SELinux saves the user file SID in a backing-file security blob so it remains available after mmap() replaces vma->vm_file with a backing file. For nested backing files (overlayfs over overlayfs, or FUSE passthrough backed by overlayfs), user_file may itself be a backing file. Its fsec->sid is the SID of the mounter that opened it, rather than the user that opened the top-level file. mprotect() then checks fd { use } against the mounter SID. This can incorrectly deny access without a domain transition, or check the wrong target SID after one. Copy the saved user SID when user_file is a backing file. Keep using the regular file SID for the first backing layer. With two nested overlayfs mounts and SELinux enforcing, mprotect(PROT_READ) returns EACCES with an fd { use } denial against the mounter SID. With this change, mprotect() succeeds. Fixes: 82544d36b172 ("selinux: fix overlayfs mmap() and mprotect() access checks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-5.6-sol Signed-off-by: Karl Mehltretter --- Changes in v2: - Add selinux_file_user_sid() helper instead of open-coding the lookup (Amir). Tested on arm64 QEMU at fd6e2388a3ea with SELinux enforcing and two nested overlayfs mounts. The policy omitted only base_t -> mounter_t:fd { use } among the relevant cross-domain allows: baseline: mprotect(PROT_READ) returned EACCES with that denial patched: mprotect(PROT_READ) succeeded; test exited 0 This patch fixes SID propagation only. backing_file_user_path() still resolves to the middle layer for a nested mapping, so the audit path and inode do not correspond to uf_sid, and that layer's mounter is not re-checked. Preserving the full user path likely needs a VFS-side change, such as having backing_file_open() store file_user_path(user_file). security/selinux/hooks.c | 9 ++++++++- security/selinux/include/objsec.h | 2 +- 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c index 1ead2eee1944..171b90412ff1 100644 --- a/security/selinux/hooks.c +++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c @@ -3843,13 +3843,20 @@ static int selinux_file_alloc_security(struct file *file) return 0; } +static inline u32 selinux_file_user_sid(const struct file *file) +{ + if (unlikely(file->f_mode & FMODE_BACKING)) + return selinux_backing_file(file)->uf_sid; + return selinux_file(file)->sid; +} + static int selinux_backing_file_alloc(struct file *backing_file, const struct file *user_file) { struct backing_file_security_struct *bfsec; bfsec = selinux_backing_file(backing_file); - bfsec->uf_sid = selinux_file(user_file)->sid; + bfsec->uf_sid = selinux_file_user_sid(user_file); return 0; } diff --git a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h index 3c0a16ec978b..853f7266ed18 100644 --- a/security/selinux/include/objsec.h +++ b/security/selinux/include/objsec.h @@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ struct file_security_struct { }; struct backing_file_security_struct { - u32 uf_sid; /* associated user file fsec->sid */ + u32 uf_sid; /* top-level user file fsec->sid */ }; struct superblock_security_struct { base-commit: fd6e2388a3ea55e58cbbbef840c1d8aa2067dbb3 -- 2.39.5 (Apple Git-154)