| Seq | Timestamp | Type | Name | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0/0 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | flow | patch-triage |
3mArgs:null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"TLS",
"TLS_DEVICE",
"BPF_STREAM_PARSER"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"tls_rx_rec_wait",
"tls_sw_recvmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"tls_encrypt_done",
"sock_dequeue_err_skb",
"strp_abort_strp",
"sk_psock_backlog"
],
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch adds READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE annotations to accesses of `sk-\u003esk_err` and refactors socket error checking in `net/tls`, `net/strparser`, `net/core/skbuff.c`, and `include/linux/skmsg.h` to address data races.\n\nNone of the changes touch uninitialized memory, modify buffer boundaries, create uninitialized stack/heap structures, or copy uninitialized data to user space:\n- All introduced local variables (`skerr`, `err`, `rc`) are initialized immediately upon declaration with the results of `READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err)` or `sock_error(sk)`.\n- `sk-\u003esk_err` is a scalar field initialized when sockets are created.\n- The change addresses concurrency and compiler reordering/tearing risks (targeted by KCSAN), not uninitialized memory bugs.\n\nTherefore, dedicated KMSAN fuzzing is not required; standard testing and sanitizers are sufficient.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false,
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies reachable networking subsystems including kTLS, the stream parser, sockmap error reporting, and core skbuff error queue dequeueing. In particular, it converts raw sk_err accesses to READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE and alters the error inspection logic in tls_rx_rec_wait(), which is reachable via standard socket operations on TLS sockets. Fuzzing is warranted to ensure the altered control flow and concurrency annotations do not introduce regressions or expose race conditions.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
} |
| 1/1 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | action | read-patch-diff |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"PatchDiff": "commit e13334f7c74d7e7d9ab552486fd6bde32cc91bf1\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate: Sat Oct 10 15:04:15 2026 +0000\n\n syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h\nindex d5e35f24738d5..52ce45f25f5a6 100644\n--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h\n+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h\n@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)\n {\n \tstruct sock *sk = psock-\u003esk;\n \n-\tsk-\u003esk_err = err;\n+\tWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err, err);\n \tsk_error_report(sk);\n }\n \ndiff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c\nindex d56f4f0102f75..a6c9cf57bc3bf 100644\n--- a/net/core/skbuff.c\n+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c\n@@ -5539,12 +5539,13 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)\n \tif (skb \u0026\u0026 (skb_next = skb_peek(q))) {\n \t\ticmp_next = is_icmp_err_skb(skb_next);\n \t\tif (icmp_next)\n-\t\t\tsk-\u003esk_err = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)-\u003eee.ee_errno;\n+\t\t\tWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err,\n+\t\t\t\t SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)-\u003eee.ee_errno);\n \t}\n \tspin_unlock_irqrestore(\u0026q-\u003elock, flags);\n \n \tif (is_icmp_err_skb(skb) \u0026\u0026 !icmp_next)\n-\t\tsk-\u003esk_err = 0;\n+\t\tWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err, 0);\n \n \tif (skb_next)\n \t\tsk_error_report(sk);\ndiff --git a/net/strparser/strparser.c b/net/strparser/strparser.c\nindex 9c1559d7923f2..5f1da32b152fc 100644\n--- a/net/strparser/strparser.c\n+++ b/net/strparser/strparser.c\n@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)\n \tstrp-\u003eneed_bytes = 0;\n \n \t/* Report an error on the lower socket */\n-\tsk-\u003esk_err = -err;\n+\tWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err, -err);\n \tsk_error_report(sk);\n }\n \ndiff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c\nindex f11d0528fc431..03ce83a9d4e9c 100644\n--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c\n+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c\n@@ -444,8 +444,9 @@ static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,\n \tif ((flags \u0026 (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR)) == (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR))\n \t\treturn -EINVAL;\n \n-\tif (unlikely(sk-\u003esk_err))\n-\t\treturn -sk-\u003esk_err;\n+\trc = -READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\tif (unlikely(rc))\n+\t\treturn rc;\n \n \tflags |= MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED;\n \ttls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_MORE;\ndiff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c\nindex 312e51270f293..a2be1283ca930 100644\n--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c\n+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c\n@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)\n \tstruct scatterlist *sge;\n \tstruct sk_msg *msg_en;\n \tstruct sock *sk;\n+\tint skerr;\n \n \tif (err == -EINPROGRESS) /* see the comment in tls_decrypt_done() */\n \t\treturn;\n@@ -488,13 +489,15 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)\n \tsge-\u003eoffset -= prot-\u003eprepend_size;\n \tsge-\u003elength += prot-\u003eprepend_size;\n \n+\tskerr = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\n \t/* Check if error is previously set on socket */\n-\tif (err || sk-\u003esk_err) {\n+\tif (err || skerr) {\n \t\trec = NULL;\n \n \t\t/* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */\n-\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_err) {\n-\t\t\tctx-\u003easync_wait.err = -sk-\u003esk_err;\n+\t\tif (skerr) {\n+\t\t\tctx-\u003easync_wait.err = -skerr;\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tctx-\u003easync_wait.err = err;\n \t\t\ttls_err_abort(sk, err);\n@@ -704,10 +707,14 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,\n \tint err;\n \n \terr = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);\n-\tif (err \u0026\u0026 err != -EINPROGRESS \u0026\u0026 sk-\u003esk_err == EBADMSG) {\n-\t\t*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);\n-\t\ttls_free_open_rec(sk);\n-\t\terr = -sk-\u003esk_err;\n+\tif (err \u0026\u0026 err != -EINPROGRESS) {\n+\t\tint skerr = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\n+\t\tif (skerr == EBADMSG) {\n+\t\t\t*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);\n+\t\t\ttls_free_open_rec(sk);\n+\t\t\terr = -skerr;\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn err;\n }\n@@ -800,10 +807,9 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,\n \t}\n \n \twhile (msg_data_left(msg)) {\n-\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_err) {\n-\t\t\tret = -sk-\u003esk_err;\n+\t\tret = -READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\t\tif (ret)\n \t\t\tgoto send_end;\n-\t\t}\n \n \t\tif (ctx-\u003eopen_rec)\n \t\t\trec = ctx-\u003eopen_rec;\n@@ -1107,10 +1113,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)\n \ttimeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);\n \n \twhile (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {\n-\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_err) {\n-\t\t\tif (has_copied)\n-\t\t\t\treturn -READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n-\t\t\treturn sock_error(sk);\n+\t\tif (has_copied) {\n+\t\t\tint err = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\n+\t\t\tif (err)\n+\t\t\t\treturn -err;\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tint err = sock_error(sk);\n+\n+\t\t\tif (err)\n+\t\t\t\treturn err;\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif (ret \u003c 0)\n@@ -1132,10 +1144,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)\n \t\t * sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the\n \t\t * actual error rather than a clean EOF.\n \t\t */\n-\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_err) {\n-\t\t\tif (has_copied)\n-\t\t\t\treturn -READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n-\t\t\treturn sock_error(sk);\n+\t\tif (has_copied) {\n+\t\t\tint err = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\n+\t\t\tif (err)\n+\t\t\t\treturn -err;\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tint err = sock_error(sk);\n+\n+\t\t\tif (err)\n+\t\t\t\treturn err;\n \t\t}\n \t\tif (sk-\u003esk_shutdown \u0026 RCV_SHUTDOWN)\n \t\t\treturn 0;\n"
} |
| 2/1 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | agent | patch-evaluator |
3mModel:core Args: null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"TLS",
"TLS_DEVICE",
"BPF_STREAM_PARSER"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"tls_rx_rec_wait",
"tls_sw_recvmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"tls_encrypt_done",
"sock_dequeue_err_skb",
"strp_abort_strp",
"sk_psock_backlog"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies reachable networking subsystems including kTLS, the stream parser, sockmap error reporting, and core skbuff error queue dequeueing. In particular, it converts raw sk_err accesses to READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE and alters the error inspection logic in tls_rx_rec_wait(), which is reachable via standard socket operations on TLS sockets. Fuzzing is warranted to ensure the altered control flow and concurrency annotations do not introduce regressions or expose race conditions.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and evaluate whether it warrants fuzzing with syzkaller.
IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on internal assumptions. You must actively use your code access
tools to inspect the actual source code, callers, and surrounding context.
================================================================================
1. CORE TRIAGE PHILOSOPHY
================================================================================
The goal of patch fuzzing is to discover crashes, regressions, exposed latent bugs,
and newly triggered assertions introduced by the patch series.
- REACHABILITY IS THE PRIMARY GATE:
Fuzzing can only discover bugs in code that can actually execute in standard virtualized
environments (GCE or QEMU, utilizing software-emulated devices like USB gadgets, netdev, tun/tap).
If the modified code is structurally unreachable (see Section 2), it MUST NOT be fuzzed,
regardless of whether it adds assertions or complex logic.
- DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST "NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGE" (NFCI) OR "REFACTORING" CLAIMS:
Patch authors routinely label changes as "cleanups", "refactorings", or state
"No functional change intended". Do NOT take these claims at face value.
Code refactorings that rearrange logic, introduce helper functions, or alter state management
in core subsystems frequently introduce subtle semantic shifts or uncover latent kernel bugs.
If reachable executable code is modified or refactored, it MUST be fuzzed.
- NEW OR MODIFIED ASSERTIONS IN REACHABLE CODE MUST BE FUZZED:
When a patch introduces or modifies runtime checks or assertions (e.g., WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*,
BUG_ON*, lockdep_assert*) in reachable code paths, it enforces new or stricter invariants.
Even if the author believes the invariant always holds, fuzzing is essential to verify whether
an unusual sequence of operations can violate it.
================================================================================
2. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=false (NEGATIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=false ONLY IF all modified code falls strictly into one or more of these categories:
- Non-kernel and non-executable changes:
* Modifications to Documentation/, comments, or spelling fixes.
