6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Michail Andreas Michalopoulos commit 4f1ce9ffb996a524acf864316479a7806ae500c6 upstream. ksmbd-tools releases before 3.5.2 do not have the payload_sz field in struct ksmbd_share_config_response; the field occupies the last word of their reserved[] area, so the kernel always sees payload_sz == 0 from them. ipc_validate_msg() and share_config_request() used to treat payload_sz == 0 as "legacy userspace" and skip the payload size checks. That case was removed by commit f25e93768fcc ("ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds reads in share config responses"). With payload_sz == 0: - the IPC$ (pipe) response fails the final message size comparison: these tools always send a one-byte payload, so msg_sz is sizeof(*resp) + 1, but the expected size is now computed as sizeof(*resp) + 0; - every other share fails "payload_sz <= veto_list_sz". In addition, ksmbd-tools before 3.5.3 copy a global "veto files" setting into the IPC$ response, so with such a configuration IPC$ also fails the now unconditional "veto_list_sz > payload_sz" check, even though pipe shares never use a veto list. ksmbd_ipc_share_config_request() then returns NULL and every tree connect fails with STATUS_BAD_NETWORK_NAME, so ksmbd cannot serve any share when used with these ksmbd-tools releases, for example the 3.5.1 package shipped by Ubuntu 24.04. Login still works, which makes the failure look like a configuration problem: CIFS: VFS: BAD_NETWORK_NAME: \\127.0.0.1\IPC$ CIFS: VFS: \\127.0.0.1 failed to connect to IPC (rc=-2) When payload_sz is zero, derive it from the size of the message actually received and store it back in the response, so that the checks in ipc_validate_msg() and the path and veto list parsing in share_config_request() all use the same bound. The response is the kernel's own copy made by handle_response(), and msg_sz has already been checked to be at least sizeof(*resp), so this cannot underflow. All checks added by that commit then apply unchanged, bounded by the bytes that really arrived, and newer ksmbd-tools that fill in payload_sz are unaffected. Also skip the veto list size check for pipe shares: share_config_request() reads neither the path nor the veto list for them. Tested in QEMU with ksmbd-tools 3.5.1 and 3.5.7 and the in-kernel SMB client over loopback, with and without a global "veto files" setting. Fixes: f25e93768fcc ("ksmbd: prevent out-of-bounds reads in share config responses") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Michail Andreas Michalopoulos Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c | 16 +++++++++++++++- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) --- a/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/transport_ipc.c @@ -524,11 +524,25 @@ static int ipc_validate_msg(struct ipc_m if (entry->msg_sz < sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response)) return -EINVAL; + /* + * ksmbd-tools releases before 3.5.2 leave payload_sz zero. + * Derive it from the size of the message actually received so + * the checks below bound the payload for those releases too. + */ + if (!resp->payload_sz) + resp->payload_sz = entry->msg_sz - + sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response); + if (strnlen(resp->share_name, sizeof(resp->share_name)) == sizeof(resp->share_name)) return -EINVAL; - if (resp->veto_list_sz > resp->payload_sz) + /* + * Pipe shares carry no veto list, but ksmbd-tools before 3.5.3 + * copy a global "veto files" setting into the IPC$ response. + */ + if (!(resp->flags & KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_PIPE) && + resp->veto_list_sz > resp->payload_sz) return -EINVAL; if (resp->flags != KSMBD_SHARE_FLAG_INVALID &&