7.2-stable review patch. If anyone has any objections, please let me know. ------------------ From: Liu Chao commit 9062d50e75c24dc7911be05c9b1719b3b256af15 upstream. generic_set_cmd() and generic_get_cmd() use the low nibble of ctrl->bRequest as an index into con->data[]: u8 cmd = (ctrl->bRequest & 0x0F); /* 0 .. 15 */ ... con->data[cmd] = value; /* OOB when cmd >= 5 */ struct usb_audio_control (include/linux/usb/audio.h) declares data as a 5-element array, so indices 5 through 15 write (or read) up to 44 bytes past the end of the array on the heap. A malicious USB host can craft a class-specific SET_CUR / GET_CUR request with an arbitrary bRequest value, triggering the out-of-bounds access from an IRQ completion handler with no further preconditions. Add an ARRAY_SIZE() guard to both functions. Fixes: c47d7b09891a ("USB: audio: add USB audio class definitions") Cc: stable Reviewed-by: Weibin Liu Signed-off-by: Liu Chao Reviewed-by: Ivy Lopez Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260921072551.3708191-1-liuc63@xiaopeng.com Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman --- drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac1_legacy.c | 6 ++++++ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+) --- a/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac1_legacy.c +++ b/drivers/usb/gadget/function/f_uac1_legacy.c @@ -797,6 +797,9 @@ fail: static int generic_set_cmd(struct usb_audio_control *con, u8 cmd, int value) { + if (cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(con->data)) + return -EINVAL; + con->data[cmd] = value; return 0; @@ -804,6 +807,9 @@ static int generic_set_cmd(struct usb_au static int generic_get_cmd(struct usb_audio_control *con, u8 cmd) { + if (cmd >= ARRAY_SIZE(con->data)) + return -EINVAL; + return con->data[cmd]; }