advance_nextseg() decrements srh->segments_left and uses it to index srh->segments without checking it is non-zero. seg6_validate_srh() permits segments_left == 0, so a packet with SRH segments_left==0 reaching an End* action underflows the u8 (255) and reads srh->segments[255] (~4KB out of bounds); the read bytes are then used as the new IPv6 destination address (info leak) or crash on unmapped memory. The decap path (decap_and_validate) already checks segments_left > 0, but the standard End/End.X/End.T/End.B6.Encap/End.BPF paths do not. Reject segments_left == 0 before decrementing. Fixes: d7a669dd2f8b ("ipv6: sr: add helper functions for seg6local") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tang Bin --- net/ipv6/seg6_local.c | 4 ++++ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) diff --git a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c index 53f7b2452..1d8312467 100644 --- a/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c +++ b/net/ipv6/seg6_local.c @@ -310,6 +310,10 @@ static struct ipv6_sr_hdr *advance_nextseg(struct sk_buff *skb, /* skb_ensure_writable() may change skb pointers; evaluate srh again */ srh = (struct ipv6_sr_hdr *)(skb->data + srhoff); + if (srh->segments_left == 0) { + *reason = SKB_DROP_REASON_NOT_SPECIFIED; + return NULL; + } srh->segments_left--; addr = srh->segments + srh->segments_left; ipv6_hdr(skb)->daddr = *addr; -- 2.52.0.windows.1