smb2_get_info_sec() allocates the security descriptor reply with the size that smb_acl_sec_desc_scratch_len() estimates. A compound response pads the reply to 8 bytes inside that buffer, so after build_sec_desc() the query fails with -EFBIG when the padded length does not fit. The estimate is not padded, so a descriptor that fits the estimate can still fail. A query with AdditionalInformation 0 always fails with -EFBIG. Its reply is the 20-byte header, the estimate is 20 bytes, and the padded length is 24. The client gets an error instead of the header. Round the allocation up to 8 bytes, as READ does for its data buffer. Fixes: fda9522ed6af ("ksmbd: fix OOB write in QUERY_INFO for compound requests") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Ian Bridges --- The size check after build_sec_desc() is kept. It still makes sure the descriptor and its padding fit in the buffer. Tested on ksmbd-for-next 267029b35ad1 with KASAN. A query with AdditionalInformation 0 now returns the 20-byte header, both alone and in the middle of a compound. Replies for the other tested AdditionalInformation values are unchanged. smbtorture results match the base. This patch was developed with LLM assistance. fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c | 4 +++- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c index 29750970f8da..84f840f51297 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smb2pdu.c @@ -8510,11 +8510,13 @@ static int smb2_get_info_sec(struct ksmbd_work *work, scratch_len = smb_acl_sec_desc_scratch_len(&fattr, ppntsd, ppntsd_size, addition_info); - if (!scratch_len || scratch_len == SIZE_MAX) { + if (!scratch_len || scratch_len > SIZE_MAX - 7) { rc = -EFBIG; goto release_acl; } + /* A compound response pads the descriptor to 8 bytes in this buffer */ + scratch_len = ALIGN(scratch_len, 8); pntsd = kvzalloc(scratch_len, KSMBD_DEFAULT_GFP); if (!pntsd) { rc = -ENOMEM; -- 2.47.3