In __netif_receive_skb_core(), the another_round label can be reached via a TC ingress redirect (bpf_redirect_peer returning -EAGAIN). Across network namespaces, two BPF programs on peer devices can redirect packets back and forth indefinitely, creating an unbounded loop that monopolizes a CPU core in softirq context. This leads to RCU stalls, soft lockups, and system-wide denial of service. We reproduced it by creating a pair of TC BPF programs across two network namespaces that redirect packets to each other, and the RCU subsystem detects a stall: ``` [ 24.835219] rcu: INFO: rcu_preempt detected stalls on CPUs/tasks: [ 24.835837] rcu: (detected by 0, t=21002 jiffies, g=-627, q=2 ncpus=1) [ 24.835959] rcu: All QSes seen, last rcu_preempt kthread activity 21002 (4294691810-4294670808), jiffies_till_next_fqs=3, root ->qsmask 0x0 [ 24.836239] rcu: rcu_preempt kthread starved for 21002 jiffies! g-627 f0x2 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=0 [ 24.836362] rcu: Unless rcu_preempt kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior. [ 24.836460] rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump: [ 24.836601] task:rcu_preempt state:R running task stack:15448 pid:15 tgid:15 ppid:2 task_flags:0x208040 flags:0x00080000 [ 24.837139] Call Trace: [ 24.837568] [ 24.838008] __schedule+0x4ed/0xea0 [ 24.838934] schedule+0x22/0xd0 [ 24.839023] schedule_timeout+0x81/0x100 [ 24.839095] ? __pfx_process_timeout+0x10/0x10 [ 24.839165] rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x11b/0x650 [ 24.839226] ? __pfx_rcu_gp_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 24.839282] rcu_gp_kthread+0x17e/0x210 [ 24.839333] ? __pfx_rcu_gp_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 24.839383] kthread+0xdd/0x110 [ 24.839433] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 24.839481] ret_from_fork+0x1aa/0x260 [ 24.839538] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10 [ 24.839585] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 [ 24.839686] ...... ``` Fix this by adding a depth counter when it is about to go to another_round label. When the counter exceeds XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT (8), the packet is dropped. This follows the same pattern as dev_xmit_recursion() which protects the TX redirect path with the same limit. Reuse SKB_DROP_REASON_TC_RECLASSIFY_LOOP for observability. Fixes: 9aa1206e8f48 ("bpf: Add redirect_peer helper") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Reported-by: Yizhou Zhao Reported-by: Yuxiang Yang Reported-by: Xuewei Feng Reported-by: Qi Li Reported-by: Ke Xu Assisted-by: GLM:GLM-5.1 Signed-off-by: Yizhou Zhao --- Changes in v2: - Move the check just after `another` is set to true to avoid affecting the fast path - Reuse SKB_DROP_REASON_TC_RECLASSIFY_LOOP to avoid adding new drop reason - Link to v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260511063005.38134-1-zhaoyz24@mails.tsinghua.edu.cn/ --- net/core/dev.c | 10 +++++++++- 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/core/dev.c b/net/core/dev.c index 831129f2a..bb9ae92f0 100644 --- a/net/core/dev.c +++ b/net/core/dev.c @@ -5958,6 +5958,7 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff **pskb, bool pfmemalloc, struct net_device *orig_dev; bool deliver_exact = false; int ret = NET_RX_DROP; + int redirect_depth = 0; __be16 type; net_timestamp_check(!READ_ONCE(net_hotdata.tstamp_prequeue), skb); @@ -6031,8 +6032,16 @@ static int __netif_receive_skb_core(struct sk_buff **pskb, bool pfmemalloc, nf_skip_egress(skb, true); skb = sch_handle_ingress(skb, &pt_prev, &ret, orig_dev, &another); - if (another) + if (another) { + if (unlikely(++redirect_depth > XMIT_RECURSION_LIMIT)) { + net_warn_ratelimited( + "%s: redirect loop limit reached, dropping (dev=%s)\n", + __func__, skb->dev->name); + drop_reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_TC_RECLASSIFY_LOOP; + goto drop; + } goto another_round; + } if (!skb) goto out; -- 2.43.0