| Seq | Timestamp | Type | Name | Duration |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0/0 | 2026/10/04 04:57 | flow | patch-triage |
1mArgs:null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"TLS",
"TLS_DEVICE",
"STREAM_PARSER",
"BPF_STREAM_PARSER"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"tls_rx_rec_wait",
"tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"tls_sw_recvmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg",
"tls_encrypt_done",
"bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"tls_push_data",
"tls_device_sendmsg",
"sock_dequeue_err_skb",
"strp_abort_strp",
"sk_psock_backlog"
],
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch introduces READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE annotations to fix data races on sk-\u003esk_err across socket and TLS subsystems (skmsg, skbuff, strparser, and tls). It does not allocate new memory buffers, modify data copies to user space, change structure padding, or alter buffer bounds/length calculations. All variables accessed and modified (such as sk-\u003esk_err and local err/skerr variables) are fully initialized socket fields or initialized locals. Consequently, there are no uninitialized memory access or info-leak risks that would necessitate KMSAN fuzzing; standard sanitizers (such as KCSAN/KASAN) are sufficient.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false,
"Reasoning": "The patch alters error state handling (sk-\u003esk_err) across core networking components, including kTLS (software and device offload paths), strparser, skbuff error queue dequeuing, and skmsg. Specifically, it introduces READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE annotations and alters socket error consumption flow in tls_rx_rec_wait() and bpf_exec_tx_verdict(). These code paths are fully reachable via socket operations and kTLS ULP in standard virtualized environments and warrant fuzzing to verify error propagation and concurrency invariants.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
} |
| 1/1 | 2026/10/04 04:57 | action | read-patch-diff |
0mArgs:null Results: {
"PatchDiff": "commit e6d565e9c031ea1fe95d4427883f4b8e96268f88\nAuthor: syz-cluster \u003ctriage@syzkaller.com\u003e\nDate: Sun Oct 4 04:57:53 2026 +0000\n\n syz-cluster: applied patch under review\n\ndiff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h\nindex d5e35f24738d5..52ce45f25f5a6 100644\n--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h\n+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h\n@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)\n {\n \tstruct sock *sk = psock-\u003esk;\n \n-\tsk-\u003esk_err = err;\n+\tWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err, err);\n \tsk_error_report(sk);\n }\n \ndiff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c\nindex 5c4024a03e105..51e3cf1ea9859 100644\n--- a/net/core/skbuff.c\n+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c\n@@ -5535,12 +5535,13 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)\n \tif (skb \u0026\u0026 (skb_next = skb_peek(q))) {\n \t\ticmp_next = is_icmp_err_skb(skb_next);\n \t\tif (icmp_next)\n-\t\t\tsk-\u003esk_err = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)-\u003eee.ee_errno;\n+\t\t\tWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err,\n+\t\t\t\t SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)-\u003eee.ee_errno);\n \t}\n \tspin_unlock_irqrestore(\u0026q-\u003elock, flags);\n \n \tif (is_icmp_err_skb(skb) \u0026\u0026 !icmp_next)\n-\t\tsk-\u003esk_err = 0;\n+\t\tWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err, 0);\n \n \tif (skb_next)\n \t\tsk_error_report(sk);\ndiff --git a/net/strparser/strparser.c b/net/strparser/strparser.c\nindex a23f4b4dfc673..e5d5d755e532a 100644\n--- a/net/strparser/strparser.c\n+++ b/net/strparser/strparser.c\n@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)\n \t\tstruct sock *sk = strp-\u003esk;\n \n \t\t/* Report an error on the lower socket */\n-\t\tsk-\u003esk_err = -err;\n+\t\tWRITE_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err, -err);\n \t\tsk_error_report(sk);\n \t}\n }\ndiff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c\nindex f11d0528fc431..03ce83a9d4e9c 100644\n--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c\n+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c\n@@ -444,8 +444,9 @@ static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,\n \tif ((flags \u0026 (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR)) == (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR))\n \t\treturn -EINVAL;\n \n-\tif (unlikely(sk-\u003esk_err))\n-\t\treturn -sk-\u003esk_err;\n+\trc = -READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\tif (unlikely(rc))\n+\t\treturn rc;\n \n \tflags |= MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED;\n \ttls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_MORE;\ndiff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c\nindex d1ad31986cf2c..d85d0c1ff546d 100644\n--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c\n+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c\n@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)\n \tstruct scatterlist *sge;\n \tstruct sk_msg *msg_en;\n \tstruct sock *sk;\n+\tint skerr;\n \n \tif (err == -EINPROGRESS) /* see the comment in tls_decrypt_done() */\n \t\treturn;\n@@ -488,13 +489,15 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)\n \tsge-\u003eoffset -= prot-\u003eprepend_size;\n \tsge-\u003elength += prot-\u003eprepend_size;\n \n+\tskerr = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\n \t/* Check if error is previously set on socket */\n-\tif (err || sk-\u003esk_err) {\n+\tif (err || skerr) {\n \t\trec = NULL;\n \n \t\t/* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */\n-\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_err) {\n-\t\t\tctx-\u003easync_wait.err = -sk-\u003esk_err;\n+\t\tif (skerr) {\n+\t\t\tctx-\u003easync_wait.err = -skerr;\n \t\t} else {\n \t\t\tctx-\u003easync_wait.err = err;\n \t\t\ttls_err_abort(sk, err);\n@@ -704,10 +707,14 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,\n \tint err;\n \n \terr = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);\n-\tif (err \u0026\u0026 err != -EINPROGRESS \u0026\u0026 sk-\u003esk_err == EBADMSG) {\n-\t\t*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);\n-\t\ttls_free_open_rec(sk);\n-\t\terr = -sk-\u003esk_err;\n+\tif (err \u0026\u0026 err != -EINPROGRESS) {\n+\t\tint skerr = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\n+\t\tif (skerr == EBADMSG) {\n+\t\t\t*copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);\n+\t\t\ttls_free_open_rec(sk);\n+\t\t\terr = -skerr;\n+\t\t}\n \t}\n \treturn err;\n }\n@@ -800,10 +807,9 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,\n \t}\n \n \twhile (msg_data_left(msg)) {\n-\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_err) {\n-\t\t\tret = -sk-\u003esk_err;\n+\t\tret = -READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\t\tif (ret)\n \t\t\tgoto send_end;\n-\t\t}\n \n \t\tif (ctx-\u003eopen_rec)\n \t\t\trec = ctx-\u003eopen_rec;\n@@ -1107,10 +1113,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)\n \ttimeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);\n \n \twhile (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {\n-\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_err) {\n-\t\t\tif (has_copied)\n-\t\t\t\treturn -READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n-\t\t\treturn sock_error(sk);\n+\t\tif (has_copied) {\n+\t\t\tint err = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\n+\t\t\tif (err)\n+\t\t\t\treturn -err;\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tint err = sock_error(sk);\n+\n+\t\t\tif (err)\n+\t\t\t\treturn err;\n \t\t}\n \n \t\tif (ret \u003c 0)\n@@ -1132,10 +1144,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)\n \t\t * sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the\n \t\t * actual error rather than a clean EOF.\n \t\t */\n-\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_err) {\n-\t\t\tif (has_copied)\n-\t\t\t\treturn -READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n-\t\t\treturn sock_error(sk);\n+\t\tif (has_copied) {\n+\t\t\tint err = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n+\n+\t\t\tif (err)\n+\t\t\t\treturn -err;\n+\t\t} else {\n+\t\t\tint err = sock_error(sk);\n+\n+\t\t\tif (err)\n+\t\t\t\treturn err;\n \t\t}\n \t\tif (sk-\u003esk_shutdown \u0026 RCV_SHUTDOWN)\n \t\t\treturn 0;\n"
} |
| 2/1 | 2026/10/04 04:57 | agent | patch-evaluator |
1mModel:core Args: null Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"TLS",
"TLS_DEVICE",
"STREAM_PARSER",
"BPF_STREAM_PARSER"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"tls_rx_rec_wait",
"tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"tls_sw_recvmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg",
"tls_encrypt_done",
"bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"tls_push_data",
"tls_device_sendmsg",
"sock_dequeue_err_skb",
"strp_abort_strp",
"sk_psock_backlog"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch alters error state handling (sk-\u003esk_err) across core networking components, including kTLS (software and device offload paths), strparser, skbuff error queue dequeuing, and skmsg. Specifically, it introduces READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE annotations and alters socket error consumption flow in tls_rx_rec_wait() and bpf_exec_tx_verdict(). These code paths are fully reachable via socket operations and kTLS ULP in standard virtualized environments and warrant fuzzing to verify error propagation and concurrency invariants.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel maintainer and security engineer.
Your job is to review a provided patch series and evaluate whether it warrants fuzzing with syzkaller.
IMPORTANT: The changes have ALREADY been applied and committed as the HEAD commit in
your workspace. Do NOT rely on internal assumptions. You must actively use your code access
tools to inspect the actual source code, callers, and surrounding context.
================================================================================
1. CORE TRIAGE PHILOSOPHY
================================================================================
The goal of patch fuzzing is to discover crashes, regressions, exposed latent bugs,
and newly triggered assertions introduced by the patch series.
- REACHABILITY IS THE PRIMARY GATE:
Fuzzing can only discover bugs in code that can actually execute in standard virtualized
environments (GCE or QEMU, utilizing software-emulated devices like USB gadgets, netdev, tun/tap).
If the modified code is structurally unreachable (see Section 2), it MUST NOT be fuzzed,
regardless of whether it adds assertions or complex logic.
- DO NOT BLINDLY TRUST "NO FUNCTIONAL CHANGE" (NFCI) OR "REFACTORING" CLAIMS:
Patch authors routinely label changes as "cleanups", "refactorings", or state
"No functional change intended". Do NOT take these claims at face value.
Code refactorings that rearrange logic, introduce helper functions, or alter state management
in core subsystems frequently introduce subtle semantic shifts or uncover latent kernel bugs.
If reachable executable code is modified or refactored, it MUST be fuzzed.
- NEW OR MODIFIED ASSERTIONS IN REACHABLE CODE MUST BE FUZZED:
When a patch introduces or modifies runtime checks or assertions (e.g., WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*,
BUG_ON*, lockdep_assert*) in reachable code paths, it enforces new or stricter invariants.
Even if the author believes the invariant always holds, fuzzing is essential to verify whether
an unusual sequence of operations can violate it.
