6.12-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Aamir Ahmed [ Upstream commit de0cffef897c1c232ed973f89928cd6c93d0b1e3 ] smb_check_perm_dacl() returns the access mask it computes to the SMB2 CREATE handler, which uses it as the granted access for the open. For a security descriptor whose DACL is present but contains no ACEs, the function is supposed to deny access: an empty (non-NULL) DACL grants no access to anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL and WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5). The empty-DACL branch only denies when both - the DACL has no trailing bytes (pdacl_size == sizeof(struct smb_acl)), and - the request contains bits beyond READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC. In every other case it takes the shared "goto err_out" with rc still 0, which returns success without modifying *pdaccess, so the caller grants the full requested access. Three problems follow: - The READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC carve-out models the owner's implicit rights, but the check runs before is_owner is computed, so those rights are handed to *every* caller, not just the owner. For READ_CONTROL the SMB2 CREATE path does not fall back to inode_permission(), so any user can read the security descriptor of an object whose empty DACL is meant to deny them. - A request of exactly READ_CONTROL and/or WRITE_DAC is granted to any caller. WRITE_DAC lets the handle rewrite the DACL. - A DACL that declares zero ACEs but carries trailing bytes (pdacl_size > sizeof(struct smb_acl)) skips the deny entirely and is granted whatever was requested. On shares where the NT ACL is the authoritative access control -- e.g. "force user" shares, where every client maps to one POSIX identity so POSIX cannot distinguish users -- this is an access-control bypass. Compute is_owner before the empty-DACL branch and deny access from an empty DACL unless the caller is the owner requesting no more than READ_CONTROL / WRITE_DAC. Fixes: e2f34481b24d ("cifsd: add server-side procedures for SMB3") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Assisted-by: LLM Signed-off-by: Aamir Ahmed Signed-off-by: Namjae Jeon [ sashal: added the missing mount-mapped UID ownership calculation for is_owner ] Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin --- fs/smb/server/smbacl.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++-------- 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) diff --git a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c index 49a35974dd296..33a607e709f18 100644 --- a/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c +++ b/fs/smb/server/smbacl.c @@ -1469,6 +1469,8 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, const struct path *path, struct posix_acl_entry *pa_entry; unsigned int sid_type = SIDOWNER; unsigned short ace_size; + bool is_owner; + vfsuid_t vfsuid; ksmbd_debug(SMB, "check permission using windows acl\n"); pntsd_size = ksmbd_vfs_get_sd_xattr(conn, idmap, @@ -1489,19 +1491,27 @@ int smb_check_perm_dacl(struct ksmbd_conn *conn, const struct path *path, if (pdacl_size > acl_size || pdacl_size < sizeof(struct smb_acl)) goto err_out; + if (!uid) + sid_type = SIDUNIX_USER; + id_to_sid(uid, sid_type, &sid); + vfsuid = i_uid_into_vfsuid(idmap, d_inode(path->dentry)); + is_owner = uid == from_kuid(&init_user_ns, vfsuid_into_kuid(vfsuid)); + if (!pdacl->num_aces) { - if (!(pdacl_size - sizeof(struct smb_acl)) && - *pdaccess & ~(FILE_READ_CONTROL_LE | FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE)) { + /* + * An empty (present, zero-ACE) DACL grants no access to + * anyone except the object owner's implicit READ_CONTROL + * and WRITE_DAC (MS-DTYP 2.4.5). Deny every other caller, + * deny the owner any access beyond those two bits, and do + * not let trailing bytes after a zero-ACE DACL become an + * implicit grant. + */ + if (!is_owner || + (*pdaccess & ~(FILE_READ_CONTROL_LE | FILE_WRITE_DAC_LE))) rc = -EACCES; - goto err_out; - } goto err_out; } - if (!uid) - sid_type = SIDUNIX_USER; - id_to_sid(uid, sid_type, &sid); - if (*pdaccess & FILE_MAXIMAL_ACCESS_LE) { access_bits = READ_CONTROL | WRITE_DAC | FILE_READ_ATTRIBUTES | DELETE; -- 2.53.0