From: qianjiaru <qianjiaru77@gmail.com>

A logic vulnerability exists in the `bnxt_rfs_capable()` function of the 
Linux kernel's bnxt_en network driver. The vulnerability allows the driver
to incorrectly report RFS (Receive Flow Steering) capability on older 
firmware versions without performing necessary resource validation, 
potentially leading to system crashes when RFS features are enabled.
The vulnerability exists in the RFS capability check logic where older 
firmware versions bypass essential resource validation. 

The problematic code is:
```c
// Lines 13594-13595 in drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
if (!BNXT_NEW_RM(bp))
    return true;  // VULNERABLE: Unconditional success for old firmware
```

##Vulnerability Mechanism:

1. **Bypassed Validation**: 
Old firmware path completely skips resource availability checks
2. **False Capability Report**: 
Function reports RFS as available when resources may be insufficient  
3. **Subsequent Failure**: 
When RFS is actually enabled, insufficient resources
cause driver/system crashes
4. **State Inconsistency**: 
Driver state doesn't match hardware capabilities

##Attack Scenario

1. Administrator configures RFS/NTUPLE filtering 
on device with old firmware
2. `bnxt_rfs_capable()` incorrectly returns `true` 
without resource validation
3. Driver attempts to allocate hardware resources 
that don't exist
4. System crash or memory corruption occurs during 
resource allocation
5. Network service disruption affects the entire system

## Comparison with Similar Vulnerabilities

This vulnerability is a **direct variant** of CVE-2024-44933,
which involved similar firmware version handling issues:

- **CVE-2024-44933**: 
RSS table size mismatches due to firmware version differences
- **This vulnerability**: 
RFS capability reporting bypasses validation for old firmware

Both share the same anti-pattern: 
firmware version-specific code paths 
with reduced validation for older versions.

The root cause pattern appears throughout the bnxt driver codebase
where legacy firmware support introduces security vulnerabilities.

##Proposed Fix

The vulnerability should be fixed by ensuring 
consistent validation across all firmware versions:

```c
// Current vulnerable code:
if (!BNXT_NEW_RM(bp))
    return true;

// Proposed secure fix:
if (!BNXT_NEW_RM(bp)) {
    // Even on old firmware, validate basic resource constraints
    return (hwr.vnic <= max_vnics && hwr.rss_ctx <= max_rss_ctxs);
}
```

## Additional Variant Risks

This analysis revealed another related vulnerability in the same driver:

**`bnxt_hwrm_reserve_vf_rings()` function (lines 7782-7785)** 
contains a similar pattern:
```c
if (!BNXT_NEW_RM(bp)) {
    bp->hw_resc.resv_tx_rings = hwr->tx;  // Partial state update only
    return 0;
}
```

This should also be addressed to maintain state consistency.

## References

- **Related CVE**: 
CVE-2024-44933 (bnxt RSS out-of-bounds)
- **Linux Kernel Source**: 
https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git
- **Broadcom bnxt Driver**: 
`drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/`
- **Original Fix**: 
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/

Signed-off-by: qianjiaru <qianjiaru77@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c | 7 +++++--
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
index 207a8bb36..b59ce7f45 100644
--- a/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
+++ b/drivers/net/ethernet/broadcom/bnxt/bnxt.c
@@ -13610,8 +13610,11 @@ bool bnxt_rfs_capable(struct bnxt *bp, bool new_rss_ctx)
 		return false;
 	}
 
-	if (!BNXT_NEW_RM(bp))
-		return true;
+    // FIXED: Apply consistent validation for all firmware versions
+    if (!BNXT_NEW_RM(bp)) {
+        // Basic validation even for old firmware
+        return (hwr.vnic <= max_vnics && hwr.rss_ctx <= max_rss_ctxs);
+    }
 
 	/* Do not reduce VNIC and RSS ctx reservations.  There is a FW
 	 * issue that will mess up the default VNIC if we reduce the
-- 
2.34.1