================================================================================
2. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=false (NEGATIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=false ONLY IF all modified code falls strictly into one or more of these categories:
- Non-kernel and non-executable changes:
* Modifications to Documentation/, comments, or spelling fixes.
* User-space directories, self-tests, samples, or scripts (e.g., tools/, samples/, scripts/, usr/)
that do not affect the compiled kernel image (vmlinux) or kernel modules.
* Purely decorative logging (e.g., message strings in pr_err, printk, dev_info) or tracepoints
that do not alter control flow or data structures.
* Build system or Kconfig changes that do not alter compiled C logic.
- Structurally unreachable hardware:
* Vendor-specific PCIe switches, SmartNICs, or GPU drivers (e.g., mlxsw, pds_core, qed,
ionic, amdgpu) requiring physical ASIC/PCIe cards not emulated in standard QEMU.
- Unreachable execution paths:
* Driver teardown callbacks (.remove, .shutdown, pci_unregister_driver) executed only during
physical PCI hot-unplug or manual sysfs driver unbinding.
* Code paths exclusive to architectures other than the target architecture.
================================================================================
3. WHEN TO RETURN WorthFuzzing=true (POSITIVE CRITERIA)
================================================================================
Return WorthFuzzing=true whenever the patch touches reachable executable code, including:
- Core Subsystems:
* Any logic modifications in memory management (mm/), synchronization/locking (kernel/locking/),
BPF, scheduler, core networking, VFS, or syscall handling.
- Refactorings and Code Cleanups:
* Any restructuring of reachable data structures, helper abstractions, or algorithm flows.
- Runtime Assertions and Defensive Checks:
* Any introduction or alteration of assertions (WARN_ON*, VM_WARN_ON*, BUG_ON*, etc.) in reachable paths.
- Reachable Drivers and Protocols:
* Drivers accessible via virtual buses (virtio, USB gadget, loopback, netlink, binder, sockets, etc.).
================================================================================
4. EXTRACTING FocusSymbols (PREVENTING DILUTION)
================================================================================
When WorthFuzzing=true, you must extract specific kernel functions into FocusSymbols to guide the fuzzer:
- AVOID UBIQUITOUS LIFECYCLE HOT-PATHS:
Do NOT list generic, ubiquitous functions called by almost every program in the corpus
(including, but not limited to: general memory allocators and deallocators, page fault
and trap handlers, or core synchronization primitives; this is not an exhaustive list).
Listing ubiquitous functions causes the fuzzer to classify thousands of unrelated tests as "focused",
which severely dilutes fuzzing effort away from the actual changes.
- TARGET SPECIFIC FEATURE LOGIC AND ENTRYPOINTS:
List functions that specifically implement the logic being added or altered, or direct API entrypoints
for the subsystem feature under review.
- HANDLING STATIC INLINE FUNCTIONS IN HEADERS (.h):
Compiler-inlined static functions (such as static inlines in mm/*.h or include/linux/*.h) lack
distinct symbol addresses in vmlinux and cannot be targeted directly by symbol coverage filters.
If the changes are primarily in static inline helpers, identify non-static, feature-specific caller
functions in .c files that exercise them (avoiding ubiquitous lifecycle wrappers).
================================================================================
5. IDENTIFYING EnableConfigs
================================================================================
Identify any specific CONFIG_ options required to properly compile and reach the modified code:
- Inspect Kconfig files and #ifdef guards; do not make assumptions.
- Check "depends on" lines in Kconfig to include any non-standard parent subsystem configs needed.
- Strip any 'CONFIG_' prefix (e.g., return "NET_IPV4" instead of "CONFIG_NET_IPV4").
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Target architecture: amd64
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit e6d565e9c031ea1fe95d4427883f4b8e96268f88
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date: Sun Oct 4 04:57:53 2026 +0000
syz-cluster: applied patch under review
diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h
index d5e35f24738d5..52ce45f25f5a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)
{
struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
- sk->sk_err = err;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, err);
sk_error_report(sk);
}
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 5c4024a03e105..51e3cf1ea9859 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -5535,12 +5535,13 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)
if (skb && (skb_next = skb_peek(q))) {
icmp_next = is_icmp_err_skb(skb_next);
if (icmp_next)
- sk->sk_err = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)->ee.ee_errno;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err,
+ SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)->ee.ee_errno);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock, flags);
if (is_icmp_err_skb(skb) && !icmp_next)
- sk->sk_err = 0;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, 0);
if (skb_next)
sk_error_report(sk);
diff --git a/net/strparser/strparser.c b/net/strparser/strparser.c
index a23f4b4dfc673..e5d5d755e532a 100644
--- a/net/strparser/strparser.c
+++ b/net/strparser/strparser.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)
struct sock *sk = strp->sk;
/* Report an error on the lower socket */
- sk->sk_err = -err;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, -err);
sk_error_report(sk);
}
}
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c
index f11d0528fc431..03ce83a9d4e9c 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
@@ -444,8 +444,9 @@ static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,
if ((flags & (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR)) == (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR))
return -EINVAL;
- if (unlikely(sk->sk_err))
- return -sk->sk_err;
+ rc = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
flags |= MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED;
tls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_MORE;
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index d1ad31986cf2c..d85d0c1ff546d 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
struct scatterlist *sge;
struct sk_msg *msg_en;
struct sock *sk;
+ int skerr;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) /* see the comment in tls_decrypt_done() */
return;
@@ -488,13 +489,15 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
+ skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
/* Check if error is previously set on socket */
- if (err || sk->sk_err) {
+ if (err || skerr) {
rec = NULL;
/* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err;
+ if (skerr) {
+ ctx->async_wait.err = -skerr;
} else {
ctx->async_wait.err = err;
tls_err_abort(sk, err);
@@ -704,10 +707,14 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
int err;
err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
- *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
- tls_free_open_rec(sk);
- err = -sk->sk_err;
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ int skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (skerr == EBADMSG) {
+ *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ err = -skerr;
+ }
}
return err;
}
@@ -800,10 +807,9 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
}
while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ret = -sk->sk_err;
+ ret = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+ if (ret)
goto send_end;
- }
if (ctx->open_rec)
rec = ctx->open_rec;
@@ -1107,10 +1113,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- if (has_copied)
- return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
- return sock_error(sk);
+ if (has_copied) {
+ int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -err;
+ } else {
+ int err = sock_error(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1132,10 +1144,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
* sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the
* actual error rather than a clean EOF.
*/
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- if (has_copied)
- return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
- return sock_error(sk);
+ if (has_copied) {
+ int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -err;
+ } else {
+ int err = sock_error(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
|
| 3/2 | 2026/10/04 04:57 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 4850 output: 33 thoughts: 739 Thoughts: **Analyzing a Patch Series: Data Race Prevention in sk->sk_err**
Okay, so I've been given a patch series to evaluate. My immediate instinct is to dissect the changes. First, let's look at the touched files. The patch modifies `include/linux/skmsg.h`, `net/core/skbuff.c`, `net/strparser/strparser.c`, `net/tls/tls_device.c`, and `net/tls/tls_sw.c`. The common thread is the introduction of `WRITE_ONCE` and `READ_ONCE` annotations, specifically around `sk->sk_err`. My immediate thought is this points to potential data race issues that are being addressed – likely KCSAN reports or a proactive effort to make the code more robust.
I need to understand the full context, so I'd typically reach for `git show` or other git tools to get the commit message and author, but I'm reminded I'm working with a limited toolset (`grepper`, `codesearch-dir-index`, `read-file`, `set-results`). Since I don't have direct access to a terminal, I'll need to rely on the available tools to understand the git context. I need to figure out what each file is doing.
Let's zoom in on what has changed! This looks like a systematic annotation of `sk->sk_err` to prevent data races. Interesting. I need to understand what triggered this, but my focus is to confirm there are no regressions.
Now, wait a minute, the change in `net/tls/tls_rx_rec_wait` is particularly interesting. Previously, it looked like this:
```c
if (sk->sk_err) {
if (has_copied)
return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
return sock_error(sk);
}
```
And now it's:
```c
if (has_copied) {
int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
if (err)
return -err;
} else {
int err = sock_error(sk);
if (err)
return err;
}
```
The difference is the introduction of `READ_ONCE` inside `has_copied`. But crucially, the addition of the `sock_error(sk)` call in the `else` block is new. That looks like a functional change. Now I need to see exactly what `sock_error(sk)` does in the new implementation. Let's use `grepper` to locate that function's definition. My concerns are how that interacts with the race conditions in `sk->sk_err`. This seems to be the critical area to analyze to ensure the change is correct.
