Per-process securebits were introduced with a direct cap_capable() check for CAP_SETPCAP. The capable LSM hook and SELinux capability policy already existed, and SELinux forwarded task_prctl operations to commoncap. The direct call therefore bypassed SELinux policy from the start. It now also bypasses AppArmor, Landlock, and BPF LSM programs attached to the capable hook. A task with CAP_SETPCAP in its effective set can consequently change privileged securebits despite an LSM denial. This can alter how its capabilities evolve across UID and execution transitions without the expected LSM denial or audit record. Use ns_capable(), as cap_prctl_drop() already does for PR_CAPBSET_DROP. Call it only for a no-op, which requires privilege for legacy reasons, or when a privileged bit changes. Changes limited to SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED and their lock bits do not need the capability, so they must not invoke an LSM check or set PF_SUPERPRIV. Successful privileged checks now set PF_SUPERPRIV, as other ns_capable() callers do. Without other LSMs, the same requests remain allowed as before. The check now reaches every capable hook before commoncap commits the new credentials. A later task_prctl hook cannot provide equivalent mediation because commoncap runs first and commits the change itself. Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Günther Noack Cc: James Morris Cc: John Johansen Cc: KP Singh Cc: Matt Bobrowski Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Serge Hallyn Cc: Stephen Smalley Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Ada Smith Fixes: 3898b1b4ebff ("capabilities: implement per-process securebits") Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün --- security/commoncap.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/commoncap.c b/security/commoncap.c index d47ab3022343..1947128396e2 100644 --- a/security/commoncap.c +++ b/security/commoncap.c @@ -1283,6 +1283,23 @@ static int cap_prctl_drop(unsigned long cap) return commit_creds(new); } +/* + * Doing anything with securebits requires privilege (go read about the + * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits. Indeed, the + * SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not restrictions enforced by the kernel but + * by user space on itself. For legacy reasons, a non-change requires + * privilege too. Only checking CAP_SETPCAP when it is needed keeps LSMs from + * seeing (and logging) a capability check for unprivileged changes. + */ +static bool securebits_need_setpcap(unsigned long old, unsigned long new) +{ + const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks = SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED | + SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1; + const unsigned long changed = old ^ new; + + return !changed || (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks); +} + /** * cap_task_prctl - Implement process control functions for this security module * @option: The process control function requested @@ -1346,28 +1363,9 @@ int cap_task_prctl(int option, unsigned long arg2, unsigned long arg3, /* cannot change a locked bit */ return -EPERM; - /* - * Doing anything requires privilege (go read about the - * "sendmail capabilities bug"), except for unprivileged bits. - * Indeed, the SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED bits are not - * restrictions enforced by the kernel but by user space on - * itself. - */ - if (cap_capable(current_cred(), current_cred()->user_ns, - CAP_SETPCAP, CAP_OPT_NONE) != 0) { - const unsigned long unpriv_and_locks = - SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED | - SECURE_ALL_UNPRIVILEGED << 1; - const unsigned long changed = old->securebits ^ arg2; - - /* For legacy reason, denies non-change. */ - if (!changed) - return -EPERM; - - /* Denies privileged changes. */ - if (changed & ~unpriv_and_locks) - return -EPERM; - } + if (securebits_need_setpcap(old->securebits, arg2) && + !ns_capable(current_user_ns(), CAP_SETPCAP)) + return -EPERM; new = prepare_creds(); if (!new) -- 2.56.0 The preceding commoncap fix routes the CAP_SETPCAP check for privileged PR_SET_SECUREBITS requests through the ordinary capable hooks. Add a focused Landlock regression test for this path. Keep CAP_SETPCAP effective to isolate Landlock mediation and run the audit case in a child domain. A privileged change returns EPERM and emits an exact CAP_SETPCAP record, then an unprivileged-only change succeeds. After the child exits, require the domain deallocation record to report exactly one denial; this proves that the second operation did not create a hidden denial without relying on an asynchronous no-record timeout. The existing check-exec securebits fixture already covers commoncap's privileged, unprivileged, locked, and user-namespace semantics. Without the preceding fix, this Landlock audit test fails. Cc: Christian Brauner Cc: Günther Noack Cc: Paul Moore Cc: Serge Hallyn Signed-off-by: Mickaël Salaün --- tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++ 1 file changed, 69 insertions(+) diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c index c79bb42c6282..741567c5ab41 100644 --- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c +++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/cap_test.c @@ -1275,6 +1275,75 @@ TEST_F(cap_audit, denied) EXPECT_EQ(0, records.domain); } +/* + * A privileged denial allocates the domain ID. The following unprivileged-only + * change must not create a hidden Landlock denial, so the domain's deallocation + * record must report exactly one denial. + */ +TEST_F(cap_audit, securebits) +{ + const unsigned long unpriv = SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE | + SECBIT_EXEC_RESTRICT_FILE_LOCKED; + __u64 *domain_id, deallocated_dom = 0; + unsigned long bits; + int err, ruleset_fd, status; + pid_t child; + + domain_id = mmap(NULL, sizeof(*domain_id), PROT_READ | PROT_WRITE, + MAP_SHARED | MAP_ANONYMOUS, -1, 0); + ASSERT_NE(MAP_FAILED, domain_id); + *domain_id = 0; + + ruleset_fd = create_cap_ruleset(); + ASSERT_LE(0, ruleset_fd); + /* Allow the child to replace the audit filter before exiting. */ + ASSERT_EQ(0, add_cap_rule(ruleset_fd, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL)); + + child = fork(); + ASSERT_LE(0, child); + if (child == 0) { + enforce_ruleset(_metadata, ruleset_fd); + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); + + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP); + bits = prctl(PR_GET_SECUREBITS); + EXPECT_EQ(-1, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, + bits | SECBIT_NO_CAP_AMBIENT_RAISE)); + EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_cap(self->audit_fd, CAP_SETPCAP)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, matches_log_domain_allocated(self->audit_fd, + getpid(), domain_id)); + + EXPECT_EQ(0, prctl(PR_SET_SECUREBITS, bits | unpriv)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_SETPCAP); + + /* Receive the asynchronous domain deallocation record. */ + set_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL); + EXPECT_EQ(0, audit_filter_drop(self->audit_fd, AUDIT_ADD_RULE)); + EXPECT_EQ(0, + audit_filter_exe(self->audit_fd, &self->audit_filter, + AUDIT_DEL_RULE)); + clear_cap(_metadata, CAP_AUDIT_CONTROL); + + _exit(_metadata->exit_code); + return; + } + + ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0)); + if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) || + WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS) + _metadata->exit_code = KSFT_FAIL; + + EXPECT_NE(0, *domain_id); + err = matches_log_domain_deallocated(self->audit_fd, 1, *domain_id, + &deallocated_dom); + EXPECT_EQ(0, err); + EXPECT_EQ(*domain_id, deallocated_dom); + EXPECT_EQ(0, munmap(domain_id, sizeof(*domain_id))); + EXPECT_EQ(0, close(ruleset_fd)); +} + /* * Denials in the capset and mmap_addr paths are audited like capable hook * denials. The vm_enough_memory hook only withholds the admin reserve, with -- 2.56.0