Don't check against the overloaded CAP_SYS_ADMINin do_jit(), but instead use bpf_capable(), which checks against the more granular CAP_BPF first. Going straight to CAP_SYS_ADMIN may cause unnecessary audit log spam under SELinux, as privileged domains using BPF would usually only be allowed CAP_BPF and not CAP_SYS_ADMIN. Link: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2369326 Fixes: d4e89d212d40 ("x86/bpf: Call branch history clearing sequence on exit") Signed-off-by: Ondrej Mosnacek --- arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 3 +-- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-) diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c index 15672cb926fc1..2a825e5745ca1 100644 --- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c +++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c @@ -2591,8 +2591,7 @@ emit_jmp: seen_exit = true; /* Update cleanup_addr */ ctx->cleanup_addr = proglen; - if (bpf_prog_was_classic(bpf_prog) && - !capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) { + if (bpf_prog_was_classic(bpf_prog) && !bpf_capable()) { u8 *ip = image + addrs[i - 1]; if (emit_spectre_bhb_barrier(&prog, ip, bpf_prog)) -- 2.50.1