|
| 4/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "static inline int sock_error",
"PathPrefix": "include/net/sock.h"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/net/sock.h=2551=struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk);\n--\ninclude/net/sock.h-2556-\ninclude/net/sock.h:2557:static inline int sock_error(struct sock *sk)\ninclude/net/sock.h-2558-{\n"
} |
| 5/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 6337 output: 36 thoughts: 19 Thoughts: Okay, let's dive into this. Here's my take on those thoughts, as if they're my own: **Analyzing `sock_error` in `net/sock.h`** Alright, I'm thinking we need to refresh our understanding of the `sock_error` definition. Let's head over to `include/net/sock.h` and take a look at it. I need to be sure I have a clear picture of how this structure, macro, or whatever it is, is defined and used within the kernel's network stack. I anticipate there's something specific here that's driving this investigation, whether it's related to error handling, status reporting, or something deeper in the socket implementation. The goal is to fully understand its implications. |
| 6/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "include/net/sock.h",
"FirstLine": 2555,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": "2555:\t */\n2556:\t\n2557:\tstatic inline int sock_error(struct sock *sk)\n2558:\t{\n2559:\t\tint err;\n2560:\t\n2561:\t\t/* Avoid an atomic operation for the common case.\n2562:\t\t * This is racy since another cpu/thread can change sk_err under us.\n2563:\t\t */\n2564:\t\tif (likely(data_race(!sk-\u003esk_err)))\n2565:\t\t\treturn 0;\n2566:\t\n2567:\t\terr = xchg(\u0026sk-\u003esk_err, 0);\n2568:\t\treturn -err;\n2569:\t}\n2570:\t\n2571:\tvoid sk_error_report(struct sock *sk);\n2572:\t\n2573:\tstatic inline unsigned long sock_wspace(struct sock *sk)\n2574:\t{\n"
} |
| 7/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 6822 output: 38 thoughts: 335 Thoughts: **Analyzing the TLS Receive Wait Function** Okay, let's break this down. I'm focusing on `tls_rx_rec_wait` and noticing a specific change within it. Before, the code snippet checks if `sk->sk_err` is non-zero. If it *is* zero, `sock_error(sk)` *isn't* called. Now, the logic is different. It first checks `has_copied`. If `has_copied` is true, it reads `sk->sk_err` and returns it if it is non-zero. But, if `has_copied` is *false*, then `sock_error(sk)` is called. This makes me pause because `sock_error(sk)` itself seems interesting. It checks for a data race via `data_race(!sk->sk_err)`. If no race is detected, it returns 0. If it *does* find a non-zero error, it atomically exchanges `sk->sk_err` with 0. Essentially, `sock_error(sk)` can *clear* the error. So, the key difference is in what happens when `sk->sk_err` is initially zero. The old code avoided calling `sock_error(sk)` while the new code calls it if `!has_copied`. My immediate thought is, is there a semantic change here? The fact that `has_copied` is re-evaluated on *every* loop iteration is important. I need to dig deeper into the contexts where `tls_rx_rec_wait` is actually called. Let's look at `net/tls/tls_sw.c` and see where this function is used and, more importantly, *why* this change would be introduced. I'm looking for the implications of potentially calling `sock_error(sk)` more frequently and if there are specific race conditions that this change aims to address or improve. |
| 8/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "net/tls/tls_sw.c",
"FirstLine": 1100,
"LineCount": 70
}Results: {
"Contents": "1100:\tstatic int\n1101:\ttls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)\n1102:\t{\n1103:\t\tstruct tls_context *tls_ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk);\n1104:\t\tstruct tls_sw_context_rx *ctx = tls_sw_ctx_rx(tls_ctx);\n1105:\t\tDEFINE_WAIT_FUNC(wait, woken_wake_function);\n1106:\t\tint ret = 0;\n1107:\t\tlong timeo;\n1108:\t\n1109:\t\t/* a rekey is pending, let userspace deal with it */\n1110:\t\tif (unlikely(ctx-\u003ekey_update_pending))\n1111:\t\t\treturn -EKEYEXPIRED;\n1112:\t\n1113:\t\ttimeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);\n1114:\t\n1115:\t\twhile (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {\n1116:\t\t\tif (has_copied) {\n1117:\t\t\t\tint err = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n1118:\t\n1119:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1120:\t\t\t\t\treturn -err;\n1121:\t\t\t} else {\n1122:\t\t\t\tint err = sock_error(sk);\n1123:\t\n1124:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1125:\t\t\t\t\treturn err;\n1126:\t\t\t}\n1127:\t\n1128:\t\t\tif (ret \u003c 0)\n1129:\t\t\t\treturn ret;\n1130:\t\n1131:\t\t\tif (sk_flush_backlog(sk))\n1132:\t\t\t\treleased = true;\n1133:\t\t\tif (!skb_queue_empty(\u0026sk-\u003esk_receive_queue)) {\n1134:\t\t\t\t/* Defer notification to the exit point; this thread\n1135:\t\t\t\t * will consume the record directly.\n1136:\t\t\t\t */\n1137:\t\t\t\ttls_strp_check_rcv(\u0026ctx-\u003estrp, false);\n1138:\t\t\t\tif (tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx))\n1139:\t\t\t\t\tbreak;\n1140:\t\t\t}\n1141:\t\n1142:\t\t\t/* sk_flush_backlog() can run tcp_reset(), which sets\n1143:\t\t\t * sk_err and then sk_shutdown via tcp_done(). Recheck\n1144:\t\t\t * sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the\n1145:\t\t\t * actual error rather than a clean EOF.\n1146:\t\t\t */\n1147:\t\t\tif (has_copied) {\n1148:\t\t\t\tint err = READ_ONCE(sk-\u003esk_err);\n1149:\t\n1150:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1151:\t\t\t\t\treturn -err;\n1152:\t\t\t} else {\n1153:\t\t\t\tint err = sock_error(sk);\n1154:\t\n1155:\t\t\t\tif (err)\n1156:\t\t\t\t\treturn err;\n1157:\t\t\t}\n1158:\t\t\tif (sk-\u003esk_shutdown \u0026 RCV_SHUTDOWN)\n1159:\t\t\t\treturn 0;\n1160:\t\n1161:\t\t\tif (sock_flag(sk, SOCK_DONE))\n1162:\t\t\t\treturn 0;\n1163:\t\n1164:\t\t\tif (!timeo)\n1165:\t\t\t\treturn -EAGAIN;\n1166:\t\n1167:\t\t\treleased = true;\n1168:\t\t\tadd_wait_queue(sk_sleep(sk), \u0026wait);\n1169:\t\t\tsk_set_bit(SOCKWQ_ASYNC_WAITDATA, sk);\n"
} |
| 9/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 8597 output: 22 thoughts: 1111 Thoughts: **Fuzzing Decision for the Proposed Patch** Okay, let's break this down systematically. My immediate thought is, "Reachability is the primary gate." Can this code execute in standard virtualized environments like QEMU or GCE? Yes, absolutely. We're looking at modifications within core networking subsystems: `skmsg`, `strparser`, and TLS. This is a clear indicator that fuzzing is likely warranted. I need to be wary of those "No Functional Change Intended" (NFCI) or refactoring claims. Even seemingly innocuous changes can introduce subtle semantic shifts, especially within core systems. Therefore, the fact that code has been refactored should be noted. Now, let's apply the negative criteria. The patch modifications are **not** within non-kernel, non-executable changes (documentation, user-space tools, build systems, etc.). The modifications do **not** involve structurally unreachable hardware. Furthermore, the modifications do **not** affect unreachable execution paths (driver teardown, other architectures). The patch clearly touches reachable executable code in the network subsystem. Specifically, files like `include/linux/skmsg.h`, `net/core/skbuff.c`, `net/strparser/strparser.c`, `net/tls/tls_device.c`, and `net/tls/tls_sw.c` are all modified. Given that these files handle socket operations, TLS, eBPF sockmap, and the like, they are all reachable via standard virtualization. According to the guidelines, any modifications to reachable executable code, refactoring included, mandates fuzzing. The conclusion, therefore, is: `WorthFuzzing = true`. I'm confident we're on the right track, but let's be thorough. The instructions clearly state that we must return `WorthFuzzing=false` ONLY if *all* modified code falls under the explicitly defined negative categories. Since this patch doesn't, `WorthFuzzing` must be `true`. Now that we've established the fuzzing requirement, we need to determine the prerequisites. I need to know which configurations are required to compile and exercise the modified code. What configs are required to compile the code? What focus symbols need to be selected? What settings should be applied? I need to dig into the details. For example, regarding `include/linux/skmsg.h`, specifically `sk_psock_report_error`, where is this function used? And what configurations enable `skmsg`, `BPF_STREAM_PARSER`, and `sockmap`? Grepping for the usage of that function will provide the required insight. |
| 10/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "sk_psock_report_error"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/linux/skmsg.h=421=static inline void kfree_sk_msg(struct sk_msg *msg)\n--\ninclude/linux/skmsg.h-427-\ninclude/linux/skmsg.h:428:static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)\ninclude/linux/skmsg.h-429-{\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c=671=static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work)\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c-731-\t\t\t\t/* Hard errors break pipe and stop xmit. */\nnet/core/skmsg.c:732:\t\t\t\tsk_psock_report_error(psock, ret ? -ret : EPIPE);\nnet/core/skmsg.c-733-\t\t\t\tsk_psock_clear_state(psock, SK_PSOCK_TX_ENABLED);\n"
} |
| 11/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 10530 output: 28 thoughts: 70 Thoughts: Here's my thought process, as if I were analyzing this code: **Diving into the `sk_psock_report_error` Call** Okay, so `sk_psock_report_error` is being called from within `net/core/skmsg.c`, specifically from the `sk_psock_backlog` function. That's my starting point. Now, I need to understand what's triggering this error reporting. To get a grasp on this part of the kernel, I need to know the relevant configuration options. The source code is calling `sk_psock_backlog` therefore, I need to check the config options which control `net/core/skmsg.c`. The easiest way to do that is to check the `Makefile` in the `net/core/` directory. I'll grep for the object file, `skmsg.o`, that will reveal the compilation conditions. This will lead me to the Kconfig options, giving me the crucial configuration context I need to investigate what's causing these reported errors. |
| 12/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "skmsg\\.o",
"PathPrefix": "net/core/"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/core/Makefile=43=obj-$(CONFIG_FAILOVER) += failover.o\nnet/core/Makefile:44:obj-$(CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG) += skmsg.o\nnet/core/Makefile-45-obj-$(CONFIG_BPF_SYSCALL) += sock_map.o\n"
} |
| 13/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 10944 output: 20 thoughts: 23 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Investigating Network Socket Message Configuration** Alright, before diving too deep, I need to quickly verify something foundational. My initial hunch regarding the issue I'm looking at hinges on how network socket messages are being handled. Therefore, I need to confirm the status of `CONFIG_NET_SOCK_MSG`. My go-to would be to check `net/Kconfig`, that's usually the best place to find the relevant configuration options within the networking subsystem. However, I should probably also do a quick, broader search in the codebase in case it's defined elsewhere, perhaps as a dependency. I need to get this straight before I waste too much time chasing the wrong rabbit. Gotta make sure it's enabled or disabled, and more importantly, how it's *defined* to understand its impact. |
| 14/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "config NET_SOCK_MSG"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/Kconfig=474=config NET_SELFTESTS\n--\nnet/Kconfig-477-\nnet/Kconfig:478:config NET_SOCK_MSG\nnet/Kconfig-479-\tbool\n"
} |
| 15/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 11240 output: 20 thoughts: 13 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience, and rendered in the first person: **Analyzing the `NET_SOCK_MSG` Selector** Alright, time to dive in. My immediate thought is, "Let's trace the usage of `NET_SOCK_MSG`." The objective is crystal clear: I want to understand what processes, modules, or subsystems are employing this particular selector within the network stack. I'm not looking for a superficial overview; I need to pinpoint the *specific* components that are actively *using* this value. I want to build a mental map of its relationships and data flows. This likely means examining the relevant kernel headers, the system call implementations, and any associated interrupt handlers. I'll be looking for where this selector is used in `select()` and `poll()`, and of course in any custom network event mechanisms. I'll need to consider this in the context of both the data structures associated with sockets and the threading model of the network subsystem. Understanding the specific context of usage is key – are we talking about regular TCP/UDP sockets, datagram sockets, or something more exotic? This understanding is foundational to troubleshooting any performance bottlenecks, debugging subtle network behaviors, or even simply for making a minor optimization to our core network functionality. |
| 16/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "select NET_SOCK_MSG"
}Results: {
