EL2 builds a protected guest's ID registers from the host's sanitised values, most of them capped per field. It has no case for ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, so the register reads as 0, and a protected guest with SVE wouldn't see any of the SVE extensions the CPUs implement. Keep a copy of the host's sanitised ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1 at EL2, and advertise it when the guest has SVE, as KVM does for a non-protected guest. Cap each field at the highest value the sysreg file defines. Signed-off-by: Fuad Tabba --- arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c | 1 + arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++ 3 files changed, 21 insertions(+) diff --git a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h index 8cf42f87526dd..b9455ff8d7bdb 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h +++ b/arch/arm64/include/asm/kvm_hyp.h @@ -144,6 +144,7 @@ void __noreturn __host_enter(struct kvm_cpu_context *host_ctxt); extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr0_el1_sys_val); extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr1_el1_sys_val); extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr2_el1_sys_val); +extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64zfr0_el1_sys_val); extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar0_el1_sys_val); extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar1_el1_sys_val); extern u64 kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar2_el1_sys_val); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c index 157bf4b812020..be5127ce388a8 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/arm.c @@ -2827,6 +2827,7 @@ static void kvm_hyp_init_symbols(void) kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr0_el1_sys_val) = get_hyp_id_aa64pfr0_el1(); kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr1_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR1_EL1); kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64pfr2_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64PFR2_EL1); + kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64zfr0_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1); kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar0_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1); kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar1_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1); kvm_nvhe_sym(id_aa64isar2_el1_sys_val) = read_sanitised_ftr_reg(SYS_ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1); diff --git a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c index 06ea91415ad8b..e6bbc897cd7b1 100644 --- a/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c +++ b/arch/arm64/kvm/hyp/nvhe/sys_regs.c @@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ u64 id_aa64pfr0_el1_sys_val; u64 id_aa64pfr1_el1_sys_val; u64 id_aa64pfr2_el1_sys_val; +u64 id_aa64zfr0_el1_sys_val; u64 id_aa64isar0_el1_sys_val; u64 id_aa64isar1_el1_sys_val; u64 id_aa64isar2_el1_sys_val; @@ -114,6 +115,22 @@ static const struct pvm_ftr_bits pvmid_aa64pfr2[] = { FEAT_END }; +static const struct pvm_ftr_bits pvmid_aa64zfr0[] = { + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, SVEver, SVE2p3, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, AES, AES2, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, EltPerm, IMP, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, BitPerm, IMP, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, BF16, EBF16, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, B16B16, B16MM, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, SHA3, IMP, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, SM4, IMP, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, I8MM, IMP, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, F16MM, IMP, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, F32MM, IMP, vm_has_sve), + MAX_FEAT_FUNC(ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1, F64MM, IMP, vm_has_sve), + FEAT_END +}; + static const struct pvm_ftr_bits pvmid_aa64mmfr0[] = { MAX_FEAT_ENUM(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, PARANGE, 40), MAX_FEAT_ENUM(ID_AA64MMFR0_EL1, ASIDBITS, 16), @@ -232,6 +249,8 @@ static u64 pvm_calc_id_reg(const struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u32 id) return get_restricted_features(vcpu, id_aa64pfr1_el1_sys_val, pvmid_aa64pfr1); case SYS_ID_AA64PFR2_EL1: return get_restricted_features(vcpu, id_aa64pfr2_el1_sys_val, pvmid_aa64pfr2); + case SYS_ID_AA64ZFR0_EL1: + return get_restricted_features(vcpu, id_aa64zfr0_el1_sys_val, pvmid_aa64zfr0); case SYS_ID_AA64ISAR0_EL1: return id_aa64isar0_el1_sys_val; case SYS_ID_AA64ISAR1_EL1: -- 2.47.3