The tcp_metrics bucket is derived from a fold of the peer address. For IPv4 the fold is ipv4_addr_hash(), which returns the address unchanged. For IPv6 it is ipv6_addr_hash(), which XORs the four 32-bit words of the address. net_hash_mix() is only XORed in after that fold, so two addresses of either family with the same fold share a bucket in every netns. A host owning an IPv6 /64 can thus compute, without knowing net_hash_mix(), addresses that collide with a chosen IPv4 or IPv6 peer: w3 = w2 ^ p0 ^ p1 ^ target /* p0, p1: prefix, w2: free */ A bucket holds six entries and the seventh insert replaces the oldest. An off-path host can fill a peer's bucket with its own entries and later tell whether one was evicted, because tcp_init_metrics() seeds the initial RTO from the cached RTT. This reveals whether that peer, or another address in the same bucket, connected in the meantime. XOR and multiply is not a PRF, so net_hash_mix() can be recovered the same way, after which evictions leak about 14 bits of any client's address, depending on the number of buckets. Hash the address with SipHash and a random key instead, as commit 2ee66e948717 ("inetpeer: randomize RB-tree node comparison using SipHash") did for inet_peer. net_hash_mix() and hash_32() are kept, to separate namespaces and to reduce the result to the table size. Fixes: 51c5d0c4b169 ("tcp: Maintain dynamic metrics in local cache.") Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org Signed-off-by: Juan Agustin Niccolini --- This can be exploited remotely to recover a client's IPv4 address. A single host narrows the address to about 262 thousand candidates, and because each netns keys the hash differently, intersecting buckets extracted from multiple hosts converges quickly into one candidate; 3-5 are enough. The net_hash_mix() value only needs to be extracted once per boot per host. Many common cases facilitate this. For instance, a browser loading one page connects to several hosts within the same second. That supplies the buckets needed to converge, and the shared timing shows they belong to the same client. I reproduced the bug on a QEMU guest running mainline (2a500a04d6f9) and against Ubuntu 24.04 over the internet. With the patch applied, the reproducer no longer finds addresses that share a bucket. The reproducer is available on request. For stable: 5.10 and 5.15 lack siphash_aligned_key_t; "static siphash_key_t tcpm_hash_key __read_mostly __aligned(16);" can be used there. This bug was discovered during an LLM-based code review. net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c | 32 +++++++++++++++++++++++++------- 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-) --- a/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c +++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_metrics.c @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ #include #include #include +#include #include #include @@ -94,6 +95,23 @@ static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(tcp_metrics_lock); static DEFINE_SEQLOCK(fastopen_seqlock); + +static siphash_aligned_key_t tcpm_hash_key __read_mostly; + +static u32 tcpm_addr_hash(const struct inetpeer_addr *a) +{ + net_get_random_once(&tcpm_hash_key, sizeof(tcpm_hash_key)); + + if (a->family == AF_INET) + return siphash_2u32((__force u32)a->a4.addr, a->a4.vif, + &tcpm_hash_key); + + return siphash_4u32((__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[0], + (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[1], + (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[2], + (__force u32)a->a6.s6_addr32[3], + &tcpm_hash_key); +} static void tcpm_suck_dst(struct tcp_metrics_block *tm, const struct dst_entry *dst, @@ -270,13 +288,13 @@ case AF_INET: inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_rsk(req)->ir_loc_addr); inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_rsk(req)->ir_rmt_addr); - hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_rsk(req)->ir_rmt_addr); + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr); break; #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) case AF_INET6: inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&saddr, &inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_loc_addr); inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&daddr, &inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_rmt_addr); - hash = ipv6_addr_hash(&inet_rsk(req)->ir_v6_rmt_addr); + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr); break; #endif default: @@ -310,18 +328,18 @@ if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET) { inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr); inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr); - hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr); + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr); } #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) else if (sk->sk_family == AF_INET6) { if (ipv6_addr_v4mapped(&sk->sk_v6_daddr)) { inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&saddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_saddr); inetpeer_set_addr_v4(&daddr, inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr); - hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inet_sk(sk)->inet_daddr); + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr); } else { inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&saddr, &sk->sk_v6_rcv_saddr); inetpeer_set_addr_v6(&daddr, &sk->sk_v6_daddr); - hash = ipv6_addr_hash(&sk->sk_v6_daddr); + hash = tcpm_addr_hash(&daddr); } } #endif @@ -818,7 +836,7 @@ if (a) { inetpeer_set_addr_v4(addr, nla_get_in_addr(a)); if (hash) - *hash = ipv4_addr_hash(inetpeer_get_addr_v4(addr)); + *hash = tcpm_addr_hash(addr); return 0; } a = info->attrs[v6]; @@ -828,7 +846,7 @@ in6 = nla_get_in6_addr(a); inetpeer_set_addr_v6(addr, &in6); if (hash) - *hash = ipv6_addr_hash(inetpeer_get_addr_v6(addr)); + *hash = tcpm_addr_hash(addr); return 0; } return optional ? 1 : -EAFNOSUPPORT;