* User-space directories, self-tests, samples, or scripts (e.g., tools/, samples/, scripts/, usr/)
that do not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.
* Purely decorative logging (e.g., message strings in pr_err, printk, dev_info) or tracepoints
that do not alter control flow or data structures.
* Build system or Kconfig changes that do not alter compiled C logic.
- Structurally unreachable hardware:
* Vendor-specific PCIe switches, SmartNICs, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed,
ionic, amdgpu) requiring physical ASIC/PCIe cards not emulated in standard QEMU.
- Unreachable execution paths:
* Driver teardown callbacks (.remove, .shutdown, pci_unregister_driver) executed only during
physical PCI hot-unplug or manual sysfs driver unbinding.
* Code paths exclusive to architectures other than the target architecture.
================================================================================
3. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=true (POSITIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=true whenever the patch touches reachable executable code, including:
- Core Subsystems:
* Any logic modifications in memory management (mm/), synchronization/locking (kernel/locking/),
BPF, scheduler, core networking, VFS, or syscall handling.
- Refactorings and Code Cleanups:
* Any restructuring of reachable data structures, helper abstractions, or algorithm flows.
- Runtime Assertions and Defensive Checks:
* Any introduction or alteration of assertions (WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*, BUG_ON*, etc.) in reachable paths.
- Reachable Drivers and Protocols:
* Drivers accessible via virtual buses (virtio, USB gadget, loopback, netlink, binder, sockets, etc.).
================================================================================
4. EXTRACTING FocusSymbols (PREVENTING DILUTION)
================================================================================
When WorthFuzzing=true, you must extract specific kernel functions into FocusSymbols to guide the fuzzer:
- AVOID UBIQUITOUS LIFECYCLE HOT-PATHS:
Do NOT list generic, ubiquitous functions called by almost every program in the corpus
(including, but not limited to: general memory allocators and deallocators, page fault
and trap handlers, or core synchronization primitives; this is not an exhaustive list).
Listing ubiquitous functions causes the fuzzer to classify thousands of unrelated tests as "focused",
which severely dilutes fuzzing effort away from the actual changes.
- TARGET SPECIFIC FEATURE LOGIC AND ENTRYPOINTS:
List functions that specifically implement the logic being added or altered, or direct API entrypoints
for the subsystem feature under review.
- HANDLING STATIC INLINE FUNCTIONS IN HEADERS (.h):
Compiler-inlined static functions (such as static inlines in mm/*.h or include/linux/*.h) lack
distinct symbol addresses in vmlinux and cannot be targeted directly by symbol coverage filters.
If the changes are primarily in static inline helpers, identify non-static, feature-specific caller
functions in .c files that exercise them (avoiding ubiquitous lifecycle wrappers).
================================================================================
5. IDENTIFYING EnableConfigs
================================================================================
Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly compile and reach the modified code:
- Inspect Kconfig files and #ifdef guards; do not make assumptions.
- Check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs needed.
- Strip any 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Target architecture: amd64
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit e13334f7c74d7e7d9ab552486fd6bde32cc91bf1
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date: Sat Oct 10 15:04:15 2026 +0000
syz-cluster: applied patch under review
diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h
index d5e35f24738d5..52ce45f25f5a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)
{
struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
- sk->sk_err = err;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, err);
sk_error_report(sk);
}
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index d56f4f0102f75..a6c9cf57bc3bf 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -5539,12 +5539,13 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)
if (skb && (skb_next = skb_peek(q))) {
icmp_next = is_icmp_err_skb(skb_next);
if (icmp_next)
- sk->sk_err = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)->ee.ee_errno;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err,
+ SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)->ee.ee_errno);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock, flags);
if (is_icmp_err_skb(skb) && !icmp_next)
- sk->sk_err = 0;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, 0);
if (skb_next)
sk_error_report(sk);
diff --git a/net/strparser/strparser.c b/net/strparser/strparser.c
index 9c1559d7923f2..5f1da32b152fc 100644
--- a/net/strparser/strparser.c
+++ b/net/strparser/strparser.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)
strp->need_bytes = 0;
/* Report an error on the lower socket */
- sk->sk_err = -err;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, -err);
sk_error_report(sk);
}
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c
index f11d0528fc431..03ce83a9d4e9c 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
@@ -444,8 +444,9 @@ static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,
if ((flags & (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR)) == (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR))
return -EINVAL;
- if (unlikely(sk->sk_err))
- return -sk->sk_err;
+ rc = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
flags |= MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED;
tls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_MORE;
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 312e51270f293..a2be1283ca930 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
struct scatterlist *sge;
struct sk_msg *msg_en;
struct sock *sk;
+ int skerr;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) /* see the comment in tls_decrypt_done() */
return;
@@ -488,13 +489,15 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
+ skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
/* Check if error is previously set on socket */
- if (err || sk->sk_err) {
+ if (err || skerr) {
rec = NULL;
/* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err;
+ if (skerr) {
+ ctx->async_wait.err = -skerr;
} else {
ctx->async_wait.err = err;
tls_err_abort(sk, err);
@@ -704,10 +707,14 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
int err;
err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
- *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
- tls_free_open_rec(sk);
- err = -sk->sk_err;
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ int skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (skerr == EBADMSG) {
+ *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ err = -skerr;
+ }
}
return err;
}
@@ -800,10 +807,9 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
}
while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ret = -sk->sk_err;
+ ret = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+ if (ret)
goto send_end;
- }
if (ctx->open_rec)
rec = ctx->open_rec;
@@ -1107,10 +1113,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- if (has_copied)
- return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
- return sock_error(sk);
+ if (has_copied) {
+ int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -err;
+ } else {
+ int err = sock_error(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1132,10 +1144,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
* sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the
* actual error rather than a clean EOF.
*/
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- if (has_copied)
- return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
- return sock_error(sk);
+ if (has_copied) {
+ int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -err;
+ } else {
+ int err = sock_error(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
|
| 3/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 4985 output: 32 thoughts: 514 Thoughts: **Analyzing the SK_ERR Patch** Okay, let's break down this patch. My initial impression is that it seems to be centered around the handling and propagation of socket errors (`sk->sk_err`). I see modifications in a few key areas: `include/linux/skmsg.h`, `net/core/skbuff.c`, `net/strparser/strparser.c`, and `net/tls/*`. The changes appear to be about how `sk->sk_err` is read and written, using `READ_ONCE` and `WRITE_ONCE`, which are standard for memory visibility in the kernel. Specifically, I notice a pattern: `sk_psock_report_error()`, `sock_dequeue_err_skb()`, and `strp_abort_strp()` are *writing* to `sk->sk_err`, assigning an error code. Then, `tls_push_data()`, `tls_encrypt_done()`, `bpf_exec_tx_verdict()`, and `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked()` are all *reading* from it. This suggests a classic error reporting mechanism, where different components can signal errors that are then checked and handled elsewhere in the stack. The interesting bit, however, is the change in `net/tls/tls_sw.c`, specifically within `tls_rx_rec_wait()`. The old code had a straightforward check: `if (sk->sk_err)`. If `sk->sk_err` was non-zero, it would call `sock_error(sk)`. Now, the logic is split based on `has_copied`. If `has_copied` is true, an error is checked and returned. If `has_copied` is false, it now calls `sock_error(sk)`. Wait a minute, what is `sock_error(sk)` doing? It seems to reset `sk->sk_err` to zero via `xchg(&sk->sk_err, 0)`. This is a significant change! The old behavior would check for an error and *then* clear it. Now, *if* `has_copied` is false, it calls `sock_error(sk)`. This could mean that the error is only observed in the `has_copied` path, because the call to `sock_error(sk)` will clear the error. I'd need to trace the context of `has_copied` to fully understand the implications, but this could introduce a race condition or a potential missed error condition if `has_copied` is not properly set. I will have to investigate what sets and uses `has_copied`. Also, the previous behavior did not clear the error unless a user space copy had been performed. I will need to understand what triggered the need to make this change. |
| 4/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "sock_error\\(",
"PathPrefixes": [
"include/net/sock.h"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "include/net/sock.h=2553=struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk);\n--\ninclude/net/sock.h-2558-\ninclude/net/sock.h:2559:static inline int sock_error(struct sock *sk)\ninclude/net/sock.h-2560-{\n"
} |
| 5/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 6237 output: 36 thoughts: 19 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Diving into the `sock_error` Macro** Right, let's pull up `sock_error` from `include/net/sock.h`. I'm guessing this is where the kernel handles the reporting of socket errors, likely mapping internal error codes to user-space visible values, and maybe even setting the `errno` appropriately. I need to refresh my memory on the interactions here, especially around how it deals with races or concurrency issues in a multithreaded environment. I'll be looking for how it handles things like `EAGAIN`, `EWOULDBLOCK`, and the various connection-related errors (ECONNRESET, etc.). It's also worth seeing if there are any subtle interactions with signaling mechanisms or workqueues within the network stack. I'm keen to spot any potential locking issues or inefficiencies in the error propagation path, especially considering the performance-critical nature of socket operations. I'll be also looking for how it interacts with the different socket families (IPv4, IPv6, UNIX sockets) and their respective error handling mechanisms. A solid understanding of this is crucial to diagnose those seemingly cryptic socket errors that pop up in real-world applications. Time to dig in! |
| 6/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "include/net/sock.h",
"FirstLine": 2555,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": "2555:\t/*\n2556:\t *\tRecover an error report and clear atomically\n2557:\t */\n2558:\t\n2559:\tstatic inline int sock_error(struct sock *sk)\n2560:\t{\n2561:\t\tint err;\n2562:\t\n2563:\t\t/* Avoid an atomic operation for the common case.\n2564:\t\t * This is racy since another cpu/thread can change sk_err under us.\n2565:\t\t */\n2566:\t\tif (likely(data_race(!sk-\u003esk_err)))\n2567:\t\t\treturn 0;\n2568:\t\n2569:\t\terr = xchg(\u0026sk-\u003esk_err, 0);\n2570:\t\treturn -err;\n2571:\t}\n2572:\t\n2573:\tvoid sk_error_report(struct sock *sk);\n2574:\t\n"
} |
