7.3-stable review patch.  If anyone has any objections, please let me know.

------------------

From: Yuanfu Xie <yuanfuxie@stu.pku.edu.cn>

[ Upstream commit ec8d583469ed64b4973192a21b5a41c33219721f ]

ceph_mdsc_wait_request() returns the reply head result code of the MDS
request to its callers as a plain int errno.  The value is a
server-controlled u32 and nothing checks that it actually is an errno;
several callers pass it straight to ERR_PTR(), e.g.
ceph_finish_lookup() on the atomic open path:

	err = ceph_mdsc_wait_request(...)	/* e.g. +0x50fc00 */
	...
	if (err)
		dentry = ERR_PTR(err);

IS_ERR() only recognizes the [-MAX_ERRNO, -1] window, so an
out-of-range value is not caught anywhere and survives as a "struct
dentry *".  On the open path the positive error travels
ceph_finish_lookup() -> ceph_atomic_open() -> ERR_PTR() in
fs/namei.c's atomic_open() wrapper -> step_into(), which dereferences
it as a dentry and oopses (mainline 7.3-rc3-135-g4982d3552a3b, the
value in R12 is the server-supplied result):

BUG: KASAN: probably user-memory-access in range
[0x000000000050fc00-0x000000000050fc07]
RIP: 0010:step_into_slowpath+0x3e3/0xe60
R12: 000000000050fc00
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 ? __pfx_ceph_atomic_open+0x10/0x10
 path_openat+0xf41/0x2440
 do_file_open+0x228/0x480
 do_sys_openat2+0x103/0x1d0
 __x64_sys_openat+0x141/0x200
 do_syscall_64+0xe8/0x4f0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x79
 </TASK>

(0xdffffc00000a1f80 in the full report is the KASAN shadow of 0x50fc00;
without KASAN the raw value is read.)  Values with the top bit set fare
no better: 0xd8000000 sign-extends through the int conversion into the
kernel address range and takes a page fault instead.

Clamp the result at the single read and return -EIO for anything
outside the errno range, which is what a malformed reply means there.
net/9p does the same to server errno values with safe_errno().  This
is the path the reported crash takes; the other readers of
head->result, including the ceph_async_create_cb() and
ceph_async_unlink_cb() callbacks, are not covered by this patch.

Each of the six crashing opens was run on a build of
7.3-rc3-135-g4982d3552a3bf with only this change applied: it crashes
the unpatched kernel on the first openat() (verified on the same
tree without the patch), and with the patch the open fails cleanly
without an oops.  A few hundred normal file operations on the
patched kernel also completed without a crash; valid errno values
pass through unchanged.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 2f2dc053404febedc9c273452d9d518fb31fde72 ("ceph: MDS client")
Signed-off-by: Yuanfu Xie <yuanfuxie@stu.pku.edu.cn>
Reviewed-by: Alex Markuze <amarkuze@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Ilya Dryomov <idryomov@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
---
 fs/ceph/mds_client.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
index d370c43cf02f5..b354c3296de36 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
@@ -3987,6 +3987,14 @@ int ceph_mdsc_wait_request(struct ceph_mds_client *mdsc,
 	/* only abort if we didn't race with a real reply */
 	if (test_bit(CEPH_MDS_R_GOT_RESULT, &req->r_req_flags)) {
 		err = le32_to_cpu(req->r_reply_info.head->result);
+		if (err > 0 || err < -MAX_ERRNO) {
+			/*
+			 * The result is server-controlled.  Values outside
+			 * the errno range are turned into bogus pointers by
+			 * the ERR_PTR() users among the callers.
+			 */
+			err = -EIO;
+		}
 	} else if (err < 0) {
 		doutc(cl, "aborted request %lld with %d\n", req->r_tid, err);
 
-- 
2.53.0