"Output": "kernel/bpf/Kconfig=27=config BPF_SYSCALL\n--\nkernel/bpf/Kconfig-33-\tselect BINARY_PRINTF\nkernel/bpf/Kconfig:34:\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG if NET\nkernel/bpf/Kconfig-35-\tselect NET_XGRESS if NET\n--\nnet/Kconfig=360=config BPF_STREAM_PARSER\n--\nnet/Kconfig-365-\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/Kconfig:366:\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\nnet/Kconfig-367-\thelp\n--\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig=382=config INET_ESPINTCP\n--\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig-385-\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig:386:\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig-387-\tselect XFRM_ESPINTCP\n--\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig=90=config INET6_ESPINTCP\n--\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig-93-\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig:94:\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig-95-\tselect XFRM_ESPINTCP\n--\nnet/tls/Kconfig=5=config TLS\n--\nnet/tls/Kconfig-10-\tselect CRYPTO_GCM\nnet/tls/Kconfig:11:\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\nnet/tls/Kconfig-12-\tdefault n\n"
} |
| 17/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 11937 output: 26 thoughts: 70 Thoughts: Here's my summary, as I delve into this: **Deep Dive into TLS Configuration** Okay, so the system has chosen `NET_SOCK_MSG`. That's the signal, and now I need to figure out *why* and *how*. Time to get down to specifics. My immediate focus shifts to `net/tls/tls_device.c` and `net/tls/tls_sw.c`. These are the likely candidates for the core implementation, given the `NET_SOCK_MSG` selection. But I need the bigger picture first. What's driving this selection? I have to understand the build configuration. I'll need to check the `net/tls/Makefile` and `net/tls/Kconfig` files. That'll reveal the dependencies, build rules, and conditional logic that dictates how `net/tls/` is brought into the project. This will give me the crucial context to fully understand the flow. I need to trace this back. The Makefile will show me the build steps and dependencies, while the Kconfig will show me the configuration options, dependencies, and default values. I'll need to see how the system is making these decisions. Let's see what's in these files... |
| 18/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls",
"PathPrefix": "net/tls/Makefile"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/Makefile=6=CFLAGS_trace.o := -I$(src)\nnet/tls/Makefile-7-\nnet/tls/Makefile:8:obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o\nnet/tls/Makefile-9-\nnet/tls/Makefile:10:tls-y := tls_main.o tls_sw.o tls_proc.o trace.o tls_strp.o\nnet/tls/Makefile-11-\nnet/tls/Makefile:12:tls-$(CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE) += tls_device.o tls_device_fallback.o\n"
} |
| 19/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 12445 output: 32 thoughts: 97 Thoughts: Here's my analysis of what I'm seeing: **Analyzing TLS Configuration Options** Okay, so I'm looking at some build system directives here, specifically related to TLS. I see these lines: `obj-$(CONFIG_TLS) += tls.o`, `tls-y := ... tls_sw.o ...`, and `tls-$(CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE) += tls_device.o tls_device_fallback.o`. My immediate thought is, "Right, `CONFIG_TLS` seems to enable the *general* TLS support, adding the `tls.o` module." Then I see that `tls-y` line, indicating some core TLS functionality. But this third line, the one using `CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE`, really catches my eye. I'm processing that last line and wondering, "Hmm, is `CONFIG_TLS_DEVICE` a *dependency* for the `net/tls/tls_device.c` module?" It sure *looks* like it. The build system is clearly conditionally including `tls_device.o` and `tls_device_fallback.o` based on that config option. Therefore, I need to confirm this. I will look at the `Kconfig` file in that directory, `net/tls/Kconfig`. I need to understand the relationship between that option and those specific source files. This will tell me if the build is working as I would expect, or if something is missing. |
| 20/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "net/tls/Kconfig",
"FirstLine": 1,
"LineCount": 50
}Results: {
"Contents": " 1:\t# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n 2:\t#\n 3:\t# TLS configuration\n 4:\t#\n 5:\tconfig TLS\n 6:\t\ttristate \"Transport Layer Security support\"\n 7:\t\tdepends on INET\n 8:\t\tselect CRYPTO\n 9:\t\tselect CRYPTO_AES\n 10:\t\tselect CRYPTO_GCM\n 11:\t\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n 12:\t\tdefault n\n 13:\t\thelp\n 14:\t\tEnable kernel support for TLS protocol. This allows symmetric\n 15:\t\tencryption handling of the TLS protocol to be done in-kernel.\n 16:\t\n 17:\t\tIf unsure, say N.\n 18:\t\n 19:\tconfig TLS_DEVICE\n 20:\t\tbool \"Transport Layer Security HW offload\"\n 21:\t\tdepends on TLS\n 22:\t\tselect SKB_DECRYPTED\n 23:\t\tselect SOCK_VALIDATE_XMIT\n 24:\t\tselect SOCK_RX_QUEUE_MAPPING\n 25:\t\tdefault n\n 26:\t\thelp\n 27:\t\tEnable kernel support for HW offload of the TLS protocol.\n 28:\t\n 29:\t\tIf unsure, say N.\n"
} |
| 21/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 13208 output: 24 thoughts: 54 Thoughts: Okay, let's see. My first thought is: **Hunting Down the Build Configuration for `net/strparser/strparser.c`**. Right, I need to figure out how `net/strparser/strparser.c` gets built. This likely involves understanding the configuration options that enable its compilation. Given that it's in the `net` directory, I'm going to start with a logical progression. I'll need to check the build system to see which configuration options control the building of `net/strparser/strparser.c`. This could be in a few likely places. My initial instinct is to look at the obvious: `net/strparser/Makefile`. If that's not it, then my next target is `net/Kconfig`, which probably contains the relevant configuration options. The goal is to trace the dependencies and identify the specific configuration elements that influence whether or not this particular source file, `net/strparser/strparser.c`, gets compiled into the final build. |
| 22/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "strparser",
"PathPrefix": "net/"
}Results: {
"Output": "\nFull output is too long, showing 200 out of 394 lines.\nUse more precise expression if possible.\n\nnet/Kconfig=418=source \"net/kcm/Kconfig\"\nnet/Kconfig:419:source \"net/strparser/Kconfig\"\nnet/Kconfig-420-source \"net/mctp/Kconfig\"\n--\nnet/Makefile=34=obj-$(CONFIG_AF_KCM)\t\t+= kcm/\nnet/Makefile:35:obj-$(CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER)\t+= strparser/\nnet/Makefile-36-obj-$(CONFIG_ATM)\t\t+= atm/\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c=671=static void sk_psock_backlog(struct work_struct *work)\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c-698-\t\toff = 0;\nnet/core/skmsg.c:699:\t\tif (skb_bpf_strparser(skb)) {\nnet/core/skmsg.c-700-\t\t\tstruct strp_msg *stm = strp_msg(skb);\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c=996=static int sk_psock_verdict_apply(struct sk_psock *psock, struct sk_buff *skb,\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1025-\t\t\toff = 0;\nnet/core/skmsg.c:1026:\t\t\tif (skb_bpf_strparser(skb)) {\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1027-\t\t\t\tstruct strp_msg *stm = strp_msg(skb);\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c=1061=static void sk_psock_write_space(struct sock *sk)\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1078-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_STREAM_PARSER)\nnet/core/skmsg.c:1079:static void sk_psock_strp_read(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1080-{\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1098-\t\tret = bpf_prog_run_pin_on_cpu(prog, skb);\nnet/core/skmsg.c:1099:\t\tskb_bpf_set_strparser(skb);\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1100-\t\tret = sk_psock_map_verd(ret, skb_bpf_redirect_fetch(skb));\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1107-\nnet/core/skmsg.c:1108:static int sk_psock_strp_read_done(struct strparser *strp, int err)\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1109-{\n--\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1112-\nnet/core/skmsg.c:1113:static int sk_psock_strp_parse(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)\nnet/core/skmsg.c-1114-{\n--\nnet/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c=15=void tcp_eat_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)\n--\nnet/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c-22-\nnet/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:23:\tif (skb_bpf_strparser(skb))\nnet/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c-24-\t\treturn;\n--\nnet/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c=677=static int tcp_bpf_assert_proto_ops(struct proto *ops)\n--\nnet/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c-687-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_BPF_STREAM_PARSER)\nnet/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c:688:int tcp_bpf_strp_read_sock(struct strparser *strp, read_descriptor_t *desc,\nnet/ipv4/tcp_bpf.c-689-\t\t\t sk_read_actor_t recv_actor)\n--\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c=352=static void psock_data_ready(struct sock *sk)\n--\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c-367-/* Called with lower sock held */\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c:368:static void kcm_rcv_strparser(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c-369-{\n--\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c-388-\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c:389:static int kcm_parse_func_strparser(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb)\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c-390-{\n--\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c-400-\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c:401:static int kcm_read_sock_done(struct strparser *strp, int err)\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c-402-{\n--\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c=1240=static int kcm_attach(struct socket *sock, struct socket *csock,\n--\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c-1249-\tstatic const struct strp_callbacks cb = {\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c:1250:\t\t.rcv_msg = kcm_rcv_strparser,\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c:1251:\t\t.parse_msg = kcm_parse_func_strparser,\nnet/kcm/kcmsock.c-1252-\t\t.read_sock_done = kcm_read_sock_done,\n--\nnet/strparser/Makefile-1-# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\nnet/strparser/Makefile:2:obj-$(CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER) += strparser.o\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-23-#include \u003clinux/workqueue.h\u003e\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:24:#include \u003cnet/strparser.h\u003e\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-25-#include \u003cnet/netns/generic.h\u003e\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=30=static inline struct _strp_msg *_strp_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-36-/* Lower lock held */\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:37:static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-38-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-64-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:65:static void strp_start_timer(struct strparser *strp, long timeo)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-66-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-71-/* Lower lock held */\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:72:static void strp_parser_err(struct strparser *strp, int err,\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-73-\t\t\t read_descriptor_t *desc)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-80-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:81:static inline int strp_peek_len(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-82-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-89-\t/* If we don't have an associated socket there's nothing to peek.\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:90:\t * Return int max to avoid stopping the strparser.\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-91-\t */\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=97=static int __strp_recv(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *orig_skb,\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-100-{\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:101:\tstruct strparser *strp = (struct strparser *)desc-\u003earg.data;\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-102-\tstruct _strp_msg *stm;\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-324-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:325:int strp_process(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *orig_skb,\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-326-\t\t unsigned int orig_offset, size_t orig_len,\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=338=static int strp_recv(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *orig_skb,\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-340-{\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:341:\tstruct strparser *strp = (struct strparser *)desc-\u003earg.data;\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-342-\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-346-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:347:static int default_read_sock_done(struct strparser *strp, int err)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-348-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-352-/* Called with lock held on lower socket */\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:353:static int strp_read_sock(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-354-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-379-/* Lower sock lock held */\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:380:void strp_data_ready(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-381-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=405=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_data_ready);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-406-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:407:static void do_strp_work(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-408-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=427=static void strp_work(struct work_struct *w)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-428-{\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:429:\tdo_strp_work(container_of(w, struct strparser, work));\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-430-}\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=432=static void strp_msg_timeout(struct work_struct *w)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-433-{\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:434:\tstruct strparser *strp = container_of(w, struct strparser,\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-435-\t\t\t\t\t msg_timer_work.work);\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-443-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:444:static void strp_sock_lock(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-445-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-448-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:449:static void strp_sock_unlock(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-450-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-453-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:454:int strp_init(struct strparser *strp, struct sock *sk,\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-455-\t const struct strp_callbacks *cb)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-462-\t *\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:463:\t * If the sock is set then the strparser is in receive callback mode.