)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_mr.c-575-\tif (mtr-\u003eumem) {\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_mr.c:576:\t\tib_umem_release(mtr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/hns/hns_roce_mr.c-577-\t\tmtr-\u003eumem = NULL;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=76=int ionic_create_cq_common(struct ionic_vcq *vcq,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-164-\tif (cq-\u003eumem)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:165:\t\tib_umem_release(cq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-166-err_qdesc:\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=174=void ionic_destroy_cq_common(struct ionic_ibdev *dev, struct ionic_cq *cq)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-184-\tif (cq-\u003eumem)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:185:\t\tib_umem_release(cq-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-186-\telse\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=870=struct ib_mr *ionic_reg_user_mr(struct ib_pd *ibpd, u64 start, u64 length,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-926-err_pgtbl:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:927:\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-928-err_umem:\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=935=struct ib_mr *ionic_reg_user_mr_dmabuf(struct ib_pd *ibpd, u64 offset,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-996-err_pgtbl:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:997:\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-998-err_umem:\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=1005=int ionic_dereg_mr(struct ib_mr *ibmr, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-1022-\tif (mr-\u003eumem)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:1023:\t\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-1024-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=1780=static int ionic_qp_sq_init(struct ionic_ibdev *dev, struct ionic_ctx *ctx,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-1908-\tif (qp-\u003esq_umem)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:1909:\t\tib_umem_release(qp-\u003esq_umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-1910-\telse\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=1915=static void ionic_qp_sq_destroy(struct ionic_ibdev *dev,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-1927-\tif (qp-\u003esq_umem)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:1928:\t\tib_umem_release(qp-\u003esq_umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-1929-\telse\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=2006=static int ionic_qp_rq_init(struct ionic_ibdev *dev, struct ionic_ctx *ctx,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-2116-\tif (qp-\u003erq_umem)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:2117:\t\tib_umem_release(qp-\u003erq_umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-2118-\telse\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c=2123=static void ionic_qp_rq_destroy(struct ionic_ibdev *dev,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-2134-\tif (qp-\u003erq_umem)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c:2135:\t\tib_umem_release(qp-\u003erq_umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/ionic/ionic_controlpath.c-2136-\telse\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c=3506=static struct ib_mr *irdma_reg_user_mr(struct ib_pd *pd, u64 start, u64 len,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3535-\tif (ib_copy_from_udata(\u0026req, udata, min(sizeof(req), udata-\u003einlen))) {\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c:3536:\t\tib_umem_release(region);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3537-\t\treturn ERR_PTR(-EFAULT);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3541-\tif (IS_ERR(iwmr)) {\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c:3542:\t\tib_umem_release(region);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3543-\t\treturn (struct ib_mr *)iwmr;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3576-error:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c:3577:\tib_umem_release(region);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3578-\tirdma_free_iwmr(iwmr);\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c=3613=static struct ib_mr *irdma_reg_user_mr_dmabuf(struct ib_pd *pd, u64 start,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3662-\t */\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c:3663:\tib_umem_release(\u0026umem_dmabuf-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3664-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c=3720=static int irdma_rereg_mr_trans(struct irdma_mr *iwmr, u64 start, u64 len,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3754-err:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c:3755:\tib_umem_release(region);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3756-\tiwmr-\u003eregion = NULL;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c=3775=static struct ib_mr *irdma_rereg_user_mr(struct ib_mr *ib_mr, int flags,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3842-\t\tif (iwmr-\u003eregion) {\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c:3843:\t\t\tib_umem_release(iwmr-\u003eregion);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-3844-\t\t\tiwmr-\u003eregion = NULL;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c=3974=static int irdma_dereg_mr(struct ib_mr *ib_mr, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-4002-\tif (iwmr-\u003eregion)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c:4003:\t\t/* For dmabuf MRs, ib_umem_release will trigger a synchronous\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-4004-\t\t * call to the revoke callback which will perform the actual HW\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-4008-\t\t */\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c:4009:\t\tib_umem_release(iwmr-\u003eregion);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/irdma/verbs.c-4010-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/main.c=255=int mana_ib_create_queue(struct mana_ib_dev *mdev, u64 addr, u32 size,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/main.c-281-free_umem:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/main.c:282:\tib_umem_release(umem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/main.c-283-\treturn err;\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/main.c=286=void mana_ib_destroy_queue(struct mana_ib_dev *mdev, struct mana_ib_queue *queue)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/main.c-291-\tmana_ib_gd_destroy_dma_region(mdev, queue-\u003egdma_region);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/main.c:292:\tib_umem_release(queue-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/main.c-293-\tif (queue-\u003ekmem)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c=100=struct ib_mr *mana_ib_reg_user_mr(struct ib_pd *ibpd, u64 start, u64 length,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c-179-err_umem:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c:180:\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c-181-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c=187=struct ib_mr *mana_ib_reg_user_mr_dmabuf(struct ib_pd *ibpd, u64 start, u64 length,\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c-253-err_umem:\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c:254:\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c-255-\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c=342=int mana_ib_dereg_mr(struct ib_mr *ibmr, struct ib_udata *udata)\n--\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c-355-\tif (mr-\u003eumem)\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c:356:\t\tib_umem_release(mr-\u003eumem);\ndrivers/infiniband/hw/mana/mr.c-357-\n\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 35272
							output: 30
							thoughts: 461
						

