7.3-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Jeff Layton commit 9a05e5ee0a98b9550521df86936b5f825bc07ec2 upstream. nfsd_nl_listener_set_doit() matches each requested listener against the existing set. The nested loop that does this is O(N * M), where N is the requested count and M is the existing count. The loop runs under sv_lock with bottom halves disabled. A userland request with a very large listener list can therefore spin in atomic context for a long time. Reject a request that carries more than NFSD_NL_LISTENER_MAX (1024) entries. The check goes in nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(), before the code takes any lock. The limit is far above any realistic configuration. This patch does not cap M. Only the message size bounded N; real sockets bound M. A listener_set result set is the requested set, so that path also holds M at the cap, but __write_ports_addxprt() adds two listeners per call and removes none, so repeated calls can push M past it. The worst case under sv_lock is therefore 1024 * M, plus 1024 nla_parse_nested() calls. Both interfaces require CAP_NET_ADMIN. Fixes: 16a471177496 ("NFSD: add listener-{set,get} netlink command") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Jeff Layton Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260901-nfsd-nl-hang-v5-1-a540d86668b0@kernel.org Signed-off-by: Chuck Lever Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c | 16 +++++++++++----- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) --- a/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c +++ b/fs/nfsd/nfsctl.c @@ -1973,21 +1973,22 @@ err_free_msg: return err; } +/* Upper bound on the number of listeners a single request may carry. */ +#define NFSD_NL_LISTENER_MAX 1024 + /** * nfsd_nl_validate_listeners - sanity-check the listener list from userland * @info: netlink metadata and command arguments * - * Walk every NFSD_A_SERVER_SOCK_ADDR attribute and confirm that each entry - * is well-formed: it parses against the policy, carries both an address and - * a transport name, and the address is long enough for its family. Doing - * this up front lets the callers below assume every entry is valid and - * guarantees we make no changes when the request is malformed. + * Walk every NFSD_A_SERVER_SOCK_ADDR attribute and confirm that the list is + * not oversized and that each entry is well-formed. * * Return: 0 if every entry is valid, or a negative errno otherwise. */ static int nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(struct genl_info *info) { const struct nlattr *attr; + unsigned int count = 0; int rem; nlmsg_for_each_attr_type(attr, NFSD_A_SERVER_SOCK_ADDR, info->nlhdr, @@ -1996,6 +1997,11 @@ static int nfsd_nl_validate_listeners(st struct sockaddr *sa; int err; + if (++count > NFSD_NL_LISTENER_MAX) { + NL_SET_ERR_MSG(info->extack, "too many listeners"); + return -E2BIG; + } + err = nla_parse_nested(tb, NFSD_A_SOCK_MAX, attr, nfsd_sock_nl_policy, info->extack); if (err < 0)