st21nfca_tm_recv_atr_req() checks that the received ATR_REQ frame is at least ST21NFCA_ATR_REQ_MIN_SIZE and that the self-declared atr_req->length is at least sizeof(struct st21nfca_atr_req), but never checks that atr_req->length does not exceed the actual received length (skb->len). st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res() then trusts the declared length: gb_len = atr_req->length - sizeof(struct st21nfca_atr_req); ... memcpy(atr_res->gbi, atr_req->gbi, gb_len); so an RF peer that sends a short frame but sets atr_req->length larger than the frame makes gb_len exceed the general bytes actually present, and the memcpy reads out of bounds past the received skb. Those bytes are placed in the ATR_RES and sent back to the peer (kernel-memory disclosure to a proximity attacker); a larger declared length is an out-of-bounds read (DoS). Reject frames whose declared length exceeds the received length. The adjacent nfc_tm_activated() path in the same function already derives its general-bytes length from skb->len rather than the declared field. Found by 0sec (https://0sec.ai) using automated source analysis; the missing bound is evident from source. Compile-tested. Fixes: 1892bf844ea0 ("NFC: st21nfca: Adding P2P support to st21nfca in Initiator & Target mode") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: 0sec:claude-opus-4-8 Signed-off-by: Doruk Tan Ozturk --- drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c | 3 +++ 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+) diff --git a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c index 3425b68f0ddc..a5fab4fd5129 100644 --- a/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c +++ b/drivers/nfc/st21nfca/dep.c @@ -205,6 +205,9 @@ static int st21nfca_tm_recv_atr_req(struct nfc_hci_dev *hdev, if (atr_req->length < sizeof(struct st21nfca_atr_req)) return -EPROTO; + if (atr_req->length > skb->len) + return -EPROTO; + r = st21nfca_tm_send_atr_res(hdev, atr_req); if (r) return r; -- 2.43.0