\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-464-\t * The upper layer calls strp_data_ready to kick receive processing\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:465:\t * and strparser calls the read_sock function on the socket to\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-466-\t * get packets.\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-467-\t *\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:468:\t * If the sock is not set then the strparser is in general mode.\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-469-\t * The upper layer calls strp_process for each skb to be parsed.\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=494=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_init);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-495-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:496:void strp_unpause(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-497-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=505=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_unpause);\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-509- */\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:510:void strp_done(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-511-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=522=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_done);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-523-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:524:void strp_stop(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-525-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=528=EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(strp_stop);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-529-\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:530:void strp_check_rcv(struct strparser *strp)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-531-{\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h=144=void tls_err_abort(struct sock *sk, int err);\nnet/tls/tls.h:145:void tls_strp_abort_strp(struct tls_strparser *strp, int err);\nnet/tls/tls.h-146-\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h=152=void tls_update_rx_zc_capable(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:153:void tls_sw_strparser_arm(struct sock *sk, struct tls_context *ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h:154:void tls_sw_strparser_done(struct tls_context *tls_ctx);\nnet/tls/tls.h-155-int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size);\n--\nnet/tls/tls.h=188=void tls_strp_dev_exit(void);\nnet/tls/tls.h-189-\nnet/tls/tls.h:190:void tls_strp_done(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h:191:void __tls_strp_done(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h:192:void tls_strp_stop(struct tls_strparser *strp);\nnet/tls/tls.h:193:int tls_strp_init(struct tls_strparser *strp, struct sock *sk);\n\n"
} |
| 23/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17453 output: 33 thoughts: 29 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, and delivered as a first-person summary: **Digging into the String Parser Configuration** Alright, so the `strparser` functionality is gated by `CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER`, which is a pretty common pattern. My first step is to immediately verify the configuration options associated with this feature. Let's dig into that `net/strparser/Kconfig` file. I need to understand the dependencies, default states, and any conditional build logic surrounding `CONFIG_STREAM_PARSER`. I'll be looking for things like: * Any interactions with other networking subsystems. * The impact on build size and performance. * Potential conflicts with other enabled features. * If this option is generally enabled by default for a specific architecture or use case, or if it has very specific prerequisites that are preventing it from being enabled. I'm assuming there's a reason this came up, so I want to understand if it's the root cause of an observed problem or if I am just trying to familiarize myself with the code. Armed with a deeper understanding of the configuration options, I'll be in a better position to understand the impact of the string parser on the system. |
| 24/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "net/strparser/Kconfig",
"FirstLine": 1,
"LineCount": 20
}Results: {
"Contents": " 1:\t# SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only\n 2:\tconfig STREAM_PARSER\n 3:\t\tdef_bool n\n"
} |
| 25/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 17835 output: 19 thoughts: 17 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience, presented in the first person: **Investigating the `STREAM_PARSER` Selection Mechanism** Right, so I'm digging into this code, and I need to figure out the logic behind what ultimately chooses `STREAM_PARSER`. I know it's probably buried somewhere in a conditional statement or some kind of dispatching mechanism, but I need to quickly zero in on it. My first instinct is to hit the code with `grepper`. It's the most efficient way to pinpoint the relevant occurrences of that specific constant and trace the call paths leading to its assignment or use. I'm hoping I can unearth the selection process and quickly understand its context. Let's see what `grepper` uncovers. |
| 26/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "select STREAM_PARSER"
}Results: {
"Output": "drivers/net/Kconfig=103=config OVPN\n--\ndrivers/net/Kconfig-111-\tselect CRYPTO_CHACHA20POLY1305\ndrivers/net/Kconfig:112:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\ndrivers/net/Kconfig-113-\thelp\n--\nnet/Kconfig=360=config BPF_STREAM_PARSER\n--\nnet/Kconfig-364-\tdepends on CGROUP_BPF\nnet/Kconfig:365:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/Kconfig-366-\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n--\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig=382=config INET_ESPINTCP\n--\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig-384-\tdepends on XFRM \u0026\u0026 INET_ESP\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig:385:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/ipv4/Kconfig-386-\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n--\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig=90=config INET6_ESPINTCP\n--\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig-92-\tdepends on XFRM \u0026\u0026 INET6_ESP\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig:93:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/ipv6/Kconfig-94-\tselect NET_SOCK_MSG\n--\nnet/kcm/Kconfig=3=config AF_KCM\n--\nnet/kcm/Kconfig-6-\tselect BPF_SYSCALL\nnet/kcm/Kconfig:7:\tselect STREAM_PARSER\nnet/kcm/Kconfig-8-\thelp\n"
} |
| 27/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 18442 output: 22 thoughts: 92 Thoughts: Okay, here's my understanding, considering I have a good grasp of networking concepts: **Deep Dive into Kernel Networking with `sock_dequeue_err_skb`** Right, let me see... I'm thinking about a few key pieces here: `BPF_STREAM_PARSER`, `AF_KCM`, `INET_ESPINTCP`, and `OVPN`. These all ring bells, indicating they could potentially interact with error handling, but I need to investigate further. My immediate focus is on `sock_dequeue_err_skb`. Where does that fit in the grand scheme of things? Ah, it looks like `net/core/skbuff.c` is the location of the `sock_dequeue_err_skb` function. Excellent. Now that I know where it lives, the next logical step is to understand *how* it's used. Time to fire up `grep` and see who's calling `sock_dequeue_err_skb`. That should reveal its callers, and likely illuminate the scenarios where it plays a role in error processing and socket management. I expect this will uncover its use in potentially key parts of the network stack. |
| 28/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "sock_dequeue_err_skb"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/net/sock.h=2550=int sock_queue_err_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb);\ninclude/net/sock.h:2551:struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk);\ninclude/net/sock.h-2552-\n--\nnet/core/skbuff.c=5517=static bool is_icmp_err_skb(const struct sk_buff *skb)\n--\nnet/core/skbuff.c-5522-\nnet/core/skbuff.c:5523:struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)\nnet/core/skbuff.c-5524-{\n--\nnet/core/skbuff.c-5550-}\nnet/core/skbuff.c:5551:EXPORT_SYMBOL(sock_dequeue_err_skb);\nnet/core/skbuff.c-5552-\n--\nnet/core/sock.c=3978=int sock_recv_errqueue(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len,\n--\nnet/core/sock.c-3985-\terr = -EAGAIN;\nnet/core/sock.c:3986:\tskb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);\nnet/core/sock.c-3987-\tif (skb == NULL)\n--\nnet/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c=523=int ip_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len)\n--\nnet/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c-535-\terr = -EAGAIN;\nnet/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c:536:\tskb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);\nnet/ipv4/ip_sockglue.c-537-\tif (!skb)\n--\nnet/ipv6/datagram.c=455=int ipv6_recv_error(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, int len)\n--\nnet/ipv6/datagram.c-468-\terr = -EAGAIN;\nnet/ipv6/datagram.c:469:\tskb = sock_dequeue_err_skb(sk);\nnet/ipv6/datagram.c-470-\tif (!skb)\n"
} |
| 29/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 19418 output: 32 thoughts: 111 Thoughts: **Analyzing Potential Network Errors** Okay, so I'm looking at this error, and my initial thought is, `sock_dequeue_err_skb` – that's definitely in the core network stack. It's built as part of the `CONFIG_NET` configuration, so we're talking about fundamental network functionality here, within `net/core/skbuff.c`. Then there's this `strp_abort_strp` function; that's in `net/strparser/strparser.c`. The fact that it is a static function means it's localized within that file. Now, it's called by `strp_parser_err` and `strp_msg_timeout`. My next step is clear: I need to quickly determine where `strp_abort_strp` is called, so I'll be checking `net/strparser/strparser.c`. |
| 30/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "strp_abort_strp",
"PathPrefix": "net/strparser/"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/strparser/strparser.c=30=static inline struct _strp_msg *_strp_msg(struct sk_buff *skb)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-36-/* Lower lock held */\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:37:static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-38-{\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=454=int strp_init(struct strparser *strp, struct sock *sk,\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-486-\tstrp-\u003ecb.read_sock_done = cb-\u003eread_sock_done ? : default_read_sock_done;\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:487:\tstrp-\u003ecb.abort_parser = cb-\u003eabort_parser ? : strp_abort_strp;\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-488-\n"
} |
| 31/2 | 2026/10/04 04:58 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 20010 output: 25 thoughts: 63 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Analyzing the `abort_parser` Callback in `strp`** Alright, so I'm looking at this line: `strp->cb.abort_parser = cb->abort_parser ? : strp_abort_strp;`. It seems like we're assigning a function pointer, specifically for the `abort_parser` callback. I see a conditional assignment happening. If `cb->abort_parser` is a valid function pointer (i.e., not NULL), it's assigned to `strp->cb.abort_parser`. Otherwise, if `cb->abort_parser` is NULL, it defaults to `strp_abort_strp`. The key question here, the one that immediately pops into my head, is: where is this `abort_parser` *actually* called? I know it's related to the `strp` code, likely within `strparser.c` (that's where I'd expect it, given the context). But *where*? What specific situations trigger this abort? It's a critical point for understanding error handling and recovery in the parsing process. Time to reach for `grep`. I'll run a quick search on the codebase for `abort_parser` to find all of its uses within the project. I need to see the call sites to fully understand its intended role and how it interacts with the overall parsing state. Then I can determine if this implementation is sound, efficient, and aligned with the expected error handling strategy. |
