PF_IEEE802154 DGRAM sockets are available to ordinary init-net processes. Their family-specific SIOCSIFADDR path calls the netdev ioctl directly and does not pass through the generic network-device setter capability check. An unprivileged process can therefore change the PAN ID and short address of a separately administrator-owned down WPAN interface. In a local fakelb fixture, uid 1000 changed both identifiers and the values remained active through a later administrator interface open in three of three fresh KASAN boots. Require CAP_NET_ADMIN in the socket network namespace before processing SIOCSIFADDR. Keep SIOCGIFADDR and all existing state and value checks unchanged. The fixed kernel rejected the same unprivileged request with -EPERM and preserved the administrator identity in three of three matched boots. Administrator SET, running-device, invalid-value, wrong-device, cleanup, later-open and recovery controls passed in all baseline and fixed runs. The demonstrated impact is local cross-principal WPAN identity and policy modification after privileged device setup. Memory corruption, disclosure, RCE and LPE were not demonstrated. Fixes: 9ec767160357 ("net: add IEEE 802.15.4 socket family implementation") Assisted-by: OpenAI Codex Signed-off-by: Sung Byeongchan --- net/ieee802154/socket.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ieee802154/socket.c b/net/ieee802154/socket.c index be8ca1f053a2b..362457de8424c 100644 --- a/net/ieee802154/socket.c +++ b/net/ieee802154/socket.c @@ -128,6 +128,10 @@ static int ieee802154_dev_ioctl(struct sock *sk, struct ifreq __user *arg, int ret = -ENOIOCTLCMD; struct net_device *dev; + if (cmd == SIOCSIFADDR && + !ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + if (get_user_ifreq(&ifr, NULL, arg)) return -EFAULT; base-commit: d48723711bae9b8cdc56719c448ba42fef28cbee -- 2.43.0