| 7/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 6822 output: 21 thoughts: 563 Thoughts: **Worth Fuzzing: A Deep Dive into kTLS and Core Networking** Okay, so I'm looking at this code and immediately I see `sock_error(sk)` returning `-err` and zero if there's no error. That makes sense. The `tls_rx_rec_wait()` function has this conditional: if data has been copied, it reads the error from `sk->sk_err`; otherwise, it calls `sock_error()`. Seems straightforward enough, but this is *kTLS*! It's right there in `net/tls/`, and it touches `net/core/skbuff.c` and `net/strparser/strparser.c`. This is kTLS, kernel TLS sockets, operating on standard `AF_INET`/`AF_INET6` sockets, enabled with `setsockopt(..., SOL_TCP, TCP_ULP, "tls", ...)` – completely software-emulated. This means it's definitely reachable – I can hit this in QEMU, in a standard fuzzing setup, right? Alright, let's back up a second. We're talking kTLS, but also stream parsers in `net/strparser`, and we're talking `skmsg`, sockmap and BPF. Plus, it's hitting `sock_dequeue_err_skb()` in `net/core/skbuff.c` - so standard core networking for the error queue, like with `MSG_ERRQUEUE`. Okay, this is pretty solid. It's touching kTLS (`net/tls`), stream parsing (`net/strparser`), sockmap (`skmsg`), and the error queue dequeue function. Core networking code, for sure. So, the big question: Is this worth fuzzing? Let's check the triage philosophy. Hmm, core subsystems: memory management, sync, BPF, scheduler, core networking, VFS, syscalls – *bingo*! And refactorings, and reachable drivers... This is *definitely* reachable core networking code. kTLS, BPF and skbuff... so yes, **WorthFuzzing = true**. Now, let's not get ahead of ourselves. I need to dive into the config, and also identify some focus symbols. And let's see if the commit log has something useful in it! |
| 8/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | tool | grepper |
0mError:no matches Args: {
"Expression": "Annotate sk-\u003esk_err"
}Results: {
"error": "no matches"
} |
| 9/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 7917 output: 25 thoughts: 188 Thoughts: Okay, let's break this down. **Investigating the Commit's Impact on the Kernel's TLS Implementation** Alright, no `git log`, so we'll have to infer from the file changes themselves. Let's see... what got touched? Okay, I've got: * `include/linux/skmsg.h`: `sk_psock_report_error` * `net/core/skbuff.c`: `sock_dequeue_err_skb` * `net/strparser/strparser.c`: `strp_abort_strp` * `net/tls/tls_device.c`: `tls_push_data` * `net/tls/tls_sw.c`: `tls_encrypt_done`, `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`, `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`, `tls_rx_rec_wait` Hmm, a cluster of TLS-related files are definitely prominent here. `skbuff.c` and `strparser.c` touch some of the networking core, so there is likely interaction with those functionalities. We know the functions in the other files are highly related to the TLS configuration. Let me see where the TLS subsystem is configured. I need to check the Kconfig files to confirm, or rule out, the hypothesis that something in TLS configuration changed, but it seems likely. |
| 10/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "config TLS",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/Kconfig-4-#\nnet/tls/Kconfig:5:config TLS\nnet/tls/Kconfig-6-\ttristate \"Transport Layer Security support\"\n--\nnet/tls/Kconfig-18-\nnet/tls/Kconfig:19:config TLS_DEVICE\nnet/tls/Kconfig-20-\tbool \"Transport Layer Security HW offload\"\n"
} |
| 11/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 8537 output: 32 thoughts: 12 Thoughts: Okay, here's my summary, presented as a stream of thought: **Checking `net/tls/Kconfig`** Alright, time to dive in. My initial thought is, let's just go straight to the source. I need to understand the configuration options related to TLS within the network stack. So, the logical first step is to check `net/tls/Kconfig`. I'm expecting this file to contain the definitions and dependencies for all the TLS-related features and options. Hopefully, it’s well-organized and clearly documents the available configuration knobs and their effects. I'm looking for a solid foundation to understand how things are controlled at build time. This should be a quick and efficient way to refresh my memory or perhaps gain some new insight into any recent changes or additions to the TLS configuration landscape within the kernel. Let's see what we find. |
| 12/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "net/tls/Kconfig",
"FirstLine": 1,
"LineCount": 40
}Results: {
"Contents": " 1:\t# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n 2:\t#\n 3:\t# TLS configuration\n 4:\t#\n 5:\tconfig TLS\n 6:\t\ttristate \"Transport Layer Security support\"\n 7:\t\tdepends on INET\n 8:\t\tselect CRYPTO\n 9:\t\tselect CRYPTO_AES\n 10:\t\tselect CRYPTO_GCM\n 11:\t\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n 12:\t\tdefault n\n 13:\t\thelp\n 14:\t\tEnable kernel support for TLS protocol. This allows symmetric\n 15:\t\tencryption handling of the TLS protocol to be done in-kernel.\n 16:\t\n 17:\t\tIf unsure, say N.\n 18:\t\n 19:\tconfig TLS_DEVICE\n 20:\t\tbool \"Transport Layer Security HW offload\"\n 21:\t\tdepends on TLS\n 22:\t\tselect SKB_DECRYPTED\n 23:\t\tselect SOCK_VALIDATE_XMIT\n 24:\t\tselect SOCK_RX_QUEUE_MAPPING\n 25:\t\tdefault n\n 26:\t\thelp\n 27:\t\tEnable kernel support for HW offload of the TLS protocol.\n 28:\t\n 29:\t\tIf unsure, say N.\n"
} |
| 13/2 | 2026/10/10 15:04 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 9089 output: 31 thoughts: 32 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's how I'd approach that problem, as though it were my own thought process: **Investigating the Build Process for TLS Components** Right, so I need to figure out how these `tls_sw.c` and `tls_device.c` files are being built. Given the context, my first instinct is to look at the `net/tls/Makefile`. That's the obvious place to find the build instructions for anything related to TLS within this networking subsystem. I'm expecting to find rules for compiling these specific source files, likely with dependencies and linker flags defined. I anticipate seeing variables that control compiler options, include paths, and maybe even conditional compilation flags if the build process adapts to different hardware or configurations. My guess is that it might be a pretty straightforward set of rules, but I'll also be on the lookout for anything that might be using more complex make features, like pattern rules or generated dependencies. Knowing the specific commands will tell me about how the files are built, which will inform any potential changes I may need to make. |
| 14/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "net/tls/Makefile",
"FirstLine": 1,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 1:\t# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n 2:\t#\n 3:\t# Makefile for the TLS subsystem.\n 4:\t#\n 5:\t\n 6:\tCFLAGS_trace.o := -I$(src)\n 7:\t\n 8:\tobj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o\n 9:\t\n 10:\ttls-y := tls_main.o tls_sw.o tls_proc.o trace.o tls_strp.o\n 11:\t\n 12:\ttls-$(CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE) += tls_device.o tls_device_fallback.o\n"
} |
| 15/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 9553 output: 33 thoughts: 65 Thoughts: Okay, let's see... I'm looking at these object files, `tls_sw.o` and `tls_device.o`, and it's immediately apparent that they were compiled with specific TLS configurations – `CONFIG_TLS` and `CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE`, respectively. No surprises there. But now, the question that needs answering, and my brain is already churning through possibilities, is, what's the deal with `net/strparser`? Does it have any TLS dependencies? My immediate thought is to check the usual suspects. I need to dive into the `net/strparser` directory and examine both the `Kconfig` file and the `Makefile`. That's where I'll find the configuration options and compilation flags that dictate whether or not TLS support, directly or indirectly, is included. This seems like the logical next step to figure out how `net/strparser` integrates with the TLS featureset. |
| 16/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "net/strparser/Kconfig",
"FirstLine": 1,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 1:\t# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n 2:\tconfig STREAM_PARSER\n 3:\t\tdef_bool n\n"
} |
| 17/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 9899 output: 28 thoughts: 9 Thoughts: Here's a summary of my thought process, assuming I'm an expert in the field: **Decoding the `STREAM_PARSER` Selection** Okay, so the question immediately that pops into my head is: Who or what is making the decision to use `STREAM_PARSER`? The context is everything here, as this choice has significant implications. Is it a: * **Configuration setting?** Perhaps there's a global configuration file or environment variable dictating the parsing strategy. That's a common and straightforward approach, easily modifiable but potentially complex to trace if settings are scattered across multiple locations. * **Runtime Decision based on input?** Perhaps it's a dynamic choice. Are we analyzing the data stream's metadata (format, encoding, etc.) and selecting the most appropriate parser at runtime? This is far more flexible, adaptable to changing input formats, but it demands careful error handling and the parsing strategy itself may be complex. The trade-off is often worth it for systems that may interface with many formats. * **Code-level directive?** Is the `STREAM_PARSER` assignment baked into the code itself? This implies a more static architecture, where we might define the parser at compile time or during a dependency injection phase. This might be fine for a highly specialized and controlled system, but far less flexible to changing needs. * **A result of a negotiation?** Could there be a system in place that negotiates the parsers and codecs that will be used? I need to understand the architectural context to determine the trigger. Is this part of a larger pipeline, a standalone application, or a library? Is it a well-defined API or a more ad-hoc process? Knowing the system's design will determine the answers. |
| 18/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "select STREAM_PARSER",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/Kconfig=360=config BPF_STREAM_PARSER\n--\nnet/Kconfig-364-\tdepends on CGROUP_BPF\nnet/Kconfig:365:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/Kconfig-366-\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n--\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig=382=config INET_ESPINTCP\n--\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig-384-\tdepends on XFRM \u0026\u0026 INET_ESP\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig:385:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig-386-\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n--\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig=90=config INET6_ESPINTCP\n--\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig-92-\tdepends on XFRM \u0026\u0026 INET6_ESP\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig:93:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig-94-\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n--\nnet/kcm/Kconfig=3=config AF_KCM\n--\nnet/kcm/Kconfig-6-\tselect BPF_SYSCALL\nnet/kcm/Kconfig:7:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/kcm/Kconfig-8-\thelp\n"
} |
| 19/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 10633 output: 27 thoughts: 38 Thoughts: Here's my take on those thoughts: **Investigating Potential String Parsing in `net/tls`** Okay, so I'm digging into the `net/tls` package. It seems like there's a potential area of interest here. Specifically, I need to figure out if `tls_strp.c` (that file name immediately catches my attention as possibly related to string parsing) actually leverages the `strparser` component at all. I know `net/tls` is a critical piece, and efficient, secure string handling is paramount in TLS implementations. So, I need to know *precisely* how that `tls_strp.c` file is handling things. Let's get cracking and dive into that code directly. It's time to examine the source and see if my hunch about parsing is correct. |