| 32/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "abort_parser",
"PathPrefix": "net/"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/strparser/strparser.c=72=static void strp_parser_err(struct strparser *strp, int err,\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-77-\tstrp-\u003eskb_head = NULL;\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:78:\tstrp-\u003ecb.abort_parser(strp, err);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-79-}\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=432=static void strp_msg_timeout(struct work_struct *w)\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-439-\tstrp-\u003ecb.lock(strp);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:440:\tstrp-\u003ecb.abort_parser(strp, -ETIMEDOUT);\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-441-\tstrp-\u003ecb.unlock(strp);\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c=454=int strp_init(struct strparser *strp, struct sock *sk,\n--\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-486-\tstrp-\u003ecb.read_sock_done = cb-\u003eread_sock_done ? : default_read_sock_done;\nnet/strparser/strparser.c:487:\tstrp-\u003ecb.abort_parser = cb-\u003eabort_parser ? : strp_abort_strp;\nnet/strparser/strparser.c-488-\n"
} |
| 33/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 20804 output: 29 thoughts: 41 Thoughts: Okay, here's my interpretation of that thought process, tailored for an expert audience: **Diving into the TLS Device Code** Alright, time to dig into `tls_device.c`. The first thing that comes to mind is to understand the control flow surrounding `tls_push_data`. I need to figure out how this function is integrated into the larger picture, especially what's *calling* it. This usually gives me the most immediate insight into its purpose and expected behavior. I need to trace the call paths to get a strong grasp on the role of this function within the TLS implementation. |
| 34/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls_push_data",
"PathPrefix": "net/tls/"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls_device.c=396=static int tls_device_copy_data(void *addr, size_t bytes, struct iov_iter *i)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-420-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:421:static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-422-\t\t\t struct iov_iter *iter,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=567=int tls_device_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-584-\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:585:\trc = tls_push_data(sk, \u0026msg-\u003emsg_iter, size, msg-\u003emsg_flags,\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-586-\t\t\t record_type);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=594=void tls_device_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-609-\t\tiov_iter_bvec(\u0026iter, ITER_SOURCE, NULL, 0, 0);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:610:\t\ttls_push_data(sk, \u0026iter, 0, 0, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-611-\t}\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c=677=static int tls_device_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-681-\tiov_iter_kvec(\u0026iter, ITER_SOURCE, NULL, 0, 0);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c:682:\treturn tls_push_data(sk, \u0026iter, 0, flags, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA);\nnet/tls/tls_device.c-683-}\n"
} |
| 35/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 21504 output: 31 thoughts: 106 Thoughts: **Analyzing Recent Changes in `tls_sw.c`** Alright, let's dive into this. My initial focus is on `tls_sw.c` – I need to understand the recent modifications within this critical component of the TLS software implementation. I want to quickly grasp the scope of the changes. So, I'm noting the functions that were touched: `tls_encrypt_done`, `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`, `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`, and `tls_rx_rec_wait`. Now that I know *what* was changed, I need to know *why*, so I'm going to follow the call graphs. Specifically, I need to check the callers of `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked` and `tls_rx_rec_wait` to determine the impact of these changes. Understanding how these functions are used will tell me everything I need to know. |
| 36/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls_rx_rec_wait",
"PathPrefix": "net/tls/"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls_sw.c=1100=static int\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1101:tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1102-{\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1180-\tif (unlikely(!tls_strp_msg_load(\u0026ctx-\u003estrp, released)))\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1181:\t\treturn tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, nonblock, false, has_copied);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1182-\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=1824=int tls_sw_recvmsg(struct sock *sk,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1878-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1879:\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags \u0026 MSG_DONTWAIT,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1880-\t\t\t\t released, !!(decrypted + copied));\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=2017=ssize_t tls_sw_splice_read(struct socket *sock, loff_t *ppos,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2044-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:2045:\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, flags \u0026 SPLICE_F_NONBLOCK,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2046-\t\t\t\t true, false);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=2091=int tls_sw_read_sock(struct sock *sk, read_descriptor_t *desc,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2129-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:2130:\t\t\terr = tls_rx_rec_wait(sk, true, released, !!copied);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-2131-\t\t\tif (err \u003c= 0)\n"
} |
| 37/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 22369 output: 32 thoughts: 50 Thoughts: Here's my understanding of the situation, tailored for an expert like yourself: **Decoding the TLS Receive Path** Alright, so I'm tracking the data flow through our TLS software stack, and it's looking pretty straightforward on the receive side. I've pinpointed three key entry points for receiving data: `tls_sw_recvmsg`, `tls_sw_splice_read`, and `tls_sw_read_sock`. Each of these functions, at some point, calls `tls_rx_rec_wait`. That function is clearly central to the TLS record reception process, acting as the synchronization point. It's the lynchpin for waiting on incoming TLS records. I need to dig deeper into what it specifically waits for, and how the reception of data is signaled. Now, on the transmit side, I see we have `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`. This function appears to handle the sending of data, and the name suggests some locking is involved. I'll need to figure out what that lock is and why it's needed. More importantly, I need to know *who* calls that function. The next step is to examine the callers of `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`, to understand the whole sending process. Knowing this should allow me to reason about the overall TLS protocol flow. |
| 38/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"PathPrefix": "net/tls/"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls_sw.c=742=static int tls_sw_sendmsg_splice(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-772-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:773:static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-774-\t\t\t\t size_t size)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=1014=int tls_sw_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1027-\tlock_sock(sk);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1028:\tret = tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(sk, msg, size);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1029-\trelease_sock(sk);\n"
} |
| 39/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 22981 output: 33 thoughts: 16 Thoughts: Okay, here's my attempt at summarizing that thought process, keeping in mind the expert user and the first-person perspective: **Hunting Down `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`** Alright, so I'm digging into this code, and the question that's top of mind right now is: Where the heck is `bpf_exec_tx_verdict` actually *used*? I need to understand the call chain, the context in which this function is invoked. Is it called directly, or is it part of some larger framework, and what triggers its execution? Knowing the call sites will be critical to understanding its role and any potential issues or modifications that might be needed. I need to trace this one down. Let's see... time to start digging through the source, looking for cross-references. |
| 40/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"PathPrefix": "net/tls/"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls_sw.c=620=static int tls_push_record(struct sock *sk, int flags,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-703-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:704:static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-705-\t\t\t u8 record_type, ssize_t *copied, int flags)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=722=static int tls_sw_push_pending_record(struct sock *sk, int flags)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-737-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:738:\treturn bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-739-\t\t\t\t \u0026copied, flags);\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=773=static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-892-\t\t\tsk_msg_sg_copy_set(msg_pl, first);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:893:\t\t\tret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-894-\t\t\t\t\t\t record_type, \u0026copied,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-952-\t\tif (full_record || eor) {\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:953:\t\t\tret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-954-\t\t\t\t\t\t record_type, \u0026copied,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=1037=void tls_sw_splice_eof(struct socket *sock)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1064-\t/* Perform transmission. */\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:1065:\tret = bpf_exec_tx_verdict(msg_pl, sk, TLS_RECORD_TYPE_DATA,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-1066-\t\t\t\t \u0026copied, 0);\n"
} |
| 41/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 23793 output: 29 thoughts: 12 Thoughts: Okay, here's my summary, tailored for an expert audience, as if I'm thinking these things myself: **Tracing the Execution Path of `tls_encrypt_done`** Right, so I'm digging into this code, and I need to understand the lifecycle of `tls_encrypt_done`. The key question right now is, precisely *where* is this function called? I can't just rely on superficial documentation or even a quick grep; I need to understand the call stack, the conditional branches, the different contexts. I need to know the entire execution path. Is it called from a core function in the TLS library, or is it invoked as a callback from somewhere else? Are there multiple entry points? Are there any potential race conditions I need to consider based on where and when it's called? Knowing the full context of these calls is critical to grasping how the encryption process concludes and how resources are freed or flags set. |
| 42/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "tls_encrypt_done",
"PathPrefix": "net/tls/"
}Results: {
"Output": "net/tls/tls_sw.c=408=int tls_tx_records(struct sock *sk, int flags)\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-466-\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:467:static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-468-{\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c=537=static int tls_do_encryption(struct sock *sk,\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-578-\taead_request_set_callback(aead_req, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:579:\t\t\t\t tls_encrypt_done, rec);\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-580-\n--\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-590-\t\t/*\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c:591:\t\t * The async callback tls_encrypt_done() has already\nnet/tls/tls_sw.c-592-\t\t * decremented encrypt_pending and restored the sge on\n"
} |
