do_tls_setsockopt_tx_payload_len() refuses to change the record size limit while a record is open, because both TX paths size the record they are filling against tx_max_payload_len. It looks for the open record through tls_sw_ctx_tx(), a plain cast of priv_ctx_tx to struct tls_sw_context_tx. On a socket whose TX side is HW offloaded (tx_conf == TLS_HW), priv_ctx_tx is a struct tls_offload_context_tx, so the load lands in an unrelated field. In the tested x86_64 configuration, open_rec sits at offset 144, which aliases sg_tx_data[2].dma_address. TLS never DMA-maps that table, so the check reads zero even while a record is open. This alias depends on the structure layouts: other configurations can read a populated field instead and reject a legitimate call with EBUSY. The missed check matters: setsockopt(SOL_TLS, TLS_TX, ...) TX offloaded to the NIC send(fd, buf, N, MSG_MORE) leaves an open_record of N setsockopt(SOL_TLS, TLS_TX_MAX_PAYLOAD_LEN, M), M < N, accepted send(fd, buf, len, 0) tls_push_data() recomputes max_open_record_len from the new limit, so max_open_record_len - record->len underflows. The next chunk is appended to the open record regardless of the limit. The record on the wire exceeds the record_size_limit the peer advertised, which the peer must answer with a fatal record_overflow alert, exactly what the option exists to prevent. Dispatch on tx_conf and look at tls_offload_context_tx::open_record for TLS_HW. TLS_BASE has no TX context and nothing to check. Found during review of the TLS core. Tested on two nodes using mlx5 TLS TX offload. Sending 256 bytes with MSG_MORE and then lowering the limit returns EBUSY with this patch and is silently accepted without it. The same sequence on a loopback TLS_SW socket returns EBUSY either way. With the limit set to 512 before sending, records carry at most 512 bytes of payload. Without this patch, lowering the limit after a MSG_MORE send produces a record exceeding the requested payload limit. Fixes: 82cb5be6ad64 ("net/tls: support setting the maximum payload size") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Rishikesh Jethwani --- net/tls/tls_main.c | 17 ++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/tls/tls_main.c b/net/tls/tls_main.c index fbb274287aa5..8f11b8629492 100644 --- a/net/tls/tls_main.c +++ b/net/tls/tls_main.c @@ -837,12 +837,23 @@ static int do_tls_setsockopt_tx_payload_len(struct sock *sk, sockptr_t optval, unsigned int optlen) { struct tls_context *ctx = tls_get_ctx(sk); - struct tls_sw_context_tx *sw_ctx = tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx); u16 value; bool tls_13 = ctx->prot_info.version == TLS_1_3_VERSION; - if (sw_ctx && sw_ctx->open_rec) - return -EBUSY; + /* Both TX paths size the record they are filling against + * tx_max_payload_len, so refuse to change it under an open record. + * priv_ctx_tx is a different struct for each TX configuration. + */ + switch (ctx->tx_conf) { + case TLS_SW: + if (tls_sw_ctx_tx(ctx)->open_rec) + return -EBUSY; + break; + case TLS_HW: + if (tls_offload_ctx_tx(ctx)->open_record) + return -EBUSY; + break; + } if (sockptr_is_null(optval) || optlen != sizeof(value)) return -EINVAL; -- 2.50.1