**Analyzing the `mem_release` Function**

Okay, so I see `mem_release` being used, or at least *referenced*, in `arch/powerpc/platforms/cell/spufs/file.c`, but that's a specific implementation, `spufs_mem_release`. My immediate concern is the general one in `fs/proc/base.c`. I recall that the `mem_release` function in that file is declared as `static`. I need to ensure it's not simply unused within the file now. I'll check its usage within `fs/proc/base.c`.

Aha! Looking at the code snippet, it looks like `mem_release` *is* still present, at least in the original form, but it's been updated. The patch shows that it's actually been replaced in `proc_mem_operations`. The `release` field in `proc_mem_operations` used to point to `mem_release`, but now it points to `mem_release_with_private`. The original `mem_release` is still there, just not used in that context any longer. That means I need to double-check that this is safe within the file, and that any code relying on that function is updated to use the new function.

I should also make sure it's not being called elsewhere in `fs/proc/base.c` using the old function name.

{
  "Expression": "mem_release",
  "PathPrefix": "fs/proc/base.c"
}

{
  "Output": "fs/proc/base.c=969=loff_t mem_lseek(struct file *file, loff_t offset, int orig)\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-984-\nfs/proc/base.c:985:static int mem_release(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\nfs/proc/base.c-986-{\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-992-\nfs/proc/base.c:993:static int mem_release_with_private(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\nfs/proc/base.c-994-{\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=1002=static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-1006-\t.open\t\t= mem_open,\nfs/proc/base.c:1007:\t.release\t= mem_release_with_private,\nfs/proc/base.c-1008-\t.fop_flags\t= FOP_UNSIGNED_OFFSET,\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=1079=static const struct file_operations proc_environ_operations = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-1082-\t.llseek\t\t= generic_file_llseek,\nfs/proc/base.c:1083:\t.release\t= mem_release,\nfs/proc/base.c-1084-};\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=1106=static const struct file_operations proc_auxv_operations = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-1109-\t.llseek\t\t= generic_file_llseek,\nfs/proc/base.c:1110:\t.release\t= mem_release,\nfs/proc/base.c-1111-};\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=2853=static const struct file_operations proc_pid_attr_operations = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-2857-\t.llseek\t\t= generic_file_llseek,\nfs/proc/base.c:2858:\t.release\t= mem_release,\nfs/proc/base.c-2859-};\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 36634
							output: 32
							thoughts: 60
						

**Examining Kernel Memory Management**

Okay, so `mem_release` is popping up in a few key areas: `proc_environ_operations`, `proc_auxv_operations`, and `proc_pid_attr_operations`. That's interesting, those are all related to process information and metadata, which makes sense. I need to make sure I understand the full picture, though. I wonder if these operations are tied to `mem_open` in any way? It's important to understand the complete memory lifecycle. Let's start with `proc_environ_operations`. I'll delve into its implementation to see how it interacts with memory allocation and deallocation.