| 43/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | patch-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 24325 output: 277 thoughts: 3646 Thoughts: **Analysis of Configuration and Focus Symbols** Okay, let's break this down systematically. My initial task is to determine the necessary kernel configurations and focus symbols for fuzzing based on the provided changes. The goal is to maximize the effectiveness of the fuzzer by targeting code specifically modified by the patch, without accidentally focusing on ubiquitous code. First, the configurations. I need to make sure the target code, including TLS, the stream parser, and the skmsg support is built into the kernel. After analyzing the Kconfig files, here's what's needed. I'm focusing on symbols that directly enable the relevant functionality or select dependencies that do so: * `TLS`: Provides the `tls_sw.o` and selects `NET_SOCK_MSG`. This is essential for kTLS software support. * `TLS_DEVICE`: Enables `tls_device.c`, which includes `tls_push_data`. This enables the kTLS device driver-based code. * `BPF_STREAM_PARSER`: This one is interesting. `STREAM_PARSER` itself is a `def_bool n`, meaning it's not directly user-configurable. However, `BPF_STREAM_PARSER` selects it. Since the syzkaller guidelines recommend to explicitly specify any required configs, I should specify this. I'm choosing `BPF_STREAM_PARSER` over other options like `AF_KCM` as it more directly represents the stream parsing functionality. The guideline mentions to avoid assumptions and check dependencies. Now, let's move on to the `FocusSymbols`. I need to identify the specific functions that implement the logic being altered. Also, the guideline says to avoid ubiquitous functions. * `sk_psock_backlog`: This is the function that calls `sk_psock_report_error`. I've confirmed that `sk_psock_backlog` is a workqueue handler, which makes it a valid symbol for fuzzing. * `sock_dequeue_err_skb`: It's an exported symbol, non-static, and a specific function related to error queue handling, so it is a good candidate. * `strp_abort_strp`: The compiler won't be able to inline this function as its address is taken, so it has a symbol in the vmlinux and is worth targeting. * `tls_push_data`: This is a key function in `tls_device.c`, so it's a good target to include. * `tls_encrypt_done`: This is a callback function for the kTLS software crypto. * `bpf_exec_tx_verdict`: This function is called by multiple kTLS entrypoints. * `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`: This function is also part of the kTLS. * `tls_rx_rec_wait`: This is another important kTLS function. * `tls_device_sendmsg`: This is the non-static caller of `tls_push_data`. * `tls_sw_sendmsg`: Non-static caller of the kTLS function `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked`. * `tls_sw_recvmsg`: Non-static caller of the kTLS function `tls_rx_rec_wait`. All these listed functions implement the logic being added or altered. I am listing the functions that the patch modifies, plus their non-static callers (if a modified function is static). Finally, after reviewing the changes, it's clear these modifications touch core networking code related to error handling, kTLS, stream parsing, and socket messaging. These code paths are reachable via user-space socket operations. Therefore, fuzzing this code is important. The final results are: Configs: - `TLS` - `TLS_DEVICE` - `BPF_STREAM_PARSER` - `STREAM_PARSER` FocusSymbols: - `tls_rx_rec_wait` - `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked` - `tls_sw_recvmsg` - `tls_sw_sendmsg` - `tls_encrypt_done` - `bpf_exec_tx_verdict` - `tls_push_data` - `tls_device_sendmsg` - `sock_dequeue_err_skb` - `strp_abort_strp` - `sk_psock_backlog` |
| 44/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"EnableConfigs": [
"TLS",
"TLS_DEVICE",
"STREAM_PARSER",
"BPF_STREAM_PARSER"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"tls_rx_rec_wait",
"tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"tls_sw_recvmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg",
"tls_encrypt_done",
"bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"tls_push_data",
"tls_device_sendmsg",
"sock_dequeue_err_skb",
"strp_abort_strp",
"sk_psock_backlog"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch alters error state handling (sk-\u003esk_err) across core networking components, including kTLS (software and device offload paths), strparser, skbuff error queue dequeuing, and skmsg. Specifically, it introduces READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE annotations and alters socket error consumption flow in tls_rx_rec_wait() and bpf_exec_tx_verdict(). These code paths are fully reachable via socket operations and kTLS ULP in standard virtualized environments and warrant fuzzing to verify error propagation and concurrency invariants.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Results: {
"EnableConfigs": [
"TLS",
"TLS_DEVICE",
"STREAM_PARSER",
"BPF_STREAM_PARSER"
],
"FocusSymbols": [
"tls_rx_rec_wait",
"tls_sw_sendmsg_locked",
"tls_sw_recvmsg",
"tls_sw_sendmsg",
"tls_encrypt_done",
"bpf_exec_tx_verdict",
"tls_push_data",
"tls_device_sendmsg",
"sock_dequeue_err_skb",
"strp_abort_strp",
"sk_psock_backlog"
],
"Reasoning": "The patch alters error state handling (sk-\u003esk_err) across core networking components, including kTLS (software and device offload paths), strparser, skbuff error queue dequeuing, and skmsg. Specifically, it introduces READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE annotations and alters socket error consumption flow in tls_rx_rec_wait() and bpf_exec_tx_verdict(). These code paths are fully reachable via socket operations and kTLS ULP in standard virtualized environments and warrant fuzzing to verify error propagation and concurrency invariants.",
"WorthFuzzing": true
} |
| 45/1 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | action | If |
0mArgs:{
"WorthFuzzing": true
}Results: null |
| 46/2 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | agent | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:core Args: null Results: {
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch introduces READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE annotations to fix data races on sk-\u003esk_err across socket and TLS subsystems (skmsg, skbuff, strparser, and tls). It does not allocate new memory buffers, modify data copies to user space, change structure padding, or alter buffer bounds/length calculations. All variables accessed and modified (such as sk-\u003esk_err and local err/skerr variables) are fully initialized socket fields or initialized locals. Consequently, there are no uninitialized memory access or info-leak risks that would necessitate KMSAN fuzzing; standard sanitizers (such as KCSAN/KASAN) are sufficient.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
}Instruction: You are an expert Linux kernel security engineer specializing in kernel memory
error detectors (KASAN and KMSAN). Your job is to review the provided patch series and
determine if the code changes justify spawning a dedicated KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer)
fuzzing session in addition to standard KASAN fuzzing.
CRITICAL DISTINCTION BETWEEN KASAN AND KMSAN:
- Standard KASAN kernel builds (upstream-apparmor-kasan.config) already enable
a comprehensive suite of debugging tools and sanitizers, including KASAN
(out-of-bounds accesses, use-after-free, double free, invalid free), LOCKDEP
(locking bugs and deadlocks), UB-sanitizers, and memory corruption checks.
- KMSAN (KernelMemorySanitizer) detects reads of UNINITIALIZED memory (stack, heap,
or page allocations) and kernel-to-user memory info-leaks.
Rule: THERE IS NO SENSE IN RUNNING A KMSAN SESSION IF A BUG CAN BE CAUGHT BY KASAN,
LOCKDEP, OR OTHER STANDARD BUG DETECTORS.
A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session incurs significant resource costs. You must ONLY
set NeedsKMSAN=true if the code changes introduce or expose UNINITIALIZED MEMORY risks
that are detected ONLY by KMSAN.
Look holistically at the patch series and surrounding code. Even if no direct
uninitialized field accesses or new buffer allocations are added in the diff itself,
a patch may alter control flow, bounds checking, or data length calculations in ways
that change how the rest of the code operates on existing buffers (e.g. allowing
uninitialized stack/heap memory to be read, copied to user space, or used in control
flow). Do not hesitate to use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code,
called functions, and callers.
Set NeedsKMSAN=true ONLY IF the patch introduces or modifies:
1. Kernel structures sent to user space (via copy_to_user, put_user, netlink skb
attributes, ioctl output arguments, socket options, or BPF buffers) where fields
or structure padding might not be fully initialized/zeroed.
2. Conditional logic or branching that depends on potentially uninitialized variables
or struct fields.
3. Allocation or initialization of complex data structures where uninitialized fields
could be read later in reachable code paths.
4. Bounds checks, lengths, or logic in a way that allows surrounding code to access
uninitialized bytes of existing buffers.
Set NeedsKMSAN=false IF:
- The code changes primarily risk out-of-bounds access, array overflows, NULL pointer
dereferences, locking deadlocks, or use-after-free bugs (these are already caught
by KASAN, LOCKDEP, or standard bug detectors).
- All stack/heap structures touched or introduced by the patch are fully zeroed
or initialized (e.g. using = {0}, memset, kzalloc) before being read or copied.
- The patch does not introduce any risk of uninitialized memory usage or info-leaks.
Use your code access tools to inspect the surrounding code if necessary, then provide
detailed KMSANReasoning contrasting KASAN vs KMSAN applicability for this patch.
Prefer calling several tools at the same time to save round-trips.
Use set-results tool to provide results of the analysis.
It must be called exactly once before the final reply.
Ignore results of this tool.
Prompt: Target architecture: amd64
For your convenience, here is the diff of the changes:
commit e6d565e9c031ea1fe95d4427883f4b8e96268f88
Author: syz-cluster <triage@syzkaller.com>
Date: Sun Oct 4 04:57:53 2026 +0000
syz-cluster: applied patch under review
diff --git a/include/linux/skmsg.h b/include/linux/skmsg.h
index d5e35f24738d5..52ce45f25f5a6 100644
--- a/include/linux/skmsg.h
+++ b/include/linux/skmsg.h
@@ -429,7 +429,7 @@ static inline void sk_psock_report_error(struct sk_psock *psock, int err)
{
struct sock *sk = psock->sk;
- sk->sk_err = err;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, err);
sk_error_report(sk);
}
diff --git a/net/core/skbuff.c b/net/core/skbuff.c
index 5c4024a03e105..51e3cf1ea9859 100644
--- a/net/core/skbuff.c
+++ b/net/core/skbuff.c
@@ -5535,12 +5535,13 @@ struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk)
if (skb && (skb_next = skb_peek(q))) {
icmp_next = is_icmp_err_skb(skb_next);
if (icmp_next)
- sk->sk_err = SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)->ee.ee_errno;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err,
+ SKB_EXT_ERR(skb_next)->ee.ee_errno);
}
spin_unlock_irqrestore(&q->lock, flags);
if (is_icmp_err_skb(skb) && !icmp_next)
- sk->sk_err = 0;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, 0);
if (skb_next)
sk_error_report(sk);
diff --git a/net/strparser/strparser.c b/net/strparser/strparser.c
index a23f4b4dfc673..e5d5d755e532a 100644
--- a/net/strparser/strparser.c
+++ b/net/strparser/strparser.c
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ static void strp_abort_strp(struct strparser *strp, int err)
struct sock *sk = strp->sk;
/* Report an error on the lower socket */
- sk->sk_err = -err;
+ WRITE_ONCE(sk->sk_err, -err);
sk_error_report(sk);
}
}
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_device.c b/net/tls/tls_device.c
index f11d0528fc431..03ce83a9d4e9c 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_device.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_device.c
@@ -444,8 +444,9 @@ static int tls_push_data(struct sock *sk,
if ((flags & (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR)) == (MSG_MORE | MSG_EOR))
return -EINVAL;
- if (unlikely(sk->sk_err))
- return -sk->sk_err;
+ rc = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+ if (unlikely(rc))
+ return rc;
flags |= MSG_SENDPAGE_DECRYPTED;
tls_push_record_flags = flags | MSG_MORE;
diff --git a/net/tls/tls_sw.c b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
index d1ad31986cf2c..d85d0c1ff546d 100644
--- a/net/tls/tls_sw.c
+++ b/net/tls/tls_sw.c
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
struct scatterlist *sge;
struct sk_msg *msg_en;
struct sock *sk;
+ int skerr;
if (err == -EINPROGRESS) /* see the comment in tls_decrypt_done() */
return;
@@ -488,13 +489,15 @@ static void tls_encrypt_done(void *data, int err)
sge->offset -= prot->prepend_size;
sge->length += prot->prepend_size;
+ skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
/* Check if error is previously set on socket */
- if (err || sk->sk_err) {
+ if (err || skerr) {
rec = NULL;
/* If err is already set on socket, return the same code */
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ctx->async_wait.err = -sk->sk_err;
+ if (skerr) {
+ ctx->async_wait.err = -skerr;
} else {
ctx->async_wait.err = err;
tls_err_abort(sk, err);
@@ -704,10 +707,14 @@ static int bpf_exec_tx_verdict(struct sk_msg *msg, struct sock *sk,
int err;
err = tls_push_record(sk, flags, record_type);
- if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS && sk->sk_err == EBADMSG) {
- *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
- tls_free_open_rec(sk);
- err = -sk->sk_err;
+ if (err && err != -EINPROGRESS) {
+ int skerr = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (skerr == EBADMSG) {
+ *copied -= sk_msg_free(sk, msg);
+ tls_free_open_rec(sk);
+ err = -skerr;
+ }
}
return err;
}
@@ -800,10 +807,9 @@ static int tls_sw_sendmsg_locked(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
}
while (msg_data_left(msg)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- ret = -sk->sk_err;
+ ret = -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+ if (ret)
goto send_end;
- }
if (ctx->open_rec)
rec = ctx->open_rec;
@@ -1107,10 +1113,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
timeo = sock_rcvtimeo(sk, nonblock);
while (!tls_strp_msg_ready(ctx)) {
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- if (has_copied)
- return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
- return sock_error(sk);
+ if (has_copied) {
+ int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -err;
+ } else {
+ int err = sock_error(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (ret < 0)
@@ -1132,10 +1144,16 @@ tls_rx_rec_wait(struct sock *sk, bool nonblock, bool released, bool has_copied)
* sk_err here so a connection abort surfaces as the
* actual error rather than a clean EOF.
