6.1-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: HyeongJun An [ Upstream commit 59e1592d3c270ff4642d5d6dc55c545306eb0693 ] The bounce_error_event() embeds the failed event in the bounce payload by pointing data.ext.ptr at it. When that event is a queued variable-length event, its own data.ext.ptr holds the address of its first extension cell, put there by snd_seq_event_dup(). The payload goes out verbatim through snd_seq_expand_var_event(), so the address reaches userspace. That is the same address commit 705dd6dcbc0e ("ALSA: seq: Clear variable event pointer on read") removed from the event header. The read path still clears it there, just above the call that expands the payload. Embed a sanitised copy instead, treated exactly as snd_seq_read() treats the header. A stack copy is enough because delivery is synchronous and snd_seq_event_dup() copies before returning. An unprivileged client reaches this by setting SNDRV_SEQ_FILTER_BOUNCE, queueing a variable-length event to a port that does not exist and reading the bounce back. Eight bytes on 64-bit, from its own pool. Fixes: efc86691e4d8 ("ALSA: seq: Fix kernel heap address leak in bounce_error_event()") Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-5 Signed-off-by: HyeongJun An Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260811131835.3837024-1-sammiee5311@gmail.com Signed-off-by: Takashi Iwai Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c | 16 ++++++++++------ 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) diff --git a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c index 140e1510b8de5..5763ad14f5638 100644 --- a/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c +++ b/sound/core/seq/seq_clientmgr.c @@ -554,7 +554,7 @@ static int bounce_error_event(struct snd_seq_client *client, struct snd_seq_event *event, int err, int atomic, int hop) { - struct snd_seq_event bounce_ev; + struct snd_seq_event bounce_ev, quoted; int result; if (client == NULL || @@ -570,15 +570,19 @@ static int bounce_error_event(struct snd_seq_client *client, * For user clients, send SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE with the * original event embedded as variable-length data. This * avoids exposing data.quote.event (a kernel pointer) to - * userspace. The variable-length path in snd_seq_event_dup() - * copies the event data from data.ext.ptr into chained cells, - * and snd_seq_expand_var_event() copies only the data content - * -- never the pointer -- to userspace. + * userspace. Sanitise the embedded copy too - a queued + * variable-length event carries the address of its own + * extension cell, and the payload goes out verbatim. */ + quoted = *event; + if (snd_seq_ev_is_variable("ed)) { + quoted.data.ext.len &= ~SNDRV_SEQ_EXT_MASK; + quoted.data.ext.ptr = NULL; + } bounce_ev.type = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_BOUNCE; bounce_ev.flags = SNDRV_SEQ_EVENT_LENGTH_VARIABLE; bounce_ev.data.ext.len = sizeof(struct snd_seq_event); - bounce_ev.data.ext.ptr = (char *)event; + bounce_ev.data.ext.ptr = (char *)"ed; } else { /* * For kernel clients, quote the event pointer directly. -- 2.53.0