{
  "Expression": "proc_environ_operations",
  "PathPrefix": "fs/proc/base.c"
}

{
  "Output": "fs/proc/base.c=1016=static ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-1078-\nfs/proc/base.c:1079:static const struct file_operations proc_environ_operations = {\nfs/proc/base.c-1080-\t.open\t\t= environ_open,\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=3311=static const struct pid_entry tgid_base_stuff[] = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-3319-#endif\nfs/proc/base.c:3320:\tREG(\"environ\",    S_IRUSR, proc_environ_operations),\nfs/proc/base.c-3321-\tREG(\"auxv\",       S_IRUSR, proc_auxv_operations),\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=3670=static const struct pid_entry tid_base_stuff[] = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-3676-#endif\nfs/proc/base.c:3677:\tREG(\"environ\",   S_IRUSR, proc_environ_operations),\nfs/proc/base.c-3678-\tREG(\"auxv\",      S_IRUSR, proc_auxv_operations),\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 37202
							output: 30
							thoughts: 29
						

Here's my summary, as though I'm thinking through this code:

**Diving into `environ_open`**

Okay, so they're using `environ_open`. My gut tells me this function is probably where the `file->private_data` field gets set, likely to some memory management structure, probably `mm`. Let's confirm that hypothesis, shall we? Time to dig into the definition of `environ_open` and see what it's *really* doing under the hood. I need to understand how they are managing the associated memory.

{
  "Expression": "environ_open",
  "PathPrefix": "fs/proc/base.c"
}

{
  "Output": "fs/proc/base.c=1002=static const struct file_operations proc_mem_operations = {\n--\nfs/proc/base.c-1010-\nfs/proc/base.c:1011:static int environ_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\nfs/proc/base.c-1012-{\n--\nfs/proc/base.c=1079=static const struct file_operations proc_environ_operations = {\nfs/proc/base.c:1080:\t.open\t\t= environ_open,\nfs/proc/base.c-1081-\t.read\t\t= environ_read,\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 37556
							output: 36
							thoughts: 9
						

Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing the thought process, as requested, geared toward an expert audience, and written in the first person:

**Diving into `environ_open`**

Alright, let's take a look at `environ_open`. I'm going to start by getting a handle on the function signature and any obvious data structures it manipulates. I'll need to understand how it's intended to be used, what it does in a basic sense, and what the potential edge cases are that require attention. I'll be focused, especially, on any error paths and potential security implications. Is it reading environment variables directly, or is it going through some kind of abstraction layer? Does it handle potential race conditions if multiple processes are trying to access or modify the environment concurrently? I'll be looking for signs of potential vulnerabilities like buffer overflows or format string bugs, especially if it interacts with user-provided input, or data read from disk. I'm also going to see if this function is standard, or something specific to this particular project, that might need closer scrutiny if it isn't something well known. Understanding the larger context is essential here.

{
  "File": "fs/proc/base.c",
  "FirstLine": 1010,
  "LineCount": 10
}

{
  "Contents": "1010:\t\n1011:\tstatic int environ_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)\n1012:\t{\n1013:\t\treturn __mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ);\n1014:\t}\n1015:\t\n1016:\tstatic ssize_t environ_read(struct file *file, char __user *buf,\n1017:\t\t\t\tsize_t count, loff_t *ppos)\n1018:\t{\n1019:\t\tchar *page;\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 38000
							output: 35
							thoughts: 37
						

Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, presented in the first person:

**Digging into Memory Mapping**

Alright, so `environ_open` uses `__mem_open` – standard procedure. The function call is `__mem_open(inode, file, PTRACE_MODE_READ)`. Okay, that's what I expected. The `inode` is likely the in-memory representation of the file, `file` would be the file structure itself, and the `PTRACE_MODE_READ` is obviously about read access for potential tracing. Now, let's drill down into `__mem_open`. Gotta see how that memory mapping is being set up. This is where the core logic of accessing the process's memory will be, and I need to understand the details. My goal is to determine the methodology, identify and confirm the assumptions and ensure this meets my standards for secure access.

{
  "File": "fs/proc/base.c",
  "FirstLine": 840,
  "LineCount": 10
}

{
  "Contents": " 840:\tstatic int __mem_open(struct inode *inode, struct file *file, unsigned int mode)\n 841:\t{\n 842:\t\tstruct mm_struct *mm = proc_mem_open(inode, mode);\n 843:\t\n 844:\t\tif (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mm))\n 845:\t\t\treturn mm ? PTR_ERR(mm) : -ESRCH;\n 846:\t\n 847:\t\tfile-\u003eprivate_data = mm;\n 848:\t\treturn 0;\n 849:\t}\n"
}

gemini-3.1-pro-preview

null

null

							input: 38433
							output: 368
							thoughts: 3769
						

**Analysis of the `/proc/pid/mem` Patch: KMSAN Unnecessary**

Okay, let's break this down. The core change here involves managing a `struct mem_private` for `/proc/pid/mem` file operations. The key question is whether this introduces uninitialized memory problems that require KMSAN. The patch adds a new struct that's allocated via `kmalloc_obj`, which *doesn't* zero memory. It contains a pointer to the `mm_struct` and a boolean `introspection` flag.

