When message interleaving is enabled, the first send waits for association establishment before building its data chunks. The wait drops the socket lock, and handshake processing can reduce the output stream count to the peer-advertised inbound stream count. sctp_stream_init() then frees the extension of every removed stream. The sender resumes with the stream that it checked before the wait. If the peer removed that stream, sctp_outq_tail() later dereferences its NULL extension. Fatal-oops policies then panic the host. KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x38-0x3f] RIP: sctp_outq_tail+0x49e/0xaa0 Call Trace: sctp_primitive_SEND sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc sctp_sendmsg A range check alone is insufficient. Stream reconfiguration can grow the output count again while the lock is released without recreating extensions freed by the earlier shrink. The stream can then be in range while its extension remains NULL. The send-buffer wait has the same issue. Factor the range and extension checks into a helper and repeat both after each send-path wait that drops the socket lock. Once the lock is reacquired, the validation remains stable through data creation and queueing. If validation fails after the connect wait, the auto-created association is already established. Return ESRCH so the existing caller path keeps it under state-machine ownership instead of freeing it directly, which would leave protocol, counter and socket state inconsistent. Fixes: 668c9beb9020 ("sctp: implement assign_number for sctp_stream_interleave") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com> --- Changes in v2: - Repeat full stream validation after both send-path waits. - Recreate a missing stream extension after shrink followed by growth. - Return ESRCH after the connect wait to retain the live association. v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20261002010449.3689454-1-4ncienth@gmail.com net/sctp/socket.c | 33 +++++++++++++++++++++------------ 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/sctp/socket.c b/net/sctp/socket.c index 4652fd90d9a6c4..aaeb58ce055771 100644 --- a/net/sctp/socket.c +++ b/net/sctp/socket.c @@ -1786,6 +1786,18 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_check_sflags(struct sctp_association *asoc, return 1; } +static int sctp_sendmsg_check_stream(struct sctp_association *asoc, + struct sctp_sndrcvinfo *sinfo) +{ + if (unlikely(sinfo->sinfo_stream >= asoc->stream.outcnt)) + return -EINVAL; + + if (unlikely(!SCTP_SO(&asoc->stream, sinfo->sinfo_stream)->ext)) + return sctp_stream_init_ext(&asoc->stream, sinfo->sinfo_stream); + + return 0; +} + static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, struct msghdr *msg, size_t msg_len, struct sctp_transport *transport, @@ -1800,16 +1812,9 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, long timeo; int err; - if (sinfo->sinfo_stream >= asoc->stream.outcnt) { - err = -EINVAL; + err = sctp_sendmsg_check_stream(asoc, sinfo); + if (err) goto err; - } - - if (unlikely(!SCTP_SO(&asoc->stream, sinfo->sinfo_stream)->ext)) { - err = sctp_stream_init_ext(&asoc->stream, sinfo->sinfo_stream); - if (err) - goto err; - } if (sp->disable_fragments && msg_len > asoc->frag_point) { err = -EMSGSIZE; @@ -1830,10 +1835,9 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, err = sctp_wait_for_sndbuf(asoc, transport, &timeo, msg_len); if (err) goto err; - if (unlikely(sinfo->sinfo_stream >= asoc->stream.outcnt)) { - err = -EINVAL; + err = sctp_sendmsg_check_stream(asoc, sinfo); + if (err) goto err; - } } if (sctp_state(asoc, CLOSED)) { @@ -1848,6 +1852,11 @@ static int sctp_sendmsg_to_asoc(struct sctp_association *asoc, err = -ESRCH; goto err; } + err = sctp_sendmsg_check_stream(asoc, sinfo); + if (err) { + err = -ESRCH; + goto err; + } } else { wait_connect = true; } -- 2.55.0