From: Chen Yufeng This issue is similar to the vulnerability in the `mcp251x` driver, which was fixed in commit 03c427147b2d ("can: mcp251x: fix resume from sleep before interface was brought up"). In the `hi311x` driver, when the device resumes from sleep, the driver schedules `priv->restart_work`. However, if the network interface was not previously enabled, the `priv->wq` (workqueue) is not allocated and initialized, leading to a null pointer dereference. To fix this, we move the allocation and initialization of the workqueue from the `hi3110_open` function to the `hi3110_can_probe` function. This ensures that the workqueue is properly initialized before it is used during device resume. And added logic to destroy the workqueue in the error handling paths of `hi3110_can_probe` and in the `hi3110_can_remove` function to prevent resource leaks. Signed-off-by: Chen Yufeng Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250911150820.250-1-chenyufeng@iie.ac.cn Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++---------------- 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 16 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c index 09ae218315d7..96bef8f384c4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c @@ -545,8 +545,6 @@ static int hi3110_stop(struct net_device *net) priv->force_quit = 1; free_irq(spi->irq, priv); - destroy_workqueue(priv->wq); - priv->wq = NULL; mutex_lock(&priv->hi3110_lock); @@ -770,34 +768,23 @@ static int hi3110_open(struct net_device *net) goto out_close; } - priv->wq = alloc_workqueue("hi3110_wq", WQ_FREEZABLE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, - 0); - if (!priv->wq) { - ret = -ENOMEM; - goto out_free_irq; - } - INIT_WORK(&priv->tx_work, hi3110_tx_work_handler); - INIT_WORK(&priv->restart_work, hi3110_restart_work_handler); - ret = hi3110_hw_reset(spi); if (ret) - goto out_free_wq; + goto out_free_irq; ret = hi3110_setup(net); if (ret) - goto out_free_wq; + goto out_free_irq; ret = hi3110_set_normal_mode(spi); if (ret) - goto out_free_wq; + goto out_free_irq; netif_wake_queue(net); mutex_unlock(&priv->hi3110_lock); return 0; - out_free_wq: - destroy_workqueue(priv->wq); out_free_irq: free_irq(spi->irq, priv); hi3110_hw_sleep(spi); @@ -908,6 +895,15 @@ static int hi3110_can_probe(struct spi_device *spi) if (ret) goto out_clk; + priv->wq = alloc_workqueue("hi3110_wq", WQ_FREEZABLE | WQ_MEM_RECLAIM, + 0); + if (!priv->wq) { + ret = -ENOMEM; + goto out_clk; + } + INIT_WORK(&priv->tx_work, hi3110_tx_work_handler); + INIT_WORK(&priv->restart_work, hi3110_restart_work_handler); + priv->spi = spi; mutex_init(&priv->hi3110_lock); @@ -943,6 +939,8 @@ static int hi3110_can_probe(struct spi_device *spi) return 0; error_probe: + destroy_workqueue(priv->wq); + priv->wq = NULL; hi3110_power_enable(priv->power, 0); out_clk: @@ -963,6 +961,9 @@ static void hi3110_can_remove(struct spi_device *spi) hi3110_power_enable(priv->power, 0); + destroy_workqueue(priv->wq); + priv->wq = NULL; + clk_disable_unprepare(priv->clk); free_candev(net); base-commit: cbf658dd09419f1ef9de11b9604e950bdd5c170b -- 2.51.0 From: Duy Nguyen Driver configures register to choose controller mode before setting all channels to reset mode leading to failure. The patch corrects operation of mode setting. Signed-off-by: Duy Nguyen Signed-off-by: Tranh Ha Link: https://patch.msgid.link/TYWPR01MB87434739F83E27EDCD23DF44B416A@TYWPR01MB8743.jpnprd01.prod.outlook.com Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c b/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c index b3c8c592fb0e..7e8b1d2f1af6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/rcar/rcar_canfd.c @@ -823,9 +823,6 @@ static int rcar_canfd_reset_controller(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) /* Reset Global error flags */ rcar_canfd_write(gpriv->base, RCANFD_GERFL, 0x0); - /* Set the controller into appropriate mode */ - rcar_canfd_set_mode(gpriv); - /* Transition all Channels to reset mode */ for_each_set_bit(ch, &gpriv->channels_mask, gpriv->info->max_channels) { rcar_canfd_clear_bit(gpriv->base, @@ -844,6 +841,10 @@ static int rcar_canfd_reset_controller(struct rcar_canfd_global *gpriv) return err; } } + + /* Set the controller into appropriate mode */ + rcar_canfd_set_mode(gpriv); + return 0; } -- 2.51.0 From: Vincent Mailhol Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the etas_es58x driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)); to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, es58x_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN(FD) frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. For example, using the es581.4 variant, the frame will be dispatched to es581_4_tx_can_msg(), go through the last check at the beginning of this function: if (can_is_canfd_skb(skb)) return -EMSGSIZE; and reach this line: memcpy(tx_can_msg->data, cf->data, cf->len); Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU or CANFD_MTU (depending on the device capabilities). By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. Fixes: 8537257874e9 ("can: etas_es58x: add core support for ETAS ES58X CAN USB interfaces") Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-1-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/usb/etas_es58x/es58x_core.c | 3 ++- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/etas_es58x/es58x_core.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/etas_es58x/es58x_core.c index db1acf6d504c..adc91873c083 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/etas_es58x/es58x_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/etas_es58x/es58x_core.c @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ * * Copyright (c) 2019 Robert Bosch Engineering and Business Solutions. All rights reserved. * Copyright (c) 2020 ETAS K.K.. All rights reserved. - * Copyright (c) 2020-2022 Vincent Mailhol + * Copyright (c) 2020-2025 Vincent Mailhol */ #include @@ -1977,6 +1977,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops es58x_netdev_ops = { .ndo_stop = es58x_stop, .ndo_start_xmit = es58x_start_xmit, .ndo_eth_ioctl = can_eth_ioctl_hwts, + .ndo_change_mtu = can_change_mtu, }; static const struct ethtool_ops es58x_ethtool_ops = { -- 2.51.0 From: Vincent Mailhol Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, hi3110_hard_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. The driver will consume frame->len as-is with no further checks. This can result in a buffer overflow later on in hi3110_hw_tx() on this line: memcpy(buf + HI3110_FIFO_EXT_DATA_OFF, frame->data, frame->len); Here, frame->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. Fixes: 57e83fb9b746 ("can: hi311x: Add Holt HI-311x CAN driver") Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-2-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c index 96bef8f384c4..963ea8510dd9 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/spi/hi311x.c @@ -799,6 +799,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops hi3110_netdev_ops = { .ndo_open = hi3110_open, .ndo_stop = hi3110_stop, .ndo_start_xmit = hi3110_hard_start_xmit, + .ndo_change_mtu = can_change_mtu, }; static const struct ethtool_ops hi3110_ethtool_ops = { -- 2.51.0 From: Vincent Mailhol Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the sun4i_can driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, sun4ican_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len as-is with no further checks on this line: dlc = cf->len; Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs a couple line below when doing: for (i = 0; i < dlc; i++) writel(cf->data[i], priv->base + (dreg + i * 4)); Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. Fixes: 0738eff14d81 ("can: Allwinner A10/A20 CAN Controller support - Kernel module") Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-3-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c b/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c index 6fcb301ef611..53bfd873de9b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/sun4i_can.c @@ -768,6 +768,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops sun4ican_netdev_ops = { .ndo_open = sun4ican_open, .ndo_stop = sun4ican_close, .ndo_start_xmit = sun4ican_start_xmit, + .ndo_change_mtu = can_change_mtu, }; static const struct ethtool_ops sun4ican_ethtool_ops = { -- 2.51.0 From: Vincent Mailhol Sending an PF_PACKET allows to bypass the CAN framework logic and to directly reach the xmit() function of a CAN driver. The only check which is performed by the PF_PACKET framework is to make sure that skb->len fits the interface's MTU. Unfortunately, because the mcba_usb driver does not populate its net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu(), it is possible for an attacker to configure an invalid MTU by doing, for example: $ ip link set can0 mtu 9999 After doing so, the attacker could open a PF_PACKET socket using the ETH_P_CANXL protocol: socket(PF_PACKET, SOCK_RAW, htons(ETH_P_CANXL)) to inject a malicious CAN XL frames. For example: struct canxl_frame frame = { .flags = 0xff, .len = 2048, }; The CAN drivers' xmit() function are calling can_dev_dropped_skb() to check that the skb is valid, unfortunately under above conditions, the malicious packet is able to go through can_dev_dropped_skb() checks: 1. the skb->protocol is set to ETH_P_CANXL which is valid (the function does not check the actual device capabilities). 2. the length is a valid CAN XL length. And so, mcba_usb_start_xmit() receives a CAN XL frame which it is not able to correctly handle and will thus misinterpret it as a CAN frame. This can result in a buffer overflow. The driver will consume cf->len as-is with no further checks on these lines: usb_msg.dlc = cf->len; memcpy(usb_msg.data, cf->data, usb_msg.dlc); Here, cf->len corresponds to the flags field of the CAN XL frame. In our previous example, we set canxl_frame->flags to 0xff. Because the maximum expected length is 8, a buffer overflow of 247 bytes occurs! Populate net_device_ops->ndo_change_mtu() to ensure that the interface's MTU can not be set to anything bigger than CAN_MTU. By fixing the root cause, this prevents the buffer overflow. Fixes: 51f3baad7de9 ("can: mcba_usb: Add support for Microchip CAN BUS Analyzer") Signed-off-by: Vincent Mailhol Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918-can-fix-mtu-v1-4-0d1cada9393b@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/usb/mcba_usb.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/mcba_usb.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/mcba_usb.c index 41c0a1c399bf..1f9b915094e6 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/mcba_usb.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/mcba_usb.c @@ -761,6 +761,7 @@ static const struct net_device_ops mcba_netdev_ops = { .ndo_open = mcba_usb_open, .ndo_stop = mcba_usb_close, .ndo_start_xmit = mcba_usb_start_xmit, + .ndo_change_mtu = can_change_mtu, }; static const struct ethtool_ops mcba_ethtool_ops = { -- 2.51.0 From: Stéphane Grosjean Explicitly uses a 64-bit constant when the number of bits used for its shifting is 32 (which is the case for PC CAN FD interfaces supported by this driver). Signed-off-by: Stéphane Grosjean Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20250918132413.30071-1-stephane.grosjean@free.fr Reported-by: Marc Kleine-Budde Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/20250917-aboriginal-refined-honeybee-82b1aa-mkl@pengutronix.de Fixes: bb4785551f64 ("can: usb: PEAK-System Technik USB adapters driver core") [mkl: update subject, apply manually] Signed-off-by: Marc Kleine-Budde --- drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c index 117637b9b995..dd5caa1c302b 100644 --- a/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c +++ b/drivers/net/can/usb/peak_usb/pcan_usb_core.c @@ -111,7 +111,7 @@ void peak_usb_update_ts_now(struct peak_time_ref *time_ref, u32 ts_now) u32 delta_ts = time_ref->ts_dev_2 - time_ref->ts_dev_1; if (time_ref->ts_dev_2 < time_ref->ts_dev_1) - delta_ts &= (1 << time_ref->adapter->ts_used_bits) - 1; + delta_ts &= (1ULL << time_ref->adapter->ts_used_bits) - 1; time_ref->ts_total += delta_ts; } -- 2.51.0