| 20/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "strp",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/tls/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "\nFull output is too long, showing 200 out of 876 lines.\nUse more precise expression or PathPrefixes if possible.\n\nNumber of matching lines per file (6 files in total):\nnet/tls/Makefile:1\nnet/tls/tls.h:25\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:12\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:9\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:184\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:66\n\nnet/tls/Makefile=8=obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o\nnet/tls/Makefile-9-\nnet/tls/Makefile:10:tls-y := tls_main.o tls_sw.o tls_proc.o trace.o tls_strp.o\nnet/tls/Makefile-11-\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h=144=void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err);\nnet/tls/tls.h:145:void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err);\nnet/tls/tls.h-146-\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h=152=void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:153:void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:154:void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h-155-int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size);\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h=183=int tls_sw_fallback_init(struct sock *sk,\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h-186-\nnet/tls/tls.h:187:int tls_strp_dev_init(void);\nnet/tls/tls.h:188:void tls_strp_dev_exit(void);\nnet/tls/tls.h-189-\nnet/tls/tls.h:190:void tls_strp_done(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h:191:void __tls_strp_done(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h:192:void tls_strp_stop(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h:193:int tls_strp_init(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sock *sk);\nnet/tls/tls.h:194:void tls_strp_data_ready(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h-195-\nnet/tls/tls.h:196:void tls_strp_check_rcv(struct tls_strparser *strp, bool announce);\nnet/tls/tls.h:197:void tls_strp_msg_consume(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h-198-\nnet/tls/tls.h:199:int tls_rx_msg_size(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb);\nnet/tls/tls.h:200:void tls_rx_msg_maybe_announce(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h-201-\nnet/tls/tls.h:202:bool tls_strp_msg_load(struct tls_strparser *strp, bool force_refresh);\nnet/tls/tls.h:203:int tls_strp_msg_cow(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:204:struct sk_buff *tls_strp_msg_detach(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:205:int tls_strp_msg_hold(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff_head *dst);\nnet/tls/tls.h-206-\nnet/tls/tls.h=207=static inline struct tls_msg *tls_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h-213-\nnet/tls/tls.h:214:static inline struct sk_buff *tls_strp_msg(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)\nnet/tls/tls.h-215-{\nnet/tls/tls.h:216:\tDEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(!ctx-\u003estrp.msg_ready || !ctx-\u003estrp.anchor-\u003elen);\nnet/tls/tls.h:217:\treturn ctx-\u003estrp.anchor;\nnet/tls/tls.h-218-}\nnet/tls/tls.h-219-\nnet/tls/tls.h:220:static inline bool tls_strp_msg_ready(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)\nnet/tls/tls.h-221-{\nnet/tls/tls.h:222:\treturn READ_ONCE(ctx-\u003estrp.msg_ready);\nnet/tls/tls.h-223-}\nnet/tls/tls.h-224-\nnet/tls/tls.h:225:static inline bool tls_strp_msg_mixed_decrypted(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)\nnet/tls/tls.h-226-{\nnet/tls/tls.h:227:\treturn ctx-\u003estrp.mixed_decrypted;\nnet/tls/tls.h-228-}\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=839=static void tls_device_core_ctrl_rx_resync(struct tls_context *tls_ctx,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-842-{\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:843:\tstruct strp_msg *rxm;\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-844-\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-867-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:868:\trxm = strp_msg(skb);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-869-\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=887=tls_device_reencrypt(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-893-\tstruct scatterlist sg[1];\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:894:\tstruct strp_msg *rxm;\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-895-\tchar *orig_buf, *buf;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-899-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:900:\trxm = strp_msg(tls_strp_msg(sw_ctx));\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-901-\torig_buf = kmalloc(rxm-\u003efull_len + TLS_HEADER_SIZE + cipher_desc-\u003eiv,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-906-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:907:\terr = tls_strp_msg_cow(sw_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-908-\tif (unlikely(err))\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-910-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:911:\tskb = tls_strp_msg(sw_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:912:\trxm = strp_msg(skb);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-913-\toffset = rxm-\u003eoffset;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-948-\t\t/* Practically all frags must belong to msg if reencrypt\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:949:\t\t * is needed with current strparser and coalescing logic,\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:950:\t\t * but strparser may \"get optimized\", so let's be safe.\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-951-\t\t */\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=978=int tls_device_decrypted(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *tls_ctx)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-981-\tstruct tls_sw_context_rx *sw_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:982:\tstruct sk_buff *skb = tls_strp_msg(sw_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:983:\tstruct strp_msg *rxm = strp_msg(skb);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-984-\tint is_decrypted, is_encrypted;\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-985-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:986:\tif (!tls_strp_msg_mixed_decrypted(sw_ctx)) {\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-987-\t\tis_decrypted = skb-\u003edecrypted;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=361=static void tls_sk_proto_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-387-\tif (ctx-\u003erx_conf == TLS_SW || ctx-\u003erx_conf == TLS_HW)\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:388:\t\ttls_sw_strparser_done(ctx);\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-389-\tif (ctx-\u003erx_conf == TLS_SW)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=397=static __poll_t tls_sk_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-417-\tif ((skb_queue_empty_lockless(\u0026ctx-\u003erx_list) \u0026\u0026\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:418:\t !tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) ||\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-419-\t READ_ONCE(ctx-\u003ekey_update_pending))\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=621=static int do_tls_setsockopt_conf(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-750-\t\tif (!update)\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:751:\t\t\ttls_sw_strparser_arm(sk, ctx);\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-752-\t}\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-768-\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:769:\t\ttls_strp_check_rcv(\u0026rx_ctx-\u003estrp, true);\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-770-\t}\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=1221=static int __init tls_register(void)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1228-\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1229:\terr = tls_strp_dev_init();\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1230-\tif (err)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1234-\tif (err)\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1235:\t\tgoto err_strp;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1236-\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1239-\treturn 0;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1240:err_strp:\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1241:\ttls_strp_dev_exit();\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1242-err_pernet:\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=1247=static void __exit tls_unregister(void)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1249-\ttcp_unregister_ulp(\u0026tcp_tls_ulp_ops);\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1250:\ttls_strp_dev_exit();\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1251-\ttls_device_cleanup();\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-6-#include \u003clinux/workqueue.h\u003e\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:7:#include \u003cnet/strparser.h\u003e\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-8-#include \u003cnet/tcp.h\u003e\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-13-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:14:static struct workqueue_struct *tls_strp_wq;\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-15-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:16:void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err)\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-17-{\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:18:\tif (strp-\u003estopped)\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-19-\t\treturn;\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-20-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:21:\tstrp-\u003estopped = 1;\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-22-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-23-\t/* Report an error on the lower socket */\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:24:\tWRITE_ONCE(strp-\u003esk-\u003esk_err, -err);\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-25-\t/* Paired with smp_rmb() in tcp_poll() */\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-26-\tsmp_wmb();\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:27:\tsk_error_report(strp-\u003esk);\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-28-}\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-29-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:30:static void tls_strp_anchor_free(struct tls_strparser *strp)\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-31-{\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:32:\tstruct skb_shared_info *shinfo = skb_shinfo(strp-\u003eanchor);\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-33-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-34-\tDEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(atomic_read(\u0026shinfo-\u003edataref) != 1);\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:35:\tif (!strp-\u003ecopy_mode)\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-36-\t\tshinfo-\u003efrag_list = NULL;\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:37:\tconsume_skb(strp-\u003eanchor);\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:38:\tstrp-\u003eanchor = NULL;\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-39-}\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c=41=static struct sk_buff *\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:42:tls_strp_skb_copy(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *in_skb,\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-43-\t\t int offset, int len)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-48-\tskb = alloc_skb_with_frags(0, len, TLS_PAGE_ORDER,\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:49:\t\t\t\t \u0026err, strp-\u003esk-\u003esk_allocation);\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-50-\tif (!skb)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-68-/* Create a new skb with the contents of input copied to its page frags */\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:69:static struct sk_buff *tls_strp_msg_make_copy(struct tls_strparser *strp)\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-70-{\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:71:\tstruct strp_msg *rxm;\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-72-\tstruct sk_buff *skb;\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-73-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:74:\tskb = tls_strp_skb_copy(strp, strp-\u003eanchor, strp-\u003estm.offset,\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:75:\t\t\t\tstrp-\u003estm.full_len);\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-76-\tif (!skb)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-78-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:79:\trxm = strp_msg(skb);\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-80-\trxm-\u003eoffset = 0;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-84-/* Steal the input skb, input msg is invalid after calling this function */\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:85:struct sk_buff *tls_strp_msg_detach(struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-86-{\n\n"
} |
| 21/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 15273 output: 38 thoughts: 691 Thoughts: **Analyzing the TLS Patch: Data Race Considerations**
Okay, so I'm diving into this TLS patch and immediately I see something that jumps out at me. On line 24 of `net/tls/tls_strp.c`, `WRITE_ONCE(strp->sk->sk_err, -err);` is already using `WRITE_ONCE`! That's interesting, because it means the author of this patch is systematically replacing raw accesses to `sk->sk_err` with `READ_ONCE` and `WRITE_ONCE` across related networking code. Let's list those related changes:
* `include/linux/skmsg.h`: `sk_psock_report_error()`: `WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, err)`
* `net/core/skbuff.c`: `sock_dequeue_err_skb()`: `WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, ...)`
* `net/strparser/strparser.c`: `strp_abort_strp()`: `WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, -err)`
* `net/tls/tls_device.c`: `tls_push_data()`: `rc = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);`
* `net/tls/tls_sw.c`:
* `tls_encrypt_done()`: `skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);`
* `bpf_exec_tx_verdict()`: `READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err)`
* `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked()`: `READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err)`
And finally, the most interesting one in `tls_rx_rec_wait()`. The logic here has been altered, let's look at the old and new code. Previously there was an `if (sk->sk_err)` statement that would exit on error. Now, it seems like the error handling and reads are conditionally handled by `has_copied`.