The critical thing to remember is that `__mem_open` sets `file->private_data = mm;`, and `mem_release` calls `mmdrop(file->private_data)`. The patch introduces `mem_release_with_private` for the new `struct mem_private`. The `introspection` flag is initialized *after* `proc_mem_open` is called and its result checked. If `proc_mem_open` fails, the function returns early. If `kmalloc_obj` fails, it returns `-ENOMEM`. Therefore the `struct mem_private` is not used in uninitialized state.

The `struct mem_private` is allocated, but its fields are all initialized *before* `file->private_data` is set. The struct is never copied to userspace. There's potential for padding in the struct, but this is irrelevant because padding is not visible to userspace, therefore it's not a source of any information leak.

The introduction of the `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` LSM hook also needs inspection. This hook gets called, and the SELinux implementation allocates a `struct av_decision avd` on the stack. The critical part is that `avd` is passed as an *output* parameter to `avc_has_perm_noaudit()`. The function `avc_has_perm_noaudit()` populates `avd`. The contents of `avd` are *not* even used by `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force()`. Therefore, whether `avd` is initialized prior to its use is completely irrelevant.

It is also important to consider if the order of operations leaves any potential use of uninitialized memory. However, file operations can only be done after successful opening of a file descriptor, and `introspection` is fully initialized at this time. The VFS layer provides the correct credentials. There's no concurrent access issue since the file descriptor isn't visible until `open` returns.

I've also checked `kmalloc_obj` and confirmed that it's a wrapper around `kmalloc` and is completely safe. The `__free` attribute automatically frees it when `mem_open` returns. So, it is safe to use.

In summary: the patch explicitly initializes all relevant fields. The struct is never leaked to userspace. There are no other memory management issues as far as I can tell. There are no uninitialized memory issues. Standard KASAN should be sufficient to detect any other memory safety issues like use-after-free or memory leaks.

Therefore, KMSAN is not necessary here.

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch modifies the `/proc/pid/mem` open and read/write logic to track whether the ptrace access check was bypassed due to introspection (a process accessing its own memory). It introduces a new `struct mem_private` to hold the `mm_struct` pointer and a boolean `introspection` flag. This struct is allocated via `kmalloc_obj` (which does not zero memory), but both of its fields are explicitly initialized in `mem_open()`. The struct is only used internally within `fs/proc/base.c` and is never copied to userspace, so any uninitialized padding bytes do not pose an info-leak risk.\n\nAdditionally, the patch introduces a new LSM hook `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` and its SELinux implementation `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`. The SELinux implementation allocates a `struct av_decision avd` on the stack without initialization, but it is passed purely as an output parameter to `avc_has_perm_noaudit()`, which populates it. The contents of `avd` are not even read by the caller.\n\nSince all introduced memory is either fully initialized before use or used strictly as output parameters, and no kernel memory is copied to userspace in a way that could leak uninitialized bytes, there is no risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks. Standard KASAN and other bug detectors are sufficient to catch any potential memory safety issues (like use-after-free or memory leaks) introduced by these changes. A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not required.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}

{
  "KMSANReasoning": "The patch modifies the `/proc/pid/mem` open and read/write logic to track whether the ptrace access check was bypassed due to introspection (a process accessing its own memory). It introduces a new `struct mem_private` to hold the `mm_struct` pointer and a boolean `introspection` flag. This struct is allocated via `kmalloc_obj` (which does not zero memory), but both of its fields are explicitly initialized in `mem_open()`. The struct is only used internally within `fs/proc/base.c` and is never copied to userspace, so any uninitialized padding bytes do not pose an info-leak risk.\n\nAdditionally, the patch introduces a new LSM hook `security_introspect_mem_foll_force` and its SELinux implementation `selinux_introspect_mem_foll_force`. The SELinux implementation allocates a `struct av_decision avd` on the stack without initialization, but it is passed purely as an output parameter to `avc_has_perm_noaudit()`, which populates it. The contents of `avd` are not even read by the caller.\n\nSince all introduced memory is either fully initialized before use or used strictly as output parameters, and no kernel memory is copied to userspace in a way that could leak uninitialized bytes, there is no risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks. Standard KASAN and other bug detectors are sufficient to catch any potential memory safety issues (like use-after-free or memory leaks) introduced by these changes. A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session is not required.",
  "NeedsKMSAN": false
}