From: Tristan Madani When the BPF verifier processes a context load of an LSM hook return value, it calls __mark_reg_s32_range() to narrow the register to the hook's valid range. However, __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects the new range with the register's existing bounds using max_t()/min_t() rather than replacing them. If the destination register carries stale bounds from a prior instruction (e.g. BPF_MOV64_IMM), the intersection can produce a range narrower than reality. The verifier then believes it knows the register's exact value, while at runtime the actual hook return value is loaded, creating a verifier/runtime mismatch that can be used to bypass BPF memory safety checks. The else branch already calls mark_reg_unknown() to reset register state before any narrowing. Apply the same reset in the is_retval path so stale bounds are cleared before __mark_reg_s32_range() intersects. Fixes: 5d99e198be27 ("bpf, lsm: Add check for BPF LSM return value") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Tristan Madani --- kernel/bpf/verifier.c | 1 + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) diff --git a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c index 54c6953a8b84..7e30dddc7721 100644 --- a/kernel/bpf/verifier.c +++ b/kernel/bpf/verifier.c @@ -7532,6 +7532,7 @@ static int check_mem_access(struct bpf_verifier_env *env, int insn_idx, u32 regn */ if (info.reg_type == SCALAR_VALUE) { if (info.is_retval && get_func_retval_range(env->prog, &range)) { + mark_reg_unknown(env, regs, value_regno); err = __mark_reg_s32_range(env, regs, value_regno, range.minval, range.maxval); if (err) -- 2.47.3