Now, if `has_copied` is false, `sock_error(sk)` is being called every single loop iteration! I need to understand that. Let's look at what `sock_error(sk)` does, because that's got to be expensive if it's called repeatedly!
```c
static inline int sock_error(struct sock *sk)
{
int err;
if (likely(data_race(!sk->sk_err)))
return 0;
err = xchg(&sk->sk_err, 0);
return -err;
}
```
Aha! If `sk->sk_err` is 0, `sock_error(sk)` returns 0. So, `if (err) return err;` will *only* return if an error code is present, and then it is cleared with `xchg`. Now, I really need to look at `tls_rx_rec_wait()` in full to see why that conditional logic is there!
|
| 22/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "net/tls/tls_sw.c",
"FirstLine": 1100,
"LineCount": 60
}Results: {
"Contents": "1100:\tstatic int\n1101:\ttls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)\n1102:\t{\n1103:\t\tstruct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);\n1104:\t\tstruct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);\n1105:\t\tDEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);\n1106:\t\tint ret = 0;\n1107:\t\tlong timeo;\n1108:\t\n1109:\t\t/* a rekey is pending, let userspace deal with it */\n1110:\t\tif (unlikely(ctx-\u003ekey_update_pending))\n1111:\t\t\treturn -EKEYEXPIRED;\n1112:\t\n1113:\t\ttimeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);\n1114:\t\n1115:\t\twhile (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {\n1116:\t\t\tif (has_copied) {\n1117:\t\t\t\tint err = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n1118:\t\n1119:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1120:\t\t\t\t\treturn -err;\n1121:\t\t\t} else {\n1122:\t\t\t\tint err = sock_error(sk);\n1123:\t\n1124:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1125:\t\t\t\t\treturn err;\n1126:\t\t\t}\n1127:\t\n1128:\t\t\tif (ret \u003c 0)\n1129:\t\t\t\treturn ret;\n1130:\t\n1131:\t\t\tif (sk_flush_backlog(sk))\n1132:\t\t\t\treleased = true;\n1133:\t\t\tif (!skb_queue_empty(\u0026sk-\u003esk_receive_queue)) {\n1134:\t\t\t\t/* Defer notification to the exit point; this thread\n1135:\t\t\t\t * will consume the record directly.\n1136:\t\t\t\t */\n1137:\t\t\t\ttls_strp_check_rcv(\u0026ctx-\u003estrp, false);\n1138:\t\t\t\tif (tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx))\n1139:\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n1140:\t\t\t}\n1141:\t\n1142:\t\t\t/* sk_flush_backlog() can run tcp_reset(), which sets\n1143:\t\t\t * sk_err and then sk_shutdown via tcp_done(). Recheck\n1144:\t\t\t * sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the\n1145:\t\t\t * actual error rather than a clean EOF.\n1146:\t\t\t */\n1147:\t\t\tif (has_copied) {\n1148:\t\t\t\tint err = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n1149:\t\n1150:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1151:\t\t\t\t\treturn -err;\n1152:\t\t\t} else {\n1153:\t\t\t\tint err = sock_error(sk);\n1154:\t\n1155:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1156:\t\t\t\t\treturn err;\n1157:\t\t\t}\n1158:\t\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_shutdown \u0026 RCV_SHUTDOWN)\n1159:\t\t\t\treturn 0;\n"
} |
| 23/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17548 output: 32 thoughts: 21 Thoughts: Here's a summary of my thought process, tailored for an expert like you: **Investigating Callers of Modified TLS Functions** Alright, let's get down to brass tacks. I need to understand the full impact of these recent changes to our TLS implementation, specifically the modifications around `tls_rx_rec_wait()` and any other related function tweaks. My immediate focus is on tracing the propagation of these changes. I'm thinking, "Who's calling these functions now? What's the call graph look like pre and post-modification?" I'm mentally building the call stack in my head, anticipating potential ripple effects. I need to identify *all* the callers, direct and indirect, across the entire code base. That means meticulously examining the code. This isn't just about finding the immediate callers; I'm expecting some indirect dependencies I may have missed, and I'll need to account for those. I have to think about data dependencies too. I need to map out where the data the functions operate on is coming from, and where it goes. This will involve using the appropriate tools (static analysis, dynamic analysis, perhaps even some debugging) to pinpoint the affected regions. |
| 24/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls_rx_rec_wait",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/tls/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls_sw.c=1100=static int\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1101:tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1102-{\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1180-\tif (unlikely(!tls_strp_msg_load(\u0026ctx-\u003estrp, released)))\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1181:\t\treturn tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, false, has_copied);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1182-\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=1824=int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1878-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1879:\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags \u0026 MSG_DONTWAIT,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1880-\t\t\t\t released, !!(decrypted + copied));\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=2017=ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2044-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:2045:\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags \u0026 SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2046-\t\t\t\t true, false);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=2091=int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2129-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:2130:\t\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, true, released, !!copied);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2131-\t\t\tif (err \u003c= 0)\n"
} |
| 25/2 | 2026/10/10 15:05 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 18383 output: 22 thoughts: 627 Thoughts: **My Analysis of Potential Fuzzing Targets** Okay, so I've got a list of networking syscall entry points here: `tls_sw_recvmsg()`, `tls_sw_sendmsg()` (which calls `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`), and `sock_dequeue_err_skb()`. Given they are all exposed via syscalls, these seem like decent candidates for fuzzing, and I think I'm going to determine a `WorthFuzzing` value here. Digging into `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked()`, specifically, I see that `bpf_exec_tx_verdict()` gets called within it (line 704). Furthermore, `tls_encrypt_done()` is the encryption async callback. I'm also seeing `sock_dequeue_err_skb()`, which is used when reading the error queue, along with `sk_psock_report_error()` – that's BPF psock/sockmap error reporting – and `strp_abort_strp()` in `strparser.c`, the stream parser error abort function. I see `tls_push_data()` in `tls_device.c`, which is related to TLS device offload, but it looks like the software implementation is still relevant. So yeah, these are *definitely* potential fuzzing targets. `WorthFuzzing` = True. Now, let me apply the methodology. I need to be careful with my symbol selection, based on Section 4 of whatever document this is, which highlights: * Avoiding ubiquitous lifecycle hot-paths (memory allocators, page faults, synchronization primitives, etc.). That's a huge waste of time and dilutes fuzzing. * Instead, I should target specific feature logic, API entrypoints. * Also, static inline functions in headers can't be targeted directly. If changes are primarily in inlines, find feature-specific caller functions in .c files. Avoid ubiquitous wrappers. Okay, let's see what was changed. One of the functions that got modified is `sk_psock_report_error` in `include/linux/skmsg.h`. Ah, it's a `static inline void` function, so I'm going to need to find its callers to actually target it. |
| 26/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "sk_psock_report_error"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/linux/skmsg.h=421=static inline void kfree_sk_msg(struct sk_msg *msg)\n--\ninclude/linux/skmsg.h-427-\ninclude/linux/skmsg.h:428:static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)\ninclude/linux/skmsg.h-429-{\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c=671=static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work)\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c-731-\t\t\t\t/* Hard errors break pipe and stop xmit. */\nnet/core/skmsg.c:732:\t\t\t\tsk_psock_report_error(psock, ret ? -ret : EPIPE);\nnet/core/skmsg.c-733-\t\t\t\tsk_psock_clear_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED);\n"
} |
| 27/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 19772 output: 22 thoughts: 144 Thoughts: **Analyzing the `sock_dequeue_err_skb` Function** Okay, so the caller in this situation is identified as `sk_psock_backlog`. Now, let's look at `sock_dequeue_err_skb`. This function, residing in `net/core/skbuff.c`, is pretty key. The fact that it's *not* static immediately piques my interest. It implies that it's potentially exposed beyond this specific file. Is it truly a widely used function, a staple in the networking stack? Hmm, the answer is no, it appears to be restricted to error queue handling. Specifically, functions like `ip_recv_error` and `ipv6_recv_error` rely on it. This narrows down its potential impact significantly. Now, I need to understand who the *actual* callers are. I need to trace the call paths to thoroughly grasp its role and potential vulnerabilities in this context. |
| 28/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "sock_dequeue_err_skb"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/net/sock.h=2552=int sock_queue_err_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);\ninclude/net/sock.h:2553:struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk);\ninclude/net/sock.h-2554-\n--\nnet/core/skbuff.c=5521=static bool is_icmp_err_skb(const struct sk_buff *skb)\n--\nnet/core/skbuff.c-5526-\nnet/core/skbuff.c:5527:struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)\nnet/core/skbuff.c-5528-{\n--\nnet/core/skbuff.c-5554-}\nnet/core/skbuff.c:5555:EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_dequeue_err_skb);\nnet/core/skbuff.c-5556-\n--\nnet/core/sock.c=4020=int sock_recv_errqueue(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len,\n--\nnet/core/sock.c-4027-\terr = -EAGAIN;\nnet/core/sock.c:4028:\tskb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);\nnet/core/sock.c-4029-\tif (skb == NULL)\n--\nnet/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c=523=int ip_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len)\n--\nnet/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c-535-\terr = -EAGAIN;\nnet/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:536:\tskb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);\nnet/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c-537-\tif (!skb)\n--\nnet/ipv6/datagram.c=455=int ipv6_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len)\n--\nnet/ipv6/datagram.c-468-\terr = -EAGAIN;\nnet/ipv6/datagram.c:469:\tskb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);\nnet/ipv6/datagram.c-470-\tif (!skb)\n"
} |
| 29/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 20749 output: 21 thoughts: 66 Thoughts: Here's my summary, as if I were thinking these thoughts: **Analyzing Error Queues and String Parsing Aborts** Okay, so `sock_dequeue_err_skb` is an *exported symbol*. That means it's a global function, specifically designed for dequeuing Socket Buffers (SKBs) from the error queue, which I'd expect given the name. Nothing unusual there, it's a non-static function, which makes sense for something that likely needs to be used across different modules. But now I'm curious, what's up with `strp_abort_strp` in `net/strparser/strparser.c`? That filename rings a bell. Let's delve into that function. |
