7.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com> commit 80756e263846ab694984e749e8c626897331438f upstream. tb_xdp_properties_request() allocates room for 45 data dwords in its 252-byte response buffer. The XDomain length field is six bits wide, however, and a malicious peer can set it to 63. After the fixed response fields are subtracted, the driver treats this as 48 data dwords. Commit 322e93448d90 ("thunderbolt: Clamp XDomain response data copy to allocation size") only bounds the copy against data_len. If data_len is at least 48, memcpy() reads 192 bytes from the 180-byte res->data array, causing a 12-byte heap out-of-bounds read. Commit 4db2bd2ed478 ("thunderbolt: Limit XDomain response copy to actual frame size") limits the earlier copy but does not constrain this header-derived length. Reject response data lengths that exceed the allocated source buffer before copying them into the assembled property block. Fixes: d1ff70241a27 ("thunderbolt: Add support for XDomain discovery protocol") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Daehyeon Ko <4ncienth@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Mika Westerberg Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c +++ b/drivers/thunderbolt/xdomain.c @@ -377,6 +377,10 @@ static int tb_xdp_properties_request(str len += sizeof(res->hdr.xd_hdr) / 4; len -= sizeof(*res) / 4; + if (len > TB_XDP_PROPERTIES_MAX_DATA_LENGTH) { + ret = -EINVAL; + goto err; + } if (res->offset != req.offset) { ret = -EINVAL;