The Open vSwitch vport name table uses the network namespace pointer as the Jenkins hash seed. When an Open vSwitch vport already exists in the attacker's network namespace, unprivileged OVS_VPORT_CMD_GET requests can look up attacker-chosen missing names and time whether those lookups traverse an occupied bucket. Ranking the resulting collision pattern across possible KASLR slides recovers the init_net pointer and thus the kernel text base. Use the namespace cookie instead. It is a stable, unique, non-address identifier that is deliberately exposed to userspace. setup_net() assigns it before per-net initializers run, and it remains unchanged for the namespace lifetime. Fold both halves into the seed so vports in different namespaces retain namespace-dependent bucket placement. Found by AI-assisted code review and reproduced on an unmodified kernel without fault injection. After privileged setup created the resident vport, the timing measurements ran as an unprivileged user with no effective capabilities. With this change, the pointer-derived prediction fails. Existing and missing vport lookups behave as expected. Identically named vports in separate network namespaces remain independent. Fixes: 46df7b814548 ("openvswitch: Add support for network namespaces.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Zhengchuan Liang --- net/openvswitch/vport.c | 5 ++++- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/net/openvswitch/vport.c b/net/openvswitch/vport.c index 083f7a8d9d4e..6689c8370ec1 100644 --- a/net/openvswitch/vport.c +++ b/net/openvswitch/vport.c @@ -53,7 +53,10 @@ void ovs_vport_exit(void) static struct hlist_head *hash_bucket(const struct net *net, const char *name) { - unsigned int hash = jhash(name, strlen(name), (unsigned long) net); + u32 seed = jhash_2words(lower_32_bits(net->net_cookie), + upper_32_bits(net->net_cookie), 0); + unsigned int hash = jhash(name, strlen(name), seed); + return &dev_table[hash & (VPORT_HASH_BUCKETS - 1)]; } -- 2.34.1