| 30/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "strp_abort_strp"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/strparser/strparser.c=30=static inline struct _strp_msg *_strp_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-36-/* Lower lock held */\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:37:static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-38-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=70=static void strp_parser_err(struct strparser *strp, int err,\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-75-\tstrp-\u003eskb_head = NULL;\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:76:\tstrp_abort_strp(strp, err);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-77-}\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=400=static void strp_msg_timeout(struct work_struct *w)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-407-\tlock_sock(strp-\u003esk);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:408:\tstrp_abort_strp(strp, -ETIMEDOUT);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-409-\trelease_sock(strp-\u003esk);\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h=144=void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err);\nnet/tls/tls.h:145:void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err);\nnet/tls/tls.h-146-\n--\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c=14=static struct workqueue_struct *tls_strp_wq;\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-15-\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c:16:void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err)\nnet/tls/tls_strp.c-17-{\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=2202=int tls_rx_msg_size(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2256-read_failure:\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:2257:\ttls_strp_abort_strp(strp, ret);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2258-\treturn ret;\n"
} |
| 31/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 21629 output: 32 thoughts: 103 Thoughts: Okay, here's my breakdown of what I'm looking at, from my perspective as someone familiar with this area: **Investigating the `strparser` Module's Error Handling** Alright, so I see this `strp_abort_strp` function in `net/strparser/strparser.c`. The fact that it's `static` is immediately interesting, which means it's limited in scope and only called within this specific file. I also see that it's called by `strp_parser_err` and `strp_msg_timeout`, which suggests it's related to error handling or timeout scenarios within the string parsing process. My immediate question is: what's the external entry point into the `strparser` module? Where does the parsing process actually *begin*? Is it triggered by something like `strp_work`, `strp_process`, `strp_data_ready`, or perhaps `strp_check_rcv`? I need to understand how the data gets *into* the parser to fully grasp how errors are handled. Therefore, the next logical step is to dive directly into `net/strparser/strparser.c` to trace the calls, determine where the processing starts, and then better understand how `strp_abort_strp` fits into the overall architecture. I suspect the function will become more clear as I see how it interacts with the rest of the parsing flow. |
| 32/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "EXPORT_SYMBOL.*strp",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/strparser/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/strparser/strparser.c=348=void strp_data_ready(struct strparser *strp)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-372-}\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:373:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_data_ready);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-374-\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=412=int strp_init(struct strparser *strp, struct sock *sk,\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-432-}\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:433:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_init);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-434-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=435=void strp_unpause(struct strparser *strp)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-443-}\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:444:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_unpause);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-445-\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=449=void strp_done(struct strparser *strp)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-464-}\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:465:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_done);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-466-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=467=void strp_stop(struct strparser *strp)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-470-}\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:471:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_stop);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-472-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=473=void strp_check_rcv(struct strparser *strp)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-476-}\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:477:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_check_rcv);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-478-\n"
} |
| 33/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 22628 output: 31 thoughts: 156 Thoughts: **Analyzing the `net/tls/tls_sw.c` Module for Changes** Okay, let's dive into `net/tls/tls_sw.c`. I need to figure out the impact of recent changes. First, I'm going to quickly identify the functions within this file that have been modified or that directly interact with the static functions I'm focusing on. Alright, let's see... I've identified a few key ones: `tls_encrypt_done`, which is a static callback function; `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`, which is a static int and is called by `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`; and `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked` is another static int, and it's called by `tls_sw_sendmsg`, `tls_sw_sendpage_locked` and other potential functions. Now, my focus is the exposed sendmsg function. So, what's the external facing function here? Ah, it's `tls_sw_sendmsg`. Now, let's drill down and understand the behavior of `tls_sw_sendmsg`. |
| 34/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls_sw_sendmsg",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/tls/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls.h=154=void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:155:int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size);\nnet/tls/tls.h-156-void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=996=static void build_protos(struct proto prot[TLS_NUM_CONFIG][TLS_NUM_CONFIG],\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1005-\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE] = prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1006:\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE].sendmsg\t\t= tls_sw_sendmsg;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1007-\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE].splice_eof\t= tls_sw_splice_eof;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=722=static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-741-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:742:static int tls_sw_sendmsg_splice(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-743-\t\t\t\t struct sk_msg *msg_pl, size_t try_to_copy,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-772-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:773:static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-774-\t\t\t\t size_t size)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-863-\t\tif (try_to_copy \u0026\u0026 (msg-\u003emsg_flags \u0026 MSG_SPLICE_PAGES)) {\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:864:\t\t\tret = tls_sw_sendmsg_splice(sk, msg, msg_pl,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-865-\t\t\t\t\t\t try_to_copy, \u0026copied);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1013-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1014:int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1015-{\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1027-\tlock_sock(sk);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1028:\tret = tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(sk, msg, size);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1029-\trelease_sock(sk);\n"
} |
| 35/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 23785 output: 31 thoughts: 91 Thoughts: Here's my thought process, breaking down these TLS function calls: **Analyzing TLS Socket Operations** Okay, so I'm looking at these core TLS socket operations: `tls_sw_sendmsg` and its locked counterpart, `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`. Makes sense; one likely handles the raw send operation, and the other probably enforces some kind of locking mechanism for thread safety. Now, what about `tls_rx_rec_wait`? That name suggests waiting for a TLS record to be received. I need to understand where this function gets called from. Let's see... the callers are: `tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_sw_splice_read`, and `tls_sw_read_sock`. Interesting. That means it's a fundamental building block for receiving data through the TLS layer. Let me take a closer look at `tls_sw_recvmsg`. I want to understand how it utilizes that wait function and the overall flow of data reception. I'll need to dig into the implementation of that function to get a full picture. |
| 36/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls_sw_recvmsg",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/tls/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls.h=162=void tls_sw_free_ctx_rx(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:163:int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len,\nnet/tls/tls.h-164-\t\t int flags);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c=996=static void build_protos(struct proto prot[TLS_NUM_CONFIG][TLS_NUM_CONFIG],\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1009-\tprot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW] = prot[TLS_BASE][TLS_BASE];\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1010:\tprot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW].recvmsg\t\t = tls_sw_recvmsg;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1011-\tprot[TLS_BASE][TLS_SW].sock_is_readable = tls_sw_sock_is_readable;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1014-\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW] = prot[TLS_SW][TLS_BASE];\nnet/tls/tls_main.c:1015:\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW].recvmsg\t\t= tls_sw_recvmsg;\nnet/tls/tls_main.c-1016-\tprot[TLS_SW][TLS_SW].sock_is_readable = tls_sw_sock_is_readable;\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=1818=static void tls_rx_reader_unlock(struct sock *sk, struct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1823-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1824:int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1825-\t\t struct msghdr *msg,\n"
} |
| 37/2 | 2026/10/10 15:06 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 24638 output: 30 thoughts: 55 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of this thought process, keeping in mind my expertise: **Diving into the TLS Software Receive Path** Alright, so I'm focusing on `tls_sw_recvmsg`. This is the core, the *proto* `recvmsg` implementation specifically for TLS Software (SW) receive operations. It's the lynchpin for how we handle incoming data over a TLS connection when we're operating in software, rather than offloading to hardware. Now, my mind naturally jumps to related components. I'm thinking about the network interface, and particularly, the `net/tls/tls_device.c` file. Specifically, I'm trying to remember what `tls_push_data` does in that context. I need to refresh myself, so I'm going to quickly look at the callers of `tls_push_data`. I want to know where the push happens relative to the recvmsg. |
| 38/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls_push_data",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/tls/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls_device.c=396=static int tls_device_copy_data(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-420-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:421:static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-422-\t\t\t struct iov_iter *iter,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=567=int tls_device_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-584-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:585:\trc = tls_push_data(sk, \u0026msg-\u003emsg_iter, size, msg-\u003emsg_flags,\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-586-\t\t\t record_type);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=594=void tls_device_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-609-\t\tiov_iter_bvec(\u0026iter, ITER_SOURCE, NULL, 0, 0);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:610:\t\ttls_push_data(sk, \u0026iter, 0, 0, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-611-\t}\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=677=static int tls_device_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-681-\tiov_iter_kvec(\u0026iter, ITER_SOURCE, NULL, 0, 0);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:682:\treturn tls_push_data(sk, \u0026iter, 0, flags, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-683-}\n"
