This patch introduces selftests to cover the new bounds refinement
logic introduced in the previous patch. Without the previous patch,
the first two tests fail because of the invariant violation they
trigger. The last test fails because the R10 access is not detected as
dead code. In addition, all three tests fail because of R0 having a
non-constant value in the verifier logs.

In addition, the last two cases are covering the negative cases: when we
shouldn't refine the bounds because the u64 and tnum overlap in at least
two values.

Signed-off-by: Paul Chaignon <paul.chaignon@gmail.com>
---
 .../selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c     | 137 ++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 137 insertions(+)

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
index 560531404bce..97065a26cf70 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/bpf/progs/verifier_bounds.c
@@ -1863,4 +1863,141 @@ l1_%=:	r0 = 1;				\
 	: __clobber_all);
 }
 
+/* This test covers the bounds deduction when the u64 range and the tnum
+ * overlap only at umax. After instruction 3, the ranges look as follows:
+ *
+ * 0    umin=0xe01     umax=0xf00                              U64_MAX
+ * |    [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]                                       |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |   x               x                                       | tnum values
+ *
+ * The verifier can therefore deduce that the R0=0xf0=240.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds refinement with single-value tnum on umax")
+__msg("3: (15) if r0 == 0xe0 {{.*}} R0=240")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__naked void bounds_refinement_tnum_umax(void *ctx)
+{
+	asm volatile("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];	\
+	r0 |= 0xe0;			\
+	r0 &= 0xf0;			\
+	if r0 == 0xe0 goto +2;		\
+	if r0 == 0xf0 goto +1;		\
+	r10 = 0;			\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test covers the bounds deduction when the u64 range and the tnum
+ * overlap only at umin. After instruction 3, the ranges look as follows:
+ *
+ * 0    umin=0xe00     umax=0xeff                              U64_MAX
+ * |    [xxxxxxxxxxxxxx]                                       |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |    x               x                                      | tnum values
+ *
+ * The verifier can therefore deduce that the R0=0xe0=224.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds refinement with single-value tnum on umin")
+__msg("3: (15) if r0 == 0xf0 {{.*}} R0=224")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__flag(BPF_F_TEST_REG_INVARIANTS)
+__naked void bounds_refinement_tnum_umin(void *ctx)
+{
+	asm volatile("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];	\
+	r0 |= 0xe0;			\
+	r0 &= 0xf0;			\
+	if r0 == 0xf0 goto +2;		\
+	if r0 == 0xe0 goto +1;		\
+	r10 = 0;			\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test covers the bounds deduction when the only possible tnum value is
+ * in the middle of the u64 range. After instruction 3, the ranges look as
+ * follows:
+ *
+ * 0    umin=0x7cf   umax=0x7df                                U64_MAX
+ * |    [xxxxxxxxxxxx]                                         |
+ * |----------------------------|------------------------------|
+ * |     x            x            x            x            x | tnum values
+ *       |            +--- 0x7e0
+ *       +--- 0x7d0
+ *
+ * Since the lower four bits are zero, the tnum and the u64 range only overlap
+ * in R0=0x7d0=2000. Instruction 5 is therefore dead code.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds refinement with single-value tnum in middle of range")
+__msg("3: (a5) if r0 < 0x7cf {{.*}} R0=2000")
+__success __log_level(2)
+__naked void bounds_refinement_tnum_middle(void *ctx)
+{
+	asm volatile("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];	\
+	if r0 & 0x0f goto +4;		\
+	if r0 > 0x7df goto +3;		\
+	if r0 < 0x7cf goto +2;		\
+	if r0 == 0x7d0 goto +1;		\
+	r10 = 0;			\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test cover the negative case for the tnum/u64 overlap. Since
+ * they contain the same two values (i.e., {0, 1}), we can't deduce
+ * anything more.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds refinement: several overlaps between tnum and u64")
+__msg("2: (25) if r0 > 0x1 {{.*}} R0=scalar(smin=smin32=0,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=1,var_off=(0x0; 0x1))")
+__failure __log_level(2)
+__naked void bounds_refinement_several_overlaps(void *ctx)
+{
+	asm volatile("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];	\
+	if r0 < 0 goto +3;		\
+	if r0 > 1 goto +2;		\
+	if r0 == 1 goto +1;		\
+	r10 = 0;			\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
+/* This test cover the negative case for the tnum/u64 overlap. Since
+ * they overlap in the two values contained by the u64 range (i.e.,
+ * {0xf, 0x10}), we can't deduce anything more.
+ */
+SEC("socket")
+__description("bounds refinement: multiple overlaps between tnum and u64")
+__msg("2: (25) if r0 > 0x10 {{.*}} R0=scalar(smin=umin=smin32=umin32=15,smax=umax=smax32=umax32=16,var_off=(0x0; 0x1f))")
+__failure __log_level(2)
+__naked void bounds_refinement_multiple_overlaps(void *ctx)
+{
+	asm volatile("			\
+	call %[bpf_get_prandom_u32];	\
+	if r0 < 0xf goto +3;		\
+	if r0 > 0x10 goto +2;		\
+	if r0 == 0x10 goto +1;		\
+	r10 = 0;			\
+	exit;				\
+"	:
+	: __imm(bpf_get_prandom_u32)
+	: __clobber_all);
+}
+
 char _license[] SEC("license") = "GPL";
-- 
2.43.0