5.10-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Pengpeng Hou commit 95540462e630edbc8504e9537d16453d6942d143 upstream. ecryptfs_miscdev_write() accepts the minimum one-byte packet-length encoding, but always copies the maximum two-byte encoding from userspace before parsing it. A six-byte message therefore reads one byte beyond the submitted user buffer. Zero-initialize the peek buffer and copy only the packet-length bytes present. The existing exact packet-size check still rejects truncated two-byte encodings after the parser determines their encoded length. Fixes: 8bf2debd5f7b ("eCryptfs: introduce device handle for userspace daemon communications") Cc: Signed-off-by: Pengpeng Hou Signed-off-by: Tyler Hicks Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c | 5 +++-- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) --- a/fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c +++ b/fs/ecryptfs/miscdev.c @@ -356,7 +356,7 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_write(struct file *file u32 seq; size_t packet_size, packet_size_length; char *data; - unsigned char packet_size_peek[ECRYPTFS_MAX_PKT_LEN_SIZE]; + unsigned char packet_size_peek[ECRYPTFS_MAX_PKT_LEN_SIZE] = { }; ssize_t rc; if (count == 0) { @@ -372,7 +372,8 @@ ecryptfs_miscdev_write(struct file *file } if (copy_from_user(packet_size_peek, &buf[PKT_LEN_OFFSET], - sizeof(packet_size_peek))) { + min_t(size_t, count - PKT_LEN_OFFSET, + sizeof(packet_size_peek)))) { printk(KERN_WARNING "%s: Error while inspecting packet size\n", __func__); return -EFAULT;