} |
| 39/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 25427 output: 29 thoughts: 730 Thoughts: **Analyzing TLS Device Offload Implementation** Okay, so I'm diving into this `tls_device.c` code, and I see `tls_device_sendmsg`. The obvious question is, how is this leveraging hardware support if the device offload is actually happening? I need to understand the relevant symbols in this diff to get a handle on the changes. I've got a list here: `sock_dequeue_err_skb`, `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`, `tls_sw_sendmsg`, `tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_rx_rec_wait`, `tls_encrypt_done`, `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`, `strp_abort_strp`, `tls_push_data`, `tls_device_sendmsg`, and the static inline `sk_psock_report_error` which calls `sk_psock_backlog`. That seems like a good starting point. Now, I need to see which of these are actually relevant to device offload. Specifically, I should check if `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`, `tls_rx_rec_wait`, `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`, and `tls_encrypt_done` are present in the vmlinux symbol table. My gut tells me some could be inlined, so I need to account for both static functions and their callers, like `tls_sw_sendmsg`, `tls_sw_recvmsg` and `sock_dequeue_err_skb`. This should give me a more complete picture of what's happening. Next, I need to check the configurations: `TLS` enables `CONFIG_TLS`, which builds `net/tls/tls_sw.c`. `TLS_DEVICE` enables `CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE`, which is the one building `net/tls/tls_device.c`. That's straightforward. Then there's `STREAM_PARSER`. Is it `CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER` or `CONFIG_BPF_STREAM_PARSER`? Wait, it looks like `STREAM_PARSER` is a `def_bool n` in `net/strparser/Kconfig`. Can a user select that directly? No prompt means no. Okay, so who *does* select `STREAM_PARSER`? Let's re-examine that: * `BPF_STREAM_PARSER`: Selects `STREAM_PARSER`, along with `NET_SOCK_MSG`. * `INET_ESPINTCP`: Selects `STREAM_PARSER`. * `AF_KCM`: Also selects `STREAM_PARSER`. And I should figure out what enables `skmsg.c`. I will have to check `net/core/Makefile` for `skmsg.o` to understand that bit. |
| 40/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "skmsg\\.o",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/core/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/core/Makefile=43=obj-$(CONFIG_FAILOVER) += failover.o\nnet/core/Makefile:44:obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG) += skmsg.o\nnet/core/Makefile-45-obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += sock_map.o\n"
} |
| 41/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 26891 output: 31 thoughts: 132 Thoughts: Okay, here's my breakdown of what I'm looking at, from my perspective as someone well-versed in kernel configuration: **Kernel Configuration Dependencies: Unraveling the Network Socket Mysteries** Right, so `CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG` is flagged as being selected by `CONFIG_TLS`. That's the first connection I'm picking up. Let's take a closer look at `net/tls/Kconfig` to confirm this association. As expected, there it is: `CONFIG_TLS` explicitly `select`s `NET_SOCK_MSG`. We know TLS requires certain socket message functionality, so that makes logical sense. Now, let's bring `BPF_STREAM_PARSER` into the equation. It also selects `STREAM_PARSER` and, crucially, `NET_SOCK_MSG`. This is the important part because I know BPF is a very important tool in many networking use cases. I need to understand why `NET_SOCK_MSG` is being selected in multiple contexts. My next step is to determine if `BPF_STREAM_PARSER` has a dependency on `CGROUP_BPF`. This is my question because if it is, the connection to `NET_SOCK_MSG` might be more focused on how BPF interacts with the network stack via cgroups. I need to be sure. I'll need to check the Kconfig files for that too. |
| 42/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "config BPF_STREAM_PARSER",
"PathPrefixes": [
"net/"
]
}Results: {
"Output": "net/Kconfig=353=config BQL\n--\nnet/Kconfig-359-\nnet/Kconfig:360:config BPF_STREAM_PARSER\nnet/Kconfig-361-\tbool \"enable BPF STREAM_PARSER\"\n"
} |
| 43/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 27433 output: 32 thoughts: 17 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my summary, taking the first-person perspective as requested: **Navigating the Kconfig Labyrinth** Alright, time to get my hands dirty. I need to understand something specific, and I have a feeling the answer lies in the depths of `net/Kconfig`. Let's zero in on line 360 – that's a good place to start my investigation. It's a common practice: when you know roughly where a relevant configuration option or definition should be, a focused exploration around a known point in the Kconfig file can yield insights into the relevant logical context and supporting configuration variables. I'm preparing myself to parse the syntax and meaning of the configuration, looking for conditional statements, dependencies, and any hints about how this particular option interacts with others in the network stack. This is the starting point, and I expect it will take me to other parts of the Kconfig tree, as I follow dependencies and explore related config options. I'm ready to get my head in this and understand the configuration in detail. |
| 44/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "net/Kconfig",
"FirstLine": 355,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 355:\t\tprompt \"Enable Byte Queue Limits\"\n 356:\t\tdepends on SYSFS\n 357:\t\tselect DQL\n 358:\t\tdefault y\n 359:\t\n 360:\tconfig BPF_STREAM_PARSER\n 361:\t\tbool \"enable BPF STREAM_PARSER\"\n 362:\t\tdepends on INET\n 363:\t\tdepends on BPF_SYSCALL\n 364:\t\tdepends on CGROUP_BPF\n 365:\t\tselect STREAM_PARSER\n 366:\t\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n 367:\t\thelp\n 368:\t\t Enabling this allows a TCP stream parser to be used with\n 369:\t\t BPF_MAP_TYPE_SOCKMAP.\n 370:\t\n 371:\tconfig NET_FLOW_LIMIT\n 372:\t\tbool \"Net flow limit\"\n 373:\t\tdepends on RPS\n 374:\t\tdefault y\n"
} |
| 45/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 27968 output: 236 thoughts: 730 Thoughts: **My Configuration Assessment** Okay, let me break this down. From what I've gathered, to get this configuration right, we need to ensure certain features are enabled. `BPF_STREAM_PARSER` activates `STREAM_PARSER` and `NET_SOCK_MSG`. The `TLS` setting is tristate, which, if enabled, brings in kTLS. And `TLS_DEVICE` is a boolean that controls TLS device offload. Specifically, I need to make sure the following configs are set: `TLS`, to pull in `net/tls/tls_sw.c`; `TLS_DEVICE`, which is for `net/tls/tls_device.c`; and crucially, `BPF_STREAM_PARSER`, which enables `net/strparser/strparser.c` and includes the relevant header in `include/linux/skmsg.h`. `NET_SOCK_MSG` is a dependency of `TLS` and `BPF_STREAM_PARSER`, so it should be automatically enabled. I need to confirm there aren't any other gotchas. I see `INET` is standard and should be on by default. Also, the presence of `sock_dequeue_err_skb()` in `net/core/skbuff.c` is guaranteed, being part of core `skbuff.c`. Now, let's look at the symbols this touches. I've compiled a list of non-ubiquitous functions: `sock_dequeue_err_skb`, `tls_rx_rec_wait`, `tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_sw_sendmsg`, `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`, `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`, `tls_encrypt_done`, `strp_abort_strp`, and `sk_psock_backlog`. I've carefully analyzed each of those to ensure they are *not* ubiquitous. `sock_dequeue_err_skb` is only used during error queue handling, within `sock_recv_errqueue`, `ip_recv_error`, and `ipv6_recv_error`. `tls_rx_rec_wait`, `tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_sw_sendmsg`, `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`, `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`, `tls_encrypt_done`, `strp_abort_strp` and `sk_psock_backlog` are specific to kTLS and/or BPF stream parser functions, and are not found anywhere outside of this limited context. Now, let's cross-reference this against the requirements and guidelines. The "Core Triage Philosophy" looks good because it's accessing concurrency to `sk->sk_err` using `READ_ONCE()` / `WRITE_ONCE()` across kTLS sw/device, skbuff error queue, stream parser, and sockmap components, and restructures `tls_rx_rec_wait()`. This is absolutely touching reachable core networking code (kTLS, skbuff, strparser, sockmap), which is important. The "EnableConfigs" list confirms what I've already determined: `TLS`, `TLS_DEVICE`, and `BPF_STREAM_PARSER`. The "FocusSymbols" are non-ubiquitous, specific to the modified paths. Excellent, it appears I've thoroughly checked everything. I'm ready to call `set-results`. |
| 46/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"EnableConfigs": [
"TLS",
"TLS_DEVICE",
"BPF_STREAM_PARSER"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"tls_rx_rec_wait",
"tls_sw_recvmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"tls_encrypt_done",
"sock_dequeue_err_skb",
"strp_abort_strp",
"sk_psock_backlog"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies reachable networking subsystems including kTLS, the stream parser, sockmap error reporting, and core skbuff error queue dequeueing. In particular, it converts raw sk_err accesses to READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE and alters the error inspection logic in tls_rx_rec_wait(), which is reachable via standard socket operations on TLS sockets. Fuzzing is warranted to ensure the altered control flow and concurrency annotations do not introduce regressions or expose race conditions.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"TLS",
"TLS_DEVICE",
"BPF_STREAM_PARSER"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"tls_rx_rec_wait",
"tls_sw_recvmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"tls_encrypt_done",
"sock_dequeue_err_skb",
"strp_abort_strp",
"sk_psock_backlog"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch modifies reachable networking subsystems including kTLS, the stream parser, sockmap error reporting, and core skbuff error queue dequeueing. In particular, it converts raw sk_err accesses to READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE and alters the error inspection logic in tls_rx_rec_wait(), which is reachable via standard socket operations on TLS sockets. Fuzzing is warranted to ensure the altered control flow and concurrency annotations do not introduce regressions or expose race conditions.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
} |
| 47/1 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | action | If |
0mArgs:{
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Results: null |
| 48/2 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | agent | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:core Args: null Results: {
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch adds READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE annotations to accesses of `sk-\u003esk_err` and refactors socket error checking in `net/tls`, `net/strparser`, `net/core/skbuff.c`, and `include/linux/skmsg.h` to address data races.\n\nNone of the changes touch uninitialized memory, modify buffer boundaries, create uninitialized stack/heap structures, or copy uninitialized data to user space:\n- All introduced local variables (`skerr`, `err`, `rc`) are initialized immediately upon declaration with the results of `READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err)` or `sock_error(sk)`.\n- `sk-\u003esk_err` is a scalar field initialized when sockets are created.\n- The change addresses concurrency and compiler reordering/tearing risks (targeted by KCSAN), not uninitialized memory bugs.\n\nTherefore, dedicated KMSAN fuzzing is not required; standard testing and sanitizers are sufficient.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel security engineer specializing in kernel memory
error detectors (KASAN and KMSAN). Your job is to review the provided patch series and
determine if the code changes justify spawning a dedicated KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer)
fuzzing session in addition to standard KASAN fuzzing.
CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KASAN AND KMSAN:
- Standard KASAN kernel builds (upstream-apparmor-kasan.config) already enable
a comprehensive suite of debugging tools and sanitizers, including KASAN
(out-of-bounds accesses, use-after-free, double free, invalid free), LOCKDEP
(locking bugs and deadlocks), UB-sanitizers, and memory corruption checks.
- KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer) detects reads of UNINITIALIZED memory (stack, heap,
or page allocations) and kernel-to-user memory info-leaks.
Rule: THERE IS NO SENSE IN RUNNING A KMSAN SESSION IF A BUG CAN BE CAUGHT BY KASAN,
LOCKDEP, OR OTHER STANDARD BUG DETECTORS.
A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session incurs significant resource costs. You must ONLY
set NeedsKMSAN=true if the code changes introduce or expose UNINITIALIZED MEMORY risks
that are detected ONLY by KMSAN.
Look holistically at the patch series and surrounding code. Even if no direct
uninitialized field accesses or new buffer allocations are added in the diff itself,
a patch may alter control flow, bounds checking, or data length calculations in ways
that change how the rest of the code operates on existing buffers (e.g. allowing
uninitialized stack/heap memory to be read, copied to user space, or used in control
flow). Do not hesitate to use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code,
called functions, and callers.
Set NeedsKMSAN=true ONLY IF the patch introduces or modifies:
1. Kernel structures sent to user space (via copy_to_user, put_user, netlink skb
attributes, ioctl output arguments, socket options, or BPF buffers) where fields
or structure padding might not be fully initialized/zeroed.
2. Conditional logic or branching that depends on potentially uninitialized variables
or struct fields.
3. Allocation or initialization of complex data structures where uninitialized fields
could be read later in reachable code paths.
4. Bounds checks, lengths, or logic in a way that allows surrounding code to access
uninitialized bytes of existing buffers.
Set NeedsKMSAN=false IF:
- The code changes primarily risk out-of-bounds access, array overflows, NULL pointer
dereferences, locking deadlocks, or use-after-free bugs (these are already caught
by KASAN, LOCKDEP, or standard bug detectors).
- All stack/heap structures touched or introduced by the patch are fully zeroed
or initialized (e.g. using = {0}, memset, kzalloc) before being read or copied.
- The patch does not introduce any risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks.
Use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code if necessary, then provide
detailed KMSANReasoning contrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability for this patch.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Target architecture: amd64
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit e13334f7c74d7e7d9ab552486fd6bde32cc91bf1
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date: Sat Oct 10 15:04:15 2026 +0000
syz-cluster: applied patch under review
diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h
index d5e35f24738d5..52ce45f25f5a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)
{
struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
- sk->sk_err = err;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, err);
sk_error_report(sk);
}
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index d56f4f0102f75..a6c9cf57bc3bf 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -5539,12 +5539,13 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)
if (skb && (skb_next = skb_peek(q))) {
icmp_next = is_icmp_err_skb(skb_next);
if (icmp_next)
- sk->sk_err = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)->ee.ee_errno;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err,
+ SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)->ee.ee_errno);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock, flags);
if (is_icmp_err_skb(skb) && !icmp_next)
- sk->sk_err = 0;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, 0);
if (skb_next)
sk_error_report(sk);
diff --git a/net/strparser/strparser.c b/net/strparser/strparser.c
index 9c1559d7923f2..5f1da32b152fc 100644
--- a/net/strparser/strparser.c
+++ b/net/strparser/strparser.c
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)
strp->need_bytes = 0;
/* Report an error on the lower socket */
- sk->sk_err = -err;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, -err);
sk_error_report(sk);
}
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c
index f11d0528fc431..03ce83a9d4e9c 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
@@ -444,8 +444,9 @@ static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,
if ((flags & (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR)) == (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR))
return -EINVAL;
- if (unlikely(sk->sk_err))
- return -sk->sk_err;
+ rc = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
flags |= MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED;
tls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_MORE;
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index 312e51270f293..a2be1283ca930 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
struct scatterlist *sge;
struct sk_msg *msg_en;
struct sock *sk;
+ int skerr;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) /* see the comment in tls_decrypt_done() */
return;
@@ -488,13 +489,15 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
+ skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
/* Check if error is previously set on socket */
- if (err || sk->sk_err) {
+ if (err || skerr) {
rec = NULL;
/* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err;
+ if (skerr) {
+ ctx->async_wait.err = -skerr;
} else {
ctx->async_wait.err = err;
tls_err_abort(sk, err);
@@ -704,10 +707,14 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
int err;
err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
- *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
- tls_free_open_rec(sk);
- err = -sk->sk_err;
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ int skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (skerr == EBADMSG) {
+ *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ err = -skerr;
+ }
}
return err;
}
@@ -800,10 +807,9 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
}
while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ret = -sk->sk_err;
+ ret = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+ if (ret)
goto send_end;
- }
if (ctx->open_rec)
rec = ctx->open_rec;
@@ -1107,10 +1113,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- if (has_copied)
- return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
- return sock_error(sk);
+ if (has_copied) {
+ int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -err;
+ } else {
+ int err = sock_error(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1132,10 +1144,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
* sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the
* actual error rather than a clean EOF.
*/
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- if (has_copied)
- return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
- return sock_error(sk);
+ if (has_copied) {
+ int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -err;
+ } else {
+ int err = sock_error(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
|
| 49/3 | 2026/10/10 15:07 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 4197 output: 236 thoughts: 1692 Thoughts: **KMSAN Evaluation: No Need for Dedicated Session** Okay, let's break this down. My goal is to determine if this patch series warrants a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session. The patch seems straightforward: it's all about data race annotations, specifically applying `READ_ONCE` and `WRITE_ONCE` to accesses of `sk->sk_err`, which is a pre-existing integer field within the `struct sock` structure. This is a common pattern for dealing with concurrency issues. Initially, I see updates across a handful of files: `include/linux/skmsg.h`, `net/core/skbuff.c`, `net/strparser/strparser.c`, `net/tls/tls_device.c`, and `net/tls/tls_sw.c`. The changes consistently involve replacing plain reads and writes of `sk->sk_err` with their atomic counterparts. Essentially, it's making the code safe for multithreaded environments by ensuring that reads and writes to this error code are atomic. The `tls_rx_rec_wait` function underwent some refactoring to improve thread safety as well. The critical question is, does this patch introduce or expose uninitialized memory risks? That's what KMSAN is for. Looking at the criteria, I need to check for any new kernel structures sent to userspace, conditional logic depending on uninitialized variables, allocation of complex data structures with potentially uninitialized fields, or changes that allow access to uninitialized bytes of existing buffers. Conversely, I *don't* need KMSAN if the patch primarily fixes issues like out-of-bounds access, array overflows, NULL pointer dereferences, locking deadlocks (KASAN catches these), or if all structures are fully initialized before use. From my analysis, it seems clear: there is no uninitialized memory concern with this patch. All the added variables are local and immediately assigned values, like `skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err)` or `int err = sock_error(sk)`. The `sk->sk_err` field itself is already initialized during socket creation. The modifications are only about making sure concurrent reads/writes of an *already-initialized* value are done safely. No new memory allocations, no user-space copying, no changes to buffer sizes...nothing that would indicate an uninitialized memory exposure. I looked at the more complex `tls_rx_rec_wait` code, and after careful re-reading, confirm it’s just concurrency hardening. So, in summary: the patch is about data race elimination via `READ_ONCE`/`WRITE_ONCE` on `sk->sk_err`. There are no changes that would introduce or expose uninitialized memory. KMSAN is not needed here. Standard KASAN, KCSAN and existing bug detection tools are sufficient. I'm setting `NeedsKMSAN=false`. Let's move on. |
| 50/3 | 2026/10/10 15:08 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch adds READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE annotations to accesses of `sk-\u003esk_err` and refactors socket error checking in `net/tls`, `net/strparser`, `net/core/skbuff.c`, and `include/linux/skmsg.h` to address data races.\n\nNone of the changes touch uninitialized memory, modify buffer boundaries, create uninitialized stack/heap structures, or copy uninitialized data to user space:\n- All introduced local variables (`skerr`, `err`, `rc`) are initialized immediately upon declaration with the results of `READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err)` or `sock_error(sk)`.\n- `sk-\u003esk_err` is a scalar field initialized when sockets are created.\n- The change addresses concurrency and compiler reordering/tearing risks (targeted by KCSAN), not uninitialized memory bugs.\n\nTherefore, dedicated KMSAN fuzzing is not required; standard testing and sanitizers are sufficient.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
}Results: {
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch adds READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE annotations to accesses of `sk-\u003esk_err` and refactors socket error checking in `net/tls`, `net/strparser`, `net/core/skbuff.c`, and `include/linux/skmsg.h` to address data races.\n\nNone of the changes touch uninitialized memory, modify buffer boundaries, create uninitialized stack/heap structures, or copy uninitialized data to user space:\n- All introduced local variables (`skerr`, `err`, `rc`) are initialized immediately upon declaration with the results of `READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err)` or `sock_error(sk)`.\n- `sk-\u003esk_err` is a scalar field initialized when sockets are created.\n- The change addresses concurrency and compiler reordering/tearing risks (targeted by KCSAN), not uninitialized memory bugs.\n\nTherefore, dedicated KMSAN fuzzing is not required; standard testing and sanitizers are sufficient.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
} |
| Total Calls | Total Tokens | Avg Tokens | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|
| Total Calls | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|