*/
- if (sk->sk_err) {
- if (has_copied)
- return -READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
- return sock_error(sk);
+ if (has_copied) {
+ int err = READ_ONCE(sk->sk_err);
+
+ if (err)
+ return -err;
+ } else {
+ int err = sock_error(sk);
+
+ if (err)
+ return err;
}
if (sk->sk_shutdown & RCV_SHUTDOWN)
return 0;
|
| 47/3 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 4062 output: 33 thoughts: 774 Thoughts: **Evaluating the Necessity of a Dedicated KMSAN Fuzzing Session** Okay, let's break this down. My initial assessment is whether this patch warrants firing up a dedicated KMSAN fuzzing session. This requires careful consideration of the changes. The patch itself is focused on managing concurrent access to `sk->sk_err` within the kernel. It seems like the core issue here is data races – likely discovered by KCSAN or possibly simply addressing existing race conditions on this particular field. The patch introduces `READ_ONCE` and `WRITE_ONCE` barriers, and this gives us our major insight. Here's my analysis of the modified files and functions: * `include/linux/skmsg.h`: Modification in `sk_psock_report_error()` to ensure atomic write. * `net/core/skbuff.c`: Modifications in `sock_dequeue_err_skb()`, which also utilizes atomic writes. * `net/strparser/strparser.c`: Similar atomic write in `strp_abort_strp()`. * `net/tls/tls_device.c`: Reads from `sk->sk_err` uses `READ_ONCE`, and the return is refactored for use of the READ_ONCE. * `net/tls/tls_sw.c`: More examples of `READ_ONCE` usage in multiple functions: `tls_encrypt_done()`, `bpf_exec_tx_verdict()`, `tls_sw_sendmsg_locked()`, and `tls_rx_rec_wait()`. `tls_rx_rec_wait()` changes the error checking logic by using a local variable that is populated with a `READ_ONCE`, and then it performs an error return. What's really interesting here is the consistent use of these memory barriers. The patch seems to be addressing a data race problem, focusing on atomicity of the `sk->sk_err` field. I see a connection to `sock_error(sk)`. A closer inspection reveals the relationship of `sock_error(sk)` and `sk->sk_err`, since `sock_error(sk)` uses an `xchg` operation or `READ_ONCE` then `WRITE_ONCE`, or similar, to `sk->sk_err`. Given this, I need to understand what `sock_error(sk)` does, specifically. This will tell me more about the semantics surrounding this error code. Now, I should look at `include/net/sock.h` to see how `sock_error(sk)` operates at the lower levels. I need to understand if the functions it is called in will cause an atomic race condition, and the overall effect on the kernel. |
| 48/3 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | grepper |
0mArgs:{
"Expression": "static inline int sock_error",
"PathPrefix": "include/net/sock.h"
}Results: {
"Output": "include/net/sock.h=2551=struct sk_buff *sock_dequeue_err_skb(struct sock *sk);\n--\ninclude/net/sock.h-2556-\ninclude/net/sock.h:2557:static inline int sock_error(struct sock *sk)\ninclude/net/sock.h-2558-{\n"
} |
| 49/3 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 5565 output: 36 thoughts: 15 Thoughts: Okay, here's my take on those thoughts, tailored for an expert audience: **Analyzing `sock_error(sk)`** Alright, let's dive right in. My first thought is to take a look at the contents of `sock_error(sk)`. I'm immediately interested in what this function returns and, more importantly, what the state of the socket, `sk`, is when this function is called. The return value is critical, of course – it's the immediate indicator of any error. But I'm going to want to correlate that with everything I know about `sk` at that point in execution. I'll need to remember to check how that value changes. Has the socket been closed? What's the socket's current state? Are we mid-connection attempt, established, or in a weird half-closed state? Understanding the context around that call to `sock_error` is going to be just as important as the raw error code itself. I'll be looking for clues in the surrounding code that could give me some hints. |
| 50/3 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | read-file |
0mArgs:{
"File": "include/net/sock.h",
"FirstLine": 2556,
"LineCount": 15
}Results: {
"Contents": "2556:\t\n2557:\tstatic inline int sock_error(struct sock *sk)\n2558:\t{\n2559:\t\tint err;\n2560:\t\n2561:\t\t/* Avoid an atomic operation for the common case.\n2562:\t\t * This is racy since another cpu/thread can change sk_err under us.\n2563:\t\t */\n2564:\t\tif (likely(data_race(!sk-\u003esk_err)))\n2565:\t\t\treturn 0;\n2566:\t\n2567:\t\terr = xchg(\u0026sk-\u003esk_err, 0);\n2568:\t\treturn -err;\n2569:\t}\n2570:\t\n"
} |
| 51/3 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | llm | kmsan-evaluator |
0mModel:gemini-3.8-flash Args: null Results: null Tokens: input: 6042 output: 163 thoughts: 490 Thoughts: **KMSAN Assessment: No Uninitialized Memory Risks Introduced** Okay, let's break this down. My initial thought was to scrutinize this patch for potential uninitialized memory exposures. The `sock_error()` function is the focus, specifically how it handles `sk->sk_err` and the atomic exchange (`xchg`). My expertise immediately flags this as a candidate for KMSAN analysis. We need to be vigilant about any potential for the code to read uninitialized memory, especially when dealing with kernel structures and data races. I systematically went through the four KMSAN criteria: 1. **Kernel structures sent to user space:** Nothing here. This patch isn't directly involved in copying kernel data to userspace in the usual ways (like `copy_to_user`, netlink, etc.). It's modifying how `sk->sk_err` is read and written, not leaking it to userland. 2. **Conditional logic based on uninitialized variables:** No. `sk->sk_err` is part of `struct sock`, which is initialized on socket allocation, and `err` is also initialized upon return or read of `sk->sk_err`. There isn't any branching or logic flow based on the *potential* presence of uninitialized data in those variables. 3. **Allocation/Initialization of complex data structures:** Not applicable. The patch doesn't introduce any new memory allocations or structures. It's just modifying existing data access patterns. 4. **Unintentional Access to Uninitialized Bytes:** Nope. No buffer manipulation, lengths, or bounds checks are being altered here. This is purely about read and write operations. So, according to those criteria, the patch doesn't *introduce* or *expose* uninitialized memory risks. The focus here is on concurrency and data races on `sk->sk_err`. The patch's primary function is to enhance the existing usage with `READ_ONCE`/`WRITE_ONCE`/`xchg` to eliminate race conditions. This is the domain of KCSAN (Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer), not KMSAN. Thinking about the overarching principle – "DON'T waste resources" – we *only* use KMSAN if KASAN, LockDep, or other standard bug detectors cannot find the flaw. This patch doesn't fit that bill. A dedicated KMSAN fuzzing run is costly. Because this is race condition/concurrency issue, KCSAN is appropriate, not KMSAN. Therefore, `NeedsKMSAN=false`. |
| 52/3 | 2026/10/04 04:59 | tool | set-results |
0mArgs:{
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch introduces READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE annotations to fix data races on sk-\u003esk_err across socket and TLS subsystems (skmsg, skbuff, strparser, and tls). It does not allocate new memory buffers, modify data copies to user space, change structure padding, or alter buffer bounds/length calculations. All variables accessed and modified (such as sk-\u003esk_err and local err/skerr variables) are fully initialized socket fields or initialized locals. Consequently, there are no uninitialized memory access or info-leak risks that would necessitate KMSAN fuzzing; standard sanitizers (such as KCSAN/KASAN) are sufficient.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
}Results: {
"KMSANReasoning": "The patch introduces READ_ONCE and WRITE_ONCE annotations to fix data races on sk-\u003esk_err across socket and TLS subsystems (skmsg, skbuff, strparser, and tls). It does not allocate new memory buffers, modify data copies to user space, change structure padding, or alter buffer bounds/length calculations. All variables accessed and modified (such as sk-\u003esk_err and local err/skerr variables) are fully initialized socket fields or initialized locals. Consequently, there are no uninitialized memory access or info-leak risks that would necessitate KMSAN fuzzing; standard sanitizers (such as KCSAN/KASAN) are sufficient.",
"NeedsKMSAN": false
} |
| Total Calls | Total Tokens | Avg Tokens | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|
| Total Calls | Total Duration (Seconds) | Avg Duration (Seconds) |
|---|