The backing_file_alloc and backing_file_free LSM hooks get the backing file as "struct file *backing_file", but its f_path is not populated while they run: - security_backing_file_alloc() is called from init_backing_file() in alloc_empty_backing_file(), before vfs_open() sets f_path, so backing_file->f_path.dentry is NULL; - security_backing_file_free() can run for a backing file whose open failed and whose f_path was already cleared. Neither hook is listed in untrusted_lsm_hooks, so bpf_lsm_is_trusted() lets BPF LSM programs use the argument as a trusted pointer. A program attached to lsm/backing_file_alloc can pass &backing_file->f_path to the trusted-args kfunc bpf_path_d_path(), and d_path() dereferences the NULL dentry on the first open of a file on overlayfs: extern int bpf_path_d_path(const struct path *path, char *buf, size_t sz) __ksym; char buf[256]; SEC("lsm/backing_file_alloc") int BPF_PROG(poc, struct file *backing_file, const struct file *user_file) { bpf_path_d_path(&backing_file->f_path, buf, sizeof(buf)); return 0; } # bpftool prog load poc.bpf.o /sys/fs/bpf/poc autoattach # cat Oops: general protection fault, probably for non-canonical address 0xdffffc000000000c: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000060-0x0000000000000067] RIP: 0010:d_path+0xb4/0x810 Call Trace: bpf_path_d_path+0x26/0x70 bpf_prog_f8f2e241d4ff7217_poc+0x33/0x37 bpf_trampoline_6442521065+0x61/0xf9 security_backing_file_alloc+0x78/0xe0 alloc_empty_backing_file+0xf0/0x170 backing_file_open+0xfd/0x290 ovl_open_realfile+0x1ed/0x270 ovl_open+0x1a9/0x2f0 do_dentry_open+0x404/0x1280 vfs_open_consume+0xba/0x4b0 path_openat+0xc4f/0x1f60 Add both hooks to untrusted_lsm_hooks, next to file_alloc_security and file_free_security, which are listed there for the same reason. The program above is then rejected at load time with "R1 must be referenced or trusted". Fixes: 6af36aeb147a ("lsm: add backing_file LSM hooks") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: Claude:claude-fable-5-2 Signed-off-by: Sergei Nizovtsev --- Tested on bpf.git master (475a0cfd02f1) under virtme-ng with KASAN: the reproducer oopses without the patch and fails to load with it. Only the backing_file_alloc case was reproduced; backing_file_free is from code reading. kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c | 2 ++ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c index f58dce888ff4a..f39a3766f2245 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c @@ -411,6 +411,8 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_map_free) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_bpf_prog_free) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_alloc_security) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_file_free_security) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_backing_file_alloc) +BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_backing_file_free) #ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_alloc_security) BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_sk_free_security) -- 2.56.0