Commit 5d39580f68e6 ("tcp: restrict SO_ATTACH_FILTER to priv users") requires CAP_NET_ADMIN to attach a classic BPF filter to a TCP socket. However, a caller can still attach an eBPF socket filter through SO_ATTACH_BPF without this capability. Both options install a filter that runs on incoming TCP packets. Disabling unprivileged BPF loading does not close this gap: a caller that already holds a socket-filter program file descriptor can still use SO_ATTACH_BPF. Use one CAP_NET_ADMIN check for both attachment options before taking the socket lock. Use the same namespace-aware capability helper already used by SO_ATTACH_FILTER. Leave other socket types unchanged. Fixes: 5d39580f68e6 ("tcp: restrict SO_ATTACH_FILTER to priv users") Assisted-by: Codex:gpt-6 Signed-off-by: Manjunath Patil --- net/core/sock.c | 11 ++++++----- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) diff --git a/net/core/sock.c b/net/core/sock.c index e7405be8941f..5f6d8b9ff4f6 100644 --- a/net/core/sock.c +++ b/net/core/sock.c @@ -1310,6 +1310,12 @@ int sk_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, optlen, optname == SO_RCVTIMEO_OLD); } + /* Restrict TCP socket filters to prevent sequence/ack-number probing. */ + if ((optname == SO_ATTACH_FILTER || optname == SO_ATTACH_BPF) && + sk_is_tcp(sk) && + !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) + return -EPERM; + sockopt_lock_sock(sk); switch (optname) { @@ -1466,11 +1472,6 @@ int sk_setsockopt(struct sock *sk, int level, int optname, case SO_ATTACH_FILTER: { struct sock_fprog fprog; - if (sk_is_tcp(sk) && - !sockopt_ns_capable(sock_net(sk)->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { - ret = -EPERM; - break; - } ret = copy_bpf_fprog_from_user(&fprog, optval, optlen); if (!ret) ret = sk_attach_filter(&fprog, sk); base-commit: 65ba8f34ec886ec72b2c07ddc8cf3d815c32869d -- 2.52.0